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Abstract
Turkey's determined attempt after 1954 to improve her relations with the Arab world should 
be seen in the context of a wider search for security against the perceived Soviet threat to her 
independence and territorial integrity. It was encouraged by Washington’s proposal to set up 
a Middle East defence organisation based on the countries of the 'Northern Tier,' which 
paved the way for the creation of the Baghdad Pact with Turkish, Iraqi, British, Banian and 
Pakistani membership. The USA, however, ultimately declined all invitations for full pact- 
membership. Her equivocal attitude encouraged Egypt and Syria not only to resist all 
attempts to lure them into the pact but also to embark on a determined counter-policy to 
block the adherence of other non-committed Arab states. The thesis argues that Turkish 
leaders failed in then rather high-handed bid to expand the pact's Arab membership and to 
isolate Egypt because they were ill-informed about the latest political trends in the Arab 
world and ignored any alternative and differing advice coming fiom then diplomatic missions 
and lower echelons in then Foreign Ministry. Moreover, none of Turkey's allies were fully 
convinced that her proposals were necessarily the best on offer. The thesis also tries to shed 
light on some of the alternative policies attempted by Turkey after the Suez war to stem the 
tide of pro-Communist and radical pan-Arab nationalist tendencies in the region. It argues 
that the toppling of the Iraqi monarchy, despite being a short-term setback for Turkey, 
proved in the long run to be a panacea to her attempts to retain her alliance with NATO and 
preserve in the meantime a workable relationship with her Arab neighbours. It also discusses 
Turkey's changing attitude towards Israel and the Palestine question as well as the changes in 
the official Turkish evaluation of'Abd al-Nasir's policies.
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Preface
This dissertation studies Turkey's relations with her Arab neighbours, Syria and Iraq, and, to 
a lesser extent, with the other Arab states of the Middle East, in particular Egypt, Lebanon 
and Jordan, during the period of the formulation and the eventual collapse of the Baghdad 
Pact. It is a case study of the correlation between the Cold War concerns of the Great Powers 
in the Middle East and the national policies pursued by the lesser states in the region. This 
study investigates how those relations were affected by Cold War pressures at one of its tense 
periods and how did Turkey, Iraq and Syria try to accommodate, not to say manipulate, the 
prevailing global Cold War climate to pursue then own national aspirations. These relations 
are studied here on three different levels: (a) the international/regional level, i.e. the Cold War 
atmosphere and its repercussions in the area; (b) the bilateral level, including the historical 
legacy inherited by Turkish, Ir aqi and Syrian leaders, which made their task of tackling thorny 
issues difficult or easy according to the prevailing different circumstances; and (c) the 
individual country level, i.e. the analysis of the various strategies pursued by different political 
forces within each of the three countries concerned, the solutions they advocated to particular 
problems, and the roles they played in shaping the foreign policy of then respective countries 
in general, and relations with individual neighbouring states in particular.
The emphasis throughout is on Turkey. The development of her foreign policy towards 
her Arab neighbours is analysed and the factors behind it scrutinised. Appropriate attention is 
paid to the study of some of the specific characteristics of the Turkish foreign policy 
decision-making process during the period under review. Issues concerning Turkey's Arab 
neighbours are touched only as far as they are crucial to an understanding of the atmosphere 
prevailing in the Middle East during that period, and provide us with the background against 
which the Turkish actions can be judged and evaluated.
In addition to some memoirs by Turkish and Arab diplomats or statesmen, which tackle, 
to one extent or another, the topic of Turkish-Arab political and diplomatic relations in the 
twentieth century, various books and monographs have also appeared on the issue during the 
last few decades. A substantial list of those covering the specific topic and time-span of this 
dissertation appear s in the bibliography. Of these, the D.Phil. dissertation of Biilent Ali Riza, 
dealing with the years 1951-53-and still available only on microfilm-is admirable. Its sole 
deficiency seems to be the author's inability to consult primary sources available only in
Arabic. However, many of the other works are less satisfactory. They often cover quite 
extended periods of time and they rarely make use of primary archival material. This study, 
which begins where Riza has stopped, seeks to redress the balance by focusing on a relatively 
short, albeit important, period and using a variety of source material in many languages. 
While this author has, unlike Riza, been unable to consult the Turkish archives, he has 
attempted, as much as possible, to describe and analyse the issues from both sides of the
The transliteration of names into English presents problems in a study of this kind, 
covering two distinct languages and cultures. I have adhered to the contemporary spelling of 
Turkish proper names. The modem Turkish alphabet, since the introduction of Latin script, is 
completely phonetic. All letters as pronounced as in English except the following:
j as s in measure
g with hard vowels a guttural and barely perceptible g (bagci); with soft 
vowels as y (efeer=eyer).
Arabic proper names, terms and titles have also been transliterated into English forms in a 
consistent and systematic manner. The extensive use of diacritical marks has been avoided, 
except for (% which because of the relative unsophisticated nature of the fonts in my personal 
world-processor is used instead of both the hamza and the letter 'ayn. I have also sometimes 
followed a usage common in Iraq of frequently referring to individuals by their first names 
only, like Nun and 'Alt Jawdat. The few Russian, Iranian and Pakistani names which appear 
in this study have been transcribed, in their turn, in a simple yet consistent way. Well-known 
geographical names of countries, capitals and main cities in the Arab world, like Damascus, 
Mosul and Aleppo, are spelt as they are in common usage in English. Lesser known 
geographical sites, however, are spelt according to the above-described criteria for 
transliterating Arabic proper names. Proper names mentioned in quoted passages are left as 
they are in the original sources. This has inevitably given rise to some inconsistencies in the 
spelling of some names, like 'Abd al-Nasir and Nasser, but it is extremely unlikely that this 
will confuse the reader and hinder in any way the easy comprehension of the text.
The dates of quoted newspaper articles and diplomatic documents are mentioned in the 
footnotes in a consistent manner, with 12.11.56 standing for 12 November 1956.
This study has been in the making since the autumn of 1991, when I began my three-year 
study period as a postgraduate student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),
fence.
i as / in cousin 
u as u in rule 
o as eu in French peu 
c asy in jar
a as a in far  
ii as u in French tu 
§ as sh in shuttle 
9 as ch in church
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the University of London. It was completed after my return to my home-city, Beirut. During 
the past four years, I have acquired a heavy indebtedness to many people, who have given 
advice, insight and assistance in the preparation of this study. It is a pleasure to acknowledge 
then kindness. To cite all then names would be impracticable, but it is impossible not to 
mention my two supervisors: Malcolm E. Yapp and R. Michael Burrell. Prof Yapp, together 
with Dr. William Hale of SOAS, helped me in defining the aims and limits of this study and 
then gave the most helpftd advice throughout the two long years, during which I was 
collecting the archival data and then preparing the first draft of this thesis. Dr. Burrell 
supervised my work at its later stages, reading the whole manuscript and making very useful 
suggestions as regards its final form and contents. I must also thank Dr. Hale, for sparing his 
precious time to share with me some of his vast knowledge of Turkish affairs and bringing to 
my attention certain primary and secondaiy sources which proved helpful during the 
preparation of this work. The same applies to Dr. Muhammad Nur al-Din of the Lebanese 
University and Centre for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation (Beirut) and Mr. 
'Isam al-Mahayri, the former leader of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Damascus). Dr. 
Ulrike Freitag and Mr. Anthony OMahony, both of SOAS, showed continuous interest in the 
progress of my work and were also helpful in bringing into my attention certain monographs 
and articles used during this research. Dr. Salih Zahr al-Din (Lebanon) was helpful during the 
compilation of the appendix of the biographical notes. None of them, however, should be 
considered responsible for any errors contained in this thesis.
Needless to say, the kind and generous assistance given by the staffs of several libraries, 
where I conducted most of my research, was of great help to me in the course of the 
preparation of this thesis. I am especially indebted to those of the Public Record Office, the 
Institute of Historical Research, the University of London Library at Senate House and the 
School of Oriental and African Studies in London, as well as the Jafet Library of the 
American University of Beirut, the Barsumian Library of Haigazian University College, the 
Centre for Arab Unity Studies, the Arab Information Centre and the "Spink'' magazine in 
Beirut. Mr. Kevork Mrkayelian in Beirut was also very kind in putting his library of Turkish 
books at my disposal.
My three-year stay in London was financially supported by my uncles resident in the 
United States, Arsen, Harout, the late Avedis and particularly the late Hagop Sanjian, as well 
as by grants ftom the Overseas Research Students Award Scheme (UK), the Armenian 
Missionary Association of America, Inc, (New Jersey), the Department of Armenian Affairs 
at the Gulbenkian Foundation (Lisbon), the Armenian General Benevolent Union London 
Trust and the Benlian Trust (London). Without their generous assistance this work would 
have never seen the light.
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Finally, I would like to acknowledge the debt I owe to my parents, Garabed and Mayda 
Sanjian, who patiently endured and financially and morally supported my absence from home 
for eight long years in pursuit of successive university degrees in a discipline, with which their 
son was deeply in love, but which, it was apparent from the beginning, could offer more 
intellectual and personal, rather than material rewards.
12
1The Setting:
The Cold War, Turkey, the Arabs
and
the Middle East Collective Defence Project
The immediate post-World War II era is known as the "Cold War" period, when Europe was 
divided into two political/military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
led by the United States of America (USA) in the West; and the Warsaw Pact led by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the East. Both camps were imbued with 
sharply differing ideologies on how human society should be organised in general. Westerners 
cherished and wished to safeguard liberal, democratic values and the free-market economy. 
Communist regimes, however, accused the ruling Western bourgeoisie of manipulating those 
principles to exploit the working classes and hide more important inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth. Both sides became convinced of the mutual irreconcilability of then 
respective ideologies. Then sense of universal mission to extend their own values and way of 
life involved them in a complex strategic, political and ideological power-game, resulting in 
the globalisation of the Cold War.
One of the regions which soon felt the discomforting effects of this new conflict was the 
Middle East, an ill-defined geographic term, which, for the purposes of this study, will cover 
the land-mass extending from Libya in the west to Pakistan in the east and from the southern 
borders of the USSR in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. Throughout recorded 
history, this region had been an important route for international trade and communication, 
and had, because of its geostrategic significance, been coveted for long periods of time by 
several, sometimes rival, imperial powers. In the twentieth century, the discovery there of 
vast reserves of oil, upon which the material well-being and progress of industrialised 
countries had increasingly become dependent, provided the Middle East with a new 
importance. In the late 1940s, it produced around 15% of the world's total oil output and was 
estimated to have around 60% of the world's proven oil reserves. 1
% m . Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United
Britain, France and the USA in the Post-War Middle East 
Generally speaking, the Middle East had very much been within the Anglo-French sphere of 
influence during the period between the two world wars. The large economic interests built 
up during that period and Cold War strategic considerations^ made Britain determined to 
continue to exercise control over her Middle Eastern "informal empire"-a network of 
protectorates, League of Nations mandates and the colony of Aden-by ensuring that, 
whenever and wherever she surrendered formal sovereignty to local forces, some of her 
former colonial or mandatory rights would survive, usually through a "treaty of alliance1 
imposed on the latter in return for her voluntary disengagement.
Britain, however, had inherited a heavy financial burden from World War B and felt 
unable to meet her pre-war commitments frilly. Successive post-war British governments of 
the late 1940s attempted to prolong some kind of British military presence in the Arab 
countries in then sphere of influence. Their early efforts did not mostly bear fruit, however. 
If, in the past, local Arab oligarchic govemments-installed during British control-had 
themselves been interested in seeing this, albeit unequal, British connection survive, because 
their continued exercise of power partly depended on those "alliances,'' they were no longer 
the only organised voice in then respective countries. Arab nationalism had now acquired its 
own momentum and proved intransigent toward successive British compromise proposals. 
Under its impact, many Arab states had ceased to share the West's perception of interests and 
threats and wanted to pursue their own political agendas. Some even viewed the new global 
East-West antagonism, into which, they suspected, the West was dragging them, as a serious 
distraction from their own causes. Only Transjordan agreed in 1948 to revise her existing 
treaty in line with the new British proposals, hi Iraq, the Treaty of Portsmouth, negotiated in 
January 1948, had to be repudiated within a few days of its signature, as the news of its 
conclusion precipitated widespread hostile demonstrations in Baghdad. After 1948, therefore, 
Britain sought to obtain her goals through the eventual creation, with US support and 
involvement, of a multilateral Middle East defence organisation with Arab participation. She
States, and Post-war Imperialism (1984), 9; David R. Devereux, The Formulation o f British Defence Policy 
Towards the Middle East, 1948-56 (1990), 9; Alexandre DeConde, A History o f  American Foreign Policy. 
Volume II: Global Power (1900 to Present) (1978), 281.
^See details in British Interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; A Report by a Chatham 
House Study Group (1958), 28; John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism: A Study in Power 
Politics (1961), 34, 64; Louis, Empire, 15; Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World, 1945-49: The 
View from the Foreign Office", IA, 61/2 (Spring 1985), 231; Raymond Smith and John Zametica, "The Cold 
Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945-47", ibid., 247; Nigel John Aston, "The Highjacking of a Pact: 
The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958", Review 
of International Studies, 19/2 (April 1993), 124.
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also concluded that only conservative Arab regimes were interested in such an arrangement, 
thus inevitably siding against all voices demanding a radical change in the Arab world.
French political influence in the Middle East during the colonial age had been, compared 
to that of Britain, relatively limited. It was further weakened during World War H  France 
granted in 1946, under strong British pressure, full independence to her two League of 
Nations mandates, Syria and Lebanon, without receiving any treaty concessions in return. 
French ability, therefore, to shape developments in the Middle East was extremely limited in 
the mid-1950s. She was preoccupied with issues of internal stability. Wartime Anglo-French 
differences in the Levant had soured prospects for future co-operation in the area. France 
suspected that Britain (perhaps, the USA as well) intended to wipe out completely her 
influence in the Arab world and hence viewed all-British supported ventures in the area with 
the utmost suspicion. Britain and the USA, in turn, suspected that France aimed solely at 
preserving her special position in Syria and Lebanon, even at the expense of progress towards 
a Western-inspired anti-Communist multilateral defence arrangement. Moreover, Britain did 
not oppose the prospect of Arab political unity in principle as long as, she argued, it was 
achieved legally and enjoyed in general the consent of the population of the countries 
concerned. She was even ready to encourage certain unity schemes if they could strengthen 
the Western position in the region. France, however, was categorically against any change in 
the status quo in Syria and Lebanon, which, she thought, would adversely affect her position 
in the region as a w h o l e .  3 She also wanted to diminish Egyptian influence by fiustrating Ar ab 
solidarity because she believed, especially after 1954, that the Arabic-speaking natives, 
opposing French presence in North Africa, were getting aid from Egypt and would be 
encouraged by any advance toward Arab unity. The harsh French colonial measures in North 
Africa, in turn, further diminished her standing among politically-conscious Ar abs.
Unlike Britain and France, pre-war American interests in the Middle East had been largely 
confined to missionary work, trade and oil. During World War n, however, Washington, 
while still not highly dependent itself on the import of Middle Eastern oil, nevertheless began 
to view the preservation of access to Middle Eastern oil fields, particularly in Saudi Arabia, as 
part of her national interest. War commitments made the USA expand her network of Middle 
Eastern diplomatic missions. Finally, in 1947, she decided to make full use of her political, 
economic and, if necessary, military power to defend the region. When Britain felt unable to
, f £*>
meet her financial and military obligations towards Greece and Turkey at a moment when the 
latter were racing strong So\det pressure,Washington stepped in to fill the resulting financial
% lie Kedourie, "Panarabism and British Foreign Policy", The Political Quarterly, 28/2 (April-June 
1957), 114; Documents Diplomatiques Frangais [hereafter DDF], 1954 (21 juillet-31 decembre), 119-21.
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and military void. American naval presence was also strengthened in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
Containment, the general American defence plan in the early years of the Cold War, 
assumed that Soviet hostility towards the West stemmed basically from the inability of a 
totalitarian system to tolerate diversity. American strategists believed that the expansion of 
Soviet influence, even the smallest further shift in the balance of power, could upset the entire 
structure of post-war international relations and imperil the USA's own security. All points 
along the Communist perimeter were of equal vital interest, and Washington should patiently, 
but firmly and vigilantly, contain Soviet expansive tendencies; lead the free world in 
safeguarding the international status quo; and create conditions under which existing free and 
democratic conditions could survive and prosper. Washington hoped that it could thus even 
foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system or, at least, bring Moscow to the 
point of modifying its behaviour to conform to acceptable international standards. 
Containment abstained, however, from trying to modify the status quo by forced
Washington gave substance to its policy by a series of high-publicity initiatives. The 
Tinman Doctrine (1947) vowed to support free nations-especially Greece and 
Turkey-resisting attempted subjugation by the USSR or Communist-backed armed groups. 
The NATO alliance (1949)-also including Canada and 10 West European states-pledged to 
repel collectively any armed attack against one or more of its member-states either in Europe 
or in North America. Military assistance was extended to like-minded governments to enable 
them defend themselves against external Soviet bloc or internal Communist threats, or 
participate in collective defence arrangements. Furthermore, based on the conviction that 
Communism could only prevail in conditions of widespread economic discontent, 
Washington pursued measures designed to improve the living standards of the peoples of the 
"Free World". The Marshall Plan (1947) aimed at the economic recovery of post-war 
Europe, while the Point Four Program (1949) offered to share American skills, knowledge, 
equipment and investment capital with over thirty developing nations outside Europe in the 
areas of industry, agricultur e, public administration, health and education.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who assumed the US presidency in January 1953, firmly believed 
in these foreign policy priorities. His influential Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, added 
a moral dimension to the East-West conflict, by claiming that, in the prevailing circumstances, 
neutrality was both immoral and "an obsolete conception". ^  Both called for the further
 ^John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f  Post-war American National 
Security Policy (1982), 25-126.
^David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East (1992), 7.
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strengthening of the defence capabilities of the "Free World," extending, during their two 
terms in power, Washington's defence commitments by treaty to five more Asian countries 
and actively participating in the creation of new pro-Western alliance networks around the 
Communist perimeter, like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954,6 as 
well as the Baghdad Pact, the story of the establishment and eventual collapse of which will 
be an important part of this study.
If the USA and United Kingdom (UK) had no conflict of purpose in their shared fear of 
Soviet expansionism, fiiction arose between them in the Middle East over Washington's 
continuing anti-colonial sentiment and its support for Israel. After the birth of NATO, 
however, Washington began to see virtue in the maintenance of British influence in the 
Middle East and did not try to compete with or displace British responsibilities or interests 
there, without recognising, however, any exclusive British sphere of influence. Later, it 
gradually assumed Britain's position in the area, by committing itself to the maintenance of 
the balance of power there.
Despite the availability of nuclear warfare technology, the defence of the Middle East was 
thought in the West largely in conventional terms. Britain and the USA differed, however, on 
how the region should be defended. Washington preferred to build up its new client states, 
Turkey and Iran, the so-called "Outer Ring", with the "Inner Ring" only as a backdrop. The 
latter, centred at Suez, was advocated by Britain. Washington wished to extend military aid 
and to build-up local forces, whereas Britain, having little faith in the quality of Ar ab troops, 
perhaps with the exception of Jordanians, believed that her own forces (with US support) 
were the only pillar of Middle Eastern security.
Moreover, Washington wanted to prevent the development in the Middle East and 
elsewhere of regional struggles which might eventually directly involve itself and Moscow, 
thereby turning the Cold War into a "hot" one. This determination was reciprocated, for all 
practical purposes at least, by the latter, and had a sobering effect, in the next few years, on 
the unfolding of events in the ar ea, whenever the situation acquired dangerous proportions.
The USSR and the Middle East
Soviet interests in the Arab Middle East, too, had not been substantial before 1939, but here 
again, the war proved instrumental in reviving such interest, which had existed to a certain 
extent in czarist times. During those years, the USSR extended her network of diplomatic 
representation in the Arab world.
^SEATO included the USA, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and 
Thailand.
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In tlie spring of 1945, the USSR unexpectedly made the automatic renewal of the 1925 
Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality conditional on the return of the regions of 
Kars and Ardahan, that had been part of Russia in 1878-1914, and the revision of the 1936 
Montreux Convention governing the rights of passage through the straits of Bosphorus and 
.the Dardanelles, accepting Soviet participation in their defence. Turkey, however, managed, 
^  I with strong Anglo-American support, to resist those demands. ^  
i  After this rebuff Moscow remained relatively inactive in the Middle East until 1954. In
1947, it unexpectedly backed the idea of partitioning Palestine and, in May 1948, became the 
first country to recognise Israel de jure. As regards Turkey, Soviet hostility persisted, 
confining itself however, to the occasional formal protest against, say, Ankara's entry to 
NATO,** or its participation in the Middle East Command proposals. Moscow also attacked 
the Tinman Doctrine and Marshall Plan as disguised methods to extend Washington's sphere 
of influence.
After Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet policy towards the "Third World" was 
modified. His successor, Nikita Khrushchev relegated class struggle in the colonial world to 
secondary importance and identified Afro-Asian national-liberation movements with the 
international peace movement and neutralism. He supported anti-colonial movements, 
together with lion-communist—and sometimes even anti-Communist-neutralist regimes in the 
"Hurd World". Local Communist parties were advised to minimise their immediate demands 
and co-operate with the national bourgeoisie in pursuit of national aims, under the umbrella 
of broad anti-colonial national fronts.
Moscow was thus far ahead of Washington in recognising the advantages of encouraging, 
instead of obstructing, the growth of neutralism among emerging nations. It hoped that the 
self-extrication of former colonies from their special pohtico-military ties with Western 
powers would weaken the latter's standing in the global balance of power. It, therefore, began 
to favour, to the delight of Arab governments, the latter's viewpoint on Palestine. It played up 
Arab pride and national sentiment, declaring on countless occasions that it stood firmly 
behind Arab aspirations. 9 Soviet diplomatic representation in the Arab East was further 
strengthened.
The West now took the possibility of Soviet penetration to the Arab world seriously. This 
dissertation shows that the new Soviet strategy there forced Washington into a difficult
^See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics o f  
Influence (1982), 9-13; Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (1972), 62-76.
^George C. McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine 
Contained the Soviets in the Middle East (1990), 89.
^Moshe Leshem, "Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East", MEA, 4/1 (January 1953), 1-10.
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comer, for tlie latter had, in the meantime, failed, in effect, to channel the emergent "Third 
World" nationalism into reliably anti-Communist directions. Earlier, the USA had assumed, 
based on her own dislike of traditional colonialism, that the newly-independent states would 
see then interests in the same terms as she did. However, nations like Iran and Egypt did not 
always turn then nationalism against communism in the way Washington wanted them to. 
Furthermore, as long as Washington gave priority to its alliance with Western European 
powers, its ability to tolerate Arab nationalism was limited, for the latter aimed at the 
diminution of Eur opean influence in the Middle East. In the mid-fifties, to prevent Moscow 
from taking advantage of "disorder" in the area, Washington usually supported the regional 
status quo and opposed the forces of change (i.e. nationalism). It associated itself sometimes 
even unwillingly, with the policies of West European colonial powers and resisted with 
increasing intensity the growing neutralist sentiments.
The Soviets gave most support, however, to those Arab nationalist movements which 
were also socially reformist. Arab Communist parties, too, promoted alliances with forces 
advocating reform and neutralism Western observers sometimes found it difficult to judge 
where Communist influence in a given state began and where supposedly non-communist 
nationalist influence ended. ^  The Communist-radical nationalist alliance aroused the 
suspicions of dynastic families and landowning or mercantile classes. They had cause to fear 
social upheaval and hence moved closer to Western powers. This can be best illustrated by 
the differences in approach to international affairs between, say, the Iraqi establishment on 
the one hand and the Ba'th Party and other reform-minded Syrian politicians like Khalid al- 
'Azm on the other.
Turkey
Of the countries of the modem Middle East, Turkey was among the veiy few not to have 
ever come under direct colonial rule. This partly explains the absence of deep-rooted anti- 
Western sentiments among politically-conscious Turks. Moreover, the post-World War I 
Turkish republican elite had aspired after total identification with Europe. So, in 1945, when 
other "Third World" nationalisms were looking to the USSR for sympathy and support 
against the West, Turkey herself did not hesitate to forge, with the revival of Turkish-Soviet 
antagonism, an alliance the West, particularly Washington, to forestall Soviet expansionism
The Turidsh-American alliance remains to-date a constant feature of Middle Eastern 
politics. It was sustained, during the period under review, by a vaijefty of factors. Thirteen
l^F0371/115473/V10338/1, Sterndale Bennett to Ward, 29.1.55.
0***
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Russo-Turkish wars over the past 400 years had generated a full measure of Turkish hostility 
towards the Russians, and the vast majority of Turks now rejected Communism as a new 
form of Russian imperial ideology. Turkish anti-Russian attitude was described as "an 
ingrained prejudice, fierce, blind, and proud". H  The ideological aspects of the Cold War, 
although not negligible, were accorded less importance in T u r k e y , ^  and accusations of 
"pursuing a neutralist policy" became "a powerftd insult". ^  Moreover, says Feroz Ahmad, 
"Turkey's post-war foreign policy was an extension of her internal policy, whose aim was to 
transform Turkey from an underdeveloped and poor country to a developed and a prosperous 
one... The political leadership wanted to make Turkey a 'little America' or the America of the 
Middle East". ^  Turkey benefited from both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In 
the immediate post-war period, she received US military aid worth more than $ 1,000m, 
largely in the form of grants, which she mainly used to modernise her army and purchase 
modem equipment. ^  Moreover, Turkey was herself  ^ in relation to her national income, one 
of the highest-spenders on her armed forces within the Western alliance.16 The US-Turkish 
alliance was sealed by Turkey’s formal entry to NATO in 1952. In order to secure NATO 
admission, however, Turkey had to make a public commitment, to Britain that she would 
continue to play an active role in the projected Middle Eastern defence organisation.
The post-war years also witnessed Turkey's transition into frill multi-party democracy. 
The two main political parties of this era, the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) and the 
newly-established opposition Democrat Party (DP) were both committed to the above- 
described pro-Western policy^ and co-operated in silencing radical leftist dissidents. The 
DP, which later held power for ten years from May 1950, considered Turkey's defence 
interests to be identical with that of Western powers, officially endorsing the American view 
that global peace was indivisible and that trouble in any part of the world contained the seeds 
of a general conflagration.^ During those years, Ankara signed 31 separate military 
agreements with Washington, permitting the building of US military installations and bases 
and the stationing of Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey. I 9
Furthermore, the Democrats worked to extend the network of anti-Soviet alliances in
11 Lewis V. Thomas and Richard V. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (1971), 55.
^Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat: Hatirat (1981), 96.
^FO371/136456/RK1022/2, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 11.2.58.
^Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975 (1977), 398.
^McGhee, Connection, 38.
16Feroz Ahmad, The Making o f Modem Turkey (1993), 124.
1 ^ Mehniet Ali Birand, Can Diindar, Biilent £apli, Demirkirat: Bir Demokrasinin Dogu?u (1991), 33, 78.
18FO371/130179/RK1022/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 7.1.57.
19Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: Modem History (1993), 287-88.
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Turkey's immediate vicinity. They formed in 1954, with Greece and Yugoslavia, the short­
lived Balkan Defence Pact, binding the three countries in a mutual defence accord for twenty 
y e a r s ,20 while the story of Turkish endeavours to forge a similar alliance in the Middle East 
is a main theme in this thesis. This thesis shows that Turkey hoped that the extension of this 
network to her neighbouring Arab states would improve her own defences by securing her 
southern flank with like minded-governments and make Washington more committed to the 
defence of the area. Moreover, Turkey probably hoped to get increased aid by re-asserting 
her own strategic importance for the West.
Turkey's close alignment with the West, however, inversely affected her relations with 
the emerging independent states of Asia and Africa. Turkey preferred not to get involved— 
9  within the United Nations Organisation (UN) and side-in conihcts^betwecn the latter and 
Western colonial powers. She refused to openly support anti-French independence 
movements in North Afiica and ultimately sided with Britain against the oil nationalisation in 
Iran. She was also one of the few states that backed the West's point of view at the Afro- 
Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955.21
After Stalin's death, Turkey received her share of Soviet peace overtures.22 in 1953, 
Moscow relinquished all territorial claims and demands for participation in administering the 
Straits, followed by a frank private admission that Stalin's mistakes in his dealings with 
Turkey would not be repeated in future. Turkish leaders were left in no doubt that Moscow 
desired warmer relations and that Turkish membership of NATO need be no bairier.23 
Economic help was offered "on teims which no other country could or would offer" and with 
"no political strings attached".24 Ankara, however, greeted these gestures with caution, 
claiming that it would judge them only by "what they cost the Russians".25 it was convinced 
that there had been no change of heart in Moscow and hesitated to take any step which might 
jeopardise its relations with Washington. Ankara restricted the rapprochement to a few 
exchanges of economic character and even declined invitations for cultural or sporting 
contacts.2b Moscow was told on various occasions that any improvement in bilateral
2^See Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy o f  Turkey (1971), 199-200; 
Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (1959), 159-63; Tiirkkaya Ataov, N.A.T.O. and Turkey (1970), 116-25.
2^0rhan Soysal, An Analysis o f  the Influence o f  Turkey's Alignment with the West and o f the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict upon Turldsh-Israeli and Turkish-Arab Relations, 1947-1977, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Princeton University, 1983, 27; Sina Ak$in(ed.), Turkiye Tarihi, 4: (fagda$ Turkiye 1908-1980 (1992), 180; 
Kuneralp, Sadece, 84-86.
22See details in Rubinstein, Policy, 14-17.
23FO371/117723/RK10338/2 & 5; FO371/121251/V1073/118, Stevens toFO, 3.4.56.
24F0371/124010/RK10338/2, Chancery, Ankara to Northern Department, 17.1.57.
25FO371/112927/WK10338/l, FO minute, 11.11.54.
2(T 0 3 7 1/12410/RK10338/1, Chancery, Ankara to Northern Department, 10.1.56.
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relations could only result from the development of general relations between NATO and the 
Communist Bloc. Turkey even feared that the apparently more conciliatory Soviet line might 
confuse Western opinion, undermine NATO's resolve to build up its defences and lead to 
concessions being made to Moscow. She remained firmly convinced that any modifications in 
Soviet tactics had been due to the growth of Western strength. Westerners, therefore, should 
further consolidate their unity and po w er.27
Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Decision-Makers
Turkish foreign policy was made and carried out in the mid-1950s by a small group of very 
■p well-educated, westernised and aristocratic personnel, who, according to Kemal Karp at, were 
D the "farthest removed from the country's realities among the civil s e r v ic e " .  28 The decision­
making process was highly centralised, "personally directed and controlled, even in matters of 
detail"2^ by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, together with the help of a very narrow circle 
of confidantes. This is seen as the continuation of a trend originally set in Ottoman times and 
continued during the early years of the republic.^
The DP advocated, based on its concept of "the national will" (milli trade), that any party 
which received the majority of the popular vote, should be left to pursue its policies free of 
any legal or constitutional constraints. It considered matters of foreign policy to be national, 
above-party concerns, not liable to public criticism The fact that DP constantly enjoyed large 
majorities in the Turkish parliament, the Grand National Assembly (GNA), made easier the 
enforcing of its foreign policy decisions. The Turkish electorate was not, on the whole, much 
interested in foreign affairs, especially as regards the Arab world, and had, therefore, a 
negligible say in its conduct. Foreign affairs did not play any significant role in the 1954 and 
1957 general election campaigns. The notable exception was perhaps the Turkish public's 
concern to the fate of their ethnic kftr in the British colony of Cyprus, where the Greek 
majority was demanding the end of British rule, followed by the island's union with Greece. 
Some might argue, however, rightly in this author's view, that Cyprus was not for Turkey a 
"pure" foreign policy, rather a "national" issue. The Turkish press, too, was not greatly 
interested in foreign affairs. It generally, though not always, supported and justified the 
government line.
The opposition RPP, supported fully attempts to forge closer links with the West and, in
27F0371/112921/WK1011/1, Helm to Eden, 1.1.54; F0371/124005/RK1022/2, Bowker to Lloyd, 5.3.56.
2^Kemai H. Karpat(ed-), Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974 (1975), 7.
29FO371/130181/RK10316/4, Bowker to Lloyd, 24.8.57.
^^Biilent Ali Riza, Turkish Participation in Middle East Defence Projects and Its Impact on Turco-Arab 
Relations, May 1950-June 1953, unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1982, viii.
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broad ter ms, the government's policy of rapprochement with the Arab world. Disagreements 
were usually confined to points of application of policy. The RPP expressed certain 
misgivings that Turkey could overreach herself by undertaking additional military 
commitments to fellow Middle Eastern countries, or that the latter could try to make use of 
the new arrangements to acquire Turkey's backing against then own regional adversaries. 31 
It also sometimes expressed resentment, both in private and in public, at being kept without 
information about foreign policy matters (an accusation, which Menderes hotly denied), and 
claimed that it sometimes gained knowledge of political and military subjects discussed in 
NATO meetings only through reading the European press. It argued that it, was unreasonable, 
in such circumstances, to expect the maintenance of a bipartisan foreign p o l i c y .32
Adnan Menderes was "a handsome, articulate and confident leader".33 He spoke 
excellent English, and many Turks argued at the time that he understood Americans better 
than other Turkish politicians.34 He found it very hard, however, to accept criticism and was 
accused of appealing "sometimes to be rigid and to take insufficient account of changing 
circumstances".3  ^ According to the Chef de Protoco^dX the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
Menderes "had insufficient time to give to foreign affairs [and] was quite arbitrary in his
decisions. "3d
Relations between Menderes and Celal Bayar, the President of Turkey at the time, have 
fascinated historians of modem Turkey. Bulent Ali Riza, based on Bayar's own testimony, 
says that the broad outlines of Turkish foreign policy, in the beginning of the 1950s at least, 
were jointly determined by both. Menderes then supervised its implementation. 37 Metin 
Tamko9 , too, claims that "every important decision of the government, in the final analysis, 
emanated from" Bayar.38 He suggests, however, that "at no time in the history of the 
republic was such mutual trust, close co-operation, and understanding established between a 
president and his prime minister".39 Journalist Metin Toker, the son-in-law of RPP leader 
Ismet Inonu, on the other hand, claims that Bayar initially controlled Menderes. After 1954, 
however, the latter began to resent this and reversed the trend.40 Based on this research, it
31FO371/112922/WK1013/4& 12.
32FO371/130179/RK1022/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 7.1.57.
33McGliee, Connection, 94.
34Frey, Elite, 106.
35F0371/124001/RK1016/35, Bowker to Lloyd, 12.9.56.
36pQ371/130181/RK10316/3, Chancery, Istanbul to Levant Department, 10.7.57.
32Riza, Participation, viii-ix.
3®Metin Tamko?, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians o f the National Security and Modernization o f  
Turkey (1976), 40.
39Ibid., 243,
40Birand, Demirhrat, 87, 177.
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can be added safely that, throughout the period 1953-58, their views, expressed during 
meetings with foreign visitors, contained no striking contradiction. While Bayar was not 
involved in day-to-day dealings with foreign diplomats, he always appeared, to his visitors, a 
well-informed politician on issues of current concern.
Four different politicians held the post of Foreign Minister in the successive Menderes-led 
governments of the 1950s. Prof. Fuat Koprulii was the first. Appointed in 1950, he resigned 
that post in April 1955,41 stayed in the cabinet as a Minister of State. Menderes then 
reseived to himself the portfolio of foreign affairs for the next two months. At the end of 
July, Fatin Ru§tii Zorlu was appointed acting Foreign Minister. On 29 November 1955, 
however, the cabinet resigned due to allegations of corruption. A commission of inquiry was 
set up to investigate allegations of illegal activities by three ministers, including Zorlu. On 
December 12, Menderes formed a new government, with Kopffilii back as Foreign Minister. 
The latter resigned again on 19 June 1956, owing to differences over party matters. Defence 
Minister Ethem Menderes (no relation to the Premier) took over the foreign affairs portfolio 
in an acting capacity, which, in effect, meant that the Premier was back in lull control. Finally, 
with the 1955 commission having failed to substantiate the corruption allegations, Zorlu was 
re-appointed Foreign Minister in November 1957 and stayed in office until the military coup 
of 1960. The actual influence of the office of Foreign Minister, however, seems to have been 
quite limited. It has been suggested that Bayar and Menderes used the device of deliberate 
fluctuations in personnel and their placement within the highest levels of DP and the state 
apparatus to aid then control over the state of affairs and forestall the rise of opposition ffom
within.42
Koprulii, a famous scholar, reportedly possessed "a keen mind and articulate views on 
any important issue touching upon Turkish or Middle Eastern history and politics,"43 
together with "fanatical views" about Communism and n e u t r a l i s m . 44 The foreign affairs 
portfolio probably fell below his expectations, for he had been widely acknowledged as the 
man immediately next to Bayar prior to the latter's election to the presidency in 1950.45  
Future disagreements between Koprulii and Menderes should perhaps be traced as back as 
the succession struggle. Riza says the role of Koprulii and his ministry were mainly restricted 
to providing Bayar and Menderes "with information on which they based their decisions and 
to explaining and carrying out Turkish foreign policy in accordance with the guidelines set
41 See Chapter 4.
42prederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (1965), 173,
4^McGhee, Connection, 94.
44FO371/136456/RK1022/30, Bowker to Addis, 18.2.58.
45Ahmad, Experiment, 78.
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out by Bayar and M e n d e r e s 1' .4b This study confirms that this trend continued after 1953. Sir 
Janies Bowker, the UK ambassador in Ankara, reported that from the second half of 1953, 
Menderes did not allow Koprulu great authority and initiative in foreign a f fa ir s .  47 This 
dissertation shows, however, that even after Koprulu's resignation, some civil servants in the 
Foreign Ministry continued to share his opinion that every effort should be made to improve 
relations with the Arab states.
Ethem Menderes's tenure as acting Foreign Minister was short-lived and mostly 
ineffectual. Fatm Ru$tu Zorlu, on the other hand, was Menderes's right-hand man. Their 
wives were first cousins. Zorlu1 s contemporaries admired his abilities but also underlined his 
arrogance and high-handed approach. According to US ambassador George McGhee, Zorlu 
was "confident and articulate, although he was inclined to be rather arrogant in his dealings 
with subordinates-and Americans of lesser r a n k " . 48 p01 the British Foreign Office (FO), he 
was "an uncertain factor in Turkish politics" who "may have an undesirable influence over 
Monsieur Menderes". Bowker, while acknowledging that Zorlu was "the only effective and 
active Turkish Foreign Minister" in the mid-fifties and "the one man whose advice M. 
Menderes has constantly seemed to rely in financial, economic and foreign relations, "49 also 
said he was
a Foreign Minister of the type "my country right or wrong". He has the typically 
Asian characteristics of a Turk in being suspicious and scrupulous and convinced of 
the efficacy of rough methods and shock tactics. This makes him unpleasant to deal 
with when things are not going to his wishes; on the other hand it makes it easier to 
give a tough response when the occasion calls for it. He has little standing in the 
country or the DP and depends entirely on the Prime Minister for his position. 50
The fact that Zorlu was the son-in-law of Tevfik Ru$tu Aras, Turkey's Foreign Minister 
during the Turkish-Soviet honeymoon of the 1920s and 30s, did not help his reputation. Zeki 
Kuneralp, a junior Turkish colleague of his, confirms that Zorlu was the driving spirit behind 
Turkey's pro-NATO foreign policy and admits his having "a hard, sometimes thorny, shell, 
but a soft interior".Menderes knew of Zorlu's unpopularity with foreign diplomats, but 
considered him irreplaceable, "the only member of the Grand National Assembly with the 
required knowledge and experience to be Foreign Minister". Shortly before re-appointing
4bRiza, Participation, ix.
47FO371/11718/RK1016/45, Bowker to Macmillan, 20.12.55.
4^McGhee, Connection, 99.
49F0371/124001/RK1016/35, Bowker to Lloyd, 12.9.56.
50FO371/136456/RK1022/l & 3G.
^Kuneralp, Sadece, 72-73.
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Zorlu as Foreign Minister in 1957, he asked US Ambassador Fletcher Warren if Washington 
would approve of his choice. ^
The Turkish Foreign Minister was advised by the Secretary-General, who, in turn, was 
aided by four assistant Secretaries-General for political, commercial, NATO and 
administrative affairs. Political affairs were mainly handled by the five diplomatic affairs 
departments or general-directorates, which represented both a geographical and functional 
distribution (relations with Europe and the USA; with Africa and Asia; with the UN and 
other international bodies; cultural relations; and protection of Turkish minorities and Turkish 
citizens abroad). Other departments dealt with economic and trade affairs, with press and 
information services, and with personnel and administrative questions. There was also a 
Protocol Department, a Political Planning Board, and the Office of the Legal Adviser. ^ 3
The role of the Secretary-General, the Ministry's top civil servant, was crucial in running 
external relations and even sometimes in taking decisions. In the period under review, this 
post was successively occupied by Cevat Ai^ikakn (1952-54), Muharrem Nuri Birgi (1954- 
56) and Rauf Melih Esenbel (1957-60). Of these, Birgi was described as "exceedingly 
capable," working "very closely with the Prime Minister" and clearly enjoying "his 
confidence". He was also accused, however, of working "single-handed, delegating very little 
authority and thereby delaying the execution of routine business". ^  He reputedly disliked the 
Arabs in general and harboured scepticism towards co-operation with Arab radical nationalist 
regimes. 'Utliman 'Asal, the Egyptian charge d'affaires in Ankara in 1955-57, writes that "this 
Nuri was more cursed than his namesake (Nuri al-Sa'id), and it is said that he was a donme. I 
believe that he was the real architect of the Baghdad Pact. His loathing for Egypt was 
extreme". 55
Since Turkish Foreign Ministry archives are still inaccessible, except to very few select 
individuals, Tamko? has likened the laborious task of putting data reported in memoirs and 
periodicals as regards the Turkish foreign policy decision-making process into a meaningful 
form and shape to working jigsaw p u z z l e s .   ^6 The British FO General Correspondence 
papers, together with published US and French diplomatic documents, give us a good picture 
of how Turkish foreign policy evolved in the mid-fifties as regards the Arab world. 
Unfortunately, they do not allow us to uncover the details of the foreign policy debate within
^Foreign Relations o f the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, 745-46.
53Vali, Bridge, 76.
54FO371/130232/RK1903/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 11.1.57.
~*^ See 'Asal's article in 'Abd al-Hamid al-Katib, Hikayat Ataturk wa-l-islam (n.d.), 165. The donme were 
islamised Jews, suspected of still secretly practising their former religion.
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the lower echelons of the Ministry, since the latter's structure was hierarchical, and Western 
diplomats were very correct in then dealings with the Turkish government, keeping their 
contacts limited to ministers and some of the top civil servants and making very little contact 
with then junior counterparts. Menderes himself was perhaps an overconfident politician and 
had the habit of disregarding advice coming fiom the lower echelons if it contradicted with 
his own convictions and perceptions. The British embassy was aware of certain views within 
the ministry which were not always in conformity with those expressed by Menderes and his 
confidantes. The inconsistent nature of then reporting of these differing views, however, does 
not enable us to trace then development. Kuneralp's memoirs give us further reason to 
believe in the existence of differing outlooks and points of view. This is certainly a very 
interesting subject which someone may hopefidly carry out in the future, if he/she gets 
unrestricted access to the Turkish Foreign Ministry archives.
Riza says that, in the period 1950-53, "strong views" were expressed on the conduct of 
Tuiidsh foreign policy in the respective GNA committee and its confidential reports to the 
government. ^  ^  Unfortunately, the limited nature of sources used in this study makes it 
impossible to discover what shape debates in the GNA Foreign Affairs Committee took after 
1953.
Another important topic which is not covered adequately in this study, again because of 
lack of availability of relevant primary sources, is the role played by the military in the 
formulation of Turkish foreign policy. This author thinks that, during the period under 
review, there were probably no sharp disagreements between Turkish politicians and army 
generals on foreign policy matters. The Democrats were careful to stuff the army hierarchy 
with officers loyal to the government line, while the relatively junior officers, who organised 
the 1960 coup, do not appear to have been greatly concerned with foreign policy issues. The 
Yassrada trials, they organised to delegitimise the ten-year Democratic rule, did not 
concentrate on foreign policy matters, except probably for the case of Turkey's reaction to 
the 1958 revolution in Iraq, which is analysed in Chapter 10.
The Arab World58
By 1953, there were eight sovereign Arab states in the Middle East. Of those, Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia had never been under Western colonial rule. Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan had
-^Riza, Participation, ix.
-^This chapter discusses only those aspects of the Arab political landscape which were generally 
common for all independent Arab states. The specificities of the balance of power in Iraq and Syria will be 
dealt with in chapters 2 and 4 respectively.
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become independent only after conceding certain rights to British troops on their territory, 
Syria and Lebanon, however, had won independence from France without similar constraints. 
Libya, a former Italian colony, became independent in 1951. On the other hand, Palestine, 
was, in effect, divided in 1948 between the newly-created Jewish state of Israel and 
Transjordan-renamed Jordan in 1950, after the annexation of the West Bank of the river 
Jordan, formerly part of mandated Palestine-and more than 700,000 Arab Palestinian 
refugees were scattered in the Arab world.
Most Arab governments, usually old-guard oligarchies, professed to work for a total end 
to foreign military presence and the eventual establishment of a single, pan-Arab, powerful 
political and economic entity. Moreover, nearly all insisted that no common cause could be 
made with the West until Arab national demands as regards Palestine and the Suez Canal 
(where there still was a significant British armed presence) were met. These regimes were 
now being challenged, however, by a younger generation of pan-Arab nationalists, who 
rejected all kinds of alliances with foreign powers and demanded the complete withdrawal of 
British troops from Arab territories. They desired equal status with all other nations in the 
world and freedom to judge every international issue on its own merits and solely in the light 
of pan-Arab interests. Thanks to the spread of basic education, new means of inter­
communication, and also to the wartime experience of Britain's military pregnability, their 
views were gaining acceptance among a wider cross-section of Arab society. For many 
radical, young Arab intellectuals, like those in the Ba'th Party, Arab unity became closely 
linked with the need to defeat internal "reactionary" forces and implement radical social 
reforms. ^  They turned Arab nationalism into an instrument for challenging the status quo, 
and a means by which allegiance to the rulers could be superseded by a higher form of 
patriotism. The power of these Arab revolutionary parties, ranging from Islamic revivalists to 
Communists, lay in the streets. The real basis of their organisation was popular. They had no 
respect for the caricature of "democracy" bequeathed to the Arab world by colonial powers. 
Finally, they regarded the Hashimite rulers of Iraq and Jordan as British puppets and no 
longer believed that the family, which led the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule in 
1916, could bring about Arab unification. Events in Iraq in 1941, when the Regent, Prince 
'Abd al-Dah-originally deposed by pan-Arab nationalist rebels-had been restored to power by 
British troops had created an irreconcilable breach between the two camps.
The advent of the Cold War was met by Arab governments with relative unconcern.60
- ^ W a lte r  z. Laqueur(ed.), The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History (1958), 341.
^Fayez A. Sayegh(ed.), The Dynamics o f  Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (1964), 127-28, 
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Their attention was focused on matters closer to home, especially the loss of the larger part 
of Palestine in 1948, They feared that Israel would inevitably attempt to gain further territory 
and water resources to settle incoming Jewish immigrants. Neutralist feeling toward global 
Cold War issues spread in the Arab world as a reaction against the supposed Western 
betrayal of legitimate Arab hopes and aspirations. Arab nationalists believed that colonial 
powers were purposefully exaggerating the Soviet "threat" to distract Arab attention from the 
real issues (Palestine, full independence, etc.) they wanted to tackle. Desire for social change 
brought some of them closer to Communism, while the West's ad hoc support for 
conservative Arab regimes led them to believe that the West was resisting social change in 
the Arab world. To Western proposals urging closer regional co-operation against the USSR, 
Arab governments responded with the creation in 1950 of the Arab League Collective 
Security Pact (ALCSP) intended to co-ordinate defences against Israel. Disagreements and 
rivalry, however, left most of its provisions on paper.
Turkish-Arab Relations after World War n
Starting in the sixteenth century, the greater part of the Arab Middle East was continuously 
ruled by the Ottoman Turks. By the end of World War I, however, most of it had come under 
West European tutelage. Then, throughout the inter-war period, the Turkish republican elite 
shunned close relations with its Arab neighbours. It had not still forgiven the Arabs for their 
"betrayal," when the latter had sided with Britain during the war. Turkish intellectuals 
harboured a feeling of superiority towards then* Middle Eastern neighbours and believed that 
the latter could prosper by only following the policies of westernisation, secularisation and 
co-operation with the West adopted by Kemal Ataturk, the first president of the Turkish 
Republic. Moreover, some Turkish Foreign Ministry officials had inherited an exaggerated 
Big Power complex from Ottoman times toward their former subjects. 61 The short-lived 
Sa'dabad Pact (1937), including both Iraq and Turkey, was perhaps the sole exception to this 
trend.
The post-war Soviet threat made Turkey realise how isolated she had become from her 
Middle Eastern neighbours. She, therefore, embarked on a hurried and intensive effort to 
improve relations with the emerging sovereign Arab states and signed friendship treaties with 
Iraq (1946) and Jordan (1947). These attempts, like the rest of Turkish foreign policy 
initiatives of that period, were fuelled primarily by her concern to contain the perceived 
Soviet threat to her territorial integrity and form of government. The DP's more tolerant
^Karpat, Transition, 4.
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attitude than the RPP towards manifestations of the Islamic faith in Turkey was, in turn, 
appreciated by several Arab governments.
Differences in political outlook, contrasting evaluations of threats and interests, however, 
obstructed further rapprochement with the Arab world. Turkey, for example, after initially 
opposing the creation of Israel, gradually changed her hostile attitude, when it became 
apparent that Israel was not particularly friendly towards Moscow. Ankara hoped that by 
improving relations with Tel Aviv, it could gain the sympathy of the influential Jewish 
communities in the West. She became the first state with a majority Muslim population to 
recognise Israel and establish with her diplomatic relations. She then asked the Arabs to 
follow her, 62 fuelling Arab resentment towards the Turks and exacerbating the Arab 
stereotype of Turkey as the gendarme of the West in the Middle East. 63
Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iraq
Turkey preferred dealing with conservative pro-Western Arab regimes rather than those with 
radical anti-Western inclinations. Her bilateral relations with her immediate Arab neighbours, 
Iraq and Syria, best illustrate this situation.
Both Iraq and Syria had been carved, as political entities, by the victorious allies out of 
former Ottoman territories at the end of World War I and immediately placed, against the 
express wishes of the native population, under British and French mandates respectively. 
During the mandate years, Turkey seemed content to deal directly with the mandatory 
powers on matters related to Syria and Iraq, without insisting on local Arab participation in 
the negotiations. Some of those issues were territorial disputes and left a strong impact on the 
pattern of Turkey's future bilateral relations with Syria and Iraq, after they had become 
independent.
With Iraq, the territorial dispute centred around the largely Kurdish-inhabited region of 
Mosul and Kirkuk. It was ultimately resolved in favour of Iraq through the League of Nations 
in 1925. hi return, after the discovery in the said region of vast oil reserves, Turkey received 
from Iraq, over a period of 25 years, a fixed annual payment of £500,000 as compensation 
for lost revenue. This compromise paved the way for the future establishment of relatively 
smooth links with Iraq, which were later reinforced by a mutual determination to co-operate 
in areas of defence and suppression of Kurdish aspirations on both sides of the border.
6%liza, Participation, 63; Soy S2&, Analysis, 32.
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Technical problems of bilateral nature were solved smoothly and without any recrimination.
In addition to the above-mentioned S a'dab ad Pact, Turkey and Iraq signed* in 1946, a 
bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness.
Turkish- Syrian relations, however, were more problematic. Their territorial dispute 
centred around the district of Alexandretta (Hatay). In the late 1930s, Ankara managed to 
press the mandatory power, France, for concessions over the issue and ultimately annexed the 
region in 1939. The indignation felt by the Arab Syrians at the this loss soured-and continues 
to sour-bilateral links with Turkey. Syria refused to acknowledge the legality of the territorial 
transfer, and, hence, the dispute seriously delayed Turkey's recognition of Syrian 
independence in 1946, until a secret compromise was mediated whereby Ankara did not insist 
on formal Syrian recognition of Hatay's incorporation, while Damascus undertook not to 
raise the issue formally so long as she was not required to make any express renunciation. ^ 4 
This dissertation shows that, even in the mid-fifties, many Syrians feared that Turkey might 
eventually try to annex more Syrian territory, in particular Aleppo. The Turks made 
surprisingly little effort to deny such worries, and, on a few occasions, were quite happy to 
use them as some sort of counter-measure against well-publicised popular Syrian irredentism 
towards Hatay. This Syrian bitterness was exacerbated from time to time by other problems 
relating to minorities, the properties of Turkish and Syrian nationals in each other's territory, 
the division of the waters of the river <Jagh-Jaglf in al-Jazhah, cross-border smuggling and so 
o n .  6  ^These bilateral problems, which in other circumstances could have been solved through 
compromise and without much ado, now attained unprecedented proportions, and the finding 
of common ground on issues of regional concern, like Middle East collective defence, 
became all the more difficult. Hence, these bilateral disputes could indeed be considered as 
one of the secondary, though certainly never the determinative, factor which made Syria 
oppose the Baghdad Pact.
Turkish and Arab Attitudes Toward Middle East Collective Defence Proposals
The ideas to set up a separate anti-Soviet Middle East collective defence structure were being 
circulated since the late 1940s. Finally, on 13 October 1951, the USA, UK, France and 
Turkey collectively asked Egypt to join them, as an equal partner, in setting up a "Middle * 
East Command" (MEC) along with any other countries that might wish to adhere. The
^D aniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History o f an Ambition (1990), 60; Omer Kurk^uo^lu, Tiirkiye'nin 
Arap Orta Dogusu'na Kar$i Politikasi 1945-1970 (1972), 16.
^Najib al-Armanazi, 'Ashr sanawat fi-l-dibhtmasiyyah fi samim al-ahdath al-'arabiyyah wa-1- 
dawliyyah, vol. II (1964), 69-71.
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invitation emphasised Egypt's role in the "Free World," and promised that equality and 
partnership would be the fruits of MEG participation. New "allied" military arrangements, 
with headquarters in Cairo, would replace the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Most MEC 
troops would still be British, but those not assigned to the Command would leave, while 
Egypt would only be asked to provide base facilities. Britain expected Commonwealth 
countriesto contribute to Middle East defence as well. Although the USA would furnish staff 
to the MJ$C and provide military assistance and missions to friendly countries, it would not 
commit troops to the area.66
Britain hoped that through integrating Egypt into the MEC, she could finally establish a 
collective defence mechanism in the Middle East; provide a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian 
dispute over the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone Base; and bring Turkey 
into the Western defence system. Since Egypt arguably had, since the mid-1940s, established 
herself as the focus of growing Arab opposition to Britain's regional supremacy, her 
adherence could also encourage other Arab states to join the MEC.
Turkey, willing to participate in a Middle Eastern defence system since February 1949, 
would have ideally preferred to see her allies proceed with caution. Her membership in 
NATO had not been finalised then, and Turkish leaders feared that if Egypt rejected the MEC 
proposal, Turkey would be expected to provide its military backbone, making it difficult for 
her to insist on the assignment of her forces to NATO’s main command. Nevertheless, under 
direct pressure from Washington to follow a joint line, Turkey went along with the
proposal. 67
Egypt, however, refused to participate in any pact as long as Britain continued to occupy 
the Suez Canal Zone. Her rejection destroyed the chances of acceptance by other Arab 
countries. The four sponsoring powers decided, therefore, to go ahead with the MEC with 
headquarters in Cyprus.68 The project was pursued for another 18 months or so, mainly by 
Britain, but it gradually acquired a narrower scope, involving little more than allied 
consultation. Finally, at Washington's suggestion its name was changed to the Middle East 
Defence Organisation (MEDO) to make the planning organisation sound less like a military 
command, and hence less offensive to Arab ears. The above-described American and British 
disagreements over tactics prevented MEDO from reaching even the stage of having an 
official preliminary meeting.69 The military coup in Egypt in July 1952 briefly appeared to
^Devereux, Formulation, 109.
^Devereux, Formulation, 58; Riza, Participation, 16, 79, 91. 
6^McGhee, Connection, 96.
^^Devereux, Formulation, 66-68; Riza, Participation, 168.
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provide MEDO with renewed hope. Ankara shared this short-lived hope that the new 
Egyptian leaders would seriously consider MEDO, but nothing came out of i t  70 Finally, 
Menderes agreed, during talks he had in London on 13-19 October 1952, that MEDO should 
be organised as quickly as possible through the adoption of a "set up shop" approach, i.e. 
Turkey and Britain should first openly assert their intention to set up a Middle East defence 
organisation and then proceed as occasion offered to work on individual Arab states to make 
them take a more "realistic" attitude. If no Arab country agreed to go along, then MEDO 
should be established without then support. Britain agreed that to Ankara's suggestion that 
Iraq should be approached first. 71
Turkey embarked on a program designed to strengthen relations with the Arab countries, 
mainly through cultural exchanges and a series of visits by top-level officials and 
parliamentarians. 72 Until the beginning of 1953, she still had illusions that she was in a better 
position than the other Western powers concerned to persuade the Arabs to adopt a less 
negative attitude to the proposals concerned. The latter, however, did not respond to Turkish 
overtures. Turkey steadily became disillusioned by then b e h a v i o u r ,73 and Menderes 
suspended the initiative at the end of April 1953.74
This decision was a low point in Turkey's attempts to forge close links with the Arab 
world. It did not last long, however. Dulles's long trip to the Middle East in May 1953-the 
first by an American head of diplomacy-gave, as shown in chapter 2, a new impetus to the 
search for ways to establish a Middle East defence organisation, out of which sprang the 
Baghdad Pact, with Turkey destined to play a ciucial role in its creation.
Throughout the deliberations to establish MEC/MEDO, Turkey remained fully convinced 
of the necessity of some arrangement to fill the strategic gap on her eastern flank. She hoped 
that Arab involvement in MEC/MEDO would make Soviet infiltration in the Arab world very 
difficult. Turkish leaders were also convinced of the military necessity of a strong British 
presence on the Suez Canal, for they had no confidence whatsoever in the political or military 
competence of the Arabs. They could not convince the latter, however, that there was no 
relation between Turkey's membership of NATO and MEDO.
Turkey was aware of and resented British efforts to use her largely to prevent internal 
popular opposition against pro-British Arab regimes in Iraq and Jordan. Some Turkish 
politicians even feared that Britain was preventing Turkey from assisting other Arab countries
^^The Memoirs o f  Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (1960), 245.
^FO371/110788/V1073/54, Bowker toFO, 6.10.54; Devereux, Formulation, 69.
^McGhee, Connection, 138.
73FO371/112921/WK1011/l, Helm to Eden, 1.1.54.
74Riza, Participation, 226.
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iii military matters on an individual b a s i s .  75 Hence, Turkey wanted Washington to play a 
larger role in regional defence, for she knew that America wanted to incorporate Turkish 
forces into NATO, where they would serve as the Middle Eastern anchor to the defence of 
Europe and simultaneously contribute to MEDO.
This dissertation shows that Turkeys ultimate goal was to bring all Arab states into 
NATO. She preferred, however, at this early stage, to work separately with individual Arab 
countries, fearing that any proposal referred to the Arab League would go nowhere. Argued 
Kdpriilu: "Collectively, the Arab leaders displayed even less courage in making difficult 
decisions involving issues tainted by c o l o n i a l i s m " .  76
Of the individual Arab states, Egypt was always considered the prized possession. 
Ankara, too, believed that once Egypt adhered to a regional alliance, bringing in other Arab 
countries would be made much easier. Egypt's repeated refusals even to consider the matter 
enfuriated the Turks. Their occasional decisions to stop wooing Egypt temporarily and try to 
create a regional defence organisation despite Egyptian reluctance were simply manifestations 
of occasional Turkish sheer frustration. In such circumstances, Iraq inevitably attained added 
importance for Turkish foreign policy-makers, as her leaders were known to be better- 
inclined towards MEC/MEDO proposals and were seen as a suitable counterweight for 
Egyptian influence within the Arab world.
Another constant feature of Turkeys foreign policy of the period was her desire to co­
operate on defence matters with other Muslim countries solely on the basis of geographical 
and political realities, rather than religious affinity. Turkish leaders feared that any 
rapprochement based on religion might in the end endanger Turkeys secularism and pro- 
European aspirations.
Sources
hi preparing this dissertation, the author has relied mainly on West European and US archival 
material, especially British FO General Correspondence (F0371) files kept at the Public 
Record Office in London. These files are usefiil as regards Turkey and Iraq, i.e. Britain's allies 
at the time. The strengths and weaknesses of British diplomatic reporting in relation to 
Turkish foreign policy have been referred to above. Moreover, British diplomats in Ankara 
seem to have had minimal contact with opposition figures. As regards Iraq, the British 
embassy had cordial links with the Palace and all main figures of the establishment, but here 
again contacts with radical opposition figures were almost non-existent. British records are
^Huseyin Bagci, Demokrat Parti Donemi Di§ Politikasi (1990), 51; McGhee, Connection, 89.
^ M c G h e e ,  Connection, 143.
34
not reliably informative on Syria, because British-Syrian relations were tense at the time and 
were broken off in November 1956, to be re-established (with the UAR) only on 1 December 
1959. During the period, when the British embassy in Damascus was shut down, it fell to the 
British embassy in Beirut to report on developments in Syria, and the reliability of the 
reporting inevitably diminished. This author has also made limited use of the private papers of 
successive British Foreign Secretaries (FO800) of the time. Published US and French 
documents, the series Foreign Relations o f the United States and Documents Diplomatiques 
Franqais, have also been consulted. Unfortunately, no first-hand archival material from 
Turkey, Iraq or Syria was available to me, when preparing the dissertation, which made the 
task of verifying certain assumptions, or even some of the more obscure facts, very difficult.
The author has also relied on the printed memoirs of some Turkish, Iraqi, Syrian, 
Egyptian, British and American politicians and diplomats of the time, as well as certain issues 
of relevant newspapers and periodicals. Some of the main statesmen figuring in this 
dissertation, like Menderes, Zoriu, Nuri and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, did not have an 
opportunity to write then memoirs. The memoirs of al-'Azm, Runeralp and Muhammad Fadil 
al-Jamali, however, were particularly helpful. In order to put the results of this research 
within a broad context, the author has also endeavoured to read the relevant "background" 
and secondary literature in English, French, Arabic, Turkish and Russian. A full list of books 
quoted in this dissertation is given in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.
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2The “Northern Tier” Project
The Dulles Tour
John Foster Dulles's historic tour across eleven Middle Eastern countries between 11 and 29 
May 1953 was an important stage in the evolution of the general Middle East defence plan. It 
bmied MEDO and replaced it with the so-called "Northern Tier" collective defence project, 
based on the voluntary participation of those Middle Eastern countries lying on the southern 
borders of the USSR.
The Eisenhower administration, that had just assumed office, considered the Middle East 
as a key area, where further efforts were needed to bolster local defences against the 
perceived Soviet menace. It also wished to correct the pro-Israeli bias of the previous 
administration, promising to take "a balanced view of the Middle East directed against neither 
the Arabs nor the Jews". 1 The US Secretary of State returned to Washington convinced that 
MEDO was clearly "a future rather than an immediate possibility". The ongoing controversy 
over the nationalisation of Iranian oil, the conflict between Egypt and Britain over the Suez 
base, and the Arab-Israeli dispute were ob^ructing its implementation.2 The prospect of 
collective defence seemed more encouraging in the northernmost Middle Eastern countries 
bordering or near the USSR: Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria, where a natural defence 
barrier jS7dsted.and where political leaders were perceived to be more aware of the Soviet 
threat. MEDO had moreover not worked because of Western predominance. Dulles proposed 
that any future regional pact should be based on an association of local forces under an 
indigenous command. The absence of Western membership in this projected pact could 
encourage other Middle Eastern countries to join. Outside powers could not present a 
"blueprint" and expect it to be accepted automatically, but as the pact developed, they could 
become involved in planning and organisation. Furthermore, the new scheme would delink 
the issues of regional defence from the intricacies of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics.^ 
Dulles thought that, for a viable defence concept to develop, Arab participation, or at least
^esch , Syria, 39; FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 13.
•^Donald James Decker, U.S. Policy Regarding the Baghdad Pact, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The 
American University, 1975, 61-62.
3j. C. Hurewitz(ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record. Vol. II: 1914- 
1956 (1956), 337-42.
co-operation, was ultimately necessary. Arab participation depended on their goodwill, but 
their past colonial experiences, their emergent nationalism and past US and British support of 
Israel made this inconceivable for the immediate future. Based on these observations, 
Washington decided to assume greater independence and greater responsibility in the area 
vis-a-vis Britain, and drop the multilateral approach to work, for the time being, on individual 
states like Iraq, Pakistan and possibly Syria.^
The "Northern Tier" project was not a radical break with past plans. None of the 
countries previously involved in MEDO discussions, Britain and Turkey in particular, saw it 
as such. Much of Dulles's recommendations had been implicit in the policies of the previous 
administration. ^  During 1952, Washington had drawn closer to Britain in all areas of defence 
co-operation, while Britain had gone a long way in realising the inadequacy of her "Inner 
Ring" strategy. Instead, she had begun planning a "Forward Strategy," based on rapid and 
mobile forces stationed in Cyprus, Libya and Jordan, that would eventually replace the static 
and expensive defence line on the "Inner Ring". Britain had made the maintenance of friendly 
relations with Iraq and Jordan to retain her strategically important positions there a priority. 
After the Dulles tour, the British FO agreed, in theory at least, that MEDO should be shelved 
for the time being, and that the best course to achieve collective security would be to work 
individually with certain Middle Eastern states. 6
The Turkish-Fakistani Agreement
Ankara was included as a destination in Dulles's tour in the last minute and only at expressed 
Turkish insistence. The visit coincided with a period when the Turks had temporarily 
concluded that, for the time being, any hope of having the Arab countries accept MEDO 
should be abandoned. Dulles failed to convert Menderes and Bayar to accepting his new 
"Northern Tier" plan and the necessity of bringing in the Arab states in some capacity in 
order to make the envisaged organisation politically and strategically viable. Rather than wait 
any longer for the Arab states, the Turkish leaders preferred to see the four Western powers, 
themselves included, proceed immediately toward setting up a formal MEDO, open to 
accession by all Middle Eastern countries, including Pakistan. Menderes assured that Turkey 
remained anxious to work with the Arab states. The latter, however, were still not ready for 
co-operation.^ Hence, Turkey's official, but not publicised, reaction to Dulles's plan was
4 John W. Young(ed.), The Foreign Policy o f Churchill’s  Peacetime Administration 1951-1955 (1988),
152.
5Ayesha Jalal, "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947- 
1955", The International History Review, 11/3 (August 1989), 418, 428.
^Devereux, Formulation, 118, 156-57.
1FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 147.
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"rather negative". Turkish leaders felt that Washington, while recognising that the 
establishment of MEDO with Arab participation was a remote possibility, was not drawing 
what they considered to be the logical and necessaiy conclusion of going ahead without the 
Arabs.8
Instead, in the following few months, Turkey moved, with US and-according to 
Eden-UK blessing, closer to Pakistan. The latter was eager to forge close links with the West 
and all fellow Muslim states in order to receive Western military aid, strengthen her defences 
and be in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis her regional rivals, India and Afghanistan,
a .
with (whomEoth she had territorial disputes. Washington showed interest in associating 
Pakistan with the chain of local defensive arrangements, because of her vital geographic 
location and relatively strong army. 9 The Turkish-Pakistani Agreement of Friendly Co­
operation, signed in Karachi on 2 April 1954, turned out to be the first step towards the 
projected "Northern Tier" alliance. It defined bilateral defence co-operation in flexible terms, 
without any definite obligations. Article 4 stated that co-operation would cover exchange of 
information on technical experience and progress, endeavours to meet the requirements in 
production of arms and ammunition, as well as co-operation against any unprovoked attack 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It was thought that further substance could be given later 
to these provisions, through the conclusion of additional implementation agreements.^ 
Washington followed by signing with Pakistan a Mutual Defence Agreement, promising to 
provide military equipment and training to her armed forces on condition that she "will not 
undertake any act of aggression against any other nation" and that the assistance provided 
would be used "exclusively" to maintain internal security, for legitimate self-defence, or 
participation in regional defence or UN collective security arrangements. 11
An Invitation to Iraq
Even before the Turkish-Pakistani agreement had been finalised, the Turkish position vis-a- 
vis Arab participation had undergone sufficient change to make a new demarche to Iraq to 
join the projected alliance possible.
%FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 391. See also McGhee, Connection, 159-60; FO371/104187/E1033/22, 
BMEO weekly political suimnary, 4.6.53.
^S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (1990), 22, 152, 
162; Eden, Full Circle, 259; Devereux, Formulation, 157; Decker, Policy, 77; Jalal, "Baghdad Pact", 418-19, 
422, 425, 429.
l^See full text in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 345-46. Article 51 guarantees "the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessaiy to maintain international peace and security".
 ^^ Burke, Pakistan, 163-65.
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The choice of Iraq as the first Arab country to be approached was perhaps predictable. Of 
all the Arab countries, her leaders had felt most that the USSR threatened their independence 
and the established political order. They believed that since the Persian/Arab Gulf had 
featured high among the strategic objectives of Czarist Russia, its subsequently found rich oil 
reserves could now further lure Moscow to try to extend its influence there either through 
direct aggression, or, more probably, through local Communists and sympathisers, and the 
manipulation of Kurdish nationalist sentiments in Northern Iraq. In the early 1950s, Iraq was 
still a relatively poor country, and the establishment feared that widespread lower-class 
discontent could be easily manipulated by Communist propaganda. These fears were 
crystallised especially after the confrontation in Iran, in the summer of 1953, between the 
conservative forces loyal to the Shah and their radical-nationalist and left-wing opponents. 
Iraqi leaders were shocked in seeing the Shah being forced to leave his country temporarily 
and feared, for a while, that the coming to power in Iran of the radical-left Tudeh (Masses) 
Party might have serious consequences in neighbouring states. They soon began to look 
seriously for ways to make the repetition of such events, this time in Iraq, impossible. ^
The oil royalties Ir aq received from the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) formed her main 
source of income. Since concluding a more favourable profit-sharing agreement in 1952, the 
government was trying to strengthen its internal position by channelling most of the newly- 
acquired revenue to large-scale development programs aimed at improving, in the long run, 
the standard of living of the bulk of the population. The total revenue, they believed, was not 
enough, however, both to keep the development program going and to equip and maintain a 
strong army. They showed, therefore, strong interest in maintaining close relations with the 
former mandatory power, Britain, and in cultivating new ones with the USA.
Iraq's relations with Britain, since the termination of the mandate in 1932, had been 
governed by then 1930 Treaty of Preferential Alliance. ^  Under its provisions, Iraq was 
bound to co-operate closely with Britain on foreign and defence policy matters; accord the 
UK ambassador in Baghdad "precedence" in relation to other diplomatic representatives; and 
resort to British military and civilian advisers, whenever foreign technical assistance was 
needed. Britain retained control of the air bases at al-Shu'aybah, in the vicinity of Basra, and 
al-Habbaniyyah, near Baghdad. She could also use local facilities to transport troops through 
Iraqi territory. The 25-year treaty, due to expire in 1957, had long been unpopular with large 
segments of educated Iraqis, and the two governments recognised that new arrangements 
were needed, if the alliance was to survive. Iraq was keen to sign a revised agreement-albeit
^Axelgard, Policy, 121; Devereux, Formulation, 144; FO371/104189/E1061/1, Mackenzie to Baker,
19.8.53.
See full text in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 178-81.
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with 110 permanent British bases on her soil-because she considered that the British 
connection was necessaiy to maintain internal stability. Iraq first suggested to the British to 
terminate the existing treaty and replace it with new arrangements under the guise of 
regional defence co-operation stipulated by Article 51 of the UN Charter after the August 
1953 events in Ir a n . 14
American interests in Iraq were more recent than Britain's. Iraqi leaders recognised, 
however, that US influence in the Middle East was glowing veiy rapidly and were ready to 
shift some then friendship and loyalty to Washington.15 in March 1953 and again during the 
Dulles tour, Iraq requested that she should receive some of her military equipment free from 
Washington. The high cost of her development program was draining her resources, she 
claimed, and she could not afford to continue to buy all her military needs from Britain. ^
Iraq had always been the most enthusiastic of Arab states towards Western-backed 
defence plans. ^  She already had the experience of entering into the Sa'dabad Pact (1937) 
with neighbouring non-Arab states. Furthermore, when finally adhering to the ALCSP in 
February 1951, Iraq had added a reservation that the obligation of members to abide by 
decisions taken by a two-thirds majority in the Defence Council was not "applicable to 
individual or collective defence preparedness to resist any military aggression," because, she 
argued, Article 4 of the pact recognised the right of member-states to "cooperate in 
consolidating and coordinating their aimed forces," and "participate according to their 
resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse" armed 
aggression. ^  Moreover, Iraq had long enjoyed almost troublefree relations with Turkey and 
Pakistan.^
Finally, for the Turkish-Pakistani agreement to have any military/strategic effect, the two 
signatories should fill then territorial gap. The defence of the north-western Iranian province 
of Azerbaijan, of the passes through the Zagros mountains and of the Tigris-Euphrates valley 
in Iraq and Syria were essential for protecting the region, specifically Turkey's eastern flank. 
Beyond the Zagros there were no natural geographical obstacles to southern Iraq and the
14F0371/110986/VQ1011/1, Troutbeckto Eden, 11.1.1954; FO371/115496/V1073/463, Wright to Eden, 
9.3.55.
^Robert A. Femea and Wm. Roger Louis(eds), The Iraqi Revolution o f  1958: The Old Social Classes 
Revisited (1991), 65.
16FO371/110986/VQ1011/l, Troutbeck to Eden, 11.1.54.
l^Axelgard, Policy, 78, 95; Riza, Participation, 99, 151, 180,
-^Abubaker M. Saad, Iraq and Arab Politics: The Nuri as-Said Era, 1941-1958, unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Washington, 1987, 157. See full text of ALCSP in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 311- 
14.
l^Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (1959), 219; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, 
Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History (1968), 358.
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Mediterranean. Iraq's adherence would give the Turkish-Pakistani agreement a strategic 
position in depth, air bases, and lines of communication from Turkey to the Gulf, which could 
be used to support vital defensive positions at the said passes. 20
On 16 February 1954, the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad unofficially invited Iraqi 
Premier Fadil al-Jamah to join the projected Turkish-Pakistani agreement.21 Turkey's 
Foreign Minister, Fuat Kopriilu, declared that it would be open to any friendly power that 
wished to join, expressing hope that "the Arab countries would also one day show interest in 
the pact".22
The Iraqi answer was delayed, however. Although al-Jamah was personally anxious to 
improve Iraq's relations with T u r k e y , 2 3  lie refused to acknowledge publicly that Iraq had 
been invited to join the agreement or had been acquainted with its c l a u s e s . 2 4  This go-slow 
approach may be explained by al-Jamali's fear of a violent internal opposition. Although Iraq's 
landed classes favoured the acceptance of US military aid and association with the Turkish- 
Pakistani agreement, opposition-led by the National Democratic, Independence and the 
banned Communist paities-was not n e g l i g i b l e . 2 5  Al-Jamah also did not wish to break with 
Iraq's Arab partners, particularly at a time when he was pushing in the Arab League a plan for 
closer Arab unity, with perhaps an eye on securing a throne in Syria for Crown-Prince 'Abd
a l - H a h .2 6
The Turkish-Pakistani approach coincided with the last stages of American dehberations 
concerning Iraq's request for military aid. The two issues became objectively interlinked. In 
April, the US State Department overcame various objections from Saudi Arabia and Israel 
and authorised the allocation of an annual $10m in military aid to Iraq. The deal was 
formalised as a bilateral "understanding," not an "agreement," because the Iraqi government 
was anxious, due to its special internal legal position, to avoid criticism and opposition by ah 
means possible and preferred not to be required to submit the deal to the Chamber for 
a p p r o v a l .  22 Al-Jamah was left in no doubt, however, that Washington hoped that even if Iraq 
could not accede immediately to the Turkish-Pakistani pact, she must nonetheless at least
20Decker, Policy, 82, 127, 207.
21FO371/110787/V1073/7, Mackenzie to Eden, 24.2.54.
22Ismail Soysal, "The 1955 Baghdad Pact", STAR, 5 (1990), 51; FO371/112922/WK1013/5, Political 
Summary, Ankara, 11-24 February 1954.
23FO371/110994/VQ1022/l, FO minute by Falla, 15.1.54.
24FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 2, 2375; FO371/110787/V1073/7, Mackenzie to Eden, 24.2.54; F0371/ 
110841/V1782/2, FO Research Department memo, 6.4.54; see full text of al-Jamali's March 21 
announcement in FO371/110787/V1073/24; see also ibid., -/20-21, TroutbecktoFO, 23.3.54.
25F 0371/110787/VI073/20, Troutbeck to FO, 23.3.54; FO371/110786/V1072/12, Troutbeck to 
Furlonge, 24.3.54.
2^For details, see Chapter 4.
27FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 2, 2384.
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declare publicly her support for regional defence co-operation. Furthermore, al-Jamah was 
warned that if Iraq’s first move after signing the aid agreement was towards Israel through 
union with Syria, rather than toward the "Northern Tier," Washington could still revoke the
signed agreement. 28
The question of Iraqi adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani agr eement was soon put on hold 
because al-Jamah's government resigned after losing the support of the followers of Nuri al- 
Sa'id, the largest group in the Ir aqi Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber was dissolved and 
new elections called. With Nuri abroad, undergoing an operation, 'Abd al-Hah hoped to 
return a Chamber sympathetic to his Syrian ambitions.
During the June 9 elections, conservative pohtical parties and other "unaffiliated" 
deputies, mostly members of the ruling ehte, won the bulk of seats. Ten seats, mainly in 
Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, went, however, to the National Front, an electoral bloc 
consisting of the pan-Arab nationahst Independence Party, the left-wing reformist National 
Democratic Party and individual members ftom the banned Communist Party and other- 
radical left-wing organisations. The Front had campaigned on a platform of neutralism and 
rendering assistance to Arab peoples fighting imperialism. It had demanded the abrogation of 
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, the abolition in Ir aq of foreign military bases and foreign monopolistic 
companies.
The newly-elected Chamber had some very difficult problems to tackle, especially the 
termination of the 1930 treaty and the negotiation of new defence arrangements for Iraq. 
'Abd al-Hah was soon convinced that only Nuri had the influence and experience to manage 
this tricky task. So, on 12-15 July, he flew to Paris to meet Nuri. The latter was extremely 
unhappy with the election results, which had reduced the numerical strength in the Chamber 
of his own party, and returned many prominent leftists, with whom he did not wish to work. 
To secure Nuri's return to the premiership, 'Abd al-Ilah was left with little choice but to 
promise new elections. 29 The new Chamber was first prorogued after holding only a single
^Axelgard, Policy, 145, 151, 156; Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 52-53. See text in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 
346-48. A secret Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in Washington on 26 
February, subordinating the projected American military assistance to already existing British plans for the 
expansion of Iraqi armed forces; see text in F0371/110820/VI 139/39. Of this, Iraq was only told by the USA 
that she should continue to look to Britain as her main source of arms supply. Actually, much of the 
American assistance was later procured from British sources through off-shore purchases.
29see details in Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri (1964), ch. 1; Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, 
Mawaqif wa 'ibar f i  siyasatina al-dawliyyah: safahat min tarikhina al-mu'asir (1991), 271; idem., review of 
Iraq under General Nuri, MEF, XL/7 (October 1964), 13; Phebe Marr, The Modem History o f Iraq (1985), 
114-15; 'Abd al-Amir Hadi al-'Akam, Ta'rikh hizb al-istiqlal al-'iraqi 1946-1958 (1980), 78, 294-98; George 
Grassmuck, "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958", MEJ, 14/4 (Autumn, 1960), 405, 408-12.
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session and Nuri was re-appointed Premier. The Ring then agreed to Nuri's request to call 
new elections "to enable the people to pronounce on" his policy:
(a) termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and cooperation between Iraq and 
other foreign states in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter;
(b) the strengthening of relations between the Arab countries and the removal of 
friction and tension between them;
(c) strengthening of relations with neighbouring states and improvement of 
cooperation between them and the Arab states to repel the Zionist danger.
Then, Nuri embarked on a chain of measures to engineer the "right" climate before 
proceeding with new elections planned to return an entirely subservient Chamber. He 
dissolved all political parties, including his own; closed down many newspapers across the 
country; made joining some pro-Communist leftist associations an offence; amended the 
Penal Code to permit the deportation of and the stripping of Iraqi citizenship from persons 
convicted of communism, anarchism and accused of working for a foreign government; gave 
the Ministry of the Interior powers to close down political parties and other associations 
"departing from their terms of reference or provoking disorder"; and amended the Reserve 
Seivice Law, allowing the call-up of officials and students dismissed because of their political 
beliefs. All open political activity was effectively de-legitimised.3^ Through new elections 
held on September 12 under government intimidation, altogether 44 members of the Chamber 
elected in June were replaced mostly with candidates lacking any record of recent opposition 
to Nuri. 31 The de-facto breaking-off of Iraq's diplomatic relations in early 1955 with the 
USSR formed the final chapter in Nuri's anti-leftist d r i v e .32
A Change of Heart in Turkey: The Conference of July 1954
By May 1954, Turkey was again becoming restless about possible Iraqi non-adherence to the 
Turkish-Pakistani agreement and was questioning the American tactics of granting seemingly 
unconditional military aid to Iraq, fearing that the latter would now have little incentive to 
join the above-mentioned agreement.33
Menderes thoroughly discussed the question of Iraqi accession with the visiting Pakistani 
Premier Muhammad 'Ali on 9-15 June 1954. They were dissatisfied with Iraq's recent 
behaviour, as "she appeared to say different things to the Pakistanis, the Turks, the
^Axelgard, Policy, 166.
31F0371/110990/VQ1015/55, Hooper toFO, 5.8.54.
32SeeFO371/111051 & FO371/115803.
33Axelgard, Policy, 145; F0371/110787/V1073/40, Scott Fox to Falla, 10.5.54.
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Americans and the British, with the obvious intention of drawing the maximum advantage out 
of the present situation, whilst avoiding any commitments".3 4 They agreed that the strongest 
pressure should be brought upon Iraq and that "the moment must shortly come when Iraq 
should be asked to say definitely whether she proposed to accede or not" .Menderes  said 
that "Iraq indulged merely in expression of goodwill and put forward the excuse of its public 
opinion not being ready for not joining in the defence arrangements. He did not consider this 
argument valid. Public opinion in Iraq, he thought, would be only too happy to see Iraq 
associate herself with Pakistan and Turkey. One-third of the population of Iraq was Turkish 
[sic!] ; and he knew that a major portion of the population was in fact already in favour' of 
these arrangements". On 11 June, Menderes told the Iraqi ambassador that he thought Iraq 
was not "sufficiently conscious" of the communist danger and warned him that "if Turkey 
collapsed countries down to the Cape of Good Hope would collapse too".3b A month later, 
Birgi, the General-Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, told UK Ambassador Sir James 
Bowker that Ankara was "anxious to put an end to disingenuous ambiguities of Iraq's 
attitude; even if Iraq gave negative reply to Turkish approach that would at least enable us to 
see where we stood".37
The question of bringing Ir aq into the Turkish-Pakistani pact, together with more wide- 
ranging aspects of Turkish foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab world, were discussed at a 
special conference of Turkish diplomats held in Ankara and Istanbul on 12-17 July 1954. 
Chaired by Bayar and Menderes, it was also attended by Kopriilii, Birgi, Deputy Premier and 
Minister of State Zorlu, the Head of the Second Political Department in the Foreign Ministry, 
Orhan Eralp, and Turkish heads of mission in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and
Syria. 3 ^
The conference concluded that the Arab League was a "nefarious body" with 
"destructive" and "negative" aims, and had always been manipulated by Egypt to her own 
interest. Working through the League channels would be counter-productive. Instead, 
relations with Arab states should be improved on a bilateral basis. Turkey should maintain "an
34FO371/110787/V1073/47, Bowker to Eden, 18.6.54.
35F 0371/110787/V1073/45, FO minute by Brewis, 12.7.54.
3^F0371/110788/V1073/51, Aide-memoire by Pakistani Cabinet Secretary, 11-12 June 1954. Menderes 
was not alone in Turkey to claim that Turkey was the first and most important line of defence against the 
USSR. On 8 January 1954, during a particularly tense moment in Turkisli-Egyptian relations, the Turkish 
daily Vatcrn wrote: "Even today, if there were not a strong Turkey in front of Suez, a Soviet puppet would 
have been sitting in General Nagib's place. Egypt's independence is preserved through Turkish honour and 
self-respect," quoted in Bedi N. Sehsuvaro&lu, Hekim Bir Siyasimizin Portresi: Bilyukelci Dr. A. HuWsi Fuad 
Tugay (1972), 203.
37FO371/110788/V1073/49, Bowker to FO, 15.7.55.
38Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 55; FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3.8.55.
45
attitude of benevolent understanding" towards individual Arab states and hope that this 
attitude might help them get over their "growing pains". Although it was clear that the 
"generally powerless" Arab countries could not provide Turkey with anything comparable 
with the aid she expected from her NATO allies, it was still very important not to let the 
Arabs side with Turkey's enemies. The Arab countries could still offer Turkey and her 
Western allies some strategic facilities for the projected regional defence arrangements. After 
being deprived of their sovereignty for more than five centuries, the Arabs were "far from 
having established their national identity and sense of responsibility". This was thought to be 
the principal reason for their "inconsistent" policies and their "unstable" internal situation. 
The Arabs were susceptible to Soviet propaganda because they viewed co-operation with the 
West, and in particular with former mandatory powers, as "an issue of sovereignty". Their 
problems with Israel had pushed the Soviet threat, for most of them, to the background and 
had even made some "see the Soviet Union as an element of counterbalance".
The conference deduced that, for various reasons-including the long-standing feud 
between the Hashimites and Saudis-there was no cohesive Arab attitude towards the policy 
of mutual security pursued by Turkey. "The sentiments of the Arabs towards Turkey" were 
"basically positive" and excuses made by Arab governments, that "public opinion" did not 
permit co-operation with Turkey, were unacceptable. Those governments were simply using 
"the sensitivity of the public opinion" for internal political reasons; to avoid co-operation; and 
to pursue a short-sighted foreign policy. The Arab press did "not generally reflect the wishes 
of the people," and the circulation of newspapers in the Arab world was very small. "In fact," 
stated the final working paper, "there is really no such a thing as a real public opinion in these 
countries".
The participants agreed that the Turkish-Pakistani agreement had stimulated among 
Arabs some "constructive" political thinking. The argument that Turkey, by co-operating 
with the West, had turned her back on the Muslim world, had been proved incorrect. In order 
to capitalise on this positive mood, Turkey should pursue a more active policy with the Arab 
states. The latter, "having been administered by other powers for a long time," were "more 
liable to show respect to power and prestige". They would probably be impressed by fiiendly 
Turkish gestures, cultural contacts, invitations and exchange of official visits. Such measures 
would help erase the negative memories of the past. The conference decided to open a 
Turkish news agency office in Beirut; set up friendship associations and parliamentary 
groups; provide scholarships for training programs; and organise naval visits.
The conference also decided that this goodwill campaign must be carried on according to 
the individual characteristics of each country. The attitude of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
towards the Turkish-Pakistani agreement was judged negative, and it was decided that, after
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having been rebuffed so many times in the past, an exception should be made for Egypt in this 
general policy, and this decision explained to other Arab states. The accession of Arab states 
to the Turkish-Pakistani agreement was deemed important to fill the geographical gap 
between the two signatories and thus turn the agreement into something useful and 
constructive. It was thought that Syria, Lebanon and Jordan would continue then "wait and 
see" policy, while Iraq, although willing to join, was simply lacking the courage to do so.
Finally, the conference instructed that the proposed rapprochement with the Arab world 
must not involve any change in Turkey's policy of friendship with Israel. It was 
acknowledged that "Turkey's recognition of Israel and the normalization of relations with 
her" had "made a negative impression in the Arab world". The conference nevertheless 
backed Menderes's expressed view that the Arab countries should acknowledge the reality of 
the existence of Israel and that a solution should be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
according to the existing realities.
This conference was a real turning point in Turkey's Middle Eastern policy. It was the 
first-ever dedicated entirely to Turkish-Arabic political relations, and its convening was an 
unmistakable sign of the importance Turkey attached to the strengthening of ties with the 
Arab world, hoping eventually to join forces with them against the Soviet Bloc. Its directives 
are a useful summary of the general mood of thinking prevalent at the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry in mid-1954, and rather unfortunately in that sense, cannot be praised as a major 
success. They make crystal-clear that the Turkish foreign policy decision-making elite was, at 
the time, generally ignorant about and found it extremely hard to understand and explain the 
latest developments in the Arab world. The Turkish attitude can be easily teimed as 
patronising, being imbued with a deep conviction that the only way open to the Arabs to 
attain maximum security was through following the Turkish path. The exclusion of Egypt 
from the list of Arab countries to be approached shows how easily Turkish leaders felt 
frustrated whenever then views were cold-shouldered. Writing on the conference almost 35 
years later, one of its participants, Ismail Soysal, the charge d'affaires in Syria, admitted that, 
at the time, "the new trends and new leaders of recently independent Arab countries were not 
sufficiently known in Turkey" and, hence, "the evaluations made were in any case superficial 
and affected by prejudice". Soysal, to-date the only published detailed source of the 
proceedings of this conference, states that he and his colleague in Cairo, Mahmut Dikerdem, 
"said at that meeting that they could not endorse the above comment on Arab public 
opinion". This statement can also be interpreted that all others present, including Menderes 
and Bayar, shared or, at least did not object to, that opinion. Indeed, the views expressed 
during the conference dominated Turkish political thinking in the following four* years, both 
during crises-management or long-term planning.
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Menderes seems to have been the main source of the ideas adopted during the 
conference, some of which contradicted the Turkish point of view presented to Dulles in May 
1953. "Dulles' desire to remain faithful to the idea of cooperation at all costs with the Arab 
countries," wrote Soysal, together with Menderes's determination "to do all in his power to 
follow the route traced by the USA" were taken into account in fixing the objective 
described. ^ ^ This inevitably brings in the question why was there this sudden change. The 
Turkish archives being inaccessible, it is difficult to penetrate into the depths of their political 
and strategic thinking. It may be that the views expressed to Dulles had simply been a 
manifestation of one of the occasional troughs Turkish enthusiasm to co-operate with the 
Arab world on defence matters seemed to plunge into from time to time. The conclusion of 
the Balkan alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia might have also encouraged supporters of 
regional co-operation. Some contemporary observers, followed by a not negligible group of 
later historians, tried to find at least part of the answer in Turkey's fast deteriorating 
economic prospects.40 The government hoped that additional Western aid could be a way 
out of the crisis, and a more determined Turkish foreign policy in pursuance of Western goals 
was probably thought to be very important to create the right atmosphere to gain access to 
foreign aid.
Another sign of the growing Turkish interest in the Arab world was that, on November 1, 
Pr esident Bayar devoted more of his annual speech at the opening of the regular session of 
the GNA to the possibilities of Middle East collaboration than to any other aspect of Turkish 
foreign policy, whereas, on the same occasion in the previous two years, Turkey's relations 
with the Arab world had received no mention at all. Bayar expressed sympathy towards Arab 
states and made friendly references to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, expressing hope that the 
Turkish-Pakistani agreement would develop, with the fiill co-operation of all Turkey's 
neighbours, into a real defence organisational
Nuri and the Turkish-Iraqi Rapprochement
Nuri had long advocated close Arab co-operation with the West, and with Britain in 
particular. He now saw in Washington's readiness to provide arms to individual Middle 
Eastern states, in return for their co-operation in the "Northern Tier" project, a golden 
opportunity for Arab countries to improve their defence capability and influence the West to
3^All quotes are from Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 53-57.
4^See details in Ergun Ozbudun(ed), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey (1988), 76; AJhmad, 
Experiment, 52-53, 135, 138.
4 *F0371/112925/WK1022/7, Bowker to Eden, 9.12.55. See texts of respective speeches in Av. Kazim 
Ozturk(ed), CumhurbaskanlarTnm T. BuyiikMilletMeclisini Agi§ Nutuklan (1969), 481-554, 576-78.
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agree to some of tlieir demands as regards Palestine. Nuri contended that the issue of Arab- 
Westem co-operation had been settled, in theory at least, back in 1949, when the Arab 
League Political Committee had concluded that the Arabs could not co-operate with the 
Communist states without themselves becoming Communist and submitting to the dictates of 
the Communist Bloc, or remain neutral between East and West because they did not have the 
means to do so. They could, however, co-operate with the West provided the questions of 
the Suez Canal base and Palestine were settled42
Nuri greeted the Turkish-Pakistani agreement as an inadequate, but nevertheless positive, 
step towards eventual Arab-Western co-operation. He proposed giving more prominence in 
the said agr eement to Article 51 of the UN Charter by widening, with US approval, the scope 
of its above-mentioned Article 4, particularly its sub-section (c), which covered consultation 
and co-operation to study and determine, should an unprovoked external attack occur against 
one of the signatories, the ways and extent of co-operation which might be effected between 
them in accordance with the said Article 51, Nuri also suggested that the situation referred to 
as "unprovoked aggression" should be defined in such a way so as to include any aggression 
by Israel on her neighbours.43
After reassuming the premiership, Nuri tried to work out some new defence arrangement 
with the UK and USA. His high-handed measures against the Iraqi left were intended to wipe 
out every kind of opposition imaginable that might arise against his efforts to that effect. 
Soon after his Paris meeting with 'Abd al-Ilah, and even before his return to Baghdad, Nuri 
paid a private visit to London and had informal meetings with FO officials. He preferred, at 
this stage, not to join the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, but form a separate grouping with 
Pakistan, in which, he hoped, Britain would play a part.44 He did not object to Iraq being 
associated with Turkey in a large regional grouping, but disliked the idea of signing a smaller 
pact with Turkey, arguing that the Turks were unpopular in Iraq and other Arab states, and
42FO371/110787/V1073/ll, Troutbeck to Eden, 10.3.54; FO371/110791/V1076/34, Troutbeck to 
Shuckburgh, 10.9,54.
43Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 54; FO371/110787/V1073/35, Hooper to Allen, 14.4.54; ibid., -131. The UK 
ambassador in Egypt, Sir Ralph Stevenson, reported that Nuri believed that Article 51 "provided for collective 
arrangements among the Arab states while Article 52 provided for the other powers"; see 
FO371/110786/V1072/27, Stevenson to FO, 18.9.54. Article 52 guarantees the freedom of member-states to 
forge regional arrangements or agencies to maintain international peace and security, provided they are 
consistent with the UN purposes and principles. It says that the UN members entering into such arrangements 
or consulting with such agencies should make every effort to achieve, through them, pacific settlement of 
local disputes before referring the issues to the Security Council, and that the Security Council should, in 
turn, encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such arrangements or 
agencies. The US State Department disagreed with Nuri's interpretation of Article 52 and opined that it 
seemed inappropriate as a legal framework for the defence arrangements they were working towards; see 
FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 2, 2403.
44FO371/110788/V1073/52, Shuckburgh to Hooper, 20.7.54.
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were still suspected of liarbouring irredentist designs in Northern Iraq. The assurances Nuri 
later received personally from Menderes that Turkey did not entertain any territorial 
I ambitions outside those stated in the 1920 Turkish National Pact, did not allay his fears, for 
the pact's terminology as regards Mosul and Kirkuk was too v a g u e . 45 Nuri told the British 
that it had been agreed, during his private visit to Karachi in April, that, under a treaty limited 
to Iraq and Pakistan, "Iraq would not undertake any obligation to go to the aid of Pakistan, 
but if Israel were to attack Iraq or her neighbours, Pakistan would undertake to come to their 
aid, provided the United States saw no objection, because the Pakistanis reasoned that the 
success of the scheme depended on American military a i d " . 46 Nuri said that the projected 
Iraq-Pakistan pact "would be open to accession by any country interested in the peace of the 
area"-except France47-and clarified that its purpose "would be to enable the United 
Kingdom to join at a later stage". With British participation, Iraq and Britain "could broach 
the question of revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty". A pact of this kind could develop either to
(a) a regional defence organisation based on the Arab League with Egyptian participation; or
(b) a more limited sub-regional alliance, whereby Syria and Lebanon would join the projected 
Iraqi-Pakistani treaty and thus ensure Iraq's lines of communication with the Mediterranean. 
Nuri had already spoken informally about his plans to American and, on matters relating to 
Syria and Lebanon, French officials. He also raised in London the possibility, perhaps to 
impress upon his hosts his determination to forge a new alliance, that Iraq might even have to 
leave the Arab League if Egypt refused to join the projected g r o u p i n g .  48
Thus, by August 1954, the situation in the Middle East as regards a possible 
breakthrough in collective defence negotiations seemed to have drastically improved. Besides 
Turkey's renewed determination to court the Arabs and Nuri's desire to revise Iraq's treaty 
arrangements with Britain, a solution to the long Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the Suez base 
had also been reached, with Britain agreeing to have the base evacuated within two years. 
Some 1,200 British civilian technicians would stay behind to maintain the base for a period of 
seven years. Britain would also retain some of her stores, promising to return them to Egypt 
after seven years. Egypt, in return, conceded the right of British troops to return to the base if 
any ALCSP member or Turkey were attacked from o u t  s id e .  4 9 Till this agreement, Britain 
had shown little enthusiasm for the "Northern Tier" scheme. She had viewed the extension of
45FO371/110788/V1073/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27.10.54; FO371/110791/V1076/16, 26 & 44; F0371/ 
U0991/VQ1015/83, Troutbeck to Eden, 11.9.54.
46FO371/110788/V1073/52, Shuckburgh to Hooper, 20.7.54; FO371/110791/V1073/69, Troutbeck to 
Falla, 27.10.54; FO371/110787/V1073/39, Troutbeck to Allen, 27.4.54.
4^See also infra.
48FO371/110788/V1073/52, Shuckburgh to Hooper, 20.7.54.
49JaIal, "Baghdad Pact", 430-31.
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US aid to Iraq with suspicion and thought that the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, with its 
potential damage on relations with India, would not contribute to Middle East defence. Now, 
the air bases Britain possessed in Iraq suddenly acquired additional strategic importance. 
Nuri's proposal, that a "Northern Tier" arrangement could help revise the 1930 treaty, 
softened British scepticism and made her go by a scheme that excluded Egypt. 50 She hoped 
that this projected arrangement would satisfy Iraqi nationalist opinion, while preserving the 
spirit of the abortive Portsmouth Treaty. 5 1
For Nuri, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement unexpectedly opened up other prospects as well, 
which, for a while at least, seemed to usher a radical shift in his plans for defence co­
operation with the West. On 14 August, the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Major 
Salah Salim, held meetings in Sarsank, Northern Iraq, with senior Iraqi politicians and 
members of the Royal Family. He claimed that previous Egyptian opposion to defence co­
operation with non-Ar ab states had been because of her fear of isolation. Things, however, 
had changed since the base agreement 52 Although Egypt would continue to oppose the 
Turkish-Pakistani pact and all defence arrangements with non-Arab countries, she saw merit 
in and was ready to work towards co-operation with West. Salim claimed he had full powers 
to reach with Iraq an understanding, written or otherwise, on the "formulation of a general 
policy covering the relations of the Arab States with the West including the defence aspects 
of this p o l i c y ^  Nuri, therefore, suggested an idea which had always appealed to him 
personally, i.e. modifying the ALCSP to meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and permit membership of regional non-Arab and Western states. Salim seemed to 
like it. Although no draft agreement was drawn up in the end, both sides agreed in principle 
to approach individually both Britain and the USA to seek their views on the modifications 
required in the ALCSP text in order to expand it into an effective regional defence
organisation. 54
Nuri was delighted with this preliminary agreement. He used with the US ambassador 
every argument he could think of to make Washington agree to the proposal. He urged its 
adoption because the objectives of MEDO and the Turkish-Pakistani agr eement would thus 
be achieved more quickly and the Arabs brought into regional defence through a scheme put 
forward by themselves. Nuri proposed that, in the expanded pact, with US and UK
50FO371/110788/V1073/56, CRO outward telegram, [n.d.].
^Devereux, Formulation, 166; Decker, Policy, 199-200, 222.
52FO371/110996/YQ10316/2, Hooper to Falla, 28.7.54; FO371/110791/V1076/16, Troutbeck to 
Shuckburgh, 2.9.54.
53FO371/110996/VQ10316/3, Stevenson to FO, 10.8.54.
^^Al-Armanazi, 'Ashr sanawat, II, 126-27; FO371/110788/V1073/56, CRO outward telegram. For Nuri 
previously advocating a similar expansion of ALCSP, see FO371/104236/E1197/1, Troutbeck to FO, 16.2.53.
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participation, the Arab members should pledge troops and military support to each other 
against aggression from whatever source, as well as provide general support to its non-Arab 
members. There would be no question of Arab troops being sent abroad. Nuri was also 
quietly confident that, in such circumstances, Egypt would agree to the reactivation of the 
Suez Canal base in the event of an external attack on Iran. Britain and the USA could provide 
military and technical aid to the pact's Arab members in peace-time and promise to send 
aimed forces in case of hostilities. Nuri said that "the proposed pact had the merit of 
concentrating attention of Arab States on Soviet menace and diverting it from Israel," and 
one of its functions would be to prepare for peace with Israel in accordance with the spirit of 
the 1947-49 UN resolutions. UK accession would render the 1930 treaty obsolete, and new 
arrangements might be negotiated under which the two air bases would revert to Iraq, but 
agreements drafted by technical experts would regulate their use by Britain and all other 
signatories. Nuri preferred not to invite France because her influence in Syria and North 
Africa was "distastefixl" to all Arabs, and because she-as he later told UK ambassador Sir 
John Troutbeck-'could make no contribution to Middle East defence". Nuri's proposal 
seemed to have the general consent of Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, who was more flexible, however, 
on the issue of French adherence, thinking that there would be no difficulty about including 
France if Britain insisted. ^  Washington was not impressed, however. Dulles was "greatly 
disturbed" at Iraq's apparent moving away from the Turkish-Pakistani agreement and even 
entertained the idea of reminding her of the aid agreement p r o v i s i o n s . ^
hi order to continue to build on the understanding reached in Sarsank, Nuri met in Cairo 
on September 14, with Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. The meeting-the last 
between the two-convinced Nuri that Salim's superiors did not share his enthusiasm in 
Sarsank. ^  No verbatim record of the meeting has been published and both parties seem to 
have left the chamber with differing perceptions of each other's position. However, from the 
testimonies of some of the meeting's junior participants, it can be deduced with certainty that 
Nuri did most of the talking. He later claimed to have told 'Abd al-Nasir that Egypt, having 
reached an agr eement with Britain, which affected all ALCSP signatories, should now work 
to modify that pact so as to improve the general defence of the Middle East with Western 
assistance. Egypt could thus counteract Arab criticism that she reached with Britain an 
agreement concerning them with no prior consultation. However, if, for Egypt, the moment
55FO371/110791/V1076/l, Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 24.8.54; ibid., -/3, Hooper to FO, 20.8.54; 
F0371/ 110791/V I076/7, Troutbeck to FO, 1.9.54. The UN resolutions Nuri had in mind were those calling 
for partition of Palestine between two, Jewish and Arab, states; internationalisation of Jerusalem; and return 
of Arab refugees to their homes.
56FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 545-46.
^Al-Jamali, review of Iraq, 17.
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was yet inopportune for such a move, Iraq would tlien feel obliged to go ahead with her 
separate arrangements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. 'Abd al-Nasir, in the end, told Nuri 
that he was free to do whatever he wished. What he really meant is not fully clear. Nuri took 
it as a somewhat reluctant green light. He thought that 'Abd al-Nasir's cautious attitude 
emanated from his concern that the internal situation in Egypt was not yet ripe for any 
advance towards organised Middle East defence and from his belief that an Iraqi-Pakistani 
Pact could completely side-track Egypt and other Arab s t a t e s .  5 8 "The Egyptians for 
domestic reasons were unwilling for the next two years or so to consider his ideas for a 
regional pact," Nmi said, but they would probably leave him free to work for some form of 
regional grouping, which would allow Egypt to join later, if she so d e s i r e d .  59 Nuri's 
optimism was probably not groundless, for, in an off-the-record press interview on 16 
December 1954, the British embassy in Cairo reported, Abd al-Nasir admitted to have told 
Nmi that Egypt had no alternative but to be on the side of the West, but was unable to accept 
his arguments that Iraq should join the Turkish-Pakistani Pact. He confessed having 
"indicated that i f  Iraq insisted on going ahead, Egypt would raise no objection. He had 
promised that there would be no attacks on Iraq in the Egyptian press but had made it clear 
that Egypt would not be able to support such a move by Iraq in the Arab League [emphases 
added]". He also admitted favouring the inclusion of Iran in the base-reactivation clause of 
any revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty.66 With the amended ALCSP option having reached a dead 
end, Nmi returned to some of his previous options. Immediately after leaving Egypt, he paid 
a lengthy visit to London, where, he was reportedly thinking of three possible arrangements: 
one, including Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Britain; a second, embracing Iraq, Turkey, Iran 
and Britain; and a third, limited to Iraq, Pakistan and Britain.6*
It is evident that, throughout his negotiations, Nmi emphasised different aspects of his 
projected pact to different parties. To the Americans, he stressed the Communist threat and 
tried to show the projected pact as a means to overcome the Arab conflict with Israel; with 
Turks and Pakistanis, he sought then support against Israel; with Britain, he pushed forward 
the idea of revising the 1930 treaty. The US charge d'affaires in Baghdad, Phillip W. Ireland, 
reported that Nmi was "adept [to] any tailoring [of] his argument to fit [the] listener on 
h a n d " . 62 Future developments unmistakably show, however, that, besides the strengthening 
of his regime's standing at home, the treaty revision and the improvement of the general Arab
5 8Marr, Iraq, 117; F 0371/110791/VI076/22, Stevenson to FO, 16.9.54. ^  ^  ) ' ‘ r j !'
59FO371/110788/V1073/56, CRO outward telegram [n.d.]. tW  - '»*•
60FO371/l 10788/V1073/88, Murray to FO, 17.12.54. ^
6lF 0371/l 10791/V1076/36, Falla to Troutbeck, 24.9,54. ''"  /
62FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 2, 2390.
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position vis-a-vis Israel were primarily what concerned him.63 Nuri could have, after all, 
simply allowed the 1930 treaty to lapse in 1957. He understood well, however, that the 
continuation of the British connection was essential for the survival of the Hashimite 
monarchy and the corresponding status quo in Iraq. By claiming to have terminated this 
unpopular treaty, he could present it as a major national achievement, but it was extremely 
improbable that he would be able to get any converts from the ranks of his opponents. Even 
after having forced the opposition underground, he was anxious, like al-Jamah before him, 
not to be obliged to pass the new arrangements with Britain through Parliament, probably to 
prevent the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty fiasco. Nuri planned to get the Iraqi Parliament ratify an 
initial agreement, preferably with Pakistan, and thereafter obtain the adherence of other 
powers, including Britain. Once the UK had joined, he would terminate the Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty. The military facilities which Britain required in Iraq-probably on the lines of the 
Portsmouth treaty-could be negotiated between general staffs and need not come up for 
political ratification at any stage.64 Furthermore, a comparative analysis of his actions and 
various proposals show that Nuri, thus far, was consistently unwilling to enter an agreement 
limited regionally to Iraq and Turkey, and was against the inclusion of France in any final 
arrangement.
The absence of Iran from Nuri's informal soundings should be explained only in terms of 
timing. Nuri made no secret of his desire to involve Iran in Middle East defence. 65 The Shah, 
too, having reasserted effective control over Iranian foreign policy, wished to join the 
"Northern Tier". Both Britain and the USA, however, thought that Iran, weakened 
economically because of the international oil boycott against the deposed regime of 
Muhammad Musaddiq, could still not support a large army to contribute effectively to Middle
East defence. 66
Although Nuri undeniably preferred to conclude the initial deal with Pakistan, he had 
overlooked that, among all his candidates to enter his projected treaty, only Turkey shared his 
determination to conclude an early agreement. Menderes had already sensed that Nuri was 
not only reluctant to join the Turkish-Pakistani pact outright, but "seemed anxious to set up a 
rival grouping" to the latter, thus "making a not very positive contribution to Middle East 
defence",67 When Prince 'Abd al-Hah paid a private visit to Istanbul to enquire about the 
health of his cousin, Talal, the ex-King of Jordan, Menderes insisted that he should stay as an
6^See also Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, Dhikrayat wa ‘ibar: karithat Filastin wa-atharuha fi al-waqi' al- 
'arabi{\965\ 114.
64F0371/110791/V1076/43, FO to Baghdad, 6.10.54.
65FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 549.
66Young, Foreign Policy, 170-71.
67FO371/110769/V1015/3, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 27.8.54.
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official guest and engaged him in political d i s c u s s i o n s .  6 8 Menderes emphasised that it was 
absurd to think that the Arab states could constitute among themselves the basis of a defence 
system for the Middle East. No such system could be effective without Turkey and Britain. 
Finally, both agreed that if Nuri refused <noi? adhere to the Turkish-Pakistani pact, Iraq and 
Turkey should instead explore the possibilities of entering into a separate bilateral 
arrangement which could later be combined with the Turkish-Pakistani p a c t .  69
Nuri himself visited Istanbul for ten days on his way home from London in October. ^  
His meetings with Menderes proved decisive. According to Turkish sources, it took several 
days of bruising exchanges to make Nuri retreat front his preoccupation with the Israeli threat 
to regional security.7! It became apparent that both sides shared the same objectives to 
establish a grouping to include most Arab states, plus Ban and Pakistan, preferably with-but, 
if necessary, without-Syria, in close association with Britain and the USA. Menderes did not 
press Iraq to join the Turkish-Pakistani agreement and made it plain that "Turkey was quite 
ready to modify it, or incorporate it in something else". He also "fully accepted" the principle 
"that Iraqi forces should not be employed outside Iraq" .7^ Menderes suggested that Turkey 
and Iraq should sign a pact of mutual assistance in the event of an external attack. Nuri was 
not immediately pleased with this proposal because of his suspicion about Turkish irredentist 
designs on Mosul.73 He agreed, however, that talks should continue and that both sides 
should also pursue contacts with other Arab countries. Menderes accepted an invitation to 
Baghdad, later fixed for 6 January. He encouraged Nuri that any new regional agreement 
should allow Britain to continue enjoying defence facilities in Iraq. Turkey, too, was most 
concerned that Britain should not withdraw from the Middle East. "In present 
circumstances," continued Menderes, "if there were a choice between Cyprus remaining in 
British hands or being returned to Turkey he would prefer that it should remain in British
68^0371/112922/WK1013/20, Political Summary, Ankara, 26 August-11 September 1954. Talal had 
abdicated in 1952, after having been pronounced mentally unfit to reign. He stayed in a mental asylum in 
Istanbul until his death in 1976.
69FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 551; F0371/110791/V1076/20, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO,
14.9.54. The first source ascribes the original proposal to this effect to 'Abd al-Ilah; the second, to Menderes. 
When King Husayn of Jordan had also visited Istanbul privately, on August 23, to see his father, Talal, the 
Turkish govermnent had again wished to receive him officially. Husayn accepted the invitation and held long, 
but inconclusive, discussions about regional defence matters. He abstained from any commitment claiming 
that, with no govermnent ministers at his side, he was unprepared for political discussions and that the 
moment was inappropriate because his country was preparing for elections; see H.M. King Hussein of Jordan, 
Uneasy Lies the Head: An Autobiography (1962), 83-84; F0371/112955/WK1941/1-2; F0371/110774/ 
V1025/1.
^Decker, Policy, 84 says Nuri prolonged his stay to be meet a visiting Pakistani military delegation.
^Axelgard, Policy, 152.
72FO371/110788/V1073/63, Bowker to FO, 21.10.54.
73FO371/110788/Vl073/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27.10.54.
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hands" for Britain's occupation of Cyprus was "essential for her participation in Middle East 
defence". In return, Nuri asked Turkey to support the principle that Israel should abide by the 
UN resolutions on Palestine. Zorlu thought that the talks had generally dissipated Nuri's 
suspicions and misapprehensions about Turkey's position and aims, and established a basis of 
common Turkish-Iraqi approach to the problem of Middle East d e f e n c e .  ^ 4 Troutbeck 
thought this appraisal was over-optimistic, for, even after the visit, Nuri remained suspicious 
of Turkish aims in Northern Iraq and attributed Turkish opposition to any future Iraqi- 
Pakistani pact to "a certain jealousy".M enderes, however, was not a politiciahf who gave 
up easily. His determination, together with the lack of any practical alternative for Nuri, 
ultimately proved decisive for the formulation of the Baghdad Pact.
Turkey and Syria: A Slower Pace
Turkey's task to bring Syria into a "Northern Tier" arrangement promised to be more 
difficult. Despite the relative thaw in Turkish-Syrian relations during the last months of Adib 
al-Shishakh's rule, Turkey did not regret the latter's downfall in a military coup on 25 
February 1954, for his attitude toward the projected Turkish-Pakistani pact had been hostile 
and, probably, privately fearful as well that the eventual inclusion of his arch-enemy, Iraq, in 
this arrangement might not bode well for his own future.
The new regime was greeted with general approval inside Syria. Charge d'Affaires 
Soysal, too, believed that "the new regime, possibly comparable with Iraq," would "be in 
Turkish interests" .The plotters asked former President Hashim al-Atasi-who had resigned 
in 1951 following al-Shishakli's coup-to resume his constitutional duties. Sabri al-'Asali 
formed an interim government, conservative in outlook, excluding radical elements like the 
Ba'th Party. International, including Turkish, recognition followed, when this government 
formally agreed to honour all international engagements entered into by al-Shishakli.
Turkey did not take seriously rumours that Iraq, who had encouraged and financed al- 
Shishakli's opponents, would now try to bring about a union with Syria. Baghdad was told 
that Turkey would adopt a "strictly neutral" attitude towards any Arab unity project, 
"especially whilst those projects were still only at a such very nebulous stage".^7 There was 
very little speculation, too, in the Turkish press on such a possibility and its implications for
the Turkish-Pakistani pact.78
74Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 58-61; FO371/110788/V1073/63, Bowker toFO, 21.10.54.
75FO371/I10788/V1073/67, Troutbeck to FO, 21.10.54; ibid., -/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27.10.54.
76F0371/111140/VY1016/75, Gardener to FO, 4.3.54.
77F 0371/11 0 7 8 5 m 071/18, Scott Fox to Boothby, 6.2.54.
78po37i/H2922/WK1013/6, Political Summary, Ankara, 25 February-10 March 1954.
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The new Syrian government gave Turkey almost nothing to complain about. It was 
cautiously positive toward the Turkish-Pakistani pact and defended Iraq's right to conclude 
an aid agreement with Washington, hi June, it agreed to exchange ministers with Turkey after 
a long interregnum during which both legations had been in the hands of charges d'affaires. It 
also suspended the application of the controversial aliens' property law of 1952 on Turkish 
nationals and introduced a bill amending the restrictions that had angered Ankara. Great care 
was taken to solve frontier disputes quickly and a m ic a b ly .  ^ 9
Turkey took an exceptional interest in the Syrian parliamentary elections, held eventually 
on September 24-25. Prime Minister al-Ghazzi, who was heading another interim 
government at the time, was told before the elections that "while Turkey did not care which 
right wing party won the elections she would not tolerate the formation of left wing 
Government in Syria". Al-Ghazzi, an advocate of closer ties with Turkey himself decided to 
capitalise on these Turkish worries, telling Soysal "strictly confidentially" that he had annulled 
the elections in al-Qamishli on some faked technical fault so that two Kurdish Communist 
candidates would not be elected. 80
These favourable signs encouraged Turkey to attempt to associate herself with the 
Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The USA, Britain and France had jointly specified in this 
declaration that they would not tolerate any renewal of war to change forcibly the existing 
armistice lines between Arabs and Israel and would regulate the flow of arms and war 
material in order to prevent an aims race in the Middle East, supplying weapons only after 
receiving undertakings that the recipient states would not use them for aggressive 
p u r p o s e s .  Ankara first offered to adhere to this declaration in May to the visiting Assistant 
US Secretary of State for the Near East, Henry Byroade, and later officially endorsed the 
proposal during the above-described conference of Turkish diplomats. "This was not merely a 
question of prestige for Turkey," said Eralp. Turkey "considered that it was essential that she 
and the three Western Powers should act in common in all questions concerning the Middle 
East". Moreover, Turkey "being the Power concerned in the first degree with the stability and
^Lesch, Syria, 48; FO371/110787/V1073/31, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 27.3.54; 
F0371/110788/V1073/50, Chancery, Ankara to Western and Southern Departments, 6.7.54; F0371/ 
111138/VY1013/5 & 8, Political Summary, Damascus, April & July 1954; FO371/111150/VY10344/3, 
Gardener to FO, 19.7.54.
80FO371/111141/VY1016/117, Gardener to FO, 26.9.54. The Iraqi minister in Damascus thought that 
al-Ghazzi had somewhat edited the facts to impress Soysal, for, according to what the minister himself had 
heard from independent sources, the so-called Communist, whose election had been annulled, although a 
member of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement was not, in fact, a Communist but a local notability 
unacceptable to the army; see FO371/111141/VY1016/123, Gardener to Falla, 30.9.54.
^ S ee  full text in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 308-11.
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ecurity of the area, he ought to participate in the document which guaranteed the status 
quo".82
Washington, however, ultimately did not encourage the Turkish initiative. It doubted 
whether Turkish adherence would give the Tripartite Declaration greater weight in Arab 
eyes, because the latter were still looking upon Turkey as a puppet of "imperialist" powers 
and resented her cordial relations with Israel. 8  ^ Moreover, Washington was determined not 
to prejudice in any way the chances of pro-Western candidates in the upcoming Syrian 
elections. 8^
Turkey's own attempts to get a direct Syrian approval were also unsuccessful. The Syrian 
government, being sceptical towards the suggestion from the start, contacted Iraq and Egypt 
and found that both shared similar views.85 The Syrian government first replied that, because 
of its purely transitional nature, the time was not suitable to raise the issue. When Turkey 
persisted, the government felt obliged to tell her frankly that neither itself nor the Syrian 
public favoured Turkish adherence,8^ unless the declaration embodied some endorsement of 
the 1947-49 UN resolutions on Palestine.8 ^  The Syrians probably added the latter condition 
not to make then rejection seem too categorical. By mid-August, Ankara realised that "at any 
rate for the time being," it had to hold its hand as regards requesting participation in the 
declaration.88 The proposal never re-surfaced, for Egypt's arms deal with the Soviet Bloc in 
September 1955 made the entire logic behind the declaration obsolete.
Still, Soysal told the British embassy in Damascus in early December that Turkey hoped 
that sometime in the future, once relations had been sufficiently improved, she would be in a 
good position to encourage Syria to co-operate with the West and adhere to a Western- 
backed regional defence alliance. The present Syrian government, he thought, wanted to 
come to terms with Turkey and was prepared to put the question of Alexandretta on one side 
to achieve this aim It could count on the support of an influential pro-Turkish element in 
Syria with strong backing from religious groups anxious for a rapprochement with an 
adjoining Muslim country. An officially inspired article on Turkish-Arab relations, published 
in almost all Damascus newspapers on November 24, had pictured a rosy future, emphasising 
the close historical ties between the two peoples and proposing some measures to improve
82F0371/110773/V1024/17, Bowker to FO, 31.7.54; FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bo\ricer to Eden, 3.8.54.
83F0371/110773/V1024/10, Scott Fox to Falla, 26.5.54; FO371/110773/V1024/11, Bailey to Brewis,
9.6.54.
8^Lesch, Syria, 50.
85FO371/llU41/VY1016/123, Gardener to Falla, 30.9.54; F0371/U0773/V1024/30, Gardener to Eden,
27.8.54.
8^F0371/110773/V1024/19, Gardener to Falla, 3.8.54.
87FO371/110773/V1024/27, Gardener toFO, 23.8.54.
88FO371/110773/V1024/25, Bowker to FO, 17.8.54.
58
Turkish-Syrian bilateral ties on matters of secondary i m p o r t a n c e . ^ 9  The regular annual 
conference of governors of the provinces on either side of the Turkish-Syrian border, held in 
Gaziantep (Turkey), to discuss frontier incidents, water rights, smuggling and other thorny 
issues, had been very friendly and received a very favourable Syrian press.90 In this 
optimistic mood, even the usual anti-Turkish demonstration on the anniversary of the loss of 
AlexandrettaOl had not dampened Soysal's enthusiasm. Ankara had been encouraged by his 
reports to the extent that Menderes was now thinking seriously about adding Damascus to 
Baghdad and Beirut on his itinerary for the following J a n u a r y .92
According to Soysal, the Turks thought it likely that Syria's future attitude would depend 
upon Egypt's willingness to co-operate with the West,93 but even in this direction things 
seemed to be moving at last. Since Egypt's decision to allow British troops to return to the 
Suez Canal base if Turkey were attacked, 'Abd Al-Nasir had made some pleasant public 
remarks about Turkish friendship with Egypt and the Ar ab w o r l d , 94 and both countries had 
consented to renew the exchange ambassadors after the previous Turkish ambassador, Dr A. 
Hulusi Fuad Tugay, had been stripped of his diplomatic immunity and expelled from Egypt 
earlier that year for criticising 'Abd al-Nasir publicly for his decision to confiscate the 
property of the members of the former Egyptian royal family, including that of Tugayk 
w i f e . 95 Menderes even hoped to meet 'Abd al-Nasir "at any time and place he might choose" 
and try to get from him some sort of statement to the effect that a bilateral agreement 
between Turkey and Iraq would not be at variance with the Arab L eague.9b He told Bowker 
on December 11 that
the atmosphere in the Middle East was improving. Until recently it had been a case of 
trying to urge the Arab States along a road which they were reluctant to take. Now 
they themselves were showing willingness to follow it on then own free will... The 
Turkish Government considered that progress in organising regional defence, by 
increasing the confidence of the Ar ab States, would reduce then fear of aggression
89FO371/111150/VY10344/4, Gallagher to Eden, 2.12.54.
90FO371/111150/VY10344/l & 5.
9^FO371/111138/VY1013/12, Political Summary, Damascus, November 1954.
92F0371/110788/V1073/80, Scott Fox to FO, 27.11.54.
93F 0371/111150/VY10344/4, Gallagher to Eden, 2.12.54.
94 Ahmad, Experiment, 395. According to Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study o f Post-War 
Arab Politics (1986), 208 and Lesch, Syria, 55, the Turkish-Egyptian thaw was the result of a precautionary 
move by Egypt not to be outdone and outmanoeuvred by a Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement.
9^!j>ehsuvaro£lu, Heldm, 137-38, 147-48; FO371/112922/WK1013/2, 4 & 8. Tugay was related, through 
marriage, to the deposed royal family.
96FO371/110791/V1073/27, Bowker to Eden, 14.9.54; F 0371/110783/VI056/23, Bowker to Ward,
16.11.54.
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from Israel and so to engender a readiness to accept the fact of Israel's permanent 
existence and the idea of a settlement with h e r .  97
The year 1955 was indeed to provide some of what Menderes hoped for, but it would 
hold for him some unpleasant surprises as well!
97FO371/110783/V1056/34, Bowker to Eden, 11.12.54.
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3The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact
Despite the clear warming of Turkish-Iraqi relations in the last few months of 1954, the 
declaration of intent, made in Baghdad on January 13, 1955, that Iraq and Turkey would 
soon conclude a treaty on defence co-operation came still as a surprise to most outside 
observers. By the end of the following month, the envisaged treaty had been concluded. The 
"Northern Tier" scheme now seemed closer to realisation than ever before.
The January 13 Communique
When Menderes caught the plane for Baghdad on January 6, 1955, nobody, not even the 
Turkish Premier himself, was expecting him to sign an agreement during his visit, nor was he 
taking with him any draft. The delay over his projected visit to Egypt and the unlikelihood of 
any rapid progress being made as regards persuading the majority of Ar ab states to join any 
defence arrangement immediately had convinced Menderes by now that he should first focus 
on signing with Iraq a bilateral pact similar' to the Turkish-Pakistani agreement. * The Turkish 
Premier now hoped solely that his visit to Baghdad would enable him to capitalise on his 
achievements in the past few months, to clarify Nuri's current intentions, to encourage the 
latter to make up his mind and thus inevitably take a further step towards his much deshed 
agreement.2
Nuri, too, did not have any immediate plan to sign an agreement with Turkey during 
Menderes's visit. He did not underestimate the difficulties posed by the sceptical state of 
opinion in other Arab countries and further thought that he was not yet sufficiently informed 
about the commitments which the US and UK governments were prepared to accept.3 Nuri 
still thought that March or April would be ideal to sign a new regional pact and thus 
terminate the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty.4
Nevertheless, the Iraqi government had arranged a strenuous programme of visits, 
banquets and receptions for then guests.^ No actual political talks took place until January 9.
XF037 1/110788/V1073/80, Scott Fox toFO, 27.11.54.
2FO371/110788/Vl 073/93, Bowker toFO, 31.12.54.
3FO371/115484/V1073/3, Beeley to Falla, 30.11.54; ibid., -/4, Hooper to FO, 5.1.55.
^Marr, Iraq, 117.
5FO371/115486/V1073/90, Hooper to Eden, 18.1.55.
Menderes, however, was immediately greatly impressed by the strength of the shade of 
political opinion in Iraq that was preoccupied with Israel to the exclusion of every other 
problem. So, he changed his cautious plan, thinking that the time had come to press the Iraqis 
more strongly. If the signing of a regional pact were delayed till just before the expiration of 
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, he concluded, the former would look suspiciously like a cover for the 
latter,6 and its appeal for other future potential Arab adherents would certainly diminish.
Another factor which made the Turkish delegation force the pace was their belief that 
Israel was increasingly tiying, by indirect methods, to obstruct Turkey's attempts to improve 
her relations with Arab states. They feared that the effects of these efforts might become 
more serious if some definite progress was not made immediately.7 Indeed, Israel, which had 
been delighted at Turkey's involvement in the Balkans throughout 1953, was now showing 
serious misgivings about the current Turkish determination to get closer to Iraq and Pakistan. 
Israeli diplomats were trying to convince Turkey that any alliance with Iraq would be 
worthless because of the latter's military weakness. It would be safer and cheaper to occupy 
Iraq in the event of a Soviet aggression, rather than arm her and expect her to defend herself. 
Furthermore, any alliance with Iraq and Pakistan might adversely affect Turkey's secular and 
pro-European character; embroil Turkey in confrontation with India and Israel; and, finally, 
weapons delivered to Iraq could fall into the hands of Kurdish insurgents in Turkey. ^  Turkey, 
who had always hoped that good relations with Israel would ensure her, through the Zionist 
lobby, a good press in the West and particularly the USA, now suspected that the Zionist 
lobby itself was behind articles, published in the West, which were critical of Turkey's 
domestic economy.
Menderes was the first foreign statesman ever invited to address the Iraqi Chamber of 
Deputies. He now refused to fulfil this engagement until Nuri agreed to publish a 
communique to the effect that a pact would be signed soon, while the assembled deputies 
were waiting. ^
Nuri envisaged that any initial bilateral deal with Turkey-which could be possibly 
extended to the UK, USA and other friendly powers-should remain limited to the exchange 
of information between the two army staffs about progress each made in its respective 
defence arrangements and to the free transit through both countries of defence material for
6F0371/115484/VI 073/6, Hooper to FO, 10.1.55.
7FO371/11584/V1073/5'A', BoMcer to Falla, 7.1.55.
^Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean (1987), 
72-73.
9F0371/ 11484/VI073/90, Hooper to Eden, 18.1.55; FO371/11590/V1073/219, Bowker to Eden, 8.2.55. 
See full Arabic translation of speech in Major Shakir, Tarikh al-sadaqah bayn Turkiyya wa-l-Traq (1955), 
179-80.
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the other for a five year period. ^  Under pressure from Menderes, however, he finally 
succumbed and put his signature under a statement much broader in scope. What also made 
Nuri acquiesce was the warning sounded by his Minister of the Interior, Sa'id al-Qazzaz, that 
from the security point of view, the best period to settle all outstanding external affairs would 
be the first few months of 1955, because the radical opponents of the Iraqi regime had not yet 
recovered from his harsh measures. 11
On January 13, a communique was published stating that both parties had decided to 
conclude in the immediate future a broad treaty of co-operation based on Article 51 of the 
UN Charter in order to safeguard the stability and security of the Middle East region and to 
repel any aggression committed against them "either from within the region or from outside". 
The communique expressed hope that other states "which have given proof of then 
determination to seive the objectives mentioned above, and are in a position to do so by 
virtue of then geographical position and the forces at then disposal," might sign the treaty 
concerned at the same time with themselves. Otherwise, the communique made clear, Turkey 
and Iraq would go on and sign a bilateral treaty "as rapidly as possible" and would only then 
continue then efforts to persuade powers with the above-described criteria join the treaty at a 
later date. ^  On January 18, Iraq issued a separate communique reaffirming her loyalty to the 
UN Charter and the ALCSP and stating that the proposed Turkish-Iraqi treaty would not 
conflict with either of them ^
British and American foreign policy-makers were pleasantly surprised at this unexpected 
announcement. Both, however, did not wish to appear overjoyed. 14 Both understood that 
some of then other friends and allies in the Middle East would not share then optimism 
toward the projected Turkish-Iraqi alliance. Dulles only sent private congratulatory messages 
to both Nuri and Menderes, while the State Department instructed all US missions in the 
Middle East to say, but only if approached, that Washington supported the agreement and 
was ready to assist its signatories to achieve realistic and effective defence arrangements. ^  
Eden, in a broadcast on January 17, expressed hope that the communique "would create 
increased stability and security throughout the Middle East". He, too, sent only a private 
message to Nuri, fearing that "too much open applause on our [i.e. British] part might upset
10FO371/115484/V1073/ll, Hooper to FO, 12.11.55.
1 ^ 0 3 7 1 /1 15748/VQ1015/2, Hooper to Eden, 12.11.55.
12See full text of communique in FO371/115487/V1073/137; Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 63.
See full Arabic text of Iraqi communique in Shakir, Tarikh, 176-77', English translation, in 
F0371/U5485/V1073/43, Hooper to FO, 19.1.55.
14FO371/115484/V1073/13, Hooper to FO, 13.1.55; FO371/115486/V1073/67, FO minute by 
Shuckburgh, 17.1.55.
1 Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 63; F0371/U5484/V1073/13, Hooper to FO, 13.1.55.
16F0371/115486/V1073/62, Bowker to FO, 18.155.
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the Arab countries, in particular Egypt, and bring us no compensating benefits". ^  The 
British FO bad not yet entirely discounted the possibility of eventually bringing Egypt into a 
regional arrangement. Cano, while contesting the timeliness of the Turkish-Iraqi 
communique, it reasoned, had not yet committed itself definitely to oppose it.
The Egyptian Reaction and the Cairo Conference
Initial views expressed in Cairo were indeed not entirely negative. On January 17, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Fawzi, told the US embassy Counsellor that while Cairo 
disliked the method and timing of the Turkish-Iraqi pact, it had no quarrel with its ultimate 
objective, 18 while 'Abd al-Nasir had already told two visiting American officials that he had 
expected to be given time to build an Arab regional organisation, "not linked openly with the 
West but so constructed that it could quickly fall in line with Western plans should a common 
danger arise". 19 jt appears the Egyptians had been convinced since Nuri's visit to Cairo in 
September that Iraq would not go alone in signing a defence pact with the W e s t . C a i r o  
anticipated Iraq's next move to be an agreement with Britain, bringing in Turkey in the same 
way as she had been brought into the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, and now said it would have 
had no objection even to Iraq bringing in Iran in the same way.21 The Egyptians felt let down 
by Turkey. Their ambassador in Ankara had seen Birgi before Menderes's flight to Baghdad 
and, after warning him against any attempt to deal with Iraq apart from the rest of the Arab 
League, had received assurances that the Turkish delegation would keep in close touch with 
the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad.22 Hence, an editorial in the Egyptian newspaper al- 
Akhbar had welcomed the visit as a further sign of increasing friendship between Turkey and 
the Arabs.23 The Turks, however, failed to keep then promise. They met Egyptian embassy 
officials in Baghdad only once, and that only an hour or two before the publication of the
joint communique.24
The prospect of a Turkish-Iraqi alliance left Egypt in a mood of isolation and weakened 
her bargaining power vis-a-vis the West. She feared she could not now count upon Iraqi 
assistance in any future Arab-Israeli conflict. There was also a distinct apprehension that the
17F0371/115484/V1073/32, FO to Washington, 18.1.55.
1 ^ FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 5-6. Fawzi, of course, should have said the MEC proposal and not MEDO.
l^Miles Copeland, The Game o f Nations: The Amorality o f  Power Politics (1969), 111.
^ H u n i e p h r e y  Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution (1970), 55; Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics 
and the Military 1945-1958 (1964), 273; Seale, Struggle, 211.
21FO371/115486/V1073/74, Stevenson to FO, 22.1.55.
22FO371/115489/V1073/187, Stewart to Bromley, 1.2,55.
23FO371/115750/VQ10344/l, Stevenson to FO, 11.1.55.
24FO371/115489/V1073/187, Stewart to Bromley, 1.2.55.
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proposed treaty might be the prelude to an eventual partition of Syria between the two
signatories. 25
Egypt immediately embarked on a campaign to force Iraq to retreat from commitments 
she had made in the January 13 communique or. failing that, isolate her from the rest of the 
Arab world. The Egyptian media, and especially the radio station, "Voice of the Arabs" (Sawt 
al-'Arab), went on the attack, accusing Nuri of making a treaty with the Turks, "the allies of 
Israel and the enemies of Arabism". Egypt also called, for January 22, a meeting in Cairo of 
Arab Prime Ministers to discuss future common defence policy following the Turkish-Iraqi
communique.
The conference, which dragged on until February 6-including a two-day visit by a high- 
level four-power Arab delegation to Baghdad-was attended by the Premiers of Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya. Nuri did not attend, fearing that the meeting 
would resemble a court session with Egypt sitting at the prosecutor's chan. His fortuitous 
illness provided him with a timely excuse not to attend. 22 He also told the other invitees that 
he saw no point in then attending if he himself did not go.28 Then, persuaded by the Iraqi 
ambassador in Cano, Najib al-Rawi, and a message from Eden,29 he finally agreed to send al- 
Jamali to Cairo, but gave him no authority at all to negotiate a compromise deal. Nuri 
instructed al-Jamali, who arrived in Cano on January 26, that his main task would be to keep 
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan away from bowing to Egyptian pressure, rather than make 
explanations to the latter. If Egypt became more co-operative, said Nuri, he would be willing 
to take a little time to help her forward, but if she persisted in opposing or remaining aloof, 
he would move on very quickly. 2 9 Al-Jamah explained in Cairo that the draft agreement, 
which Iraq would propose to the Turks, would only offer exchange of information on defence 
dispositions and preparations, and free passage of military supplies through either party's 
, territory to the other. 21 Nuri then told the visiting delegation that he had the unanimous 
support of his cabinet and other senior Ir aqi statesmen, and that he would proceed with the 
proposed pact.22 The conference ended inconclusively because of the absence of consensus 
among the participants. Egypt and Saudi Arabia wanted to condemn the Iraqi move as 
contradictory to the ALCSP. 'Abd al-Nasir even threatened to leave the ALCSP and form
^Evelyn Sliuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56 (1986), 249.
26FO371/h 5484/V1073/25, Stevenson to FO, 17.1.55.
27FO371/115485/V1073/59, Hooper to FO, 20.1.55.
2^FO371/115486/V1073/65, FO minute by Rose, 19,1.55,
29FO371/115486/V1073/65, FO to Bagdad, 19.1.55; FO371/115486/V1073/86, Stevenson to FO,
24.1.55.
30FO371/115487/Vl073/102, Wright to FO, 26.1.55.
3 ^ 0 3 7 1 /1 15487/VI073/108, Stevenson to FO, 27.1.55.
32FO371/115488/V1073/152, Wright to FO, 3.2.55.
instead an alternative alliance with Jordan and, perhaps, Saudi Arabia directed against Israel, 
thus leaving Lebanon and Syria susceptible to unchecked Turkish pressure.33 Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan still wavered, however. Finally, 'Abd al-Nasir suggested that the meeting should 
end without any resolution, provided that all present agreed that a new conference might be 
called in any Arab capital. 34
Despite its failure to produce even a final communique, the Cairo Conference proved 
significant in shaping the balance of power in the Arab world. Smaller states like Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon were left in no doubt on the strength of Saudi-Egyptian feeling against 
the projected pact. The mood in Cairo also convinced Nuri that it would serve absolutely no 
purpose to postpone negotiations and the conclusion of the proposed pact with Turkey, thus 
bringing him in line with Menderes's thinking.
The Turkish-Iraqi Negotiations
From then on, Turkey and Iraq proceeded at full speed towards the conclusion of the 
promised pact. Menderes wished to see the treaty concluded by mid-February.35 He was 
now convinced, based on his past experience, that the best way to deal with Nuri was the 
maintenance of constant pressure. Bowker reported on February 8 that, since leaving 
Baghdad, Menderes had sent to Nuri an average of two messages a day insisting on the 
necessity for utmost speed.3b in the meantime, the Turkish ambassador in Cairo had been 
very active on the fringes of the Premiers' Conference trying to recruit as many Arab states as 
possible to adhere to the proposed treaty or at least to persuade them take a position 
independent of Egypt. Both Iraq and Turkey wanted to extend the provisions of the future 
treaty as soon as possible to the USA, UK, as well as to other Middle Eastern countries like 
Iran, Pakistan and possibly Syria. Both preferred to have the two Western powers as original 
signatories, although they would not object to them joining a little later.
Nuri had initially had a more relaxed time-table in mind. He had told the new British 
ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Michael Wright, that he would prefer signature to take place 
during President Bayar's projected official visit to Iraq at the end of March. 37 The Egyptian 
threat to withdraw from the ALCSP, however, soon encouraged him to quicken the pace. He 
hoped that a hasty conclusion of the treaty would put great pressure on 'Abd al-Nasir to carry
33FO371/115489/V1073/189, Stevenson to FO, 9.2.55.
34FO371/115489/V1073/177, Stevenson toFO, 7.2.55; FO371/115493/V1073/336, Chancery, Ankara to 
Levant Department, 21.2.55. For a detailed description of the conference, see al-Armanazi, Ashr sanawat, II, 
133-39.
35po371/l 15488/V1073/166, HM Consul General, Istanbul to FO, 6.2.55.
36FO371/115490/V1073/219, Bowker to Eden, 8.2.55.
37FO371/115488/V1073/171, Wright to FO, 5.2.55.
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out liis vow to leave, thus self-inflicting a serious political damage of isolation from the rest 
of the Arab world.^8
The actual negotiations began in early February. They were conducted in complete 
secrecy through the embassies in Baghdad and Ankara. Both sides kept in close touch 
throughout with the British and American diplomats accredited in their respective capitals. 
Moreover, the text of the treaty was to be written in English, and both sides did not have 
cipher facilities in that language in then respective embassies. It is through the telegrams and 
reports sent to and from the Foreign Office and the British missions in Iraq and Turkey, kept 
at the Public Record Office in London, that we can today reconstruct the accurate stage-by- 
stage picture of the negotiations concerned.
Nuri had presented to Menderes, before his departure from Baghdad on January 14, a 
rough draft (called hereafter Nl), giving him also a flee hand to propose any amendment he 
considered necessary. 3 9 This draft consisted of a preamble and five articles and was based on 
Nuri's original ideas of quite limited defence co-operation between Iraq and Turkey, hi the 
preamble, both sides stressed then* conviction of the necessity to conclude a treaty based on 
the principles enshrined in the 1946 Turkish-Iraqi treaty, Article 51 of the UN Charter and 
the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, which, said the draft (Nl), "considered that any 
attack on Turkey or any other member State of the Arab League should necessitate taking 
defensive measures to preserve peace and security in this region”. Its main provisions, 
stipulated in Articles 1 and 2, stood as follows:
Article 1
Consultations and discussions shall be held between the respective competent military 
authorities of the two high contracting parties for the purpose of obtaining reciprocal 
information regarding security measures and defence plans in countries of the high 
contracting parties. Exchange of views and information shall also be carried out for 
the sake of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by any of 
the two high contracting parties in the field of defensive armaments.
Article 2
The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the 
passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other material used for defensive 
purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party 
without being subject to customs and any other duties.
38F 0371/115489/V1073/182, Wright to FO, 8.2.55.
•^Tlie reference names N l, N2 and N3, standing for Nuri's first, second and third drafts, have been 
assigned by this author to make is easier to follow the narrative. The same applies to M l (Menderes's first 
draft), as well as to LI andL2 (first and second drafts of exchanged letters).
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Article 3 stipulated that the treaty should be open for accession to any member state of the 
Ar ab League or any other state concerned with security and peace in the region. Article 4 set 
the period during which the treaty would remain in force as five years, automatically 
renewable to successive five-year periods unless one of the signatories notified its desire to 
terminate it six months before the date of expiration. The last article dealt with the conditions 
for ratification and exchange of ratified d o c u m e n ts .^  One of Nuri's reasons to propose a 
five-year period was his belief that it would be preferable that the first renewal of the 
projected pact should be made before the Anglo-Egyptian agreement expired in 1961 so as to 
set a pattern for renewal before the future of the latter agreement came into question. 41
This draft was unsatisfactory to Ankara, which had always contemplated a treaty very 
much on the lines of the 1954 Turkish-Pakistani pact and perhaps even more precise, owing 
to the existence of a common frontier between the contracting parties.42 Menderes, 
therefore, produced an amended, stonger and more specific text and dispatched it, on 
February 6, to Baghdad, as well as to the UK and US governments. The British FO, on the 
other hand, soon after being made aware of the contents of the draft (Nl), brought into the 
attention of both negotiating sides that it did not provide the "umbrella," under which Nuri 
had promised to revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty.42
The amended Turkish draft (called hereafter M l) omitted in its preamble the reference to 
the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and completely redrafted Article 1, inserting two additional 
new articles to give it the following appearance:
Article 1.
The contracting parties undertake to cooperate in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in confronting any armed aggression 
against one of them inside or outside the Middle East region.
Article 2.
In order to ensure effective realization and application of co-operation envisaged in 
Article 1 above the competent authorities of the contracting parties shall establish 
military plans and determine the requisite measures immediately after entry into force 
of the present treaty. These plans and measures shall be operative as soon as they 
have been approved by the Governments of the contracting parties and may moreover 
be the subject of special agreements.
Article 3.
Exchange of views and information shall be carried out between the respective 
competent military authorities of the contracting parties for the purpose of benefiting
40See full text of draft (N l) in FO371/115488/V1073/165G, Wright to FO, 6.2.55.
41FO371/115495/V1073/396, Wright to FO, 5.3.55.
42FO371/115487/V1073/104, Bowker to FO, 27.1.55.
43FO371/115488/V1073/166, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 6.2.55.
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from the technical experience and progress achieved by either of the parties in the 
field of defensive armament The contracting parties shall consult and cooperate 
together in order to satisfy, as far as possible, the needs of each of them in the 
production of arms and munitions as well as in military training and education.
Article 2 of the Iraqi draft (Nl) was kept as the new Article 4. Article 5 stipulated that the 
provisions of the treaty did not contradict then past international engagements and that the 
contracting parties would undertake not to conclude any future international engagements 
incompatible with the proposed treaty, while Article 6 added the new provision that any new 
accession should take place after agreement between the contracting parties and the state 
applying for accession.44
Both London and Washington preferred the Turkish text (Ml). The FO was especially 
satisfied because it did provide the necessary "umbrella".45 It was also at this stage that 
Britain definitely informed the two negotiating parties that she "would prefer to accede to the 
proposed treaty at a later date," after the completion of the revision of the treaty with Iraq. 4 6 
Nmi did not consider this amended draft (Ml) proper for a bilateral treaty with Turkey. 
He considered very important to have a reference, in the preamble, to the Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement, because he could thus convince all doubters that his policies did not differ in 
essence from those pursued by Egypt. He could not accept Article 1 in its amended form, 
because, the clause "in confr onting any armed aggression against one of them from inside or 
outside the Middle East region" was a clear reference to Israel, which, Nmi thought, could 
not be a matter of bilateral concern between Iraq and Turkey. Article 2 of the Turkish draft 
(Ml) was far beyond what Nmi was prepared to concede to the Turks. Also unacceptable 
was the newly-added provision in Article 6. With all these objections in mind, Nmi informed 
Menderes that he must either give more time for bilateral negotiations to continue or agree to 
the original Iraqi draft (Nl).4^
Menderes was upset. To sign the Iraqi draft (Nl) would mean a retreat for Turkey from 
the provisions of the January 13 communique. Furthermore, Nuri's draft did not contain the 
"umbrella" clause insisted upon by London. With London and Washington concurring that 
Turkey should be prepared to give more time to Iraq rather than sacrifice the chance of a 
workable agreement for the desirability of a quick conclusion, Ankara asked them both to 
instruct then representatives in Baghdad to try to soften Nuri's attitude.48
44See full text of amended draft (M l) in FO371/115488/V1073/167, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to 
FO, 6.2.55.
45FO371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Ankara, 8.2.55; FO371/115488/V1073/166, Makins toFO, 9.2.55. 
46FO371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Ankara, 8.2.55.
47FO371/115489/V1073/182, Wright to FO, 8.2.55; FO371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9.2.55. 
48F0371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9.2.55.
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Iii this, Wright succeeded. Nmi hacked down a little. Late on the night of February 9, lie 
presented to his cabinet for approval a new compromise draft (N2) he had worked out with 
Wright that afternoon, as well as an alternative text somewhat like the compromise draft (N2) 
but nearer to the Turkish wording. Discussion in the cabinet was not detailed, but a general 
agreement was reached to send both texts to Ankara the following day. 49
The compromise draft (N2) restored the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 
the preamble. New Articles 1 and 2 were inserted to replace Articles 1 and 2 of the Turkish 
draft (Ml). They read as follows:
Article 1.
The high contracting parties will cooperate for their defence and security in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Such measures as they 
agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special 
agreement with each other.
Article 2.
The measures which will be taken between Turkey and Iraq will be those contained in 
Articles 3 and 4 below.
The Articles 3 and 4 mentioned above were the Articles 1 and 2 of the original Iraqi draft 
(Nl) calling only for consultations and discussions between the military authorities and free 
passage of military equipment. Article 5 was the same Article 5 of the Turkish draft (Ml) 
stipulating that the treaty did not contradict the past international engagements of the 
contracting parties and that the latter would not conclude any future treaty incompatible with 
the one being negotiated. Article 6 kept only the first sentence of the corresponding article of 
the Turkish draft (Ml), thus eliminating the provision that any new accession should first be 
agreed by the members of the pact.^O
It was this compromise text (N2) that was communicated eventually by Nuri to Ankara. 
He ultimately decided to keep the alternative draft in reserve. 51 The Turkish government
49FO371/115489/V1073/198, Wright to FO, 10.2.55.
50FO371/115489/V1073/194, Wright to FO, 9.2.55.
 ^U he only significant difference in the alternative text from draft (N2) was the breaking down of Article
1 of (N2) into two separate Articles 1 and 2 as follows:
Article 1.
The High Contracting Parties will cooperate for their defence and security in accordance with Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter and will support each other against any aggression in violation of the United 
Nations Charter.
Article 2.
In order to ensure the realization and effect application of cooperation provided for in Article 1 above, 
the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as 
the present treaty enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been 
approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties and may form the subject of special 
agreements.
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received the new proposals by telephone from tlieir ambassador in Baghdad in the morning of 
February 10.52 Nuri hoped that, provided the Turks agreed, signature could take place in 
Baghdad within the next few days.53 Jt was not to be. Menderes, Birgi and their assistants 
found Articles 2, 3 and 4 discriminatory against Turkey, since they imposed a severe 
limitation on the scope of future defence co-operation between Turkey and Iraq, while 
granting the latter, at the same time, a free hand to negotiate broader agreements with other 
future members under the ''umbrella" provided in Article 1. Menderes realised that Nuri's 
reason for inserting Article 2 was his morbid suspicions of Turkish designs on Northern Iraq. 
He was ready to give Iraq a fresli categorical guarantee of respect of territorial integrity, 
although that, he believed, would in fact be a repetition of Article 1 of the 1946 Turkish-Iraqi 
treaty, which stated that "Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engage a respecter 
leur integrite territoriale et leur frontieres communes telles qu'elles sont defmies et tracees 
dans le Traite conclu en 1926".54
It seemed for a moment that the negotiations had reached a deadlock. The only 
concession Nmi was prepared to make at that stage was to omit Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the 
draft (N2) from the pact itself and embody the substance of its Articles 3 and 4 in a protocol 
or annex, but even that proposal he wanted it to be made to Ankara indirectly through the 
British. 55 By now, the British government had remained the only potential mediators. 
Washington had already indicated that while strongly supporting the pact, it would it not 
become an original signatory or join it at an early date because that might be interpreted as 
suggesting that the pact had been imposed from outside the area.5b The FO preferred not to 
interfere to try to patch up this latest disagreement between Turkey and Iraq, except to 
inform both sides that the new Article 1 proposed by Nmi in the draft (N2) was satisfactory 
from their point of view. And in order not to complicate matters further, it did not even 
inform the British embassies in Ankara and Baghdad that, during the secret UK-US-Turkish 
staff talks that had begun in London on 18 January, the Turkish delegation had put forward a 
plan whereby Turkish forces would enter Iraq on or before the outbreak of a general war 
with the Soviet Bloc to take over responsibility for the defence of the Rowanduz and Penjwin 
passes in the Zagros mountains.5,7
52F0371/115489/V1073/211, Bowker to FO, 10.2.55.
53FO371/115489/V1073/194, Wright toFO, 9.2.55.
54FO371/115489/V1073/211, Bowker toFO, 10.2.55.
55F0371/115490/V1073/220, Wright to FO, 11.2.55.
56F 0371/11 5 4 8 9 m 073/196, Makins toFO, 9.2.55.
57Compare the draft telegram first prepared by the FO staff with the final text actually sent to the 
respective embassies in FO371/115490/V1073/223G, FO to Ankara, 11.2.55.
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Menderes made a fresh attempt to break the deadlock. He sent Nuri a friendly message, 
asking whether it was really Nuri's intention that their work together over the last weeks and 
months should culminate in a treaty on the lines of the revised draft (N2). If it was so, 
Menderes continued, then there must be some thought in Nuri's mind which the latter had not 
expressed. Menderes said that the Turkish government would look ridiculous if it signed such 
an agreement, and went on to point out that "Articles 3 and 4, though inessential, were 
acceptable when following after the Turkish Article 2 [of the draft (Ml)]". In Nuri's revised 
draft (N2), however, they had fixed the limit to which defence co-operation between 
Turkey and Iraq should go. 58
Nuri was unmoved. He was in a mood of suspicion of the Turks, nervous that the latter 
were trying to inveigle him into some wording which could subsequently be interpreted as 
permitting entry of Turkish forces into Iraq in wartime. He even spoke of abandoning the 
idea of a pact with Turkey altogether. Prince 'Abd al-Hah, less suspicious of Turks than Nuri, 
and the Turkish ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, appealed to Wright to try and calm Nuri. 
Accordingly, Wright had a long talk with Nuri on February 15. Nuri reaffirmed that he would 
never agree to any clause which could be interpreted as permitting entry of Turkish forces in 
Iraq in any situation. He even proposed at one stage in the said meeting to write in the pact 
itself a provision that neither country should send forces into the opposite country in time of 
war. Wright tried to persuade Nuri that Turkey's main preoccupation was to avoid a wording 
that appeared discriminatory against or derogatory to herself. In the end, Nuri promised to 
propose to Goksenin the following day a revised draft (called hereafter N3) which omitted 
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of his previous draft (N2), thus leaving to both sides freedom to conclude 
a special agreement between them derived from Article 1 of the pact in the same way as any 
future agreement between Iraq and Britain. He stated that if Turkey could not accept his 
latest proposal (N3), he would have to give up the idea of a bilateral pact altogether and seek 
instead a pact with Britain and Pakistan. 5 9
Goksenin received the new Iraqi proposal (N3) in the morning of February 16.^0 The 
Turks found Nuri's latest draft acceptable, subject to minor points which could be settled 
when Menderes revisited Baghdad to sign the treaty. The points they had in mind were the 
references in the preamble to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and the ALCSP. They thought it 
would be inappropriate that an agreement between Turkey and Iraq should refer to 
agreements to which Turkey was not a party or to Iraq's obligations under the ALCSP under 
Article 4 of Nuri's latest draft (N3). They also claimed that any reference to the Anglo-
58FO371/115490/V1073/223, Bowker to FO, 16.2.55.
59F 0371/115491/V1073/245 and 247, Wright to FO, 16.2.55.
60FO371/115491/V1073/250, Wright to FO, 16.2.55.
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Egyptian agreement would almost certainly be seized by Egypt "to cause further trouble".61 
London had also been worried by the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and had 
previously unsuccessftdly tried to persuade Nmi to omit it.^2 Kopriilu assured Bowker that 
Menderes, once in Baghdad, would do his best to induce Nuri to drop these points, but he 
preferred not to refer to them specifically before departing for Baghdad lest it might cause 
further delay. ^ 3
Nmi, however, had another major surprise to pull out of his hat. On February 18, the 
Iraqi government passed to Goksenin two further amendments to the proposed text of the 
pact. The first was an alternative wording of the paragraph 4 of the preamble, referring to the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement. It read as follows:
And whereas the Agreement concluded between Her Britannic Majesty's 
Government and the Egyptian Government has considered that any aimed attack or a 
threat on Turkey or any member State of the Treaty of Joint Defence between the 
Arab League States should necessitate the affording by Egypt to the United Kingdom 
of such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Suez Canal base on a war 
footing to operate it effectively.
The second proposed amendment was an addition at the end of Article 5 of the draft (N3) 
specifying that any state "concerned with security and peace in this region" that wanted to 
accede to the treaty must be "fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties," a 
clear indication that Israel (which was not recognised by Iraq) could not accede to the treaty. 
In addition, Nmi proposed drafts of two letters to be exchanged between Menderes and 
himself in connection with the pact, hi the first letter (called hereafter LI), addressed by Nmi 
to Menderes, the Iraqi Premier stated he had
the honour to place on record that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
security in the Middle East region, and to eliminate the causes of friction in the said 
region, we have agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of 
the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.
The second proposed letter was to be addressed by Menderes to Nmi acknowledging the 
receipt of the fir st letter and confirming its content. ^ 4
61FO371/115492/V1073/273, Bowker toFO, 18.2.55.
62FO371/115490/V1073/234, Stevenson to FO, 14.2.55; F 0371/11 5 4 9 2 m 073/267, FO minute by Rose, 
15.2.55; ibid., -/269, FO to Baghdad, 17.2.55, etc.
63FO371/115492/V1073/273, Bowker to FO, 18.2.55.
64FO371/115492/V1073/276, Wright to FO, 18.2.55.
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The Turkish government was not surprised. On February 19, it telegraphed to Baghdad 
expressing agreement with Nuri's new proposals and informing him that it too had a few 
amendments on some "technical points," which Menderes would be glad to discuss in 
Baghdad. It also asked in particular that the visit should be kept secret and not announced 
before Menderes's arrival. 65
The reference in the January 13 communique to resisting any aggression from inside the 
Middle East region had given rise to some disquiet in Israel. 66 Israeli leaders did not believe 
that any Turkish-Arab rapprochement would bring benefits to them. On the contrary, they 
feared that Arabs would influence Turkey away from friendship with Israel. They believed 
that the references concerned were undoubtedly inserted in the January 13 communique on 
Nuri's insistence in order to reinstate himself with other Arab states. They feared, however, 
that in the future, countries like Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which were quite unconcerned 
about Soviet aggression and were obsessed by Israel, would do their best to see that the said 
references were given more significance than was originally intended. 67 When the Israeli 
minister in Ankara had communicated his fears to Menderes-before the final negotiations had 
got under way-and asked him if it was intended to incorporate these references in the future 
pact, the latter had replied that it was not his wish that they should be incorporated, but had 
only given a 90 percent assurance that in the event of Iraq asking that they should, he would 
refuse. 68
London and Washington were worried too about the future repercussions of any 
reference to Palestine in the pact. The FO thought that Nuri's proposal would prejudice the 
prospects of their ongoing efforts to secure a settlement to the Palestine question, 69 which 
were based on supporting the armistice regime established in 1948-49, as well as on putting 
forward, when possible, practical suggestions designed to reduce frontier tension, in the hope 
that a prolonged period of calm on the frontiers might create an atmosphere favourable to a 
settlement. 70 Dulles, in turn, had told the Israeli ambassador in Washington that he 
considered the Turkish-Iraqi pact would tend to weaken the solidarity of the Arab League 
against Israel and was confident that, as things developed, Israel would realise that this trend 
was to her benefit.71 Now, the State Department instructed American embassies in Baghdad 
and Ankara to inform their respective governments that, in the US view, the text of the pact
65F0371/115492/V1073/287, Bowker to FO, 20.2.55.
66FO371/115488/V1073/156, Nicholls to Eden, 1.2.55.
67FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 9; FO371/115487/V1073/130, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 25.1.55.
68FO371/115489/V1073/180, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 1.2.55.
69F 0371/115492/VI073/281, FO minute by Brewis, 19.2.55.
70f q 37 1/115496/V1073/418, brief prepared by Levant Department, 3.3.55.
l l FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 10.
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should be without any reference to Palestine; and that, if there must be some reference, it 
should be in a separate instrument quite distinct and without reference to the pact.72 An FO 
telegram to the British embassy in Ankara underlined that the "main value of pact, horn the 
point of view of building up under defence arrangements, is that it turns Arab eyes away from 
Palestine towards the outside danger".73
Menderes had expected Nuri to propose inserting some provision on the Palestine 
question all along and was convinced that this would be a reasonable price to pay in return 
for the gains to be made by establishing a regional anti-communist defence pact. He thought 
the letters were important to boost Nuri's position.74 The acting Secretary-General of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, Melih Esenbel, argued to Bowker that the letters were not part of 
the pact; that they went no further than the Baghdad communique and merely repeated 
previous statements by the Turkish government of general support for the 1947-49 UN 
resolutions on Palestine.75
Once the Turkish government had agreed to the proposed exchange of letters, however, 
the Iraqis began to ask that they should be included as an annex to the pact. This latest 
proposal made the Turks unhappy because of all its complications both for their future 
bilateral relations with Israel and for the prospects of UK and US accession to the pact. The 
FO too felt obliged at this juncture to remind the negotiating parties that if the exchange of 
letters in their present form should form an annex or part of the pact Britain could not accede 
to the pact itself in the future. 7b Under pressure, Nmi retreated to his old idea of exchanged 
letters referring to the pact, but quite separate and distinct from it.77
Menderes assured Bowker, the day before his visit to Baghdad, that he would first tiy to 
defer the question of an exchange of letters for later consideration, but failing to do this, he 
would then put forward a revised draft letter (called hereafter L2) suggested by Bowker 
himself, which clearly watered down the concealed anti-Israeli wording of Nuri's text by 
stating only that:
Sir, I have the honour to place on record my understanding that the treaty signed 
between us today will enable our two countries to cooperate in resisting any 
aggression directed against either of our countries whether from outside or inside the 
Middle East area, and that the Treaty will serve to establish stability in the Middle
72FO371/115493/V1073/326, FO minute by Powell, 22.2.55. 
73FO371/115492/V1073/281, FO to Ankara, 19.2.55.
74Saad, Iraq, 409.
75FO371/115492/V1073/287, Bowker to FO, 20.2.55.
76F 0371/115492/V1073/282, Wright to FO & FO to Ankara, 20.2.55. 
77F0371/115492/V1073/300, Bowker to FO, 22.2.55.
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East in a maimer in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the decisions based on those principles. 7®
The FO Levant Department staff considered that the revised text was "as innocuous as we 
can hope for," but still wanted to try to further omit the words "and the decisions based on 
those principles". In that case, they reasoned, although the Israeli government would 
undoubtedly still see what was behind those assertions, it might take comfort from the fact 
that there was no direct reference to the resolutions on Palestine and not, therefore, react too
violently. 79
Nuri, however, remained adamant. He told Wright that he had received the unanimous 
support of his cabinet and the elder statesmen in Iraq on February 21 for the final text of the 
pact, so he would risk losing his backing in Parliament by consenting to substantial alterations 
or to the postponement of the exchange of letters. Furthermore, he said, he believed that the 
exchange of letters might be decisive in inducing the USSR and the Arab countries to refrain 
from attacking the pact, and perhaps in one or two cases, induce them to join it.®®
On February 23, Menderes returned to Baghdad, accompanied by Zorlu, Kopriilu and 
Esenbel. They only succeeded in convincing the Iraqi side to drop finally the reference to 
the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in the preamble. Nuri refused to make any further major 
concessions. Hence, the discussions were mainly limited to sorting out some still unresolved 
"technicalities" in the text. Nuri also refused categorically to consider the new version (L2) of 
the letters to be exchanged-without, of course, knowing that its drafter had been Bowker. 
Menderes finally concluded that to postpone the exchange would mean postponing the pact 
itself and perhaps even losing it altogether. He was only able to make Iraq agree on a 
wording, which he considered to be "a slight improvement on the original text". The final 
version read as follows:
Sir, in connexion with the Pact signed by us today, I have the honour to place on 
record our understanding that the Pact will enable our two countries to cooperate 
effectively in resisting any aggression directed against either of them, and that, in 
order to ensure maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have 
also agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the United 
Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.
78FO371/115493/V1073/301, Bowker to FO, 22.2.55. 
7^F0371/115492/V1073/300, Bowker to FO, 22.2.55. 
80FO371/115493/V1073/314, Wright toFO, 23.2.55. 
81F0371/115493/V1073/304, B o ^ er  to FO, 22.2.55.
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The US and UK ambassadors were in agreement that, in the prevailing circumstances, 
Menderes could not have obtained a better deal. 82
Some of the discussed ''technicalities" were related to the Ir aqi desire to have one text of 
the pact to be in Arabic. Thus, difficulties were generated, because of the existence of a dual 
case in Arabic, in translating some of its clauses, for the agreement although negotiated 
originally on a bilateral level, was actually intended to serve as the basis for a future 
multilateral arrangement. 83 The Iraqi side also convinced the Turks to use the word "pact" 
(mithaq) instead of "treaty" (mu'ahadah), partly because the term mu’ahadah comes from the 
root iahd, meaning a "pledge" or "undertaking," while the word mithaq comes from the root 
wathq, meaning "trust" or "confidence," but even more importantly because both previous 
"unequal" and highly unpopular Anglo-fraqi treaties of 1930 and 1948 had been styled as 
mu'ahadahs.84 The only new provision of significance was the addition, on Turkish 
insistence, of a new article that a permanent council at ministerial level would be set up when 
the number of member-states of the pact reached four. The Iraqi side did not like a Turkish 
suggestion that unequivocally stated that the treaty should remain valid if one member-state 
(assuming there were more than two at that stage) withdrew,85 but, in the end, a 
compromise was also reached on that point.
The marathon of intensive discussions and consultations ended in the evening of February 
24, and the pact was signed at 11.30 p.m. 86 Menderes returned to Ankara the next morning.
In its final form, the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey referred in 
the preamble to the 1946 Turkish-Iraqi treaty, Article 11 of the ALCSP and Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. It specified in Article 1 that the signatories would co-operate for then security 
and defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and to conclude special 
agreements to that effect. Accordingly, the competent authorities of the member-states would 
determine the measures to be taken as soon as the pact went into force. These measures 
would become operative just after being approved by the respective governments. The 
contracting parties undertook to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs and to 
settle then disputes peacefully in accordance with the UN Charter. Article 4 declared that the 
pact was not in contradiction with any of the international obligations the member-states 
already had, and that the contracting parties had undertaken not to enter into any future 
obligations incompatible with the pact. Article 5 left the pact open for accession to any
82FO371/115493/V1073/331-32, Wright to FO, 23.2.55 
83FO371/115493/V1073/315 & 333. 
84FO371/115496/V1073/424, Hooper to Rose, 1.3.55. 
85FO371/115493/V1073/316, Wright to FO, 24.2,55. 
86FO371/115493/V1073/334, Wright to FO, 25.2.55.
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member of the Arab League or any other state actively involved with the security and peace 
in the region and which was fully recognised by both contracting parties. A Permanent 
Ministerial Council would be set up as soon as at least four powers became members of the 
Pact. The pact was to remain in force for a five-year period, renewable for other five-year 
periods. Any member-state that wished to withdraw had to notify the other members in 
writing of her desire to do so six months before the pact was due to expire. In that case, the 
pact would remain valid for the other member-states. The last article, Article 8, specified the 
procedure of ratifying the treaty and the exchange of ratifications.^
Both governments were anxious to ratify the pact as soon as possible. Hence, ratification 
took place on February 26, only two days after the signature. Both, however, had to 
overcome criticism from their respective parliamentary critics that the provisions of the pact 
dealing with the extent of co-operation were ambiguous.
In the Turkish GNA, the vote of approval was unanimous. ^  Menderes, however, had to 
assure members of the opposition RPP that it did not mean additional obligations for Turkey 
beyond her frontiers. There was no automatic obligation under the wording of the treaty to 
give military aid to Iraq in the event of an attack on the latter, he said. The pact was an 
alliance for defence and, once it had been ratified, the government would have the power to 
negotiate and conclude necessaiy measures. On the issue of the exchanged letters, the 
opposition contended that they were binding only to the government in power, while 
Menderes argued that they implied no change in Turkish policy towards Israel. Turkey, he 
said, had always supported, as a matter of principle, the UN, including, by implication, its 
resolutions on Palestine. 89
Li Iraq, Nuri tried to avoid an open debate as much as possible, despite the fact that he 
had to deal only with a Chamber of Deputies he had almost "appointed" the previous autumn. 
He asked that the bill to ratify the pact should first be discussed in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, which submitted a unanimous recommendation of approval. Later, in the plenary 
session, he stressed that the pact did not contradict Iraq's traditional policy of co-operation 
with other Arab states. Iraq was undertaking no obligations beyond her frontiers and would 
be solely responsible for her own defence. No one could dictate upon Baghdad the conditions 
or extent of defence co-operation as Article 1 provided that separate agreements "may" and
8^See hill text of pact in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 390-91.
88F0371/115494/V1073/342, Bowker to FO, 26.2.55.
8^Soysal, "Baghdad Pact”, 66; FO371/115495/V1073/389, Bowker to Eden, 1.3.55. Esenbel had also told 
the counsellor of the British embassy that in "any case the exchange of letters was of no significance, first 
because Turkey recognised the impossibility of the literal application of the Resolutions, and secondly because 
Nuri Pasha, in insisting on the letters, had made it clear that he did not expect Turkey to take further action 
and only required them in order to reinforce his position with the other Arab countries"; ibid.
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not "must" be concluded between the member-states. He expressed the hope that Iran, the 
USA and Britain-the latter, after the termination of the 1930 treaty-would accede to the new 
pact in the near future. In the event of any or all Arab states acceding to the pact, co­
operation between them would differ as it had already been defined in the ALCSP. Turkey's 
policy, he said, was not contradictory to the interests of the Arab states and Turkey was 
sincere and honest in pursuing this direction. Only three deputies spoke against ratification, 
expressing fears that Iraq was distancing herself from the Arab League. Still, the Chamber 
voted in favour’ of ratification by 112 votes against only four. The same evening, the pact was 
also debated in the Senate, the upper house, and received an affirmative vote of 25 against
one. 90
Instruments of ratification were exchanged in Ankara on 15 April 1955 between the 
Turkish Foreign Minister and the Iraqi ambassador. 91
The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement 
Nuii had already embarked, even before the final signature of the Turkisli-Iraqi pact, on the 
second stage of his pre-conceived plan, the negotiation with Britain of a new military co­
operation agreement to replace the 1930 treaty. On 5 March, Eden stopped in Baghdad on 
his way back from a regular SEATO Council of Ministers meeting in Bangkok and was 
satisfied with the draft which was under discussion. He later told the House of Commons that 
Britain's aim was to forge a new association with Iraq which would bring British-Iraqi 
"relations into line with those which already exist with Turkey and our other partners in 
NATO".92 The agreement was signed on 30 March and came into effect on 5 April, the day 
of official UK accession to the Turkish-Iraqi pact.
According to the signed agreement, Iraq formally assumed responsibility for her own 
defence and took over al-Habbaniyah and al-Shu'aybah ah’ bases. Britain agreed to withdraw 
fully from the bases within a year, but a unit of 850 personnel was to stay behind after the 
withdrawal to help in maintaining the bases and to assist in training the ah* crew and servicing 
the aircraft. The Assyrian Levies, who guarded those bases, were absorbed into the Iraqi 
army. In return, Nmi agreed to the continuation of so-called close defence co-operation 
between both countries, including planning and combined training. Iraq would continue to 
provide Britain all facilities agreed upon between the two governments for the declared
90Saad, Iraq, 410; FO371/115494/V1073/345, Wright to FO, 27.2.55; FO371/115497/V1073/463, 
Wright to Eden, 1.3.55.
91FO371/115507/Vl073/717, Bowker to FO, 16.4.55.
^^Eden, Full Circle, 223. Also quoted in Richard L. Jasse, "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or 
Colonialism?", MES, 2771 (January 1991), 141.
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purpose of maintaining Iraq's armed forces in a state of efficiency and readiness. She also 
conceded to British military aircraft the right of landing, overflying and servicing on its 
territory. Finally, the agreement stipulated that, in the event of an attack on Iraq or a threat of 
it, Britain, at Iraq's request, would assist her ally and even provide armed forces if 
necessary. 93 Nuri could not get any British concessions as regards the Palestine question. On 
the contrary, Eden told the House of Commons on March 30 that the Anglo-Iraqi agreement 
was likely to be, fi om Israel's point of view, a desirable development because it was the first 
time an Arab state was looking in other directions than simply towards Israel. 94
Nuri had originally hoped that the "umbrella" approach would save him from putting the 
new agreement before Parliament and would thus greatly diminish the chances of repetition 
of the riots of 1948. At some late stage before the final signature, however, his legal advisers 
told him that the Iraqi Constitution made it binding upon him to present this agreement to 
parliamentary scrutiny. So, on March 30, Nuri called a joint session of both Houses of 
Parliament and bulldozed through a unanimous decision of approval, when, under normal 
procedure, he should have presented the bill to each House separately. Furthermore, he took 
the precaution of presenting to scrutiny the text of only the Special Agreement and not those 
of the accompanying two memoranda, defining the conditions of military co-operation, 
although the latter texts had already been made public in London. 95
The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement, despite having striking similarities with the 1954 
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal base, went further in defining the areas of 
defence co-operation between the two signatories. This is understandable, as Nuri, unlike the 
Egyptians, was convinced of the necessity of prolonging Iraq's alliance with Britain. In real 
terms, the Special Agreement was only a slight improvement on the abortive Portsmouth 
treaty as regards safeguarding Iraq's sovereign rights to manage her foreign and defence 
policy, but unlike the latter, the legal basis of the Special Agreement's continued 
implementation was now tied completely to Iraq's wish to remain a member of the Baghdad
Pact. 96
^Majid Khadduri, Independent 'Iraq 1932-1958: A Study in 'Iraqi Politics (1960), 349-50; James 
Morris, The Hashemite Kings (1959), 185; John C. Campbell, Defense o f the Middle East: Problems o f  
American Policy (1960), 58; Seale, Struggle, 228; Devereux, Formulation, 166-67.
^Eden, Full Circle, 223. See also Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 
(1965), 184. See also Aptiilahat Ak§in, Turkiye'nin 1945den Sonraki Di$ Politika Geliqmeleri: Orta Dogu 
Meseleleri (1959), 102; Mamduh al-Rusan, A I- Iraq wa qadaya al-sharq a l-‘arabi al-qaumiyyah 1941-1958 
(1979), 306.
9^F0371/115748/VQ1015/8, Wright to Macmillan, 7.6.55. See text of main instrument and the two 
subsidiary memoranda in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 391-95.
96rhe Special Agreement, replacing the 1930 Treaty, also automatically nullified the legal basis of the 
secret UK-US MOU (1954). Washington, however, decided to continue "to act in accordance with its spirit"; 
see Axelgard, Policy, 197-98.
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Null had tlius secured tlie continuation of the British alliance with the Hashimite 
monarchy. He did not, however, win the hearts and minds of any of his critics. Indeed, the 
agreement re-enforced the link in Arab eyes between the Baghdad Pact and previous 
"unequal" military alliances imposed by former colonial powers, thus making future Arab 
adherences to the pact extremely unlikely. The next chapter tells about the initial Iraqi- 
Turidsh failure to get the adherence of further Arab members.
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4The Search for More Arab Allies
Hie signature of tlie Baghdad Pact established cordial bilateral Turkish-Iraqi relations and an 
? fihtimate personal fiiendslnp/between Nuri and Menderes. President Bayar and King Fay sal II 
exchanged official visits that same year, followed by various parliamentary, military, trade and 
other delegations. Bilateral security co-operation was also reactivated against subversive 
activities on their common frontier under the 1946 Turkish-Iraqi treaty. 1
However, no subsidiary Turkish-Iraqi special agreements were concluded, as foreseen 
under the pact's provisions, proving that both countries had entered it as a tactical move and 
not as an end in itself. Turkey proposed to turn the Baghdad Pact eventually into an elaborate 
multilateral defence organisation with a Permanent Ministerial Council, meeting twice a year; 
a Permanent Secretariat, headed by a secretary-general, with administrative, political, 
economic and propaganda sections; and a Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of the 
General Staff (CGS) of the member-states, with a Permanent Military Group attached to it, 
to which representatives of non-member countries could also be invited. The other member- 
states and the USA, however, preferred to proceed more slowly. Britain feared that the 
Turkish proposal to set up a NATO-type organisation might not be acceptable to the other 
members and could even frighten some. She wished "to let the treaty machinery grow 
naturally out of developing collaboration and not to fix it too rigidly in advance". She also 
opposed, for the time being, the establishment of formal relations with NATO and SEATO, 
preferring to maintain liaison through those pact-members who also belonged to the two 
other organisations. ^
Meanwhile, the recruitment of new pact-members became Turkey's primary political 
objective. The UK adhered on 5 April 1955, while Turkish leaders were instrumental in 
seeming both Pakistani (23 September) and Iranian (3 November) accession. 3 With five full 
members, it became possible to convene in Baghdad in November the first Pact Ministerial
*FO371/115750/VQ10344/7, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 24.8.55. Faysal II too was 
eventually engaged in 1957 to a Turkish princess, Fazilet, a descendant of the Ottoman family.
^FO371/115529/V1073/1286, Bowker to FO, 16.11.55. The Baghdad Pact did in time have its military, 
economic and counter-subversion committees. It also provided an umbrella for many regional development 
co-operation schemes in communications, agriculture and a Nuclear Centre.
^Keith Kyle, Suez (1991), 89; Young, Foreign Policy, 172; Monroe, Moment, 188; Decker, Policy, 98; 
Tamko9, Warrior, 238.
Council meeting. Iraq did not insist on getting from Pakistan and Iran further commitments 
on Palestine, judging that both had generally had a pro-Arab record on the issue.
Turkey recognised that additional Arab countries must also be brought in to make the 
Baghdad Pact viable and frustrate Egypt's desire to isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab 
world. Turkey pursued this goal rigorously throughout 1955, Syria being her main target. 
Baghdad was certainly not against expansion, but somehow seemed to attach less importance 
to it, preferring to isolate Egypt by getting declarations of approval of Iraq's conduct from 
uncommitted Arab states.
The Internal Situation in Syria
Syria had, since March 1949, been plagued by a series of military coups, partly as a direct 
consequence of unending factional fighting among the different factions within her ruling 
elite. Even after achieving frill independence in 1946, pan-Arab nationalism continued to be 
the strongest ideological current in Syria. A lack of consensus persisted about Syria's identity: 
should she remain an independent state or become part of a larger Arab political entity? Even 
among the Syrian proponents of immediate Arab political unity, however, there was no 
consensus on which Arab country Syria should unite with first. In the past, the Hashimite 
Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq had been the two main contenders. Prospects for "Greater 
Syrian" unity with Jordan under King 'Abdallah's crown had waned with the latter's 
assassination in 1951, "Fertile Crescent" unity between Syria and Iraq, however, was still 
being pursued by the early 1950s, particularly by the former Regent of Iraq, Prince 'Abd al- 
Uah, who liked to occupy someday the throne in Damascus. This plan was supported by 
many Aleppine politicians, whose traditional trade links with Baghdad and Mosul had been 
hampered with the erection of state borders after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
'Abd al-Hah had politically backed some of al-Shishakli's opponents and ordered the 
preparation of a secret plan for the Iraqi Army to invade Syria if need be.4 Iraq had also 
proposed to the Arab League in January 1954 a plan for Arab Federation,5 which was 
immediately suspected of being a covert attempt to prepare the ground for an Iraqi 
amiexation of Syria. Inevitably, official Iraqi circles welcomed al-Shishakli's fall, since the 
ensuing interim Syrian government included many traditionally pro-Iraqi politicians. The 
influence of anti-Hashimite Syrian politicians remained substantial, however, particularly in 
Damascus, with its close trade connections with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They were reluctant 
to abandon Syria's republican form of government and feared that any particular union with
^Marr, Iraq, 113-14; Seale, Struggle, 137-38; al-Jamali, Mawaqif 84-86, 264-66, 274.
-’See full text in Yusif al-K\mri(ed.), Al-Mashari' al-wahdawiyyah al-arabiyyah 1913-1989 (1990), 264- 
69; FO371/110785/V1071/8, Troutbeck to Eden, 16.1.54.
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Iraq (and/or Jordan) would only serve to extend British influence in the Arab world. No 
genuine Arab unity could be achieved, they argued, until foreign influence itself was 
completely eliminated from the Arab lands. Thus, Syria's dependence on access for her 
exports to Iraqi and Saudi markets opened the door for external intervention in internal 
Syrian politics. ^  Western-inspired plans to form a regional defence pact, with Baghdad 
playing a prominent role, became inevitably intertwined with Syria's internal troubles over 
possible union with Iraq.^
Syrian politics in the mid-1950s was volatile and unpredictable. The numerous, but 
generally weak, political parties in the country had to form tactical alliances to share power. 
Parliamentary elections returned a large number of independent deputies. Of the 141 deputies 
elected during the 1954 parliamentary elections, only just over half kept their party-political 
allegiance intact during the next four years.
The conservative National and People's parties formed the largest party blocs in 
parliament. They were representative of Syria's traditional political elite of landowners, urban 
merchants and notables, with a conservative outlook and looking favourably toward co­
operation with the West. Both, however, had little discipline over then members. The 
National Party supported the former President Shukti al-Quwatli and was strong in 
Damascus, generally enjoying cordial relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Pro-Iraqi 
sentiment was strong, however, among its Christian supporters in Aleppo. The People's 
Party, in turn, generally supported Iraq and was the chief advocate of "Fertile Crescent" 
unity. It was composed chiefly of younger landowning nationalist politicians and merchant- 
entrepreneurs, based in Hama and Aleppo, who had opposed al-Quwatli's autocratic 
tendencies in the post-independence period.
Both parties were being increasingly challenged by new, ideological parties, claiming to 
represent the interests of the rising educated middle, and even working, classes: the Arab 
Socialist Resurrection (Ba'th) Paity, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Syrian 
Communist Party, the Arab Liberation Movement (ALM) and the Socialist Co-operative 
Party. All demanded the implementation of far-reaching internal political, social and 
economic reforms; opposed imperialist presence in the Arab world and "collective defence" 
alliances with non-Arab states. All won seats in the newly-elected chamber, but the largest 
gains were those of the Ba'th. One influential political organisation of similar social 
background and political outlook that did not contest the elections was the Islamic revivalist
^Tabitha Petran, Syria: A Modern History (1978), 84.
^Prince 'Abd al-Ilali tried to persuade Turkey to support Iraq's union with Syria, emphasising that it 
would end Syria's instability, which harboured dangers for Ankara; see FO371/110785/V1071/52, Gardener 
to Falla, 30.9.54.
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Muslim Brotherhood. ^  Some Brotherhood members, however, resigned from the 
organisation and were elected as independents.
The largest group of deputies in the 1954 Chamber remained, however, the unaffiliated. 
They, too, were grouped in a series of blocs, representing a wide range of convictions. The 
largest and most influential, Khalid al-'Azm's Democratic Bloc, initially had 38 deputies. 
Westerners disliked al-'Azm as "a skilful opportunist ... willing to co-operate with anyone 
furthering his interests". For British and Turkish officials, he was a Francophile, obsessed 
with becoming President of Syria. Al-'Azm was respected, however, by many Syrians as a 
true statesman. He called for modernisation of agriculture and industry and a developed 
social program; advocated concentrating all efforts to contain the Zionist danger to the Arab 
world and force a fair solution to the Palestine question, rejecting Western-inspired regional 
military alliances because they would help freeze the 1949 Arab-Israeli armistice lines into 
permanent international borders. He opposed union with Iraq and defended his maintenance 
of good relations with France on the grounds that in 1949-55 France was the only Western 
country ready to supply Syria with arms and military equipment. 9
The political influence of the National and People's parties and the numerous 
parliamentary blocs representing the 100 or so landowning families in Syria was in decline 
also because of then lack of sufficient influence in the army. The army officer-corps had, 
since the days of the French mandate, been stuffed with men of rural origin and 
representatives of religious minorities, becoming a fertile ground for recruitment by the 
ideological parties. 10 The SSNP, the Ba'th, the ALM and, to a lesser extent, the Communists 
all had then supporters among top army officers. With winning power through the ballot-box 
still seeming almost impossible, these parties looked at the army as an extra-parliamentary 
instrument of political pressure.
It should not be forgotten, however, that while the ideological parties were competing to 
win the support of roughly the same constituency and were all opposed to the ruling elite, 
eveiy one of them proposed specific long-term solutions different from those advocated by
^Urnar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (1983), 100. The Turkish government feared, in 
early 1954, that the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood "might be sufficiently influential to deter the 
Iraqi Government from acceding to the Pact between Turkey and Pakistan" and that certain Turkish religious 
groups, "allied in some way with the Brotherhood, might cause trouble"; see FO371/110787/V1073/32, 
Chancery, Bagdad to Levant Department, 7.4.54; FO371/110788/V1781/3, Chancery, Damascus to Levant 
Department, 24.3.54.
^Petran, Syria, 107, 113; Torrey, Syrian Politics, 118; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 363 & III, 223; FRUS 
1955-1957, XII, 532; Nabil M. Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party 
Failure", IJMES, 3/1 (January 1972), 19.
l^Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (1970), 72; Patrick Seale, A sad o f  Syria: 
'The Struggle for the Middle East (1989), 39; Laqueur, Transition, xviii, 326; Petran, Syria, 86; Pipes, 
Greater Syria, 168-69.
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others. The ultimate aim of the Ba'th and the ALM was the creation of an Arab fatherland 
stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab/Persian Gulf. In order to achieve it, the Ba'th 
considered as indispensable the freeing of Arabs everywhere from colonial rule and then 
going through a process of radical social change. The SSNP called for the establishment of a 
unitary "Greater Syria," incorporating the territories of the contemporary states of Syria, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine/Israel, even the Turkish region south of the Taurus and 
Anti-Taurus mountain-chains and Cyprus. It insisted that every step towards larger Arab 
unity must inevitably start with Syrian unity. The Communists were less interested in 
pursuing irredentist aims and were accused by then rivals of being subservient to foreign 
Communist interests. Thus, in-fighting among the ideological parties was inevitable. It was in 
time transferred to the army ranks, where competition was very intense in the early 1950s 
between the Ba'th and the SSNP. 11
Soon after the elections, the National and People's parties and representatives of the 
conservative parliamentary Tiibal Bloc formed a coalition government under the premiership 
of the 77-year old Faris al-Khmi. The Ba'th Party and the Democratic Bloc joined forces in 
opposition. Li order to placate the latter, al-Khuri pledged that under no circumstances would 
he remain in office after March 21, 1955 and would not, in the meantime, enter any alliance 
with non-Arab countries.^ The fiiture course of Syrian foreign policy was debated 
vigorously in the following months. The issue of participating in Western-influenced pacts 
became linked with the question whether Syria could afford to adopt towards defence matters 
an attitude different from most other Arab states. Even advocates of an alliance with Western 
powers conceded that at least assurances as regards Palestine should be sought as a 
precondition for eventual co-operation. Left-wing newspapers vociferously condemned 
alliances with non-Arab countries, while Nationalist and Populist newspapers usually 
refrained from comment. ^  The opponents of non-Arab pacts enjoyed a slight edge in public 
arguments, and on 10 January 1955, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee 
unanimously concluded that the government had remained faithful to its pledge and 
recommended the consolidation of that policy. ^
Turkey Tries to Lure Syria into the Turkish-Iraqi Pact
It was in this Syrian climate of shaip disagr eement that, after months of attempting to create 
Arab goodwill and build confidence within Syria, Menderes decided at the end of 1954 to
^Daniel Pipes, ’'Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party", IJMES, 20/3 (August 1988), 
313-16.
12Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 307-12, 445; FO371/111141/VY1016/137, Gardener to FO, 5.11.54.
^ F 0 3 7 1 /l 10188/VI073/91, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 23.12.54
l^Lesch, Syria, 62; FO371/115482/V1071/3, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 13.1.55.
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visit Damascus and try to persuade the Syrian government to join the projected Turkish-Iraqi 
pact. After having succeeded with Nuri, Menderes now felt that he could get the adherence 
of all Arab countries one by one.
After Menderes's visits to Baghdad and Beirut for early January had been arranged by 
mid-December, the Syrian government was asked, too, if it wished to invite him to 
Damascus. An invitation was ultimately extended by the Syrian cabinet but only after much 
hesitation, an intervention from President Hashim al-Atasi, and indirect soundings from 
opposition circles that they would not object publicly. A visit of a few hours' duration-the 
fir st by a Turkish Premier to independent Syria-was set for January 14. ^  News of the visit 
was largely received unfriendlily by the Syrian press, where the questions of Alexandretta and 
Turkish trade with Israel immediately received prominence.^ There were some 
demonstrations against the visit in both Damascus and Aleppo on January 13, the 
exaggerated accounts of which made Bayar attempt to call off Menderes's visit in the last 
minute, but he was dissuaded. Two days later, the Turkish embassy building in Damascus 
was stoned and some demonstrators arrested. Police and demonstrators also clashed in 
Aleppo. Turkish charge Soysal thought that "Egyptian agents, Communists and Saudi 
Arabia" had been behind the disorders. On the day of the visit, however, the police took 
adequate security precautions and no demonstrations were allowed in Damascus. 17
During the official Turkish-Syrian discussions, only Menderes and al-Atasi spoke. 
Menderes confirmed Turkish friendship toward the Arab states, particularly Syria, and 
stressed the identity of their interests in a world troubled by Communism. He complained 
about Egypt's response to the January 13 communique, but expressed hope that this 
misunderstanding could be corrected soon, reiterating Turkey's desire to improve relations 
with Egypt. Menderes did not overtly propose Syria's adherence to the projected pact, but 
spoke in a spirit to encourage just that. Al-Atasi, in turn, sought Turkish help in enforcing the 
relevant UN resolutions on Palestine and Turidsh-US-UK mediation to secure a just and final 
settlement. Menderes replied that what had happened in Palestine was largely a matter of the 
past and could not be undone, although some minor modifications might still be possible. 
Syria could now cover herself against danger from both the USSR and Israel by joining 
Turkey and Iraq. Turkey was interested in regional stability and in the official Syrian attitude 
towards Turkey and her Western allies. Menderes added that Turkey was now happily 
installed within her frontiers as defined by the 1920 National Pact and followed up with a
15FO371/115953/VY10344/l, l'A' & 2, Gardener to FO, 1, 7 & 11 January 1955.
16FO371/115953/VY10344/3, Gardener to FO, 15.1.55.
17Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 69; Bagci, Demokrat, 65; FO371/115484/V1073/20, Gardener to FO, 15.1.55; 
F0371/115486/V1073/91, Gardener to FO, 19.1.55.
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warning that if the Syrians continued to agitate against the annexation of Alexandretta, 
Turkey could, if necessary, retaliate by making trouble over Aleppo. It was certainly not an 
encouraging start. The Syrians preferred not to respond to Menderes,!** and no official 
communique was published after the four-hour long visit. Menderes was reportedly shocked 
at the "unrealism" displayed by the Syrians as regards world affairs and notably the 
political/military dangers of Communism. 19 Soysal-who was himself present-described the 
discussions as a "dialogue of the deaf'. 20
hi public, however, the Syrian government tried to show a brave face, telling the 
opposition that the invitation had been dictated by the conventions of Arab hospitality, since 
the Turkish delegation had been overflying Syria. Al-Khuii declared that the establishment of 
a Syrian-Turkish commission was agreed to study the questions of mutual property and 
water, and that Turkey had expressed readiness to reach an understanding with Syria on all 
outstanding questions. He also privately told some deputies that he had sounded Menderes 
over raising the question of Alexandretta, but the latter had cautioned emphatically and 
angrily "not to play with fire". Foreign Minister Faydi al-Atasi stressed that Syria should co­
operate with all countries with whom she had common interests, including Turkey. He 
accused the opposition of wishing to make Syria "a sealed box cut off from the outside 
world" and declared that Syria should be content to have a single enemy like Israel. Some 
right-wing newspapers echoed his views.21
Menderes realised the difficulty of his task ftuther during his official visit to Behut on 15- 
19 January, where he was told that the reputedly pro-Western Lebanese leaders could not 
join the Turkish-Iraqi pact without consulting other Arab states and that then* eventual 
adherence would have no practical value without the participation of the latter. 22
In this atmosphere, the Syrian delegation's refusal during the Cairo Conference to 
subscribe to any final communique condemning Iraq caught Menderes by surprise. The 
Syrians argued in Cairo that each Arab state was entitled to appreciate its own dangers and 
take its own appropriate defence measures as long as the latter did not contradict the interests 
of the Arab League; Iraq was the most exposed to the Soviet threat and the proposed fraqi-
18Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 70; FO371/115484/V1073/20, Gardener to FO, 15.1.55; F0371/115486/ 
V1073/62, Bowker to FO, 18.1.55.
19F 0371/115486/V1073/92, Gardener to Falla, 19.1.55.
2^Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 70.
-^Avedis K. Sanjian, The Sanjak o f Alexandretta (Hatay); A Study in Franco-Turco-Syrian Relations, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956, 246-47; Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 335; 
FO371/115953/VY10344/3, Gardener to FO, 15.1.55; F0371/115486/V1073/91, Gardener to Eden, 19.1.55.
22chamoun, Crise, 271-72. This Lebanese position was reiterated during Lebanese President Kamil 
Sham'un's state visit to Turkey the following April; see ibid., 276-77,
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Turkish treaty could not he unfavourable to the Arab League 23 Menderes realised that his 
chances of success were not so dim as he had supposed. Rather unfortunately for al-Khuri, 
however, an oveqoyed Turkish government spokesman publicly thanked on February 2-i.e. 
before the end of the Cairo Conference-"the eminent Arab statesmen, and particularly to 
those of Syria, who assisted" Turkey "in her common cause with Iraq".24 Two days later, 
Menderes himself publicly referred to Syrian and Lebanese friendship to Turkey. 25 in a 
country like Syria, where the sour memories of the last years of Ottoman rule and the 
annexation of Alexandretta were still fresh, these statements provoked a sharp reaction, 
caused the press to attack the government and greatly embarrassed a l - K h u r i .2b Menderes 
seemed to have realised his tactical error. He asked the Syrian government to let him know if 
there was any action which he might take or refrain from taking to help them 22 By the time 
his message was transmitted, however, al-Khuri had already been forced to resign.
The New Syrian Government and the Tripartite Declaration
The behind-the-scenes manoeuvres to topple al-Khuri's cabinet had been initiated a month 
before by the Syrian army Chief of Staff (COS), Gen. Shawkat Shuqayr. The army officer- 
coips had long resented the People's Party's pro-Iraqi foreign policy. Shuqayr, playing on old 
rivalries between Nationalists and Populists, particularly in Aleppo, lured two Nationalist 
leaders, Mikha'il Hyan and Sabri al-'Asali, away from the Populists and brought them closer 
to al-'Azm and the Ba'th. Al-Khuri's cabinet collapsed, and the weak al-'Asali succeeded him 
on February 13.
The new cabinet was composed of three Nationalists, three members of the Democratic 
Bloc (including al-'Azm as Foreign Minister), and one member each from the Ba'th Party, the 
Tribal Bloc and the pro-ALM Independent Bloc. It sharply criticised al-Khuri's stand in Cairo 
and publicly backed the view that no Arab country should join the Iraqi-Turkish treaty. It 
vowed to give priority to the strengthening of defences against any possible Israeli aggression 
and called on other Arab states to improve Arab collective security. It promised to consider 
with attention the suggestion that the government should co-operate with the West, but said 
it preferred co-operation to be limited within the provisions of the UN Charter and be 
especially close with states supporting the Arab cause in Palestine.28
23FO371/115486/V1073/60, Gardener to FO, 20.1.55.
24FO371/115488/V1073/151, Bowker to FO, 3.2.55.
25FO371/115493/V1073/318, Gardener toFO, 18.2.55.
26FO371/115488/V1073/173, Gardener to FO, 5.2.55; F0371/115491/V1073/254, Gardener to Rose,
9.2.55.
22FO371/115493/V1073/311, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 14.2.55.
28Lesch, Syria, 63; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 322-24; FO371/115493/V1073/305, Gardener to FO,
22.2.55.
90
The new government improved relations with Egypt and revoked the former cabinet's 
decision to decline an invitation for Salah S a l im .29 Egypt's renewed emphasis on total 
opposition to alliances with non-Arab states had struck a chord with the now dominant 
neutralist feeling in Syria. Salim and Col. Mahmud Riyad, the Head of the Arab Affairs 
Department at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, spent five days in Syria from February 26 and 
met almost all leading local politicians.30 They argued that Iraq had, by signing a pact with 
Turkey, destroyed the ALCSP and proposed that Egypt and Syria should initiate a new pan- 
Arab mutual defence co-operation agreement.31 Salim and al-'Azm drafted a preliminary 
agreement to that effect which went further than the ALCSP in imposing severe limitations 
on the sovereign rights of prospective member-states to conduct then foreign and defence 
policies freely, particularly in peacetime. It stated that no Arab state should adhere to the 
Turkish-Iraqi pact or any other alliance with a non-Arab power and proposed the 
establishment of an Arab mutual defence organisation to co-operate in repulsing any external 
aggression. A permanent joint command and a common defence plan would be created, hi 
the economic field, it envisaged the creation of an Arab bank of issue to issue an Arab 
currency (which would also have inevitably limited the freedom of future members to ran 
then own economies), a permanent Arab economic council, Arab maritime, air, insurance, 
and limited liability companies to carry out large industrial and agricultural projects. But 
perhaps the most politically significant provision was that member-states of the organisation 
"must not conclude international agreements, whether military or political, without the 
consent of the other members".32 This provision, if applied, would have practically given 
Egypt a power of veto on the foreign policy of the other Arab states and perpetuated 
Egyptian dominance in the Arab world set in motion with the formation of the Arab League 
in 1945.33
Salim's task in Syria was made easier by two almost simultaneous, but most probably 
unconnected, incidents. On February 26, the US ambassador in Damascus, James Moose,
29Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 387.
30Riyad later became Egyptian ambassador in Syria from March 1955 to 1958.
3 1 Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 388; Chamoun, Crise, 268; F 0371/115496/V1073/415, Gardener to Eden,
3.3.55.
32See full text in al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 389-90; F 0371/115496/V1073/410 & F0371/115500/ 
V1073/535.
33'Abd al-Nasir candidly told US ambassador Henry Byroade on March 10 that the proposed pact "was of 
no general advantage to Egypt, but it was of utility in foiling Iraqi schemes: the 'unified command' in 
particular was calculated to serve this end". "He was not particularly keen to see Jordan and Lebanon join the 
proposed agreement, since their propinquity to Israel would merely load Egypt with additional commitment"; 
see FO371/115497/V1073/445, Stevenson to FO, 11.3.55. It could be argued, of course, that the said clause 
could, technically at least, have also imposed an "Arab" veto on future Egyptian moves, but the history of 
MEC/MEDO had shown that it had always been Egypt who had managed to drag the rest of the Arab world 
behind her, not vice versa.
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presented to al-'Asali and al-'Azm a long note—drafted before tbe new government had 
received a parliamentary vote of confidence—explaining that Washington attached great 
importance to the Iraqi-Turkish treaty as a first step towards a Middle East defence pact, and 
lacked confidence in the ability of the ALCSP or any successor treaty to serve the area's 
defence needs. It expressed hope that Syria would not "associate self with any effort to make 
things more difficult for Iraq" and would "act so as to leave open the possibility of its future 
association with the developing defence organisation". It also promised American military aid 
if the Arabs welcomed the Turkish-Iraqi pact and Arab-Israeli relations improved.3 ^  The 
contents of the note leaked a few days later causing the Syrian government embarrassment 
and providing left-wingers with an opportunity to claim that Washington was forcing the 
Arabs to make peace with Israel under the threat of suspending aid.35 The second incident 
was the ferocious Israeli "retaliatory" raid on Gaza on February 28, which left behind 38 
Egyptians dead and showed how vulnerable Arab defences w e r e , 36 jt proved, according to 
David Lesch, "a seminal event in the history of postwar Middle East," making the Syrian 
military put pressure on its government to conclude a speedy military agreement with 
Egypt.37 In Egypt, too, 'Abd al-Nasir had till then believed that Israel had no serious 
aggressive intentions and that the 1949 armistice agreements offered a guarantee for peace. 
After the raid, however, he took seriously the dangers posed to Egypt by Israel's aggressive 
and expansionist behaviour. His attempt to quickly arm and consolidate the Egyptian armed 
forces eventually led to the conclusion of the "Czechoslovak" arms deal later that year.3 ^
Not all Syrian politicians, however, favoured the al-'Azm-Salim draft. Cracks appeared in 
the National Party and, hence, in the coalition government. Ilyan and Finance Minister Leon 
Zamariyya absolutely opposed any separate agreement with Egypt, while the Nationalist 
Minister of the Economy, Fakhir al-Kayyali, sided with the Ba'th and Democratic Bloc in 
advocating an immediate agreement. Opposition from the People's Party, the Tribal Bloc and 
other conservative and pro-Iraqi elements was, of course, not unexpected, but the formation 
of an alternative coalition between the Populists and dissident Nationalists was out of the 
question. Despite various efforts to that effect made behind-the-scenes by President al-Atasi 
and Western diplomats, Syrian politicians remained convinced that the army would oppose
34Lesch, Syria, 64; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 239-41; FRUS1955-1957, XII, 516-17.
35FO371/115494/V1073/362, Gardener to FO, 1.3.55; FO371/115498/V1073/476, Chanceiy, Damascus 
to Levant Department, 10.3.55; FO371/115497/V1073/448, Gardener to FO, 11.3.55.
3^See details in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen(eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences
(1989), 35; Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (1981), 30-34.
3 'Lesch, Syj'ia, 64-65.
3^Malunoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (1981), 7; Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting 
the Lions Tail: Suez through Arab Eyes (1987), 66-67.
92
such a government, and could then install an even more anti-Western cabinet. 39 The People's 
Party itself was split: one faction, supporting alignment with Iraq; while another, opposing all 
alliances except those under Arab League auspices.40 Economic considerations further 
complicated the political equations. Merchants feared that if there was to be a parallel 
economic agreement with Egypt, the latter, being a low cost country, would capture Syrian 
export trade in manufactured goods, for which Iraq was an important customer.41 These 
disagreements paralysed the cabinet for the remainder of its time in office. President al-Atasi, 
despite his very limited constitutional prerogatives, resented al-'Asali's and al-'Azm's policies, 
and this, too, somewhat affected the smoothness of the workings of the government.42 
Agreement with Egypt was favoured by the ideological parties, except the SSNP, which 
found it "unrealistic, because it bound only one part of Greater Syria and ignored Lebanon
and Jordan".43
It was clear that Niui would not join the proposed organisation, and probably Cano's 
implicit aim was thus to isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. The Iraqi minister in 
Damascus, 'Abd al-Jalil al-Rawi, fought this agreement hard from its inception and was 
partially successful as pro-Iraqi Syrian deputies initially blocked its immediate ratification in 
the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. 44
The conclusion of the al-'Azm-Salim agreement was first reported on March 3, but its full 
text was made public only on March 6. Meanwhile, Salim, Riyad and al-'Azm had been off to 
Amman, Riyadh and Beirut canvassing the support of the respective governments. Only the 
Saudi monarch gave his immediate approval. From then on, the agreement became informally 
known as the Tripartite Pact as a sign for Saudi co-sponsorship. The Jordanian and Lebanese 
attitudes amounted to polite refusals.45
Al-'Azm also paid from March 14 a fruitless five-day visit to Baghdad. He told Iraqi 
leaders that the Tripartite Pact was not directed against Iraq and Syria would welcome any 
Iraqi proposals to amend it.4b There was no breakthrough, however. Despite Nuri's
39A l- 'A z m , Mudhakkarat, II, 324, 388-89; FO371/115494/V1073/361-62, Gardener to FO, 1.3,55; 
F0371/115496/V1073/415, Gardener to Eden, 3.3.55.
4^Torrey, Syrian Politics, 288,
41FO371/115506/V1073/691, Gardener to FO, 13.4.55.
42Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 401-02.
43Robert T. Waters, A Socio-Political Analysis o f Syria 1943-1958 with Particular Reference to the 
Analytical System o f Gabriel A. Almond, unpublished M.A. dissertation, American University of Beirut, 
1962, 61.
44Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 389.
45Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 391-94; Chamoun, Crise, 273-74; F0371/115495/V1073/387, Duke to FO, 
4.3.55; ibid., -/405, Gardener to FO, 7.3.55.
4  ^Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 394; FO371/115496/V1073/423, Gardener to FO, 8.3.55; F0371/ 
115498/V1073/498, Gardener to FO, 12.3.55. Al-'Asali later said that al-'Azm's trip had been "a ruse". 'Abd 
al-Nasir had declared that the Tripartite Pact would never be open to Iraq and threatened to withdraw from
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reassurances that Iraq would never agree to the entry of Turkish forces into Iraq, even in 
wartime, and that the pact with Turkey would be confined only to the exchange of 
information and providing facilities for transport of military equipment, the two sides later 
even disagreed on what had actually been the outcome of the discussions. 47
Turkey Puts Pressure on Syria
Turkey was unhappy with the change of government in Damascus.48 she urged her Western 
allies to take a tough line with those Arab countries that opposed the establishment of a 
Middle East defence organisation.49 After the Salim-al-'Azm tour of the Arab capitals had 
gone under way, Ankara made a tactical readjustment, seeing in the prevention of Syria's 
eventual adherence to the projected Tripartite Pact a necessary first step in bringing her, and 
other Arab states, into the Baghdad Pact. Deputy Premier Zorlu suggested that Turkey, 
Britain and America together should maintain, through close consultations among their 
diplomatic representatives, constant pressure on Damascus and Amman to frustrate Egypt's 
efforts. 50 Qn March 5, Menderes declared that Egyptian pressure on certain Arab countries 
"has reached a degree which is incompatible with the notion of the independence of the 
States" and that it was "evident that the Egyptian leaders have obliged the Syrian leaders to 
submit to their wishes". Turkey was worried, said Menderes, that her "neighbour and friend" 
Syria, by concluding the tripartite agreement, was participating in "the ill-judged and 
sometimes hostile actions and intentions of the Egyptian leaders against Turkey". Turkey 
could not accept that other states "should be deprived by force of the means of free action 
and of following a policy which conforms to their interests". If "this action and these 
intentions" went further, there would be cause for "anxiety about the future of Turco- 
Egyptian relations".51 A Turkish aide-memoire delivered to the Syrian government a few 
days later warned that Ankara could not remain indifferent to or tolerate a manifestly hostile 
Syrian attitude. 52
the ALCSP unless Syria joined the proposed Tripartite Pact. In order to save their own faces, al-'Asali and al- 
'Azm had agreed to sign, provided that Iraq would also be invited to join, although they privately knew that 
Nuri would certainly decline the invitation; see Seale, Struggle, 316.
47Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 395-99 speculates that the misunderstanding arose probably because the 
minutes taken down by the two delegations were never compared and agreed upon. This row is agood 
example of the informal (and somewhat haphazard) manner with which Nuri conducted his foreign policy, 
his reluctance to rely on written records and preferance to use informal channels of communication-through 
friends and confidantes-rather than the official channels provided by the presence of Iraqi missions in 
different Arab capitals.
48FO371/115491/V1073/244(i), Gardener to FO, 15.2.55.
49FO371/115494/V1073/349, Bowker to FO, 28.2,55.
50FO371/l 15495/V1073/388 & 400, Bowker to FO, 4 & 6 March 1955.
5 ^ 0371/115495^1073/401, Bowker to FO, 6.3.55.
^^See full text of aide-memoire in F0371/115500/V1073/531, Gardener to FO, 10.3.55.
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Ankara had concluded that there was no point at this juncture in mincing words. 53 it 
soon targeted its attacks on al-'Azm personally. On March 13, Soysal delivered to al-'Azm a 
harsher aide-memoire,54 stating Turkey's belief that the proposed Tripartite Pact aimed at 
preventing the accession of other Arab states to the Turkish-Iraqi pact; isolating Iraq and 
Turkey from the Arab world; and even detaching Iraq from Turkey. Ankara, therefore, could 
not remain indifferent to the newly-forged Syrian-Egyptian alliance, which with its generally 
negative spirit and hostile sentiments toward Turkey in particular, had disturbed the regional 
peace. Its implementation would force Ankara revise her policy toward Syria. The Turkish- 
Iraqi and the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi blocs could not coexist and, without measures like the 
Turkish-Iraqi pact, Syria could be wiped off geographical maps within a few d a y s .  55
Al-’Azm studied this aide-memoire "with amazement and astonishment being mixed with 
contempt and disgust in my soul".56 He was extremely angry, but in order not to play into 
Turkish hands, he only instructed the Syrian minister in Ankara, Kazim al-Jaza'iri, to inform, 
after a short while, the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the aide-memoire was being studied, 
but that it had been received "with little satisfaction" because its "spirit" and "tone" had been 
"incompatible with rules in usage in correspondence between independent states" and that it 
would affect negatively the development of bilateral relations. Ankara was promised a full 
reply after al-'Azm's return from his above-mentioned visit to Baghdad. On the evening of 
March 19, al-Jaza'iri finally presented the Syrian memorandum to Koprulii, who listened 
patiently and agreed that the tone had been harsh. But, at 7:00 a.m. on the following day, al- 
Jaza'iri was peremptorily summoned to see Menderes and Zorlu, who angrily returned the 
memorandum as being unacceptable and accused al-'Azm of going to Iraq to turn her against 
Turkey. Citing a declaration made by the latter on problems existing between Turkey and 
Syria on their common frontiers, they warned al-Jaza'iri that if Syria continued talking 
publicly about Alexandretta, Turkey would retaliate by making trouble over Aleppo, and if 
Syria wanted to break off diplomatic relations, Turkey was prepared to reciprocate. 5?
53f 0371/115500/V1073/537, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 15.3.55.
54FO371/115498/V1073/470, Gardener to FO, 14.3.55.
5^See full text in F0371/115500/V1073/537, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 15.3.55. 
Extracts are published in al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 469-70.
5^Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 470.
57F0371/115501/V1073/560, Gardener to FO, 23.3.55; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 472-74, where he 
writes that the problems on borders he had referred to in the interview concerned were not about 
Alexandretta, but the problems arising between Syrian and Turkish landowners, who owned property on the 
opposing sides of the border. It is difficult to assess whether Menderes and Koprulii were in accord or not 
about the way to treat this memorandum. The Ankara correspondent of the Associated Press speculated that 
Koprulii's resignation the following month "must have had some relation with the Syrian incident"; see 
FO371/115508/V1073/733.
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Al-Jaza'iri immediately returned to Damascus for consultations, suggesting rightly that 
Menderes's anger had probably been caused by reports emanating from Baghdad that al-'Azm 
had made Nuri change his mind.58 indeed, Turkish officials told the Iraqi leadership soon 
afterwards that the Syrians should not have been received in Baghdad or, when they had 
come, they should have been spoken to in the strongest terms. The Syrian visit to Baghdad 
would now reinforce al-'Azm's position-which was on the point of tottering over a few days 
before-and give Syria and Egypt a period of grace during which they could work out further 
means to frustrate the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Most of the ground, gained in the last three weeks 
by Turkish, Iraqi and Western firmness, was now probably lost.59 Turkish suspicions had 
also grown after receiving information that, whilst in Baghdad, al-'Azm had suggested to the 
Iraqis the construction of a railway from Lattakia to Iraq, which would bypass, between 
Aleppo and Mosul, that stretch of 250 miles of the existing Baghdad railway passing through 
Turkish territory. 60 Similar divergences in Turkish and Iraqi views on how to handle the 
Syrian situation and encourage pro-Western elements there would continue on and off for the 
next four years, with the Turks always advocating a stem approach, while the Iraqis, perhaps 
being more aware of the intricacies of intra-Arab politics, preferring to adopt a relatively 
subtler line.
The Syrian government officially expressed resentment on March 22 "at the wrong 
interpretations of Syrian policies and intentions as well as surprise and astonishment" at 
Menderes's attitude, reaffirming that Syria never wished to show hostility to Turkey, but 
"aimed at directing its relations with sister Arab States along lines required by the interests of 
the Arab Nation",61 Al-'Azm explained "the recent developments" in Syrian-Turkish relations 
to all heads of foreign missions in Damascus, 62 but severely reprimanded the editor of a 
Damascus newspaper, which had quoted large sections of the aide-memoire fairly 
accurately. 63 Al-'Azm says that he did not wish to see the incident turn into another 
telegram, which precipitated the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. 64 The Turkish government, 
however, stated further that the Syrian memorandum had been returned because of its being 
merely an expression of the intolerable tactics of the present Syrian government and its 
Foreign Minister to fight the Turkish-Iraqi treaty. 65
58Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 473.
59FO371/115503/V1073/597, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 22.3.55.
60FO371/115513/V1073/861, Gardener to Rose, 7.6.55.
61FO371/115503/V1073/613, Gardener to FO, 23.3.55.
62F0371/115501/V1073/560, Gardener to FO, 23.3.55.
63FO371/115502/V1073/583, Gardener to FO, 26.3.55.
^Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 476.
65See full text in F 0371/115505/V1073/652 &F0371/115507/V1073/734.
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Although Turkey's allies believed that Ankara's demarche had been beneficial in causing 
Syria to approach her proposed agreement with Egypt with caution, they were now worried 
that further publicised bullying could stiffen and unite Syrian public opinion behind al-'Asali's 
government and against Turkey and the W e s t .66 They were not prepared to bum all bridges 
with opponents of the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Washington wanted to keep the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the "Northern Tier" well apart and saw merit in maintaining a working 
relationship with 'Abd al-Nasir. Eden even promised the latter, during a brief visit to Cairo on 
February 26, that Britain would not attempt to bring other Ar ab states into the pact, if Egypt 
ceased attacking it. For the moment, Britain only wished to prevent Syria, Lebanon and 
Jordan from committing themselves to an exclusive anti-Baghdad grouping, which would 
exacerbate the division of the Arab w o r l d .67 Iraq, too, urged restraint, because too hard a 
Turkish line with Syria, especially any hint of troop movements near then common frontier, 
could revive Syrian suspicions of Turkish intentions and push her further into Egypt's a r m s . 68
The Turkish Foreign Ministry, however, seemed undeterred, believing that unless strong 
pressure were exercised against al-'Azm personally, Syria would sign with Egypt some sort of 
agreement which would be a constant impediment to the development of the Turkish-Iraqi 
pact. Birgi claimed that a Nationalist Syrian Minister and the President's son had strongly 
urged the continuation of the tough Turkish line. Furthermore, since Syria had done nothing 
whatever to meet Turkish representations, a sudden change of tone by Ankara at this stage 
would merely encourage al-'Azm in his present policy.69 Throughout the diplomatic crisis, 
however, Syrian Military Intelligence had not monitored any noticeable change in the overall 
strength of Turkish troops situated near the Syrian frontier.76 Later, the new Turkish 
minister in Damascus, Adnan Rural, denied to journalists the existence of troop 
concentrations. 71
Kural's arrival was welcomed in Damascus. His predecessor, Soysal, had been depicted as 
the villain by the Syrian press during the crisis. Rural presented his credentials on March 26 
and was immediately convinced that Turkish pressure on Syria had gone too far and could 
unite the opposition behind the government and against the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Encouraged 
by his British and American colleagues, Rural urged Roprulii to moderate Menderes's anti-
66FO371/115501/V1073/593, Gardener to FO, 22.3.55; FO371/115469/V1023/8, FO minute by Brewis, 
23.3.55; FO371/115502/V1073/569, Gardener to FO, 25.3.55.
6^Heikal, Cutting, 65; Devereux, Formulation, 165; Young, Foreign Policy, 152, 177.
68FO371/115501/V1073/542, Wright to FO, 21.3.55; FO371/115502/V1073/591, FO minute by Rose,
22.3.55.
69FO371/115502/V1073/582, Bowker to FO, 26.3.55.
7°FO371/115502/V1073/585, Gardener to FO, 26.3.55.
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Syrian campaign.72 Whether as a direct result of his prompting, or through taking other 
factors into account, Ankara ceased making further direct and public reproaches against 
Syria. Its hostility towards al-'Asali's government and the Tripartite Pact, however, never 
waned.
The Turkish-Syrian crisis had one lasting repercussion. It gave Moscow an opportunity to 
impress Syria and thus make inroads in the Arab East. If previous Syrian governments had 
resisted similar Soviet attempts, al-'Asali's cabinet, which included many neutralist Ministers, 
did not feel such constraints.72 It expressed gratitude for the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
statement of April 17 attacking the Turkish-Iraqi pact, accusing Turkey of striving to 
dominate the Arab world and proclaiming Moscow's readiness to defend the freedom and 
sovereignty of the states of the region 7^  Later, high-ranking Soviet officials privately 
reassured Syria on several occasions that she need not fear a Turkish invasion. Finally, when 
al-'Azm concluded that France would no longer supply Syria with weapons, probably, he 
reasoned, under British and American pressure, he, too, like 'Abd al-Nasir, turned to and 
received arms from Moscow.7  ^ It was the beginning of a long and close bilateral Soviet- 
Syrian relationship. The more conservative cabinet of Sa'id al-Ghazzi, which came to power 
in September 1955, for example, kept relations with Moscow on friendly terms.7**
Turkey, France and the Baghdad Pact
Ankara feared that France could exert a negative influence on the future of the Baghdad Pact. 
France indeed felt "neglected" for not having been consulted during its formulation and 
suspected that it was another British device to push her totally out of the Middle East.77 She 
was veiy angry because Menderes had not co-ordinated with her beforehand his above- 
mentioned negotiations in Lebanon.7** France was further anxious that if the pact succeeded,
72FO371/115503/V1073/594 & 598, Gardener to FO, 28.3.55; FO371/I15502/V1073/582, FO minute by 
Brewis, 30.3.55.
^Lesch, Syria, 46 argues that Soviet encroachment to the Arab heartland was the inevitable 
consequence of Washington's attempt to delink the political problems of the Arab world from the strategic 
goal of regional defence. Previously, Syria and Egypt, when courted to join MEC/MEDO, had viewed 
Washington as a guarantor of security against Israel and tried to use those advances unsuccessfully as a 
leverage to secure Israeli concessions. Now, with Washington focusing on the "Northern Tier," they turned to 
Moscow for arms and security guarantees.
7^FO371/115509W1073/753, Hayter to FO, 24.4.55. See full text of Russian statement in Pravda, 17
April 1955; Dzh. Ruindezh, Bor'ba irakskogo naroda protiv Bagdadskogo Pakta (1966), 110-15; 
F0371/115508/V1073/733.
7^Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 407-8, 428-29. Syria had bought in 1954 a few old, World War II German 
tanks from Czechoslovakia; see Seale, Struggle, 213.
7*frorrey, Syrian Politics, 297; Lesch, Syria, 67.
11 DDF 1954 (21juillet-31 decembre), 119-21, 670-71.
78FO371/115472/V10317/l, Gardener to Falla, 24.1.55.
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Egypt could feel left out, turn her back on the Arab world and devote herself to Afiica, where 
her revolutionary rhetoric could create trouble for British/French colonial d o m i n a t i o n . 7  9
France was believed to have financially backed al-'Azm, and hence Ankara attributed al- 
'Azm's opposition to the pact to his close relations with France. 80 Turkey conceded that 
France's position in Syria and Lebanon gave her some claim to interest herself in any Middle 
East defence scheme. Nonetheless, her role was subordinate to those of the UK and USA, 
since she had no troops or bases in the area and could not contribute militarily to regional 
defence. 81 Zorlu opined that French accession to the pact could only be considered after 
Syrian and Lebanese adherence. 82
Al-'Azm's Draft of the Tripartite Pact and the Syrian Presidential Elections 
Weathering the Turkish storm did not signal the end of al-'Azm's problems. He was under 
Egyptian pressure to sign as quickly as possible a final treaty on the lines of the joint 
Egyptian- Syrian-Saudi communique, while the Nationalist ministers in the Syrian cabinet 
threatened to resign if he did so. So, perhaps out of genuine conviction to strengthen the 
Arab front against Israel-as he himself always contended-but also perhaps as an attempt to 
keep the coalition government intact in order not to diminish his chances of getting elected 
President in July, al-'Azm drafted a new and more comprehensive political, economic and 
military treaty, open to signature to all Arab states, including I r a q .  **3 Some of its far-reaching 
proposals remained unacceptable to E g y p t .  84 Riyadh was overall closer to C a ir o .  85 Even 
some top Syrian army officers were ready to be satisfied with less. COS Shuqayr-desperate 
to reach a military agreement with Egypt-proposed his own separate draft, which covered 
only military clauses. 8b Jt was even rumoured that he had thr eatened a coup d'etat if no 
agreement was reached. President al-Atasi secretly enquired whether Iraq could temporarily 
dispatching forces to protect the constitutional government in Syria in the event of a coup or, 
at least, warn Syrian officers that any army-installed government would not be r e c o g n i s e d .  87 
Baghdad took no such action, however. American and British governments did not like to 
invoke military action or even use the threat of non-recognition as a political weapon, fearing
79FO371/115492/V1073/270, Chancery, Cairo to African Department, 15.2.55.
^Lescli, Syria, 54; Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 74.
81FO371/110788/V1073/83, Scott Fox to Falla, 29.11.54.
82FO371/115498/V1073/483, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 6.3.55.
8^See full text in al-Khuri, A l-M ash ari294-95.
^P A -hzm , Mudhakkarat, II, 402-07; F0371/11.5505/V1073/663, Stevenson toFO, 6.4.55.
85FO371/115504/V1073/645, Stevenson toFO, 4.4.55.
8 6Al-' Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 404.
87FO371/115506/V1073/686, Gardener to FO, 12.4.55; FO371/115507/V1073/712, Gardener to FO,
15.4.55.
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that it might be resented as intervention in internal Syrian affairs and consequently have 
effects directly contrary to what was intended. 88
'Abd al-Nasir was annoyed at al-'Azm's insistence on his own draft. He reportedly held al- 
'Azm in low esteem, considering him a pseudo-socialist, who had emerged from feudal 
ranks. 89 He therefore openly backed the candidacy for the Syrian presidency of al-'Azm's 
rival, ex-President al-Quwatli, hoping that the latter would be more flexible. 90 Al-'Azm also 
failed to win Shuqayr's support.91 Iraq and the Syrian Populists, too, ultimately backed al- 
Quwatli as the only viable candidate to keep al-'Azm out. So, the former was elected on 
August 18, with only the Ba'th, the Democratic Bloc and the Communists voting for al-'Azm. 
It can be surmised, however, that, in order to get elected, al-Quwatli had probably given 
various promises, sometimes contradictory, to almost e v e r y o n e .92
Turkey and the Projected Tripartite Pact
Baghdad did not communicate anything to the Turks on al-Atasi's above-mentioned request, 
fearing that it might put some unwarranted ideas into their minds. Birgi, however, heard 
about it through US embassy officials, and expressed disappointment at the British and 
American attitude. Ankara suggested that Western powers and their allies need not fear any 
really serious consequences from an Egyptian-Syrian agreement after the latest developments, 
"but such an agreement would inevitably cloud the atmosphere and produce a crop of 
annoyances," and for that reason they had to "make a final effort to prevent this agreement 
from materialising".93 Such a possibility was not yet lost. The USA and UK should "take an 
appropriate attitude for the non-recognition of an illegitimate [Syrian] Government, should it 
take power" and adopt certain economic and commercial measures, "according to the special 
features" of their ties with Syria. "It cannot in any way be claimed that the majority of Syrian 
public opinion is in favour of the Pact or that it would repudiate a Government which might 
abstain from concluding it," and the "majority" of the Arab countries, i.e. Iraq, Lebanon and 
Jordan, supported "the spirit and the aims of the Baghdad Pact". Ankara proposed that the 
USA, UK, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan should take "joint and coordinated action" to strengthen 
the Baghdad Pact and its supporters in Syria and to dissuade the promoters of the Tripartite 
Pact. The adherence of Lebanon and Jordan to the Baghdad Pact was "very important" for
88FO371/115499/V1073/510, FO minute by Rose, 14.3.55 & FO to Washington, 16.3.55; F0371/ 
115507/V1073/722, Gardener to FO, 18.4.55.
89Salah Nasr, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-tajrib at al-wahdah (n.d.), 99.
90FO371/115516/V1073/940, Murray to FO, 21.7.55.
9 ^ Mustafa Tlas, Mir'at hayati: al-'aqd al-awwal 1948-1958: al-nidal (1990?), 499-501; al-'Azm, 
Mudhakkarat, II, 444, 452; Lesch, Syria, 70.
92Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 288; FO371/128251/VY1051/2, Rose to Lamarque, 22.2.57.
93F0371/115509/V1073/760, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 19.4.55.
100
the current moment and US/UK encouragement would be crucial to that effect. Otherwise, if 
the Tripartite Pact were established, the ensuing hostility in the region "would doubtless give 
Russia the opportunity of forming a bridgehead in the Middle East ".94
Washington considered, however, that "action on the lines of the Turkish 
recommendations would not be appropriate in the present circumstances".95 The accession 
of Arab states bordering Israel was inadvisable, it said, but it was taking appropriate 
measures to tiy and stop the emergence of an anti-Baghdad Pact alliance. 9b Britain, too, 
found most of the Turkish suggestions "either unacceptable or impractical". Urging Arab 
neighbours of Israel to join the pact might make Israel feel threatened and create a dangerous 
situation in the region. The development of the Tripartite Pact was "more likely to be 
hindered by treating Syria gently than threats and pressure".97
Turkey did not want the supporters of the Tripartite Pact in Syria be seen as taking any 
credit whatsoever. When Harold Macmillan, the new British Foreign Secretary, agreed to 
meet al-'Azm, Ankara asked London to withdraw the invitation, because the meeting would 
strengthen al-'Azm's position in Syria on the eve of the presidential elections. If al-'Azm were 
only received in Paris, "his dependence upon French intrigue" would be e x p o s e d .98
The al-Gkazzi Cabinet and the Signature of the Tripartite Pact
Having failed to agree on a single candidate during the presidential race, al-'Asali's coalition 
government broke up. Moreover, exactly one week after al-Quwatli's election, al-'Azm 
suffered a serious stroke, which forced him out of politics for nearly a y e a r .  99 Salah Salim, 
too, resigned his ministerial post in Cano that month after the failure of his Sudanese 
policy. 100 jt seemed that attempts to set up a smaller, but tighter, Arab bloc were buried.
On September 13, al-Quwatli named Sa'id al-Ghazzito head a new coalition government, 
supported by the People's Party, the Constitutional Bloc, a few right-wing unaflfihated 
deputies and some former members of the Democratic Bloc. Al-Ghazzi, who also held the 
foreign affairs portfolio, declared that it was not in Syria's interest to join the Turkish-Iraqi 
pact or any foreign non-Arab pact. He promised, however, to resume discussions on the 
Tripartite Pact provided that they foimed the foundation of a new Arab pact to include all the
94FO371/115510/V1073/786, Bowker to Macmillan, 3,5.55.
9%0371/115509/V1073/788'A', Chancery, Washington to Levant Department, 3.6.55. 
96FO371/115513/V1073/856, Sliuckburgh to Bowker, 10.6.55.
97f O371/115513/V1073/856, FO minute by Rose, 7.6.55 & Sliuckburgh to Bowker, 10,6,55. 
98FO371/115955/VY1051/8, FO minute by Kirkpatrick, 23.5.55.
99Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 463.
^^yj-evelyan, Revolution, 15-18.
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Arab states who wished to join. The latter could adhere only if their obligations to foreign 
powers were not thereby assumed by the other members of the projected Arab pact. 1^1
The Ba'thists and some Nationalists rightly interpreted this statement as an abandonment 
of the Tripartite P a c t .  1^2 Menderes, too, opined that it effectively ended any likelihood of it 
coming into being. Hence, he did not object to what al-Ghazzi had said about the Baghdad 
Pact. 103 Menderes apparently thought that Turkey and Iraq had won the first tactical round 
in their struggle against Egypt over Syria. Eventual Syrian adherence to the Baghdad Pact 
would certainly consume time, but would be easier under the new circumstances.
However, the pressure the Syrian military were continuously bringing upon the 
government finally paid off. On October 20, under the threat of being forced to resign, al- 
Ghazzi's cabinet concluded a ten-year bilateral military pact with Egypt, automatically 
renewable for further five-year t e r m s .  104 T h e  two countries pledged to assist each other 
against any attack by a third party. A Supreme Council, composed of the Foreign and War 
Ministers of both countries, would be established, as well as a War Council, composed of the 
two Chiefs of Staff. A permanent Joint Command would be responsible to the Supreme 
Council. Both sides would share equally the expenditure incurred by the Joint Command, 
while the expenses for the maintenance of military installations and bases for the carrying out 
of joint plans would be borne in the proportion of 65% by Egypt and 35% by Syria. 1^5 
Shuqayr stated that, in peacetime, the Syrian Joint Command troops "would roughly be those 
on the South-West front. In war they would include the whole Syrian Army, with the 
exception of certain base installations". 1^6
Lesch surmises that the Syrian military forced the signature of the pact, because, after the 
so-called "Czechoslovak" aims deal, they hoped to get Soviet arms via Egypt and feared that 
Israel might be tempted to attack her Arab neighbours before the actual delivery of the 
purchased weapons. The Syria-Egypt agreement was also a means to drop al-'Azm's draft, for 
which the Syrian army staff had not been very enthusiastic. 107 The shortage of money in 
Syria owing to the partial failure of crops might have also played a part, for it was evident 
that the signature of an agreement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia would immediately be 
followed by financial aid from Riyadh.
101FO371/115947/VY1015/87, Gallagher to Macmillan, 21.9.55.
102A l - ' A z m ,  Mudhakkarat, II, 343; FO371/115947/VY1015/90, Gallagher to Macmillan, 28.9.55.
103FO371/115521/V1073/1067, Stewart to Rose, 28.9.55.
l°4Al-'Azm,Mudhakkarat, II, 313-14; F0371/115524/V1073/1138’A1, Gallagher toFO, 19.10.55; ibid., 
-/1141, Duke to FO, 20.10.55.
105See full text in MEJ, 10/1 (Winter 1956), 77-79; F 0371/115525/VI073/1168, Trevelyan to FO,
24.10.55.
1°6f 0371/U5967/VY1 192/4, Gardener to Rose, 14.12.55.
ifi^Lesch, Syria, 74.
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During the secret parliamentary debate on ratification of this pact on November 5, the 
People's Party forced the passage of an annex declaring that the agreement was "directed 
solely against any aggression committed by Israel on one of the two contracting parties and 
against any aggression whatever its source which may result from or be connected with such 
a g g r e s s i o n " .  108 Xiaq was assured that the agreement was not directed against her and that 
Syria would welcome Iraqi a c c e s s i o n .  109 For a short period afterwards there was even talk 
of a separate Syrian-Iraqi military pact, probably aired by some Populists, but it came to
naught. HO
Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed then bilateral military pact on October 27, followed by a 
Syrian-Saudi commercial and financial agreement on November 9. Riyadh immediately 
loaned Syria $10m, probably to cover Syria's share of the military installations provided for in 
the Syrian-Egyptian agreement. 111 Major-General 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir headed both 
Egyptian-Syrian and Egyptian-Saudi joint commands with headquarters in Cairo. The 
Tripartite Pact, Egypt's response to the Baghdad Pact, had finally materialised on her own 
terms, and as Patrick Seale has put it rightly, since "even rudimentary defence planning 
demands the co-ordination of foreign policies," 'Abd al-Nasir had gr abbed "control of Syria's 
foreign policy without assuming burdensome local responsibilities". H2 The Egyptian-Syrian- 
Saudi alliance culminated in a summit in Cairo on March 6, 1956, where the three Heads of 
State decided to co-operate fully in foreign and defence matters. * 13
Months of bargaining and wrangling, however, had clearly diminished the Tripartite 
Pact's appeal and effectiveness, especially in the eyes of its potential opponents. It was now 
doubtful that it could ever become an effective instrument unless it was built up through open 
Western and regional opposition. Britain, Iraq and Turkey, however, opposed an American 
proposal that the Western allies should "avoid an openly antagonistic position toward the 
Pact and should endeavour to live with it," on the basis that it would be impossible to reverse 
suddenly then policy of opposition and that any change of attitude would destroy confidence 
in the veracity of US and UK representatives in the Middle East. 114 The attention of Turkey, 
Iraq and the Western powers had already shifted to the internal developments in Syria, where 
Communism was thought be going out of hand. This would become one of then main 
preoccupations in the next three years.
108Ai-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, III, 95, The Turkish government was the first among the Western allies to 
get hold of tills secret annex; see FO371/115533/V1073/1369, Gardener to Rose, 30.11.55.
109FO371/115526/V1073/1199, Chancery, Beirut to Levant Department, 25.10.55.
119FO371/115528/V1073/1241, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 5.11.55.
11 ^ 0 3 7 1 /1 15532/V1073/1329, Kearney to Macmillan, 22.11.55.
ii^Seale, Struggle, 254. See also Tlas, Mir'at, 512-13,
113walid al-Mu'allim, Suriyya 1918-1958: al-tahaddi wa-l-muajahah (1985), 199, 362-64.
114FO371/115516/V1073/945; FO371/115517/V1073/981, FO minute by Rose, 6.8.55.
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The Failure to Bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact
In sharp contrast to the roughness she manifested against Syria, Turkish tactics towards 
Lebanon and Jordan were, throughout 1955, markedly different, for the latter had refrained 
from public condemnations of the Baghdad Pact. Turkey took care to lure them with 
prospects of Western military aid if they joined the pact and went even as far as making token 
military gifts to both. 11^
The diminishing threat from the Tripartite Pact did not break Turkey's resolve to bring 
new Arab members into the Baghdad Pact. This determination was strengthened after the 
"Czechoslovak" arms deal with Egypt, which, Ankara thought, had opened up a possibility 
for Soviet influence extending "the whole way along the African coast". Foreign Minister 
Zorlu opined on October 14 that despite some recent discouraging signs, Lebanon would 
follow suit if Jordan could be brought into the Baghdad Pact. "A renewed and special effort 
was also necessary in the case of Syria". 1 ^
During Bayar's official visit to Jordan on 3-8 November, the Turks made an intensive 
effort to encourage Jordanian accession, telling King Husayn that only by joining the 
Baghdad Pact could Jordan get arms and funds needed to expand and modernise her 
army. Koprulii, now back as Foreign Minister, also assured the Jordanians that, if 
necessary, Turkey could take action which could be crippling to any future left-wing Syrian 
government. 118 Bayar, in an impromptu speech made during a visit to some Palestinian 
refugee camps near the Jordan-Israel armistice line, declared that "if one day the sister army 
of Jordan were to be the object of an unjustified attack and if then one saw the Turkish army 
at its side, one should not be surprised". The aggressor meant in this case could, of course, 
only be Israel. 11^
The first Baghdad Pact Council meeting decided to do more "to disrupt" the Egyptian- 
Syiian-Saudi alliancel^O and support efforts to bring Jordan into the pact. Washington, 
however, warned London and Ankara against any hasty attempt to that effect, for it still 
opposed the pact's expansion to include any country having common frontiers with Israel. 121
115Chamoun, Crise, 275; FO371/115649/VJ10344/1-2; F0371/115507/V1073/705, Chapman Andrews 
to FO, 14.4.55.
116FO371/115523/V1073/llll, Stewart to FO, 14.10.55.
James Lunt, Hussein o f Jordan (1990), 32; Hussein, Uneasy, 89.
H^FO371/115527/V1073/1225, Duke toFO, 6.11.55.
H^FO371/115649/VJ10344/5, Stewart to Rose, 15.11.55. Bayar's remarks were interpreted by the 
Turkish opposition as an additional commitment taken by the government without authorisation from the 
GNA. Kopriilu later contended that the statement had been absolutely in accordance with Turkey's obligations 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter and as a member of the Baghdad Pact, in the context of the exchanged 
letters on Palestine; see FO371/121481/VJ10344/1, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 30.12.55.
120f o 371/121336/V1054/101"A", Brief for meeting with von Brentano, [n.d.].
174 Sliuckburgh, Descent, 308.
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Ring Husayn, however, had already become enthusiastic at the prospect of military aid in 
return for accession and sent an extravagant list of military requirements to London. The 
British Chief of the Imperial General Staff arrived in Amman on December 6 to negotiate the 
details. Talks abruptly collapsed, however, when four dissenting ministers of Palestinian 
origin resigned, bringing down the Jordanian cabinet. Widespread rioting across the country 
followed, and Husayn was forced to abandon on December 19 any thought of immediate 
accession. 122
Western and Turkish sources rightly attributed this failure to Egyptian intrigue and Saudi 
bribery. 123 'Abd al-Nasir had indeed interpreted the British mission as a breach of the above- 
mentioned promise given by Eden and unleashed the full force of his powerful propaganda 
machine against the Jordanian government. 124 a  conference of Britain's serving ambassadors 
in the Middle East held in London on 4-5 January 1956 and presided by the new Foreign 
Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, concluded that no further effort should be made, for the time being, 
to bring other Arab countries into the Baghdad Pact. 125 Turkey was understandably unhappy 
with this decision and soon clashed with her Western allies over future tactics.
Turkey and the Palestine Question
Before analysing these disagreements, however, it is important to refer to the simultaneous 
shift in the Turkish attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Iraq predictably used the rapprochement with Turkey to pull her closer towards the Arab 
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ankara was initially very careful to keep a balance. 12b 
During the. Bandung conference in April, however, it supported the Arabs on Palestine. 
Behind the scenes, she went further. Menderes, in his bid to expand the Baghdad Pact, 
assured Lebanon in January that Turkey would consider any future Israeli aggression against 
any neighbouring Arab state as an aggression against Turkey herself, while Koprulii 
guaranteed that Turkey would enter no similar agreement with I s r a e l .  122 J u  October, 
Koprulu promised Jordan that if she joined the pact, Turkey could exchange with her another 
set of letters similar to those exchanged with Iraq. All kinds of links with Israel were
122gee 1 Ali Abu Nuwar, Hina talashat al-'arab: mudhakkarat fi-l-siyasah al-'arabiyyah (1948-1964)
(1990), 160-62; Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge o f Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967 (1989), 
26-28; Eden, Full Circle, 341-44.
123Dann, King Hussein, 27, 177-78; FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 214.
124Heikal, Cutting, 88-89.
125Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (1978), 35-37; FO371/121334/V1054/41, CRO 
outward telegram, 23.1.56.
2^^See Bayar's con-committal references to Palestine during his visit to Iraq in March and King Faysal's 
return visit in June-July in FO371/115750/VQ10344/2, Wright to Eden, 16.3.55 & FO371/115806/VQ1941 
122, Bowker to Macmillan, 6.7.55.
f22Ba^ci, Demolcrat, 65.
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downgraded. Neither the Israeli Symphony Orchestra, nor any of its individual members, 
were permitted to come to Turkey to give concerts. ^
Later in 1955, Turkish leaders began to refer frequently to Palestine in public as well. 
They were encouraged perhaps by the optimistic tone of recent public proposals on the issue 
by Dulles and Eden. 129 Qn November 19, Menderes declared that Ankara would welcome 
any solution to the Palestine question which would satisfy the Arab countries and primarily 
Iraq and would, hence, support Eden's initiative in so far as the Arab countries were 
interested themselves in it. 130 Then, during the restricted session of the Baghdad Pact 
Council meeting in November, he urged his colleagues to settle the Palestinian dispute, "the 
grounds on which Egyptian-Saudi propaganda against us is based and take from the Russians 
the most potent weapon in then armoury". Menderes continued:
hi Israel the West had created a military bridgehead on the Arab mainland which was 
now rapidly becoming untenable. The Arabs would not remain unarmed for ever and 
there was nothing to prevent the balance of strength moving against Israel. 1
The gradual drift by Turkey towards accommodating the Arabs raised eyebrows in Tel-Aviv. 
Israeli leaders concluded that Ankara "had few scruples when any particular aspect of their 
policy was in danger" and were no longer sure that it would not one day "acquiesce in 
another Arab aggression of some kind against Israel".
Turkey had indeed entered a dangerous path in so far as she had become unable to 
influence events the way she desired.
m FRUS 1955-1957, XXIV, 662.
^^See Hurewitz, Diplomacy, II, 395-98, 413-15.
130FO371/117718/RK1016/37, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 29.11.55.
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5Divergence in Policy
The failure to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact precipitated serious disagreements between 
the regional pact-members on one hand and Britain (supported by the USA) on the other on 
future tactics they should adopt. These disagreements were quite sharp up to the end of 
March 1956 and had not been hilly resolved even when the Suez crisis erupted in July. 
Throughout this period, Turkey tried to play the role of regional spokesman and was more 
determined than any other Middle Eastern pact-member to persuade the American and British 
governments to change then policies as regards the future expansion of the pact's 
membership, as well as towards the Egyptian government.
Turkey, Iraq and the Expansion of the Baghdad Pact
The failure in Jordan did not alter Turkey's desire to see the Baghdad Pact expanded by 
bringing in the USA and some Arab countries besides Iraq. For Ankara, the pact was 
indispensable; to stop its reinforcement or progress would mean a regression and a loss. All 
efforts should lead towards its extension, "while reserving the choice of time and methods to 
be adopted" to that effect. 1
On the issue of US adherence, Turkey had the support of all existing pact-members. ^  
Washington, after all, had itself first proposed the "Northern Tier" project and encouraged 
the future members of the Baghdad Pact to expect its eventual lull and active participation. 
American membership would no doubt give the pact added prestige, increase its military and 
political muscle. Washington, however, now felt that it could not ignore other aspects of its 
Middle Eastern policy. If it had, up to the Baghdad communique (13 January 1955), chided 
Britain for her apparent lack of enthusiasm on the "Northern Tier" scheme,3 the idea of 
staying away from the pact, at least for the time being, had since taken firm root in 
Washington, because accession could damage its bilateral relations with countries like Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Israel. 4 Moreover, Washington had gradually become unenthusiastic even
1FO371/121248/V1073/28, Arthur to Rose, 2.2.56.
■^Rouhollah K. Rainazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study o f Foreign Policy in Modernizing 
Nations (1975), 278-79; Axelgard, Policy, 178; Decker, Policy, 136.
^Axelgard, Policy, 177.
^Decker, Policy, 96.
to extend the pact to Arab countries bordering Israel, thus trying to prevent the entanglement 
of the "Northern Tier" scheme with the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict. ^  This new 
American attitude emanated partly from a feeling in Congress that further US adherences to 
anti-Soviet pacts could hamper the relative improvement in relations with Moccow in the 
post-Stalin era; hamper Washington's influence in the still uncommitted countries of the so- 
called "Third World"; and limit its manoeuvrability to meet Soviet tactics. Washington took a 
lukewarm attitude during Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, fearing it might exacerbate 
tensions with Mo scow. ^  The USA wanted to support regional pacts only to help build up 
strength against Soviet expansionism She tried to avoid getting involved in local, especially 
inter-Arab, politics, for there was a not unfounded feeling in Washington that some countries 
had joined the Baghdad Pact and/or SEATO only to secure American support against some 
neighbour with whom they had a quarrel. Moreover, it was almost impossible to get the 
necessary Senate approval for US accession to the Baghdad Pact due to Iraq's membership, 
without also giving Israel a firm security guarantee. In view of the strength of the pro-Israeli 
lobby in America, Eisenhower feared that a political crisis over US-Israeli relations in an 
election-year might seriously damage his prospects for re-election. ^  There was, furthermore, 
a, glowing belief in Washington that Britain had, through her membership, "hijacked" the 
pact and turned it simply into a means of maintaining her imperial influence in the Arab 
world. ^  Finally, Washington feared that US membership would further increase demands 
from the other Middle Eastern member-states for military and economic aid. 9 Washington's 
failure to match the expectations of pact-members ultimately proved a major weakness for 
the alliance.
Turkey used every diplomatic channel available to convince the USA to join the pact and 
was, naturally, disappointed at Washington's intransigence. The Turks were further 
embittered because they were convinced that US accession would be crucial in encouraging 
at least some of the still hesitant Arab states, like Jordan and Lebanon, possibly even Syria, to 
adhere too. Then early accession, hoped Ankara, would isolate and weaken Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. 10 Otherwise, if countries like Jordan and Lebanon were abandoned, their pro- 
Western leaders might even fall. Ankara asked Eisenhower and Eden to declare after their 
summit in Washington (30 January-2 February 1956) their strong support for the Baghdad
^Axelgard, Policy, 229; Lesch, Syria, 82.
^Decker, Policy, 98; Aston, "Highjacking", 133.
7Lesch, Syria, 81; Decker, Policy, 201-05; FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 219-20, 235; FO371/121270/ 
VI075/22, Arthur to Rose, 20.1.56; FO371/121271/V1075/61G, Lloyd to Eden, 7.3.56; F0371/121251/ 
V1073/117G, Makins to FO, 6.4.56.
** Aston, "Highjacking11, 123-37; Decker, Policy, 220.
^Decker, Policy, 205.
10FO371/121252/V1073/145, Bowker to FO, 11.4.56.
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Pact to strengthen the position of its members. Moreover, it "earnestly" requested them "not 
to make a public declaration of any kind," say a statement that the West was not seeking the 
pact's immediate expansion, which might lead to the deterioration of the internal position of 
the rulers of Jordan and Lebanon. H  Then on March 11-12, during Selwyn Lloyd's visit to 
Ankara, Turkish leaders warned him that the political situation in Iraq was not altogether 
stable, subversive elements were at work, and recent developments had weakened Nuri's 
position. 12 Menderes opined that the lack of enthusiasm in the region to accede to the pact 
was the consequence of the West's reluctance both to give considerable assistance to the 
pact-members and apply some pressure on waverers. "If the Lebanon and Jordan had acceded 
to the Pact a year ago," said he, "Syria would probably have followed suit. Even today, if the 
United States and one more Arab country would accede, Syria would probably come in". ^  
Turkey's desire to expand the pact remained a salient feature of her Middle Eastern policy 
throughout the next few years. Without access to first-hand Turkish diplomatic documents, 
discussion about some of Turkey's motives to that effect can remain confined only to certain 
generalities. There is a consensus among writers on modem Turkey that the policies of 
successive post-war Turkish governments were generally aimed at increasing Turkey's 
strategic value in the eyes of the Western alliance, especially the USA, both in order to have 
the latter remain committed to Turkey's defence and to extract from her as much military and 
economic aid as possible. The expansion of the pact, however, would not have necessarily 
benefited either. Turkey's security and territorial integrity were already guaranteed through 
her membership of NATO and the expansion of the Baghdad Pact would not have 
precipitated a substantial growth in the US economy, thus making more money available for 
foreign aid. On the contrary, a country like Jordan could expect, after acceding to the pact, to 
get a larger share of the US foreign aid budget, thus indirectly making money less available 
for a country like Turkey. The only long-term, albeit not negligible, benefit Turkey could get 
thr ough the expansion of the Ar ab membership of the pact was that she could then feel more 
secure against the possibility of Soviet-inspired subversive efforts emanating from countries 
lying to her south, as the adherence of countries like Syria, Jordan and Lebanon would have 
virtually guaranteed the permanence in power there of like-minded pro-Western regimes. 14 
No other member of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq included, seemed, at that stage, as keen as 
Ankara to expanded its Arab membership. It was no surprise, therefore, that the Washington
n FO371/121248/V1073/28, Arthur to Rose, 2.2.56. 
l^For an expose of the situation in Iraq in early 1956, see infra.
i3 See records of Lloyd's conversations in Ankara in F0371/124020/ RK1051/31-33. 
l^See also Andrew J. A. Mango, "Turkey and the Middle East", The Political Quarterly, 28/2 (April- 
June 1957), 152-53; reprinted in Laqueur, Transition, 186-91.
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summit failed to match Turkish expectations. ^  Eden and Eisenhower did not expect any 
quick expansion in pact membership. Instead, they preferred to strengthen the organisation as 
it stood "for its political and economic, no less than for its military, value," hoping that it 
would thereby become more attractive to other Arab states. 16
Ankara was further worried that the pact was failing to deliver to its existing members the 
benefits it had promised. It suggested that Britain and the USA should, in view of misgivings 
already expressed in Ban, Pakistan and Iraq, give priority in allocating economic and military 
aid to those Middle Eastern countries, "who have already sided with us and who, in spite of a 
heap of difficulties, have shown courage to make their position clear". Providing them with 
aid in sufficient speed and in sufficient quantities would help "guard against creating the 
impression" that the pact was "of no real value" to its members and show that association 
with the West was more profitable than blackmail. 17
Since all Middle Eastern pact-members shared this worry, 18 Turkey tried to bring them 
together in pursuit of a co-ordinated policy to make their common grievances clear to their 
Western allies. On March 24, during the celebrations at the proclamation of a republic in 
Pakistan, Menderes initiated a two-hour meeting of the heads of the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi 
and Pakistani delegations to discuss the situation. All expressed great disquiet about the 
West's failure "to react with sufficient vigour in face of manifestation of Communist threat 
involved" and at the dearth of economic and defence aid offered. Menderes was the meeting's 
undisputed ringleader. He even hinted that Nuri had not expressed these views to Selwyn 
Lloyd strongly enough during the latter's visit to Baghdad and reportedly "spoke most 
strongly, alluding privately to the possibility of having to revise foreign policy unless Baghdad 
Powers obtained satisfaction". Since the four sides did not have enough time in Karachi to 
produce an agreed joint memorandum, they agreed that each government should make a 
separate communication on the agreed lines to the US and UK representatives in their 
respective c a p i t a l s .  19 The corresponding Turkish memorandum was handed over on March 
30.
l%O371/121243/V1071/83s Chapman Andrews to Shuckburgh, 18.2.56. 
l%O371/121334/V1054/41, CRO memorandum, 27.2.56. See also Eden, Full Circle, 335. 
^FO371/121248/V1073/40, Copy of instructions from Turkish Foreign Ministry to Turkish 
Ambassador, Washington, 25.1.56. Britain also wanted Turkey and Iran to get preference when receiving US 
aid.
l^Eden, Full Circle, 421.
19FO371/121250/V1073/93, 93’A', 98 & 116.
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Turkey, Iraq and Western Policy Toward Egypt
Turkeys anxiety was further enhanced by her belief that Egypt, one of the pact's most vocal 
opponents, was receiving better treatment.
Ankara had, since 1952, generally shared the ups and downs of Western perceptions of 
Egypt's revolutionary regime, including, for some considerable time, the belief that the new 
Egyptian leaders would be readier than their predecessors to compromise on the issues of 
collective defence and British military presence in the Suez Canal zone. 20 The new Egyptian 
leaders, however, were ready to reciprocate Turkish declarations of goodwill and admiration 
only as long as their own vision of a "fully independent" Egypt was not directly challenged. 21 
With no progress being achieved on matters of substance, these gestures, in time, cooled. 
Egypt's stand during the 1955 Cano Conference finally quashed Menderes's hopes that he 
could eventually persuade 'Abd al-Nasir to join or, at least, take a quiescent attitude towards 
the projected regional pact.22
After it became evident that 'Abd al-Nasir would oppose and even attempt to thwart the 
Baghdad Pact, the Turkish government and media began accusing him of having become a 
"Communist tool". Turkey's Western allies were repeatedly told that 'Abd al-Nasir could not 
be trusted. Turkey began opposing all offers of Western credit to E g y p t .  23 The Turkish press 
featured prominently an Anadoln Ajansi report on contacts in Ankara between the Egyptian 
ambassador and the Soviet charge d 'a f f a ir e s .24 O n  February 8, 1 9 5 5 ,  Menderes told Bowker 
that "Egyptian policy had taken a basically pro-Soviet orientation which might affect the 
security of the Canal Z o n e " .25 Jt was not totally uncharacteristic of Turkish politicians or 
pundits of the period to accuse foreign governments or individuals of communism or of being 
Soviet stooges, when they were pursuing policies which, irrespective of motives, did not 
seem to them to conform with the Turkish world-view and objectives, hi the immediate 
aftermath of the expulsion of Ambassador Tugay in 1 9 5 4 , 2 6  for example, the opposition RPP 
newspaper, Yeni Ulus, had accused Cano of growing increasingly obstinate towards any
20McGliee, Connection, 137; Ismail Soysal, "Turkish-Arab Diplomatic Relations after the Second World 
War (1945-1986)", STAR, 1 (1986), 253.
^Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Ma alladhijara fi Suriyya (1962?), 166-67; George Emanuel Gruen, 
Turkey, Israel and the Palestine Question, 1948-1960; A Study in the Diplomacy o f Ambivalence, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970, 200; Ivanova, Otnoshenie, 11; Bagci, Demokrat, 
67; Soysal, "Political Relations", 51,
22FO371/115486/V1073/65, FO minute by Rose, 19.1.55; ibid., -/76, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to 
FO, 22.1.55; F0371/115500/V1073/519, Bowker to FO, 18.3.55.
23FRUS 1955-1957, XXIV, 667; F0371/115469/V1023/16G, Macmillan to FO, 28.10.55; F0371/ 
121274/V1075/130, 'Record of meeting between Representatives of Bagdad Pact Powers', 6.8.56.
24F 0371/115491/VI073/239, Bowker to FO, 11.2.55.
25FO371/115489/V1073/193, Bowker to FO, 9.2.55.
26See p. 59.
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agreement with Britain over the Suez Canal base and of wanting to become totally estranged 
with the West and turn towards Moscow. It had claimed that the Egyptian "show of enmity" 
towards Turkey, i.e. Tugay*s expulsion, had been within that f r a m e w o r k .  27 Menderes's claim, 
therefore, was not taken seriously by Bowker. He replied that "the Egyptian Government's 
present policy could be explained by simpler and less sinister motives than His Excellency 
piad] suggested". 28 The sequence of events, however, made Menderes appear later to the 
same Bowker, and perhaps to other Western policy-makers as well, as a prophet, who had 
preceded them in recognising the villain in 'Abd a l - N a s i r .29
Meanwhile, 'Abd al-Nasir's reputation was undergoing a change in the Arab world. 
Through his firm opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his espousal of Arab unity and 
neutralism, he overcame the suspicions previously harboured by anti-Western and neutralist 
f o r c e s . ^9 His influential propaganda machine, which, before 1955, had never talked of Arab 
unity, began reminding the Arabs of their past glory and called for unity. He turned Arab 
nationalism into a protest movement against Western dominance. 31 Egypt soon became a 
source for inspiration and was now hailed by wide sections throughout the Arab world as the 
legitimate representative of pan-Arab aspirations. 'Abd al-Nasir attempted to foster his newly- 
found popularity by every means possible. The Cairo-based "Voice of the Arabs" radio 
station broadened political participation throughout the Arab world by sending his message to 
Arab masses everywhere, over the heads of their respective governments. It soon found a 
large and receptive audience. For the Palestinian refugees, scattered throughout the Arab 
world, 'Abd al-Nasir appeared as a potential liberator of their homeland. Finally, when 'Abd 
al-Nasir, frustrated by Western slowness, not to say unwillingness, to provide his army with 
modem sophisticated weapons, ventured instead to buy arms from the Soviet Bloc, his act 
was hailed by the Arab public in general as a slap in the face to the West, whom they 
suspected of deliberately withholding arms from the Arabs in order to safeguard the existence 
of Israel.
'Abd al-Nasir had so far prevented all Fertile Crescent Arab states from joining the 
Baghdad Pact and had, thus, somewhat isolated Iraq from the rest of the Arab world. Egypt's 
role in thwarting Jordan's accession to the pact was widely suspected. Zorlu also held Egypt 
responsible for Libya's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow without any
27Yeni Ulus, 12.1.54, quoted in §ehsuvaroglu, Hekim, 210.
28F0371/115489/V1073/193, Bowker to FO, 9.2.55.
29F 0371/124001/RK1016/35, Bowker to Lloyd, 12.9.56.
-^Fadil Husayn, Tarikh al-hizb al-watani al-dimuqrati 1946-1958 (1963), 349; al-'Akam, Ta'rikh, 167-
77.
Carl Robert Frost, The United Arab Republic, 1958-1961: A Study in Arab Nationalism and Unity, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1966, 125-26.
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previous intimation to tlie Western powers.32 By February 1956, Turkish diplomats were 
regularly suggesting that no progress could be made with the extension of the pact so long as 
'Abd al-Nasir controlled Egypt. 3 3 Egypt did not want war, said Koprulir, but was interested 
in maintaining a state of tension in the region. "She was able to do this successfully because in 
addition to the open alliance with Saudi Arabia and Syria, she was still the acknowledged 
leader of the other uncommitted Arab countries". 34
For the UK and US governments, however, more than the future expansion of the 
Baghdad Pact was at stake. Both were extremely concerned about the continuing Arab-Israeli 
tension, which, they thought, was providing the USSR an excellent opportunity to penetrate 
into the Middle East. Both believed that 'Abd al-Nasir was the only Arab leader strong and 
courageous enough to make peace with Israel, and had been, since December 1954, 
sponsoring a highly secret set of indirect discussions between Israel and Egypt, code-named 
Alpha, to find an acceptable solution. Speeches by Dulles and then Eden referred to in the 
preceding chapter were some of the few public indications of these efforts. 3 5 For this reason 
alone, London and Washington continued to give 'Abd al-Nasir, for the time being at least, 
the benefit of the doubt. They could not figure out whether Egypt's arms purchase from 
Czechoslovakia meant a definite shift of allegiance or had just been a bargaining ploy. They 
intensified efforts further, suspecting that Israel might "be tempted to provoke a preventive 
war before the balance of power turns against her" and continued to sell 'Abd al-Nasir some 
arms and provide aid.3b King Husayn's dismissal in early March of Lt.-Gen. John Glubb, the 
British Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, after being attributed for a short time in London 
to Egyptian "intrigue," was quickly laid to rest.37 Britain even hoped that after finding a 
workable arrangement between Egypt and Israel, she could eventually get Cairo to accept the 
reality of the Baghdad Pact.3 8 American and British credits, offered to Egypt in December 
1955, to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam were the ultimate Western 
"sweetener" to influence future Egyptian policy.
As long as the West continued to pin its hopes for peace on 'Abd al-Nasir, disagreements 
with Turkey were inevitable. Ankara was never told officially about the secret mediation
32F0371/115525/V1073/1152, Bowker to FO, 22.10.55.
3 3F 0371/121243/V1071/83, Chapman Andrews to Shuckburgh, 18.2.55.
34FO371/121252/V1073/145, Bowker to FO, 11.4.55.
35For details see FRUS 1952-1954, IX, Part 1; FRUS 1955-1957, XIV; Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, 73-
100.
^Monroe, Moment, 186.
3^For details see Dann, King Hussein, 32; Lunt, Hussein, 40-44. Abu Nuwar, Hina talashat, 162-63 
suggests that fears that Glubb was plotting to forcibly merge Jordan with Iraq in the wake of her refusal to 
join the pact were a major motive in his dismissal. King Husayn himself has since denied repeatedly any 
foreign involvement in the dismissal; see Hussein de Jordanie, Mon metier de roi (1975), 106.
38FO371/121334/V1054/41, CRO memorandum, 27.2.56.
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efforts and it seems improbable that it ever found out much about them on its own. It can be 
safely assumed, however, that it would have been sceptical about any eventual Arab-Israeli 
deal achieved through 'Abd ah N a sir's co-operation. Nuri, on the other hand, having been 
briefed about the secret negotiations by both London and Cairo, was as keen to reach some 
sort of solution as his Western allies. He assured Cairo that Iraq would not object to any 
compromise acceptable to all Arab states bordering I s r a e l .39 This is probably why Iraq was, 
in general, less vocal, at the time, than Turkey in condemning Egyptian policies.
Nuri had every other reason to share Turkish apprehensions about the consequences of 
'Abd al-Nasir's rising star. Iraq's bilateral relations with Egypt remained strained 40 He was 
convinced that Cano was encouraging unrest and opposition within Iraq, where 'Abd al-Nasir 
was fast becoming a focal point for pan-Arab nationalist and neutralist opponents of the 
Baghdad Pact.41 During Menderes's visit in January 1955, the police had kept some thirty 
college students in custody to prevent any possible anti-government agitation. The only 
public expressions of opposition had been a small grenade thrown at the garden of the 
Turkish embassy and a dog dressed in a piece of cloth with the words "Adnan Menderes'1 
inscribed on it.42 Recordings of messages, critical of Nuri's foreign policy, made by the 
leaders of the banned Independence Party, to be broadcast on the "Voice of the Arabs" had 
been confiscated.43 With time, however, opposition circles had become bolder. On 29 
December 1955, leaders of the banned Independence and National Democratic parties stated 
in a petition submitted to the Palace-what was, according to Wright, "certainly widely felt" 
beliefs-that Iraq "has not only become isolated from the other Arab States, but has become 
an influential factor in opposing Arab efforts, an instrument to divide the Arab Community, 
and a means of pressure on certain Arab States to induce them also to desert the noble Arab 
cause". Nuri's policy was "dangerous to the existence and future of Iraq and harmful to her 
interests". The petition demanded Nuri's dismissal; the restoration of democratic freedoms; 
Iraq's "liberation" from the Baghdad Pact and her "pursuance of a sound Arab policy 
harmonious with that of other Arab countries in their progress towards liberation and 
unity".44 More ominous for Nuri was discontent among certain sections of the Iraqi 
establishment. A year before, the Iraqi public had reportedly "received the pact without 
enthusiasm but despite-and perhaps because of-the virulence of Egyptian propaganda, as a
39'Ismat al-Sa'id, Nuri al-Sa‘id: rajul al-dawlah wa-l-insan (1992), 199-200; Trevelyan, Revolution, 43; 
al-Jamali, Dhikrayat, 131; F0371/121651/VQ10316/65, Hooper to FO, 9.8.56.
40rrevelyan, Revolution, 62-63; Decker, Policy, 92; Saad, Iraq, 46.
41FO371/115748/VQ1015/2, Hooper to Eden, 12.1.55.
42Salman al-Takriti, Al-Wasi ‘Abd al-Ilah bin ‘Ali yabhath ‘an ‘arsh 1939-1953 (1989), 186; F0371/ 
110788/V1073/90, Hooper to Falla, 21.12.54.
43FO371/115487/V1073/131, Hooper to Eden, 26.1.55.
44See full text and Wright1 s comments in FO371/121641/VQ1015/4, Wright to Lloyd, 11.1.56.
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piece of necessary foreign policy". Many had hoped that it would eventually "become a 
predominantly Arab affair with an Arab majority on the ministerial council, and this will place 
an obstacle in the way of any Turkish designs on Syria and Iraq" .45 It now appeared, 
however, that Iraq would remain in the foreseeable future the pact's only Arab member. Even 
some of Nuri's early followers began to criticise him, express doubts about the feasibility of 
his foreign policy and openly question the advantages of keeping him as P r e m ie r .4b Prince 
'Abd al-Hah, however, thought that the time was inappropriate to change N u r i .  47 Certain 
army officers, in turn, were arguing that, compared with Egypt, the pact had brought few 
benefits to Iraq. Anti-British sentiment was increasing among junior officers. Complaints 
were being aired about alleged British slowness in delivering arms to Iraq and obstacles put 
by them in the way of obtaining arms fiom elsewhere. A small secret pro-Egyptian cell had 
been uncovered at junior level in the a r m y .48
Nmi fought hard. Instead of urging the adoption of tough measures against 'Abd al-Nasir, 
however, he preferred to convince his Arab audience that he was still a credible, staunch pan- 
Arab nationalist.49 still he was forced to publicly admit that the Baghdad Pact "was not 
connected with settlement of the Palestine question, but was directed against the Communist 
danger".50 Later, he unsuccessfully tried to push the Pact Council meeting in Tehran to 
adopt a positive role in the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, arguing that it could be a 
catalyst to bring in new Arab members. Ironically, Menderes, countered that the pact could 
contribute positively to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict only after having additional 
Arab members. 5 ^  Delegates fiom other member-states were sympathetic to Nuri's case, but 
the overriding desirability of avoiding any reference in the final communique to the Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan made it impossible to include more than a passing 
reference to Palestine.52 After the meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Bash A'yan 
told Parliament that the pact was helpful to secure support for the Arab point of view on 
Palestine, and that it could become "an effective instrument for the settlement of the Palestine
45FO371/115497/V1073/463, Wright to Eden, 1.3.55.
46FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 262, 988-92; F0371/121241/V1071/9, Hooper to FO, 3.1.56; F0371/ 
121641/VQ1015/5, Beaumont to Rose, 14.1.56; F0371/121650/V10316/7, Trevelyan to Wright, 19.1.56; 
F0371/121369/V1195/8, Wright to FO, 24.1.56; F0371/121641/VQ1015/10, Rose to Wright, 10.2.56; ibid., - 
/20, Allen to Rose, 16.3.56; F0371/121641/VQ1015/19G & 21, Wright to FO, 20.3.56 & 22.3.56.
47FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 35; F0371/121641/VQ1015/24G, Wright to FO, 26.3.56.
48FO371/121668/VQ1201/2G, Hooper to Rose, 13.3.56; F 0371/119084/JE14211/218, Hooper to FO,
2.8.56.
49FO371/121642/VQ1015/32, Wright to FO, 13.4.56; FO371/121870/VY10393/18, Hooper to Lloyd, 
18.4.56; FO371/121227/V10322/9,FO minute by Shuckburgh, 17.5.56; FO371/121281/V1078/5-6, 13, 15(A) 
& 16.
50FO371/121369/Vl 195/8, Wright to FO, 24.1,56.
51FRUS1955-1957, XII, 287-88; FO371/121254/V1073/181, Nuri's opening statement, 16.4.56.
5%0371/121255/V1073/193, Wright to FO, 23.4.56.
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or any other Arab question if the Arab States concerned should accede to it".^3 No other 
Arab country agreed with Nuri, however, or dared say that it did.
Turkey and the Situation in Syria 
Ankara hoped that checking the growth of 'Abd al-Nasir's influence in the region at large 
would also affect the internal situation in Syria. 'Abd al-Nasir had established, during 1955, a 
firm hold on Syrian foreign policy. Damascus was responding positively to Soviet trade and 
aid overtures and establishing cordial relations with other Eastern Bloc countries. It followed 
Egypt in admitting publicly the conclusion of its own arms deal with C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . ^  The 
hopes of some right-wing and centrist Syrian politicians, that they could bring the Ba'th party 
under control and stop the swing to the left, by including its representatives in a new cabinet, 
had been d a s h e d .  55 In a new national coalition government formed by Sabri al-'Asali on June 
14, 1956, the important portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Economy had indeed gone to the 
Ba'th. The latter, however, with the assistance of some sympathetic senior army officers, had 
forced the new government to proclaim theoretical union with Egypt, open to adhesion by all 
Arab countries. A right-wing attempt to purge the top army hierarchy fiom leftist officers had
also been unsuccessful. 5 6
Ankara feared that if existing trends in Syrian politics continued unchecked, Turkey's own 
security could soon be threatened. It suspected that thousands of leaflets in Turkish 
distributed among the low-paid workers in Izmir and other large cities, attacking the 
government's policies and calling for its downfall, were printed by the Soviets in Beirut and 
smuggled to Turkey via Syria. 57 In mid-February the Turks were very alarmed, albeit just for 
a few days, after receiving reports of an imminent Communist coup in Syria. They urgently 
contacted their allies, only to be assured that the information they had received was 
exaggerated. ^  ^
Problems arising across the Turkish-Syrian frontier further soured bilateral relations. In 
early 1956, a new Syrian minister, 'Umar 'Addas, had been appointed in Ankara, and, on 
March 3, a bilateral trade agreement signed. 59 The Turkish government had also been
53FO371/121256/V1073/219, Duke to FO, 30.4.56.
-^pedro Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance (1990), 16-17; Torrey, 
Syrian Politics, 339-42; Lesch, Syria, 97.
55FO371/121858/VY1015/3, Gardener toFO, 17.2.56; ibid., -/7, Gardener to Lloyd, 28.2.56.
-’^Torrey, Syrian Politics, 307-08; Petran, Syria, 115; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 314 & III, 92-98; al- 
Mu'allim, Suriyya, 202; Tlas, Mir'at, 544; F 0371/128219/VY1011/2, Gardener to Lloyd, 15.11.57.
51 FRUS 1955-1957, XXIV, 666-67.
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thinking of inviting a Syrian parliamentary delegation.60 The continuing leftward drift in 
Syria, however, proved ominous, and a bitter row over smuggling in the border region 
ensued. Smuggling was profitable because of the difference between the official Turkish and 
black-market exchange rates. The Turks had planted mines along certain parts of the border 
to reduce traffic. The Syrians proposed that the mines should be removed. Rural, in turn, 
argued that the smugglers knew where the mines were or drove a herd of sheep or cattle 
before them to clear the road. The mines were, thus, only destroying harmless sheep and 
innocent shepherds who tried to retrieve them. Reports appearing in the Syrian press of 
people killed by Turkish mines while crossing the border were having an effect as anti- 
Turkish propaganda.61 Rural and the Turkish Foreign Ministry tried, but failed to persuade 
the Turkish Ministries of Defence, the Interior, and Customs to have the mines removed. The 
latter insisted that the mines were serving a useful purpose. One high level Foreign Ministry 
official even suspected that "Turkish Customs officials on the spot probably had a financial 
interest in the contraband traffic and found the mines usefid in that they obliged the Syrian 
smugglers to cross the frontier at points where the toll could be effectively l e v i e d " .62 There 
were frequent clashes between Syrian smugglers and the Turkish Gendarmerie. On June 23, 
one such clash resulted in the death of two Turkish soldiers and the detention of 38 Syrians, 
creating a minor diplomatic crisis. The detainees were released only a month la t e r .  63
Bilateral relations were complicated further through Turkey's attitude towards the Syrian 
project of draining and reclaiming the Ghab marshlands in the Orontes valley. It was to 
reduce flooding and provide 100,000 acres of newly-acquired land for landless peasants. 
Syria asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance the 
project. Ankara objected, however, that the project would reduce the waters of the Orontes 
in Hatay. Although the Bank was not impressed by the strength of the Turkish objection, the 
Syrians resented it. The Damascus newspaper al-Nasr said it was a manoeuvre to extort 
political concessions fiom Syria on the legal status of the disputed r e g i o n .  64
Turkey and the Right-Wing Coup-Attempt in Syria
Menderes's worries about growing Egyptian and Soviet influence in Syria were shared 
understandably by Nuri. Their apprehension was communicated to the Baghdad Pact Council
60FO371/121876/VY1134/2, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 6.3.56.
61F0371/121878/VY1181/4, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 3.4.56; F0371/121868/ 
VY10344/1, Chancery, Damascus to Chancery, Ankara, 25.6,56.
62F 0371/121878/VY1181/1, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 23.5.56,
63SeeFO371/121868/VY10344/3-18 & 20.
64petran, Syria, 88, 98, 100; Sanjian, Alexandretla, 255-56; F0371/121876/VY11344/6, Chancery, 
Ankara to Levant Department, 4.6.56.
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meeting (November 1955) and found attentive e a r s .65 Turkey, Iraq and the Western powers, 
together with many prominent right-wing Syrian politicians, considered Syria's links with the 
USSR more dangerous than Egypt's. They acknowledged that 'Abd al-Nasir was anti- 
Communist and could sooner or later willingly limit his dependence on Moscow. Syria, 
however, had no strong leader to match 'Abd al-Nasir. Communism had already become 
entrenched among both civilians and the m il i t a r y .66 'Adnan al-Atasi, the son of the former 
Syrian President, personally warned 'Abd al-Nasir that whenever, in future, Egypt wished to 
cease flirting with Moscow, she might find that Syria was already too firmly committed to the 
Communists to be able to follow Egypt once a g a in .  67
Nuri came under pressure both from the Crown-Prince and al-Jamali to intervene in Syria 
and try to halt the leftward trend. Turkish Ambassador Goksenin promised, too, to exert 
some pressure on Nuri to that effect. 68 Nuri, however, initially doubted whether such a 
policy would work. For months, he fluctuated between interventionism and staying aloof. His 
attitude, during a meeting with members of the Turkish delegation on the fringes of the 
Baghdad Pact Council meeting (November 1955), for example, "seemed to be more or less 
one of indifference". He reportedly told the Turks that
all Syrians were the same and all equally useless; there really seemed to be only two 
possibilities; one to let the present regime continue until its leaders were utterly 
discredited and the system collapsed of its own accord and then take action; the other 
to pick the best man out of the present bunch and try and make something for him...
Nuri also doubted that any provision of economic help could strengthen the position of pro- 
Western elements in Syria, arguing that "the last 'bribe' had been accepted but there had been 
no change that he could detect".69 He demanded firm assurances that Western powers would 
favour any Iraqi move to change the Syrian government by force and would restrain Israel 
from intervention in Syria. He thought he could "square the Turks".70
Finally, after months of hesitation, Nuri told the visiting Selwyn Lloyd in early March, 
that Iraq was ready to take action but only "in response to an appeal from elements in Syria 
as a result of some local Syrian situation 'arising'". The objective would be "to give the non- 
Communist elements in Syria a chance of coming at the top. The sovereign independence of
65po37i/il5532/V1073/1342, Record of restricted session, 22.11.55.
66F0371/115588/V1193/155, Wright to FO, 4.11.55.
67F0371/115469/V1023/15, Jebb to FO, 26.10.55; FO371/121864/VY10316/2, Gardener to Lloyd,
17.2.56.
68FO371/121870/VY10393/2G, Gardener to FO, 25.2.56.
69FO371/115947/VY1015/94, Stewart to Rose, 6.10.55.
70FO371/115954/VY10393/lG, Hooper toFO, 5.10.55. See also FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 543-44.
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Syria should not be touched1'. Turkish and Israeli restraint was necessary, however. Ankara 
had to promise-as he had some recent indications it would do-not to move across the 
frontier in Syria once the operation was under way, and Israel undertake not to take up the 
opportunity to attack Syria. Nuri was confident that, provided Washington would acquiesce 
and that "the Turks and the Israelis had been squared beforehand," he could mount the 
operation within "three or four weeks". Otherwise, "Arab nationalism would be roused and 
the possibilities of successful action by Iraq nullified".71 Lloyd-himself a believer that the 
Syrian situation could not be tolerated further-was encouraged by Nuri's plans and promised 
to discuss the matter during his tom, both in Ankara and Tel Aviv, and later with Eden. 
Menderes agreed with Nuri. "Turkey could not afford to have a hostile Syria on her southern 
frontier, he s a id " .7 2  "Turkey's only interest in Syria is that the country should not become a 
Communist satellite, but should be under a Government well-disposed towards close 
collaboration with the Western P o w e r s " .73
Soon, extremely diverse Syrian anti-government political forces were brought together to 
work with Iraq, Britain and the USA to topple the Damascus cabinet in situ. They included 
the People's Party; some pro-Westem elements in the National Party; the conservative 
Constitutional Bloc; the Socialist Co-operative Party and the exiled SSNP.74 The latter's 
participation-despite its lukewarm attitude toward the Baghdad Pact-was based on the 
feeling of revenge it harboured towards the Ba'th, Communists and Col. 'Abd al-Hamid al- 
Sarraj, head of army intelligence, who had exploited the assassination in 1955 of a senior pro- 
Ba'thist army officer by an SSNP member to ban the party and imprison-even assassinate-Tts 
l e a d e r s .75 All conspirators had had at least some past connection with the Iraqi regime. They 
agreed to co-operate in pursuit of the immediate tactical objective of toppling the existing 
Syrian government, but they would have almost certainly fallen out among themselves had 
the plot succeeded, for each group had a different long-term vision of S y r ia .  7b it is difficult,
71FO371/121858/VY1015/13, Lloyd to Eden, 10.3.56.
7^F0371/124020/RK1051/32, Record of conversation between Lloyd and Menderes, 12.3.56.
73po371/121858/V Y 1015/llG , Lloyd to Nuri al-Sa'id, 13.3,56. It appears that Lloyd did not broach this 
topic later in Tel-Aviv. He did not mention anything as regards Israel's attitude in his report to Eden 
submitted on March 15. "I am in favour of Iris plan, but sceptical of its patrons," commented Eden, referring 
probably, to Nuri and his supporters in Syria; see FO371/121858/VY1015/15G, Zulueta to Logan, 16.3.56. It 
was probably at this juncture that the so-called Arab Committee at the British Cabinet or FO level began to 
formulate a contingency plan envisaging an Iraqi invasion of Syria at the request of a Syrian pro-Western 
revolutionary government; see Chapter 9.
74pipes, Greater Syria, 100; Reeva S. Simon, "The Hashemite 'Conspiracy1: Hashemite Unity Attempts, 
1921-1958", IJMES, 5/3 (April 1974), 322.
Ghassan Zakariyya yatadhakkar al-sultan al-ahmar (1991), 96-97, 169.
76See the uncovering of this coup attempt in Chapter 6, For further details see Wilbur C. Eveland, Ropes 
o f Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (1980), 162-91; W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, 
the US and the Suez Crisis (1991), 130-31, 140, 218, 276-77; Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action:
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for example, to discount the possibility that Prince 'Abd al-Hah was still hoping that the 
planned coup could provide finally him with the Syrian throne. Nuri and his immediate circle, 
meanwhile, preferred-to the dismay of the Turks-to see Adib al-Shishakh back in power in 
D am ascus. ^ 7 The latter had not, in the past, been on friendly terms with the Hashimites, but 
he had been trying, since mid-1955, to arrive at some sort of understanding with B a g h d a d . ^
The Turkish government, subsequently, following advice they received from Nuri and 
most probably from London and Washington as well, did not get directly involved in the 
actual planning and implementation of the c o u p .  79 i n  late September, Menderes even 
complained to Fletcher Warren, the new US ambassador in Ankara, that Turkey was being 
kept in the dark about UK/US plans in Syria. 80 More ironically, Birgi complained to Lloyd, 
almost simultaneously, that "the Turkish Government had the impression that Nuri Said had 
given up the idea of doing anything about Syria for the time being, and were afraid that, 
though he talked a lot, if left to himself Nuri Said would do nothing". 81
It can deduced, therefore, that Ankara favoured the use of unorthodox measures in Syria 
if it promised to bring about any change in the political climate there. Kural, however, argued 
consistently that the Syrians should be let to manage their own affairs and that a modus 
vivendi was possible between the pro-Western forces in the Middle East and the Ba'th Party. 
He admitted to Wilbur Eveland, a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent in Syria, 
however, that he was not putting his case strongly in Ankara, because he knew nobody would 
listen to him. 82
Turkey and the Changing Anglo-American Perceptions of ‘Abd al-Nasir
These ongoing preparations for a pro-Westem coup attempt in Syria were, at this stage, at 
most a side show and did not directly affect the diplomatic row over tactics to be adopted to 
strengthen the Baghdad Pact.
Since the row was based largely on differing perceptions of Abd al-Nasir's role in the 
area, the British government, which began to lose faith in the pursued secret initiatives earlier 
than its transatlantic ally, was predictably also the first to try to reassure Ankara. During 
Lloyd's visit to Cafro, he was less forthcoming than Eden had been a year before in reassuring 
Abd al-Nasir that Britain would not ask any uncommitted Arab state to join the Baghdad
The United States and Syria, 1945-1958", MEJ, 44/1 (Winter 1990), 65-67; Seale, Struggle, 267-82; al-’Azm, 
Mudhakkarat, III, 92-93; Kyle, Suez, 338, 367; Lloyd, Suez, 106.
77FO371/115947/VY1015/94, Stewart to Rose, 6.12.55.
78FO371/115516/V1073/958, Chapman Andrews to FO, 30.7.55.
79FO371/130186/RK10345/l, Pemberton-Pigott to Galsworthy, 29.1.57.
%°FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 591.
8 *F0371/124021/RK1052/7G, 'Meeting between Lloyd and Birgi', 24.9.56.
^Eveland, Ropes, 130-31, 186.
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Pact. ^  On March 5, Eden wrote to Eisenhower that 'Abd al-Nasir's relations with the 
Soviets were probably much closer than he admitted to the Western p o w e r s .  **4 Eisenhower 
refused to close the door yet on the possibility of working with 'Abd al-Nasir in order not to 
cancel out any prospect of obtaining an Arab-Israel settlement,*^ and Britain-according to a 
Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) telegram-continued officially to harp on the old tune 
until April 14 at least. ^  The growing British doubts were enough, however, for Lloyd to 
reassure Ankara that Britain was not prepared to make a deal with 'Abd a l - N a s i r .  **7
Modem historians of the Middle East generally agree that by the end of March 1956, the 
USA and UK had concluded that the Alpha project was going nowhere. Reports that Egypt 
was assisting the rebels in Algeria and her recognition of the People's Republic of China had 
further harmed 'Abd al-Nasir's image. Soon an altogether new policy aimed at strengthening 
the position of the West's conservative allies in the Arab world was adopted in Washington 
and, then, London. The American ambassador, Henry Byroade, a symbol of the old policy, 
was recalled fiom Cano and ultimately American and British credits offered to finance the 
Aswan High Dam project were withdrawn. It has been suggested that it was at this juncture 
that Washington associated itself with the clandestine coup preparations in Syria.**** The 
above-mentioned CRO telegram, however, is one example that it took some time for this new 
policy to trickle down and cover other aspects of Middle Eastern diplomacy.
The end of March and the early part of April 1956, therefore, continued to be a period of 
acute tension and disagreement between Ankara and its Western allies. By the time of the 
Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Tehran in mid-April, Menderes still believed that he, 
personally, had to work hard to put his view across to his Western allies. He deliberately 
publicised his misgivings about 'Abd al-Nasir, by attacking him during his speech in the public 
opening session. Menderes probably intended to escalate the so far tacit conflict and thus put 
his allies under some pressure to align with him publicly against 'Abd al-Nasir. The speech he 
made at the closed session expanded on the same theme. Menderes said 'Abd al-Nasir was 
using the following weapons in his policy:
1. To make use of the lenient attitude of the United States and to a certain extent 
of Great Britain to maintain that his policy is the best way to impose upon the West 
and to impose his policies upon it while he is able to extort money and aid fiom it.
^Monroe, Moment, 190.
*aFRUS 1955-1957, XII, 249; F0371/121271/V1075/57G, Eden to Eisenhower, 5.3.56.
85FO371/121272/V1075/71, Eisenhower to Eden, 10.3.56. See also FO371/121271/V1075/61G, Lloyd to 
Eden, 7.3.56.
86FO371/121335/V1054/87, CRO outward telegram, 14.4.56.
87FO371/121243/V1071/107, Rose to Trevelyan, 28.3.56.
88Little, "Cold War", 65.
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Thus [sic!] obviously enhances his prestige both at home and in some other countries 
of the Middle East.
2. To enter into close relations with the Russians, to receive their aid, to blackmail 
the West and to call for [sic!] a rivalry in bidding for his favours.
3. To exploit Islam, and to arrogate to himself the role of the protector of Islam 
and leader of the Moslems.
4. To tiy to emerge as a champion of Arab unity.
5. To exploit Western imperialism which is on its way of [sic!] becoming a legend. 
Menderes continued:
We too cherished the hope for a long time that by being lenient towards Nasser we 
might induce him to the path of reason. We too were afraid to drive Nasser to the 
Russian embrace. But now we have lost all hope and corrected our approach. We are 
now convinced that the more you smile at Nasser the greater become his vanity and 
arrogance, and the more he is driven to drag his people to adventures... As for going 
over to the Russian side, he is unfortunately doing it before our very eyes with the air 
of diplomatic finesse and astuteness. Therefore, perhaps it will be better if we do not 
try to play his game of blackmail and leave him alone with his Russian friends. He 
might then at least be overawed by the seriousness of the situation, or perhaps the 
people of Egypt themselves might call him to order. We have nothing to lose and all 
other methods have failed, so perhaps we could try this.
Menderes claimed that Egyptian policy was directly inspired from Moscow. Egypt was not 
interested in a solution to the Palestine question, "which helped to nourish his prestige and 
feed his propaganda". "The only solution was an all out propaganda attack on N asser" .90
The Egyptian government was disturbed by Menderes's public remarks and asked Ankara 
for an explanation.91 The semi-official newspaper, al-Gumhuriyyah, described Menderes's 
opening speech as "cheap buffoonery" and "an aggression which Egypt will not tolerate".92 
The Turks sent "a stiff reply" to the Egyptian request, hoping that it would "lead to further 
uproar". They were probably disappointed when Cairo did not make further public criticism 
or take any retaliatory action. They still considered, however, that the angry Egyptian 
reaction was "a measure of the success of the [Tehran] meeting". 93
Nuri backed Menderes during the Tehran meeting. He had also been attributing lately 
most of 'Abd al-Nasir's behaviour to his supposedly ever increasing links with Moscow and
^9See hill text of speech in FO371/121256/V1073/213, Chancery, Tehran to Levant Department,
24.4,56.
90FO371/121253/V1073/174, Stevens to FO, 19.4.56.
9 iFO371/121243/V1071/120, Trevelyan to FO, 19.4.56.
^Editorial of May 2, quoted in FO371/121243/V1071/121, Trevelyan to FO, 5.5.56. 
93FO371/121256/V107/231, Stewart to Rose, 30.4.56.
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criticising Washington for responding so generously to Egyptian "bullying" of the West. 94 
Nuii, too, claimed that tlie source of 80 percent of 'Abd al-Nasir's influence emanated fiom 
the unresolved status of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 95
Menderes left Tehran content that he had pushed his allies reach a consensus on 'Abd al- 
Nasir's role in the Middle East. While such a conviction was perhaps a little premature, he 
had certainly done all he could to add one further blow to 'Abd al-Nasir's already 
deteriorating image among Western politicians. The British FO was not totally impressed by 
Menderes's proposal of "an all out propaganda attack on Nasser". It preferred "to proceed 
resolutely, but cautiously," for if a campaign was to be openly launched against him before 
Western defences in various Arab territories had been put in rather better order, the Western 
position might even get worse and 'Abd al-Nasir end up in a stronger position than before.96 
As a result of the lack of progress as regards Alpha, however, the debate within the Baghdad 
Pact had now shifted to the timing of the eventual volte-face rather than its substance. The 
tide was unquestionably moving against 'Abd al-Nasir. Nmi and Menderes had no reason to 
feel personally sorry whenever the final break occurred.
Turkey did receive some satisfaction, too, fiom other aspects of the Tehran meeting. The 
USA became a full member of the pact's Economic Committee and participated full-time as 
an observer in the Counter-Subversion Committee. She pledged to continue her bilateral 
technical, military and economic assistance to individual member-states; contribute a one- 
sixth share to the Secretariat budget; and provide an appropriate number of its officials. She 
also promised to study ways of assisting joint projects undertaken by members of the 
Economic Committee. An American proposal to establish a military liaison group at the 
Permanent headquarters of the Pact was also welcomed by the C o u n c i l .  97 "One could now 
really consider that the Americans were effectively members," said B i r g i .98 Kopriilu opined 
that "the pessimism of the previous months had now gone" and that "the work of the Pact 
would go steadily f o r w a r d " .99 The Turkish semi-official newspaper, Zafei\ commented that 
the Council meeting had solved the weakness of the pact caused by the non-participation of 
the USA and echoed Menderes's words at his closing speech in Tehran that all the members 
of the pact sincerely desired to see the USA permanently represented among them. 190
94Axelgard, Policy, 163.
95FO371/121254/V1073/192, Stevens toFO, 20.4.56.
96FO371/121256/V1073/231, Rose to Stewart, 11.5.56.
97Soysal, "BaghdadPact", 78-79; FO371/121253/V1073/166 & 175, Stevens toFO, 18-19 April 1956. 
98FO371/121256/V1073/231, Stewart to Rose, 30.4.56.
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This new sense of Turkish optimism was bound to be temporary, however. Bowker 
obseived correctly that since the ultimate Turkish objective was to expand the pact, anything 
short of that would, in the long run, be perceived as failure. 101 In fact, just before the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, Dulles's repeated declarations that 
Washington did not intend to join the Baghdad Pact were once again being criticised in 
Turkey as attempts "to show greater concern to reassure the opponents of the Pact than to 
support its members". Ankara was planning to present to the pact-members, as well as to 
Washington, a new memorandum on the future of the pact. 102 'Abd al-Nasir's act changed 
the international agenda but not Turkey's political objectives. Moreover, it gave both Ankara 
and Baghdad some hope that the Egyptian leader had committed the ultimate political 
blunder.
101FO371/121255/V1073/229, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 2.5.56. 
102f o 371/121261/V1073/307, extract from letter from Istanbul, 25.7.56.
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6The Suez Crisis: 
Expectations and Disappointment
'Abd al-Nasir's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 surprised bis 
friends and foes alike. The USA and Britain bad withdrawn, a week before, the credits they 
bad previously offered to finance the Aswan High Dam project. 'Abd al-Nasir now said he 
needed the revenue fiom the company to finance the construction of the dam, which was vital 
for Egypt's future development. He promised to leave unchanged the canal's status as an 
international wateiway; ensure freedom of navigation; and compensate the company 
shareholders at the prevailing market price.
France and Britain, however, immediately contended that 'Abd al-Nasir had breached the 
1888 Convention guaranteeing freedom of passage through the canal and Egypt's 
commitment under the company's concession. Both countries had vital interests in the 
company, which was administratively French, with its Head Office in Paris. French private 
investors held more than 50 percent of the company shares traded on the Paris Bourse, while 
the British government was the company's largest single shareholder (44 percent). Britain 
was the canal's prime user to trade with the rest of the world and import most of its Middle 
Eastern oil. Moreover, Britain interpreted the nationalisation as just another proof of'Abd al- 
Nasir's anti-Western sentiments and his determination to push them out of the Middle East. 
France, already alarmed by reports that Egypt was assisting the rebels in Algeria, 1 feared that 
the nationalisation would further erode her position in North Africa. They began to compare 
'Abd al-Nasir to Hitler and Mussolini, an indication that he would not be "appeased" further. 
A secret Anglo-French decision was reached to seek a deliberate military confrontation in 
order to secure the reversal of nationalisation; place the canal under international control; and 
cause 'Abd al-Nasir's downfall. ^  British army reservists were recalled; and Anglo-French 
naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, reinforced.
The nationalisation was of serious sequence to the Middle Eastern members of the 
Baghdad Pact. All four governments supported the Western position in general and none of
^Eden, Full Circle, 435.
^Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh(eds.), The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and 
Reappraisal (1990), 17, 54.
them was in any way sympathetic to 'Abd al-Nasir. They had welcomed the Anglo-American 
decision to withdraw the Aswan High Dam credits and now thought that 'Abd al-Nasir had 
this time overreached himself and would pay dearly for it. They would have been glad to see 
him humbled or even swept from power altogether,^ hoping that his eventual defeat could 
provide much-needed breathing space for pro-Western political forces in the Middle East. 
Throughout the ensuing international political crisis, however, and until the outbreak of 
hostilities, they kept the Baghdad Pact mechanism out of the diplomatic bargaining and 
preferred to act separately. This decision was probably taken during confidential 
consultations in the first few days of the crisis. ^  One possible reason which made them opt 
for this course was their recognition that public opinion in the four countries concerned 
would react differently to the nationalisation and would make it difficult for their respective 
governments to subscribe to a common policy in public as regards a dispute which pitted 
Britain, one of their allies, against Egypt with her rich Arab and Islamic pedigree.
Turkey and the Suez Crisis 
Turkey's economy was not dependent on the canal, but as the country exercising sovereignty 
over the straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, she was expected to show interest in the 
judicial aspects of the conflict and dislike the prospect of seeing foreign powers re-exert 
political control over the Suez canal against Egypt's wishes. After all, the USSR might, in the 
future, use that as precedent to pursue her old desire to control the straits. Furthermore, the 
autumn of 1956 itself was to mark the climax of one of the five-year cycles at the end of 
which any of the signatories of the 1936 Montreux Convention governing passage through 
the straits could have asked for amendments to any of its provisions. ^  Perhaps 'Abd al-Nasir 
had that in mind, when immediately after the nationalisation, he secretly approached Turkey, 
among others, both directly and through President Sham'un, to mediate between Egypt and 
the West. ^
The Turkish government, however, viewed the Suez crisis more as a political dispute than 
merely a commercial and juridical one. Hence, it did not consider to be in its interests to try 
to help 'Abd al-Nasir. Unlike Pakistani leaders, Menderes did not need placate local public 
opinion, as Turks in general did not sympathise with 'Abd al-Nasir and his brand of Arab
■^ For views of Iranian and Pakistani leaders see Lucas, Divided, 183; Burke, Pakistan, 181-82; Kyle, 
Suez, 158.
4F 0371/119114/JE14211/999, Menderes to Dulles, 15.8.56.
5FO371/13O174/RK1011/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 5.2.57.
^Kurkfuoglu, Tiirkiye'nin Politikasi, 93; Soysal, Analysis, 39; Chamoun, Crise, 285.
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nationalism. ^  Ankara refrained from making public statements, but its initial outrage over 
Egypt's action, as well as the solid hostility of public opinion and the press were beyond 
doubt.8 Menderes wrote privately to Dulles that his government had, in the past, been unique 
in adopting a clear attitude towards 'Abd al-Nasir. He continued:
While relief is being sought for each particular symptom, if we fail to heal the focus of 
infection which is the source of the ailment, we must continue to expect from Egypt, 
in accordance with the wishes of Russia, all sorts of new blows, the outcome of which 
will grow in gravity and the remedies for which will ever be harder to find. 9
Although the legality of Egypt's action was accepted by Ankara, politically it was judged 
to be "a further manifestation of the foolish policy of personal prestige and arbitrary action 
which was being pursued by Nasser". The Turkish government believed that 'Abd al-Nasir 
had to be forced "to accept the rule of law" and supported the imposition of some kind of 
international control. "Leaving Nasser in unfettered control of the Canal could hinder 
freedom of navigation-for example, it would leave it open to Nasser to double the dues 
whenever he liked". ^  Although this author has not come across any direct reference in FO 
General Correspondence files, nor in the published French and American documents, to 
Ankara's attitude toward the possibility of resorting to military action against 'Abd al-Nasir or 
replacing him by force, it can be safely suggested that it would not have bothered about the 
juridical or moral aspects of such a move, so long as the eventual outcome was to the benefit 
of pro-Western forces in the area.
Washington, however, did not share the Anglo-French tough stance. American 
investment in the Canal Company was negligible and the country economically much less 
dependent on the free flow of Middle Eastern oil. Eisenhower opposed the use of force 
against Egypt. Washington, he thought, could not be party to a punitive military operation in 
view of its persistent declarations of support of the rule of law and the UN Charter. He 
rightly feared that any coercive action would inevitably increase Soviet prestige in the post­
colonial world. His administration, therefore, began to devise various delaying tactics 
designed to avoid military intervention. 11 Turkey went along with all American initiatives.
^For exposes of popular pro-Egyptian sentiment in Pakistan see Kyle, Suez, 158; Burke, Pakistan, 181- 
82, 185.
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At Washington's insistence, a conference of maritime powers was convened in London to 
devise a political solution to the crisis. Turkey, as a signatory to the 1888 Convention, was 
among the 24 countries invited.^ Her delegation was led by Nuri Birgi, the Secretary- 
General of the Foreign Ministry. Menderes thought it was inappropriate for him to be in 
London when almost all other delegations present were led by Foreign Ministers. Turkey's 
acting Foreign Minister, Ethem Menderes, had no practical experience in foreign affairs and 
was unable to speak either English or French. Moreover, he had, as Minister of the Interior, 
other responsibilities at home. Birgi assured the delegates of allied countries that their 
absence did not imply any minimisation by Turkey of the importance of the gathering. ^
Before the opening of the first London Conference (16-23 August), Menderes gave his 
consent to its agenda and promised the Western powers Turkey's full support. ^  He further 
suggested that, in order to win Arab opinion, the West should make it plain that its "quarrel 
was not with Egypt or the Egyptians, but with Nasser on account of his arbitrary and 
dictatorial behaviour". Menderes also expressed Ankara's fidl sympathy with Anglo-French 
military preparations in the eastern Mediterranean, but thought that they should be explained 
"as precautions in the event of Nasser provoking an incident and not intended to exercise 
pressure on him". ^
During the public sessions of the conference, Birgi tried to strike a neat balance between 
Egypt's "right to effect nationalisation" and "the extremely dangerous state of affairs" that act 
had set loose. He described the Egyptian decision as "unfortunate," "untimely" and "hardly ... 
in conformity with the conditions of an orderly expropriation". He called on other 
participants to transcend "emotional elements" like the principles of "independence," 
"national sovereignty," "state prestige," "antagonism between east and west" and to establish 
"a regime which would both conform to the rules of international law and morality to satisfy 
the legitimate interests of all and of Egypt foremost".^ Dulles found Birgi's presentation 
"particularly strong and able".^
Turkey was among the 18 states (out of the 22 present) that backed, in principle, the 
Dulles plan, which proposed to respect Egypt's sovereignty and increase the share of canal 
tolls paid to Egypt; maintain the canal as a secure international waterway, open to all states
^ O f those, only Egypt and Greece eventually refused to attend.
13FO371/119107/JE14211/799, Lloyd to Wright, 16.8.56; FO371/119103/JE14211/799, HM Consul- 
General, Istanbul to FO, 13.8.56.
14F0371/119091/JE14211/392, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 7.8.56; FO371/119094/ 
JE14211/467, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 8.8.56.
15FO371/119097/JE14211/695, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 13.8.56.
l^See full English text of Birgi's speech in The Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-
September, 1956: A Documentary Publication (1956), 120-23.
11 FRUS 1955-1957, XVI, 219.
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witli major maritime interests; isolate its operation fiom the politics of any one country; set 
up an international board of control, composed of members fiom user nations, to supervise 
its operation, maintenance and development; and compensate the expropriated company's 
shareholders. 18 However, Turkey, together with Pakistan, Iran and Ethiopia, proposed some 
amendments to the draft plan to make, they claimed, "even clearer the respect for the 
sovereignty of Egypt, and also to increase the negotiability of the text". For Birgi, the most 
important amendment was "taking the question of compensation out of the body of the 
Treaty, and putting it into the p r e a m b l e " . ^  Dulles discussed the subject privately with Birgi 
on August 20 and, in view of Soviet and Indian opposition to his own plan, was extremely 
forthcoming. The amendments were accepted and incorporated into the original American 
plan,20 The Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was assigned to head a five-power 
delegation (including Ah Quli Ardalan, Iran's Foreign Minister) to Egypt in early September 
not to get engaged in negotiations but to explain the 18-power plan to 'Abd al-Nasir and 
discover whether it could form a basis to negotiate a settlement.
Turkey expressed satisfaction with the results of the first London Conference, thinking 
that the Baghdad Pact allies had been able to make some contribution to its work and shown 
that the pact, as an organisation, had a meaning and a reality.21
By the time of the second London Conference (18-21 September), however, Ankara had 
become more pessimistic. It had initially hoped that Egypt, in the face of determined 
international pressure, would back down. Although Egypt had refused to attend the first 
London Conference, her acceptance, in principle, of the idea of a conference to discuss the 
future of the canal was interpreted in Ankara as an implicit abandonment of the notion of 
complete Egyptian sovereignty over the waterway.22 But after 'Abd al-Nasir's rejection of 
the 18-power proposals, the Turkish officials reasoned with hindsight, that the terms of 
reference of the Menzies mission had been too rigid.22 Ankara was even more concerned at 
the apparent disarray among the countries that had previously subscribed to the said 
proposals. Although it accepted that the weaker nations among them had their failings, it
l^Louis and Owen, Suez, 297-98.
1 ^ Suez Canal Problem, 187; Kurkqjuoglu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 83-84, 92-93; Kyle, Suez, 197. See also 
records of Lloyd's three meetings during the conference on August 20-21 with representatives of the three 
Baghdad Pact powers in F0800/739, ff. 136-37, 140.
20FRUS1955-1957, XVI, 245. See those amendments ibid., 250-52.
21FO371/119133/JE14211/1505, Chancery, Ankara to African Department [n.d.]; F0371/121224/ 
V10316/3, Stewart to Ross, 9.10.56.
22FO371/119107/JE14211/799, Lloyd to Wright, 16.8.56.
2^F0371/119182/JE14211/203, Stewart to FO, 1.10.56. A similar view by was expressed by Ardalan; see 
Kyle, Suez, 252.
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pointed its main finger of accusation towards the major Western powers, which, it thought, 
had lost "the sense of resolution and purpose".24
During the second conference, Birgi did his best to concentrate on the bright side of 
events. After the idea of setting up a Suez Canal User's Association (SCUA) was in principle 
agreed upon, he opined that "it was essential that Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Turkey all sign 
simultaneously" and later worked to achieve that.25 But if Turkey and Iran were among the 
14 states who agreed immediately to join the SCUA, Ethiopia and Pakistan hesitated.26 
Dulles privately appreciated Birgi's "whole-hearted and effective cooperation,"22 but Ankara, 
it seems, was expecting to be given even more credit for its role and was unhappy for not 
receiving from the British press the praise it thought it deserved. 28
From then on, the general mood in the Turkish Foreign Ministry remained depressed. It 
was now feared that 'Abd al-Nasir would again "get away 100% with what he had done" and 
all hope was almost lost that the canal dispute would bring his downfall. It was recognised 
that if 'Abd al-Nasir managed to survive this crisis, it would have harmftd consequences for 
the security of Turkey and for Western influence in the Middle East.29 Birgi told the French 
Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, that "experience shows that it is better to be allied with 
Russia than it is to be allied with France, the US and the UK".29 When, on September 23, 
Britain and France took the issue to the UN, Turkey hesitated, arguing that the UN could do 
nothing to strengthen the negotiating position of the 18 powers. 21
On the other hand, and throughout the crisis, Turkey patiently used her influence with 
less determined friendly governments to stiffen their attitude against 'Abd al-Nasir. 
Menderes's contacts to that effect with President Sham'un, Libya's Prime Minister, Mustafa 
Bin Halim, and even with the Pakistani government (which faced strong pressure from pro- 
Egyptian public opinion at home) were appreciated by, among others, Dulles and L l o y d .  22 
Menderes's determination was not totally shared by the Turkish press. The latter greeted 
the nationalisation with strong disapproval and disquiet. It, too, hoped that 'Abd al-Nasir's
24F0371/121224/V10316/3, Stewart to Ross, 9.10.56.
25FRUS1955-1957, XVI, 535, 545.
2^D. C. Watt(ed.), Documents on the Suez Crisis: 26 July to 6 November 1956 (1957), 20; Kyle, Suez, 
253; Burke, Pakistan, 186-87; FRUS, 1955-1957, XVI, 616.
27F 0371/119147/JE14211/1951, Stewart to Young, 26.9.56.
28F0371/119199/JE14216/266, Stewart to FO, 1.10.56.
29FO371/121224/V10316/3, Stewart to Ross, 9.10.56.
30FRUS 1955-1957, XVI, 641-42.
3 ^ 0371/121224^10316/3, Stewart to Ross, 9.10.56.
32FO371/119083/JE14211/194A, FO to Ankara, 4.8.56; F0371/119100/JE14211/635, HM Consul- 
General, Istanbul to FO, 11.8.56; FO371/119109/JE14211/852, Bowker to FO, 18.8.56; F0371/121614/ 
VL10344/3G, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 9.9.56; F0371/119147/JE14211/1951, Stewart to Young,
26.9.56.
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irresponsible act would be swiftly punished by the West. The opposition newspaper, Dunya, 
supported the idea circulating at the time that a new canal should be dug through Israel to 
connect the Mediterranean and Red Seas, thus depriving Egypt of her international 
importance and precipitating 'Abd al-Nasir's departure in "the same way as Mosaddeq".33 
The press, too, saw a Soviet hand behind 'Abd al-Nasir's "machinations". However, it also 
unequivocally accepted the legality of nationalisation and later showed explicit disapproval 
for the Anglo-French troop concentrations in the region. The papers were in general 
agreement that the crisis could be settled amicably.34 The British Embassy in Ankara was 
clearly displeased with the press's adverse criticism of France and Britain. 3 5
One historian, who studied the Turkish government's attitude during the crisis, without 
having access to official records, has misleadingly accepted the writings in the press as being 
generally representative of the official p o s i t i o n .  3 b Another has gone as far as suggesting that 
"the Turks welcomed the embarrassment of the United Kingdom in the Suez affair" and 
"hoped that they would be able to replace the British, perhaps not directly, but as delegates of 
America and the Western Powers".37 This author cannot but totally disagree with these 
points of view. Although the danger of basing conclusions relying mainly on British records 
has to be acknowledged, it is still wise to expect that had Ankara ever entertained such 
hopes, they would not have gone unnoticed by the FO, determined to preserve Britain's 
privileged position in the Middle East.
Iraq and Syria during the Suez Crisis 
Nmi, unlike Menderes, faced considerable trouble with public opinion at home, for despite 
his personal dislike of Abd al-Nasir, he could not be seen breaking Arab solidarity. The 
nationalisation was publicly endorsed by leaders of the banned opposition,38 and public 
sympathy for 'Abd al-Nasir was widespread and genuine. Nuri, therefore, had to keep some 
sort of balance between his private expectations and his public posture.
33F 0371/119083/JE14211/198, Bowker to FO, 31.7.56. There were also reports that the IPC was 
engaged in surveying an alternative pipeline route to export Iraqi oil via Turkey instead of Syria; see The 
Times, 12.9.56. Washington supported this plan in principle, but feared that any tangible step in that 
direction before solving the Suez crisis would generate Arab opposition and re-kindle sour Arab memories of 
the annexation of Hatay; see FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 316-18, 347. For deliberations on this project after the 
Suez war, see George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (1960), 338-43.
^F0371/119121/JE14211/1199, Chancery, Istanbul to Levant Department, 20.8.56; F0371/119131/ 
JE14211/1459, Bowker to FO, 7.9.56; F0371/119137/JE14211/1638, Stewart to FO, 14.9.56.
35F0371/119151/JE14211/2049, Stewart to FO, 3 October 1956.
3^Kurk9tio^lu, Tiirkiye'nin Politikasi, 92-96.
37Alimad, Experiment, 396.
38Al-'Akam, Ta'rikh, 179-81; FO371/119080/JE14211/75, Hooper to FO, 28.7.56; F0371/119084/ 
JE14211/218, Hooper to FO, 2.8.56; FO371/119101/JE14211/670, Wright to FO, 12.8.56; F0371/119138 
/JE14211/1676, Wright to FO, 18.9.56;.
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Nuri first heard of the nationalisation when on a visit to London. His immediate reaction 
was to urge the British government and its allies to maintain a firm posture to cause 'Abd al- 
Nasir "to retreat to the points both of accepting adequate international control and to retract 
to a degree which would be a grave, and it was to be hoped, fatal setback to his p r e s t i g e " .39 
He initially believed that sending forces would not eventually be necessary to make Egypt 
change her mind. Egypt depended on imported fuel, and a blockade of, say, up to six weeks, 
would be enough to bring her to her knees.4(3 "It would be in the Egyptian character for 
Nasser to give up and resign as soon as he realised the strength of the forces against him," 
said N uri.41 He interpreted as a sign of Egyptian "nervousness" and "backing down" the 
Egyptian request that Nuri might mediate between London and Cairo. "He had no intention 
of assuming the role of mediator," h o w e v e r .  42
The Iraqi leaders saw in 'Abd al-Nasir's eventual downfall, within 6-8 weeks, the only 
possible solution for problems besetting the Middle East. They feared, however, that if he 
survived, he would continue his "subversive" activities in the Middle East on an 
unprecedented scale and even cause the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact. Nuri did not 
suggest any specific name to replace 'Abd al-Nasir, hoping that the former Egyptian leader, 
Muhammad al-Nagib, members of the Egyptian bourgeoisie or even 'Abd al-Nasir's 
opponents within the army could take the opportunity to topple him.43 prince 'Abd al-Uah, 
however, advocated the restoration of monarchy in Egypt "in pursuit of the principle that 
monarchy, with its continuity, is best for the East" and preferred to see Prince Abd al-Mun'im 
on the throne. "The mob in Cairo," said he, was "volatile and would cheer anything n e w " .4 4  
Nuri considered it important that, in case of an eventual outbreak of hostilities, Egypt 
should open fire first. He could then sell his anti-'Abd al-Nasir stance to his public. One way 
to lure Abd al-Nasir into an armed confrontation, said Nuri, could be the payment by user- 
states of canal dues in London and Paris, rather than in Egypt, thus prompting Cairo to stop
39FO371/119107/JE14211/812, Wright to FO, 15.8.56; Lloyd, Suez, 74; MohamedH. Heikal, The Cairo 
Documents: The Inside Story o f  Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen 
(1973), 93-95. Heikal claims that his account is based on a leaked Iraqi report which Nuri had presented to 
his cabinet after his return to Baghdad.
40FO371/119088/JE14211/327, FO minute by Dodds-Parker, 30.7.56.
41FO371/121662/VQ1051/45G, Rose to Hooper, 8,8.56.
42FO371/119109/JE14211/852, Wright to FO, 16.8.56; see also Lloyd, Suez, 106; al-Sa'id, Nuri, 193. 
Al-Jamali, Dhikrayat, 133-34, however, says that Nuri, after his return to Baghdad asked him to go and meet 
'Abd al-Nasir in Cairo and when he refused, al-Suwaydi was sent instead. Unfortunately, al-Jamali does not 
say what was discussed in Cairo.
43F 0371/119088/JE14211/327, FO minute by Dodds-Parker, 30.7.56.
44FO371/121662/VQ1051/45G, Aineiy to Lloyd, 1.8.56. 'Abd al-Mun'im, the eldest son of Egypt's last 
khedive, 'Abbas Hilmi, had been a member of the three-man regency council during the brief reign of the 
infant Ahmad Fu'ad in 1952-53.
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the traffic through the canal.45 'Abd al-Nasir, however, wisely ignored, for the time being at 
least, the Anglo-French refusal to pay the designated dues to the newly established Canal 
Authority and ordered undelayed passage for all ships.46 So, Nuri and 'Abd al-Ilah suggested 
that the stoppage by Egyptians of a British ship carrying arms for the Iraqi army could also 
serve as an appropriate casus belli.47
Nuri did not expect any long-lasting sharp outciy in the Arab world against any possible 
British military action, provided 'Abd al-Nasir was dealt with in a reasonably short time and 
Israel kept out of this venture.48 He wanted, however, any military action appear to bear an 
international character. He acknowledged that France's special interests in the canal would, 
despite her unpopularity in the Arab world over Algeria, make her participation "natural". He 
also hoped that any Anglo-French action would include at least token participation from 
Australia, New Zealand, perhaps fiom the Netherlands, Pakistan or Italy, and even, in an 
extreme case, from Turkey. Nuri "naturally hoped" that Washington would join too. If not, 
"it would be desirable if not essential" that it should give wholehearted approval and 
endorsement to the action and help in keeping Israel quiet.49 His views were largely shared 
by other prominent members of the Iraqi establishment, including King Faysal 11.56
The British government expected the crisis to create serious internal problems for Nuri. 
Nmi and 'Abd al-flali said, however, that they were not worried and discounted the possibility 
of an attempted coup. 51 Still, the Iraqi government tightened its grip over public affair s and 
made contingency plans to declare martial law in case an armed conflict broke out. 5 2 Nuri 
accompanied these measures, however, with a set of public declarations and initiatives 
designed to enhance his regime's image and Ar ab legitimacy both at home and in other Arab
45FO371/119088/JE14211/327, FO minute by Dodds-Parker, 30.7.56.
46rhe British and French shippers were continuing to pay the tolls into the old Company account in 
Paris. It has been assumed that 'Abd al-Nasir probably intended to treat such payments as credits toward the 
compensation he had promised for the nationalised Company's shareholders; see Louis and Owen, Suez, 111, 
167, 204.
47FO371/121662/VQ1051/45G, Rose to Hooper, 8.8.56.
4®F0371/119088/JE14211/327, FO minute by Dodds-Parker, 30.7.56; Anthony Nutting, No End o f a 
Lesson: The Story o f Suez (1967), 48; Louis and Owen, Suez, 398.
4^FO371/121662/VQ1051/43G, FO minute by Wright, 30.7.56. We have found no new evidence to 
support the statement by an unnamed British Cabinet minister, quoted in Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair 
(1986), 91, that Nuri had told the British to make the Jews "do the job for them".
50FO371/121274/V1075/130, Record of meeting of Representatives of Baghdad Pact Powers, 6.8.56; 
F 0371/119131/JE14211/1451, minute by military attache, Baghdad, 5.9.56; F0371/119142/JE14211/1805, 
Wright to FO, 24.9.56.
51FO371/121662/VQ1051/43G, FO minute by Wright, 30.7.56; FO371/121662/VQ1051/47, FO minute 
by Graham, 9.8.56; FO371/121645/VQ1015/49G, Wright to FO, 4.9.56.
52A1-Takriti, Al-Wasi, 146-47; Saad, Iraq, 52; FO371/121662/VQ1051/72 & 74, Wright to FO, 14 & 16 
August 1956; FO371/121646/VQ1015/87G, Wright to FO, 1.9.56; FO371/121646/VQ1015/82G, Wright to 
FO, 9.9.56; ibid., -/86, Hooper to Rose, 12.9.56.
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countries. Iraq's official line laid particular stress on Israel in order to draw attention away 
from the Western Powers; emphasise the risks for the Arab cause which had resulted from 
'Abd al-Nasir's action; and take, as much as possible, the shine out of the latter's personal 
s u c c e s s .  53 An Iraqi official communique on August 5 failed to mention 'Abd al-Nasir by 
name, but was careftd to state that "nationalization is the established right of a State," that 
Baghdad "will stand by Egypt in ensuring her dignity, sovereignty and independence" and 
expressed hope that "wisdom will prevail to solve this dispute". The larger part of the 
communique, however, dealt with Israel's activity "to exploit this dispute for its own ends" 
and stressed that "the interest shown by Arab public in this dispute should not distract them 
from the danger of Israel".54 Later, Iraq officially reiterated her readiness to meet all her 
obligations under the ALCSP.55
The August 5 communique left Menderes "puzzled". He thought that it "was at variance 
with the message which Nuri had sent him through the Turkish Ambassador in London, that 
Turkey had nothing to fear from Iraq's attitude on this issue" .^  The apparent Iraqi support 
for Egypt was also noted with disquiet by a handful of Turkish newspapers. ^  The British 
government, however, showed understanding. 5 8 and was later able to persuade Nuri not to 
put out any public statement about 'Abd al-Nasir's secret negotiations with Israel over the 
past year. Nuri would have liked to suggest that the Communists and the Zionists, disturbed 
with the prospects of a settlement in the Middle East and the subsequent delivery of massive 
economic aid to Egypt, had forced the withdrawal of the Anglo-American credits and, hence, 
precipitated the Suez c r i s i s .  5 9
Nuri asked not to be invited to the London Conference "on the ground that if Iraq was 
invited, several other Arab states would demand invitation". 60 However, he closely followed 
its proceedings, asking Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to maintain a distinction "between the 
sovereignty and rights of Egypt and the Egyptians one the one hand and the behaviour of 
Nasser, who is not to be trusted, on the other hand". He hoped that all three would "at least 
find a way of associating themselves with the principle of international control". 61 He also
53FO371/119089/JE14211/350, Hooper to FO, 6.8.56.
5^See full English text of communique in FO371/119089/JE14211/351, Hooper to FO, 6.8.56.
5^Saad, Iraq, 50.
56FO371/119107/JE14211/800, Bowker to Rose, 9.8.56.
5^F0371/119121/JE14211/1199, Chancery, Istanbul to Levant Department, 9.8.56. Nuri's daughter-in- 
law, 'Ismat al-Sa'id, an authoress biased towards Nuri, writes in Nuri, 196 that the Egyptian government 
thanked Iraq for the publication of the August 5 communique.
DDF, 1956, II, 202; FO371/12I274/V1075/130, 'Record of meeting between Representatives of 
Bagdad Pact Powers', 6.8.56.
5^F0371/121651/VQ10316/65, Hooper to FO, 9.8.56. For these secret contacts, see pp. 113-14.
60Lloyd, Suez, 107; DDF, 1956, II, 219; FO371/119107/JE14211/799, Lloyd to Wright, 16.8.56.
61F0371/119112/JE14211/958, Wright to FO, 20.8.56.
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urged Dulles to maintain Ms tough stand because any US retreat from her original stand 
would be regarded in the Middle East as the result of Soviet pressure on America, and Soviet 
prestige in the area would thereby be immediately increased, while that of Washington and 
the West would correspondingly decline. 62
Nuri planned, in the case of aimed hostilities, to declare martial law and publicly accuse 
'Abd al-Nasir of exposing "the Arabs to an attack by the Israelis and that it must be the role 
of Iraq to meet tMs danger". He would then move some of Ms army westward under the 
guise of supporting Syria if she were attacked. Such a stand, he hoped, would "command the 
maximum support in the army".63 it was feared that Nuri might even consider "violence 
against Israel to recover some of its leadersMp with other Arabs". 64 Indeed, when the Syrian 
Prime MiMster and Foreign Mimster (pressed by Egypt, according to Nuri) visited Baghdad 
to urge Iraq to endorse Egypt's actions and position, Nuri flatly replied that Egypt's decision 
had been reckless and could bring dangers upon Egypt and the Arab world and play into the 
hands of Israel.65 Iraq also refused to support Egypt during the two special Arab League 
Political Committee meetings called by Syria.66 Nuri opposed the passing there of any 
resolution approving the nationalisation because that would make it difficult for Egypt to 
back down and thus block any possibility of a compromise solution.67 The Iraqi delegates, 
however, ignored Ms instructions because they thought the tabled compromise draft-from 
wMch a good deal of rhetoric had been eliminated-"was the best that could be obtained".68 
During the second meeting in September, Iraq was again the sole objecting voice and was on 
tMs occasion extremely dissatisfied with the final resolution. 69
Nuri endeavoured to use the escalation in tension along the Israeli-Jordaman armistice 
line in September and October to demonstrate Ms professed commitment to the Arab cause 
and that the Baghdad Pact was not inimical to Arab interests. When King Husayn appealed 
for the statiouing of an Iraqi division in Jordan, Nuri suggested that Pakistan might send an 
infantry battalion to Baghdad as a symbol of Baghdad Pact military co-operation and thus 
enable Iraq to release some of her troops. KaracM, however, turned down tMs request, 
claiming that its forces were insufficient even for its own defence. 70 Iraq and Jordan later
62F0371/119114/JE14211/1017, Wright to FO, 21.8.56.
63FO371/121646/VQ1015/87G, Wriglit to FO, 1.9.56.
64FO371/121646/VQ1015/89, FO minute by Dodds-Parker, 1.10.56.
65FO371/119099/JE14211/623, Wriglit to FO, 11.8.56.
79Elie Podeh, "The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis", MES, 29/1 (January, 1993), 92.
67FO371/119089/JE14211/350, Hooper to FO, 6.8.56; FO371/119094/JE14211/461, Hooper to FO,
8.8.56.
68FO371/119101/JE14211/687, Trevelyan to FO, 13.8.56.
69F0371/119143/JE14211/1868, Trevelyan to FO, 22.9.56. See English text of resolution in F0371/ 
119139/JE14211/1711, Trevelyan to FO, 19.9.56.
70DDF, 1956, II, 534-35; FO371/121660/VQ10399/1G.
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failed to agree 011 who would command the Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan. Iraqi forces thus 
remained stationed just within Iraq and moved into Jordan, at Husayn's renewed request, only 
on November 3, after the outbreak of hostilities in the Sinai-Suez area and a simultaneous 
Jordanian invitation to Syrian and Saudi troops as well to strengthen Jordan's defences 
against any potential Israeli attack. 71
Nuri and other Iraqi leaders, too, gradually lost hope that the crisis would sharply reduce 
'Abd al-Nasir's influence. After the second London Conference and the settung up of the 
SCUA they reportedly thought that 'Abd al-Nasir had not been obliged to give way on 
anything and-that unless and until he finds himself compelled to do so-time was definitely on 
his side. If he could avoid any form of international control, then he would be seen as having 
won the game and could use his enhanced position to finally undermine Jordan and Syria, and 
perhaps Iraq and Saudi Arabia as well.72
The official political climate in Syria was in total contrast to those of Turkey and Iraq. 
With the radical pan-Arab nationalist Ba'th party and its allies prominently represented in the 
national coalition cabinet in power and enjoying wide-spread support within the army officer- 
corps, the Syrian government followed an overtly pro-Egyptian line. It fully endorsed Egypt's 
legal right "in line with laws and precedents" to nationalise the Suez Canal Company and 
promised to "stand alongside Egypt in every respect" and lay down all its "potentialities to 
prevent any harm reaching her".73 it also lobbied for Arab diplomatic support for Egypt.74 
Al-'Asali and Foreign Minister Salah al-Din al-Bitar made a short tour of Arab capitals to 
canvass for such support before the scheduled Arab League Political Committee meeting of 
August 12.75 0 h September 22, al-Quwatli pledged with King Sa'ud support for "every 
attitude Egypt takes over the Suez Canal".76 Damascus opposed the convening in London of 
any conference to deal with the future of the Suez Canal. 77 Al-Bitar claimed that the Dulles 
plan was illegal, because it denied Egypt her sovereignty and that only members of NATO, 
the Commonwealth and the Baghdad Pact had come out in its support. As regards the 
attitude of the Baghdad Pact powers, he said that the conference had shown that "adherence 
to military pacts means loss of freedom". Instead, Syria proposed to convene a conference of 
the Bandung powers78 and later welcomed the Soviet call for an alternative conference with
^For further details see Kyle, Suez, 291-97; Lucas, Divided, 228-37; Nutting, Lesson, 84-95.
72F0371/119142/JE14211/1805, Wriglit to FO, 24.9.56.
73FO371/121864/VY10316/17, Chancery, Damascus to Levant Department, 30.7.56; F0371/119080 
/JE14211/95, Andrew to FO, 30.7.56.
7^F0371/121274/V1075/130, 'Record of meeting of Representatives of Bagdad Pact Powers', 6.8.56.
75FO371/119097/JE14211/573 & F0371/119100/JE14211/632, Gardener to FO, 10-11 August 1956.
76FO371/119114/JE14211/1880, Gardener to FO, 25.9.56; Watt, Documents, 21.
77Louis and Owen, Suez, 177.
7®F0371/119119/JE14211/1144, Gardener to FO, 27.8.56.
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British, French, Egyptian, American, Soviet and Indian participation.79 Syria, Lebanon and 
Jordan protested at the UN Security Council against Anglo-French naval reinforcements in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 89 It has also been claimed that in the days leading up to the 
tripartite invasion of Egypt, al-Sarraj, the head of Syrian military intelligence, passed on 
valuable information to Cairo, "particularly about the French pilots in uniform in Cyprus 
waiting with their planes to be sent to Israel".81 The Syrian armed forces were mobilised as a 
precautionary measure to meet any possible action against Syria or Egypt82 and a Popular 
Resistance Force was formed under the wing of the army.82 The government also 
encouraged-or was, at least, in no position but to go along with-unofficial, non­
governmental pro-Egyptian measures undertaken by individual politicians outside the cabinet, 
who, predictably, took a harder line against the West than the government could afford to 
show, even advocating the closure of the IPC pipeline.84 The Syrian press generally 
remained loyal to the government line throughout the crisis.
In Syria, it was the right-wing opposition that had to somewhat conceal its real feelings, 
preferring not to express its reservations and pretending as if it, too, supported the 
government line unreservedly. The traditionally pro-Iraqi papers, for example, followed the 
official line and restricted their sympathies to giving prominence to rare Iraqi statements in 
support of Egypt. They also made very rare attempts to condemn some extreme pro-'Abd al- 
Nasir (and, hence, implicitly anti-Nuri) activities as measures to divide the Arabs.82
The British FO rightly predicted that, once military operations started, and irrespective of 
who fired the first shot, "there would be very heavy public pressure" in Syria "to join in on 
Egypt's side at once," but that the government might "be sufficiently reluctant to stick out 
their necks to wait for 24 hours or so to see how things were going," perhaps even fearing a 
French or Iraqi invasion. Therefore, "an impressive initial success might be sufficient to make
79F0371/119141/JE14211/1788, Gardener to FO, 22.9.56.
80FO371/119119/V10716/l & 4, Dixon to FO, 17 & 19 Sept. 1956.
8 ^ Heikal, Cutting, 189.
82FO371/119089/JE14211/354 & F 0371/119093/JE14211/430, Andrew to FO, 3 & 7 Aug. 1956.
82Torrey, Syrian Politics, 342.
84Al-'Azm, Mudhakkamt, II, 478-81; FO371/119089/JE14211/354, Andrew to FO, 6.8.56; F0371/ 
119094/JE14211/493, Andrew to FO, 9.8.56; FO371/119098/JE14211/574, Gardener to FO, 10.8.56; 
FO371/121862/VY1022/6, Gardener to FO, 11.8.56; F0371/121891/VY1532/1, Gardener to FO, 11.8.56; 
F 0371/119100/JE14211/662, Trevelyan to FO, 12.8.56; F0371/121891/VY1532/2-3, Gardener to FO, 
13.8.56; FO371/119105/JE14211/776, Gardener to FO, 14.8.56; FO371/119105/JE14211/778, Gardener to 
FO, 15.8.56; FO371/119105/JE14211/778(A); FO371/121281/V1078/27, Chancery, Damascus to Levant 
Department, 19.9.56; ibid., 726, Gardener to FO, 21.9.56.
82F0371/119085/JE14211/258, Andrew to FO, 3.8.56; FO371/119089/JE14211/354, Andrew to FO, 
6.8.56; F0371/119098/JE14211/574, Gardener to FO, 10.8.56; F0371/119123/JE14211/1242, Gardener to 
FO, 31.8.56; F0371/119133/JE14211/1522, Gardener to FO, 11.9.56; FO371/119296/V10716/2, Gardener to 
FO, 17.9.56; F0371/119141/JE14211/1788, Gardener to FO, 22.9.56.
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them hold their hand". On the other hand, it was almost certain that, after the outbreak of 
hostilities, the government would not be able to keep anti-Western demonstrations under
control.
The Tripartite Aggression against Egypt, the Failure of the Syrian Plot 
and Their Repercussions for the Middle East 
With Anglo-Franco military preparations completed and no sign of Egypt backing down from 
the nationalisation decision, France brought Britain and Israel together and fathered a secret 
tripartite plan to invade Egypt. A Franco-Israeli rapprochement had been going on for a few 
years based on shared antagonism to Arab nationalism and the Baghdad Pact. Israel joined in 
the plan because she felt Egypt must be defeated and Israel's free entrance to the Gulf of 
Aqaba seemed before Soviet aims delivered to Cairo gave the latter military superiority.
According to this secret plan, Israeli forces invaded Sinai on October 29 and marched 
towards the Suez Canal. The next day, an Anglo-French ultimatum was delivered to both 
Israel and Egypt demanding that their forces should immediately stop all military operations 
and withdraw ten miles from the banks of the canal to guarantee freedom of transit. Egypt 
was also asked to agree to the temporary imposition of Anglo-French troops in the canal 
zone. Israel accepted the ultimatum. Egypt, understandably, rejected it. An Anglo-French air 
bombardment of Egyptian military installations followed and, on November 5, their troops 
landed in Egypt to take control of the canal by force.
Eisenhower was furious that Britain and France had broken the 1950 Tripartite 
Declaration. He feared that then action would be instigate throughout the developing world 
an anti-Western backlash and create an opportunity for Moscow to make noticeable political 
advances there. Washington, therefore, presented to the UN Security Council on October 30 
a draft resolution condemning Israel's action against Egypt, but France and Britain vetoed it. 
The USA then introduced a resolution to the emergency session of the General Assembly, 
demanding an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli troops beyond 
the 1949 armistice lines. It was carried, and on November 4, the UN General Assembly 
further decided to send a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to take charge of the combat zone 
temporarily.
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, Egypt blocked the canal. On November 3, al-Sarraj 
led a group of Syrian sympathisers of'Abd al-Nasir-probably against the wishes of al-'Asali's 
cabinet-to seriously damage the IPC pipeline, carrying almost two-thirds of Iraqi export oil
86FO371/121222/V1021/lG-lG'A', FO minutes by Rose, 31 August & 10 September 1956.
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to tlie Mediterranean and, thence, almost totally to Europe. 87 Saudi Arabia also prohibited 
the direct export of oil to Britain and France, thus creating an acute shortage of fuel in 
Western Europe. Washington denied emergency oil shipments to Britain and France, as well 
as access to International Monetary Fund facilities to alleviate the pressure on the UK 
currency as Britain's dollar reserves began to drain. Washington thus forced the three 
aggressors to accept on November 6 an early cease-fire and, ultimately, withdraw totally 
from Egyptian soil, including the Gaza strip. The only concession Israel received in return 
was an informal Egyptian promise that she would not, in the future, impede Israeli access to 
the Gulf of Aqaba.
Although the British/French/Israeli losses in men and materiel were much less than 
Egypt's, the Anglo-French intervention proved to be a fiasco, failing to bring down 'Abd al- 
Nasir or putting the Suez Canal under international supervision. The intervention simply 
confirmed, magnified and encouraged those political trends in the Middle East, which Britain 
and France were trying to arrest. 'Abd al-Nasir survived and snatched a remarkable political 
victory to become the unquestioned hero of the Ar ab masses. He scrapped the 1954 Anglo- 
Egyptian Agr eement and a unilateral declaration to guarantee the freedom of passage through 
the canal was, in the end, all that he conceded. By late spring 1957, Britain and France had 
re-permitted then ships to use the canal but on Egypt's terms. The resumption of the oil flow 
through Syria was only authorised on 11 March 1957.88 Syria and Egypt broke off 
diplomatic ties with both Britain and France.89 in Jordan, the British Army training mission 
was dissolved and ordered to leave. The 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was abrogated and 
replaced by the Arab Solidarity Agreement of 13 January 1957, whereby Egypt, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia pledged to compensate Jordan for the loss of the £ 12.5 million annual British 
subsidy for the next ten years, an offer which King Husayn had in the past always politely 
declined.90 Moreover, the new pan-Arab nationalist Jordanian government asked Iraq to put 
her forces in Jordan under Egyptian command, and when the Iraqis refused, they were 
politely asked to leave. From then on, Britain played second fiddle to Washington in Middle 
Eastern politics. France, already less influential than Britain, lost even more. By the end of
^Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Qissat al-Suways: akhir al-ma'arik fi ’asr al-’amaliqah (1977), 241-49; 
Tlas, M ir’at, 578; Riad, Struggle, 10. Only Zakariyya, a 1-Sultan, 169, a source extremely critical of al-Sarraj, 
says that tlie destruction of the pipeline was carried out by Ilisan al-Shishakli, the son of the former Syrian 
leader. It is believed that only Washington's attitude during the crisis saved the section of the Trans-Arabian 
pipeline passing through Syria and carrying Saudi oil to the Lebanese coast from a similar fate; see 
F0371/127797/V1535/1, note by Brook, 28.8.57; FO371/128221/VY1015/25, Johnston to Watson, 20.2.57.
88FO371/128221/VY1015/34, Scott to Watson, 14.3.57.
Z9DDF, 1956, III, 172; F0371/121895/VY1891/1(B), CRO outward telegram, 7.11.56; ibid., -13, 
Gardener to FO, 3.11.56; ibid., -/16, Middleton to FO, 21.11.56.
9^Lunt, Hussein, 43, 48-51,
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November, she kept diplomatic relations with only Lebanon, Libya and Sudan.91 French 
institutions in Syria and Jordan were attacked, destroyed and set on fire. 92
Washington's attitude was instrumental in halting the tripartite aggression and its 
involvement in the uncovered Syrian plot93 did not become public immediately. It, too, 
however, failed, in the end, to gain much politically. There was generally little appreciation 
among Arab nationalists for America's role in the Suez crisis. Washington had perhaps 
previously been too closely involved with Britain and France to be heralded now as the 
saviour of relatively small and weak Egypt against colonialism. Moreover, Arab suspicions 
were further enhanced, when, soon after the end of the hostilities, Washington refused to 
defreeze Egyptian assets in American banks which Egypt needed urgently for the purchase of 
foodstuffs and medicaments, forcing Cairo to resort once again to Moscow, which supplied 
Egypt's needs without delay. 94
Instead, the Arab masses enthusiastically welcomed the Soviet role in the conflict. 95 
During the early stages of the war, Moscow itself was "busy" suppressing the uprising in 
Hungary. Soon after having the latter crushed, however, she formally threatened to use 
nuclear weapons against Israel, Britain and France if they failed to observe the UN cease-fire. 
During a pre-arranged official visit to Moscow by al-Quwatli from October 31 to November 
3, the first by a Syrian President, Soviet Head of State Kliment Voroshilov pledged to assist 
Syria in defending her independence.96 Western observers assumed that possible military 
movements in connection with the Suez war might have also been discussed during the visit, 
including, perhaps, the dispatch of Soviet "volunteers" to the Middle East,97 for al-Quwatli 
declared on his return that "thousands of Soviet Muslims had announced their readiness to 
come to the Middle East to rid the Holy Land of imperialist aggressors".98 fo the next three 
years, Soviet trade with then Arab partners trebled.99
91FO371/121221/V10317/2, FO minute by Faber, 21.11.56.
92DDF, 1956, III, 85.
9^See pp. 121, 141.
^Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez: A Study o f Westem-Arab Relations (1962), 313-14; Riad, 
Struggle, 10.
^ 5See, for example, Nutting, Lesson, 147; DDF, 1956, III, 295-96; FRUS, 1955-1957, XIII, 596.
9^Ramet, Relationship, 17.
9^Torrey, Syrian Politics, 341; Lesch, Syria, 102; FO371/121867/VY10338/20, Hayter to Lloyd,
12.11.56.
9^Seale, Struggle, 287-88. Egyptian sources have since claimed, however, that the Soviets were actually 
asked, but were reluctant to provide military help, promising only economic assistance and mobilisation of 
public opinion; see details in Anwar el-Sadat, In Search o f an Identity: An Autobiography (1978), 145-46; 
Riyad al-Maliki, Dhikrayat 'ala darb al-kifah wa-l-hazimah (1972), 231; Heikal, Cairo, 111-12; idem., 
Sphinx, 71-73.
"Soysaf^nn/v^w, 74.
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In Syria, tlie outbreak of hostilities in Egypt coincided with the collapse of the attempted 
right-wing coup. 100 The Syrian conspirators-unaware, of course, of the Anglo-Franco- 
Israeli deal to invade Egypt-had planned to seize power on October 25. A few days before 
that date, however, the British counter-intelligence, MI6, informed the CIA and Syrian coup 
leaders that the projected date had to be postponed until October 29. Eden had opined, 
during his January summit with Eisenhower, that should it eventually be decided to take 
military action, Syria and Egypt should be hit simultaneously. 101 The plotters, unaware of 
the implications of this short postponement, consented. Only on October 29 did they realise 
what it had meant. Some participants withdrew at the eleventh hour, refusing to be identified 
as collaborators with Israel. From then on, the Syrian intelligence easily uncovered the 
webs of the plot. It was already anticipating such an attempt, for the conspirators had failed 
to work in complete secrecy and there had been many leaks. 103 Intelligence officers seized 
large quantities of aims, smuggled from Iraq, and arrested numerous right-wing military 
officers and politicians, including 'Adnan al-Atasi and Munir al-'Ajlani, the leader of the right- 
wing Constitutional Bloc. Other plotters, both military and civilian, including Mikha'il Ilyan, 
Faysal al-'Asali, the leader of the Socialist Co-operative Party, and ex-Foreign Minister Faydi 
al-Atasi, fled to Lebanon and Turkey, Later, a military court tried them, under the provisions 
of martial law, for plotting against the state and condemned 'Adnan al-Atasi and five other 
politicians to death, but the then Defence Minister, Khalid al-'Azm, commuted the sentences 
to life imprisonment. 1^4
The attempted coup in Syria was unconnected with the attack on Suez. Only Britain was 
directly involved in both, and when she tried to "harmonise" them, she, probably 
unconsciously, assisted in the easy crumbling of the already carelessly managed plot in Syria.
The coup's failure left the Syrian right-wing completely demoralised. Late in December, 
the all-party government in situ collapsed due to serious differences between the People's 
Party and the other coalition partners. ^  Al-'Asali formed a new cabinet instead, based on 
the platform of the newly-established parliamentary National Gathering (al-Tajammu’ al- 
Watani), which included the Ba'th, the Communists, the ALM, al-'Azm's follwers, together
100Seepp. 117-20.
101Little, "Cold War", 66; FRUS, 1955-1957, XIII, 567.
102Little, "Cold War", 67; Eveland, Ropes, 226-27.
lO^See, for example, The Jewish Observer and Middle East Report (London), 16.3.56; F0371/115947/ 
VY1015/95, Gardener to Rose, 5.12.55.
104Torrey, Syrian Politics, 324-25; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 344, 494-97 & III, 32-33, 45-47, 114-15. 
The convicted were released only in September 1960 by the President of the UAR, 'Abd al-Nasir, on condition 
that they lived in Cairo; see Frost, UAR, 276.
lO^Torrey, Syrian Politics, 327; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, III, 35.
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with some Nationalist and independent deputies. Its program called for a firm anti­
imperialist stand; liberation of Arab states under foreign rule; opposition to the Baghdad Pact; 
support for the Iraqi people in its fight against imperialism; and austerity to enable Syria to 
cope with the dangers it faced. At home, it pledged to overcome backwardness; introduce tax 
reform and legislation to protect workers and peasants. ^
Turkey and Iraq during the hostilities
The Turkish government kept a low profile throughout the period of military confrontation 
and issued no official statement. Commented The Times of 5 November:
This silence is typical of the embarrassing dilemma of Turkish diplomacy, tom 
between her friendship with Britain and her indebtedness to the United States for 
economic and military aid given to his country. Moreover, the position taken by two 
members of the Baghdad pact, Iraq and Pakistan, against the Anglo-French action in 
the canal zone, forces Turkey to adapt her policy to theirs if the Baghdad Pact is to be 
saved from disintegration. 108
Behind-the-scenes, however, reported Bowker:
the Turkish Government have not for a moment wavered in their approval of the 
Anglo-French intervention in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. Having regretted that we 
did not intervene in force the moment Nasser nationalised the Canal, they have 
regarded our recent action as going a long way towards making good our earlier 
failure. This attitude has been shared by all officials and officers with whom I and 
members of my staff have been in touch, and I think, too, by the bulk of the public 
who follow international affairs. The only criticism has been that the arrival of our 
forces on the spot seemed slow to materialise and regret that we should have stopped 
before we had occupied the entire length of the Canal.
Bowker further reported that the Turkish authorities, despite the shortage of supplies of 
aviation fuel in the country, had promptly complied with a deluge of requests for British civil 
and military aircraft to overfly and refuel in Turkey. 109 November 3, Birgi told him 
confidentially that Ankara's sympathies "lay with Her Majesty's Government in the present
106Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 486-88 & III, 40, 87; Petran, Syria, 116-17; Torrey, Syrian Politics, 328. 
l^ S e e  its English translation in Muhammad Khalil(ed.), The Arab States and the Arab League: A 
Documentary Record, I (1962), 597-99.
108por the situation in Pakistan during the hostilities, see Kyle, Suez, 395-96, 486-88; Burke, Pakistan, 
187-88.
109FO371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 16.11.56. See also FO371/124022/RK1071/2, Hayter to 
FO, 13.11.56; Tan, 13.1.57, quoted in F0371/130190/RK1051/6, Bowker to FO, 18.1.57.
142
situation". HO Tlie next day, acting Turkish Foreign Minister Ethem Menderes, too, stressed 
that "the Turkish Government and the Prime Minister attached the greatest importance to the 
British alliance, which remained a permanent element in then foreign policy", H I According 
to a biographer of Menderes, the latter intimated to him in 1960 that he thought Britain and 
France should have persisted with their intervention for at least two more days. ^  H  One 
contemporary historian has even suggested that a report on November 6 that Turkey was 
being overflown by Soviet jet aircraft and that the Turkish Ah Force was being alerted could 
have been deliberate "disinformation" spread by the Turks to push the USA into intervention 
against Egypt and Syria. 1H
At the UN, Turkey was not a member of the Security Council at the time, but during the 
debates in the General Assembly, she avoided publicity, voting in general, following the USA, 
on the majority side. Her one or two "deviations" from this pattern were always in favour of 
Britain and France. H4 Her abstention during voting on the request to convene an emergency 
session of the UN General Assembly has been interpreted as usual Turkish reluctance to take 
sides in conflicts between friendly countries.H5 It can be also treated, however, as a device 
to free herself from making a compromise in public between her private expectations and the 
image she wanted to show to the Arab world. If initially, the American opposition to the 
Anglo-French use of force did make taking sides difficult for Turkey, it later turned out to be, 
however, very useful in showing Turkey a diplomatic way out of the immediate conflict. 
Turkey supported the calls for an immediate cease-fire; the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Egyptian territory and the establishment of UNEF. She was more restrained than her regional 
Baghdad Pact allies, however, when voting on strongly-worded resolutions demanding 
immediate Anglo-French withdrawal and spoke in favour of the Anglo-French intention to 
keep then troops in the Canal Zone until UNEF could take over. H6
The attitude of the Turkish press during the war was, according to Bowker, "mixed" and 
"patchy". He could still, however, supply the FO with a few selections of comments 
favourable to France and Britain and extremely critical of Abd al-Nasir and the USSR. * H
H°FO371/121789/VR1091/624, Bowker to FO, 3.11.56; FO371/121798/VR1091/875, FO minute,
13.11.56,
m FO371/121788/VR1091/585, Bowker to FO, 4.11.56.
H2§evket Siireyya Aydemir, ikinci Adam (fsmet Inonii), Vol. Ill: 1950-1964 (1964), 336-37; ibid., 
Menderes'in Dr arm (1899-1960) (1969), 300.
1-^Lucas, Divided, 302. See also Eisenhower, Waging, 91.
114Nutting, Lesson, 154; F 0371/121747/VR1074/472 & 496, Dixon to FO, 1 & 4 November 1956.
115Gruen, Turkey, 330-31; FO371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 16.11.56.
116Gruen, Turkey, 333-34; FO371/121798/VR1091/875, FO minute, 13.11.56.
117FO371/121789/VR1091/612, Bowker to FO, 3.11.56; FO371/121796/VR1091/816, Bowker to FO, 
10.11.56; F0371/121800/VR1091/945, Bowker to FO, 17.1.56; FO371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 
16.11.56; FO371/121802/VR1091/969, Bowker to FO, 21.11.56.
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Turkey did not make during the conflict any new friends among the anti-Western forces 
in the area. After diplomatic relations between Britain and Syria had been broken off and the 
Syrian army had been had officially at least placed under Egyptian command, the British 
government renewed its warning that the use of Syrian airfields by Egyptian warplanes 
against Anglo-British targets would make Syria liable to attack by the Royal Air Force. This 
message was communicated to Damascus through President Sham'un, as well as the Turkish 
minister in Syria. Al-Bitar, while receiving this message on November 5, told Kural that "he 
was sony that Turkey, with whom Syria was in friendly relations, should have agreed to 
transmit such an unpleasant message". H8 Turkey's relations with Egypt also worsened 
sharply and their media traded venomous accusations. 11^
The increased antagonism between Egypt and Turkey was one of the manifestations of 
'Abd al-Nasir's growing hostility toward the Baghdad Pact. 'Abd al-Nasir believed that some 
of the secret radios attacking him throughout the crisis were stationed in Turkey and Iraq. 120 
On 16 December, he told the US ambassador that it was impossible to enjoy security and 
stability in the area unless the "'other side', i.e Turkey and Iraq plays it square". 121 'Abd al- 
Nasir also rejected a Pakistani offer of a contingent for UNEF and cancelled an impending 
visit to Cairo by Pakistan's Prime Minister. 122
Meanwhile, the tripartite aggression had^put the Iraqi leadership in an unprecedentedly 
difficult situation. Nuri had in the past consistently attacked France and Israel for allegedly 
pursuing policies inimical to the Arabs and been an outspoken advocate of Anglo-Arab co­
operation. Now, it appeared-as was later confirmed-that Britain was collaborating with both 
France and Israel to subdue a fellow Arab country. Immediately after the Israeli attack on 
Sinai, the Iraqi public believed, reported Wright, that the machinery of the Tripartite 
Declaration and the UN would soon be put into force to halt the aggression. Baghdad 
informed Cairo and other Arab capitals of its willingness to provide assistance in face of the 
Israeli attack and conveyed to London its deep concern at the Israeli action. 123 Ensuing 
developments were greeted, therefore, with "disbelief' and "consternation". "Our armed 
intervention in Egypt was looked upon as a resurgence of old-fashioned British 
imperialism". 124 The Iraqi cabinet decided on October 31 not to raise with the British 
government the question of intervention at the Suez Canal. But if Britain wanted to maintain
118FO371/121880/VY1223/9-10, FO to Ankara & Middleton to FO, 3.11.56; ibid., -/II, Stewart to 
Rose, 6.11.56.
ll^Kurk^uo^lu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 100; FRUS 1955-1957, XVI, 1314, 1321. 
l^Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (1970), 409.
111 FRUS 1955-1957, XVI, 1314, 1321. 
l 22Burke, Pakistan, 203.
123FO371/121783/VR1091/410, Wright to FO, 31.10.56.
124FO371/121662/VQ1051/51, Wright to Lloyd, 7.12.56.
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support in tlie Arab world, even of her wannest friends, Nuri told Wright, then she should 
accompany her anti-Egyptian measures with a strong condemnation of Israel and take parallel 
measures to force the latter to withdraw to the armistice lines. 125 From then on, Wright 
bombarded the FO with an average of two to three telegrams a day requesting his 
government to push Israel, by force if necessary, beyond the armistice lines and for further 
evidence of Britain's impartiality between Egypt and Israel. He even feared that the Hashimite 
Family and Nuri's government might fall and a breach of Iraqi relations with Britain would 
follow. 126 DayS 0f  aerial bombing only against Egyptian targets without landing made 
matters worse, confided 'Abd al-Hah. "Even the mere news of landings would be of some 
help. People would be given at least a short pause to speculate whether the Anglo-French 
forces would act against Egypt or Israel or both," said he. 127 Wright also reported that 
Washington's attitude had been privately criticised by some members of the Iraqi 
establishment, who would have liked to see the end of 'Abd al-Nasir. 128 xjie Iraqi 
government also tried to jam the Cairo and Damascus radio stations, who were accusing Nuri 
of collaborating with the aggressors. 129 Nuri told Lloyd, when they next met several months 
later in Karachi, that his only complaint against the British was then "mixing up" with "those 
beastly Jews". 120
The Suez War made 'Abd al-Nasir a "hero" and a "martyr" for all Iraqis who resented 
Nuri's policies for one reason or another. 121 Some students were already busy demonstrating 
in Baghdad on November 1, when the government declared martial l a w .  122 Even then, 
disturbances spread to other urban areas. 123
125FO371/121782/VR1091/416, Wriglit to FO, 31.10.56.
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Nuri's and Menderes's expectations had thus been totally dashed and the terrible scenario 
they had forecast in case 'Abd al-Nasir got away with the nationalisation appeared to be close 
to reality. It seemed for a moment that everything they had fought for in the past two-and-a- 
half years was lost. Nuri faced one of the most serious internal challenges of his career. This 
crisis, however, gave both an opportunity to demonstrate that they were dedicated fighters, 
determined to pursue those objectives, which, they believed, were in the best interest of their 
respective peoples. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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7The Fightback
The Suez war had not only failed to satisfy Turkish and Iraqi aspirations, but had created for 
both additional problems, demanding immediate attention. Ankara acknowledged that the 
political damage caused by the war should be hastily limited to prevent the Baghdad Pact's 
collapse and help Nmi overcome the renewed vigour of his opponents in Iraq. Moreover, the 
left-wing government in Damascus had acquired new strength after 'Abd al-Nasir's political 
victory and the foiling of the pro-Western plot in Syria, thus threatening Turkey of 
encirclement by pro-Soviet forces both from the north and south. Hence, Turkey's sole 
objective at this juncture was to strengthen the position of pro-Westem elements in the area.
Turkey and the Withdrawal of Anglo-French Troops from Egypt 
Now that the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt had failed to dislodge 'Abd al-Nasir from 
power and stem the radical pan-Arab nationalist tide, Britain's Baghdad Pact allies, and 
Menderes in particular, realised that a total and immediate Anglo-French withdrawal from 
Egypt must ensue with simultaneous pressure on Israel to follow suit. 1 It was better, argued 
Menderes, to leave Port-Said on one's own rather than hang on to be forced out eventually. 
Such a decision would not compromise Britain's prestige, and might even have favourable 
effects. 2 Britian soon complied with this recommendation, realising that on it depended 
largely Nuri's ability to survive and the future of the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish Foreign 
Ministry welcomed on December 5 Selwyn Lloyd's announcement of December 3 that Britain 
and France would proceed immediately with the withdr awal of their* forces from the Suez 
Canal area. Pressure from the regional members of the Baghdad Pact, claimed Ankara, had 
undoubtedly influenced this decision, thus showing once more the pact's value and 
effectiveness in establishing peace and security in the area.3
lDDF, 1956, III, 171; DDF, 1957,I, 149-50; FO371/121266/V1073/398G, FO minute by Ross, 8.11.56; 
FO371/121238/V1054/142, Ionides to Jones, 24.11.56; FO371/128057/VQ1051/34, Wriglit to Lloyd, 11.7.7. 
2DDF, 1956, III, 439.
3FO371/118850/JE1027/29(A), Bowker toFO, 6.12.56.
Turkey, Nuri and the Future of the Baghdad Pact
Turkey was determined to play up the importance of the Baghdad Pact, and since Turkish- 
Iraqi co-operation remained its cornerstone, providing firm support for Nuri was now 
essential.
The Suez war had come close to toppling Nuri, raising serious questions about the 
viability of his political strategy and giving his opponents an opportunity to accuse him of 
being "the friend and love" of imperialists and Zionists. The "whole" Iraqi population was 
reportedly "under the spell of Nasser," and saw "calamities," like the blowing up of the IPC 
pipeline and disturbances in urban areas, "as a just retribution on the Iraq Government for 
their failure to support" Egypt "to the hilt",4 "Almost without exception, the political figures 
(former Prime Ministers and Ministers) who have been out of office for the past two years" 
were reported to be exploiting the popular discontent to bring Nuri dow n.5 He was, 
immediately after the war, "on occasion in a minority of one in his own Cabinet," but, 
according to Ambassador Wright, "he put heart into his colleagues, into the Army, and into 
senior officials".^
An extraordinary informal meeting of the heads of government of the Middle Eastern 
members of the Baghdad Pact was held in Tehran to discuss the developments at Suez as 
hostilities were continuing. President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan, was scheduled to visit 
Tehran on October 31. Before leaving Karachi, he asked-without previously consulting the 
Shah-Menderes and Nuri to join him there. 7 Iran ultimately went along, realising that the
meeting could bolster her international image. The participants privately acknowledged that 
they would not have been unhappy had 'Abd al-Nasir been soundly defeated. They were 
angry, however, because the apparent collusion between their ally, Britain, and Israel would 
further harden then* task of strengthening the pact. ^
Nuri arrived in Tehran on November 4, demanding a recommendation toward the early 
restoration of Egypt's independence and territorial integrity; the early withdrawal of Israeli 
forces beliind the 1949 armistice line; and the immediate release of all Egyptian prisoners of 
war. Moreover, he asked for an agreement to work for a definitive solution of the Palestine 
problem. Nuri hoped that if the participants
4FO371/121238/V1054/142, Ionides to Jones, 24.11.56; FO371/121662/VQ1051/51, Wright to Lloyd,
7.12.56.
5FO371/121647/VQ1015/103, Wriglit to FO, 14.11.56.
6FO371/128057/VQ1051/34, Wright to Lloyd, 11.7.57.
7Kyle, Suez, 398-99.
8FO371/121265/V1073/385, Bowker to FO, 10.11.56; FO371/121648/VQ1022/17, Wright to FO, 
17.11.56; F0371/121223/V1022/2, Wright to FO, 21.11.56.
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took up a solid position at once on the issues involved, if possible together with Her 
Majesty’s Government but if not with which Her Majesty's Government would soon 
associate themselves, the Bagdad Pact would not only justify its continuance, but 
could make an important contribution to a Palestine settlement. In the process the 
position of Her Majesty's Government and her relations with the Arab world would be 
to a large extent restored. 9
Nuri was soon irritated, however, by finding out that Menderes would not, "on doctor's 
orders," be able to leave Ankara immediately. He turned up in Tehran only on November 7, 
saying he had been recovering from an attack of erysipelas. For Sir Roger Stevens, the UK 
ambassador in Tehran, however, the main reason behind this delay was probably Menderes's 
hope that "the course of events in Egypt would cool the ardour of his colleagues and make 
agreement easier on a declaration of policy which would not be offensive to" B r it a in .  10 
Indeed, in Ankara, Birgi told Bowker that Menderes "had very much in mind the necessity of 
avoiding giving the impression that the four pact members were ganging-up against the 
United Kingdom". 11
By November 7, all waning sides at Suez had abided by the UN cease-fire, and the mood 
in Tehran had somewhat eased. No longer were radical ideas, like effecting a temporary 
separation from Britain or forming an alternative organisation including Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia and the USA, being toyed with. 12 Menderes and the Shah strongly argued against 
excluding Britain, claiming that the pact would then become meaningless. 13 Menderes had 
brought his own draft and insisted on setting up a special drafting committee to have his own 
draft considered and incorporated. He fought against unfriendly references to Britain in the 
communique, only to find out "with amusement" on occasions that Stevens had already 
accepted something less favourable to his country. 14
The final communique-which had received Britain's prior consent-condemned, on 
November 8, Israel's aggression against Egypt and demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
her troops to the armistice line, together with the release of all Egyptian prisoners taken by 
her. It described the Anglo-French "intervention" as "regrettable" and called on both 
governments to withdraw their forces and respect frilly Egypt's independence. It hoped that
9FO371/121790/VR1091/650, Wright to FO, 6.11.56.
10FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 15.11.56.
11F0371/121788/VR1091/600, Bowker to FO, 3.11.56.
l 2FO371/121265/V1073/387, Stevens to FO, 10.11.56; F 0371/121266/VI073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 
15.11.56; FO371/121268/V1073/453, Stewart to Rose, 11.12.56.
13FO371/121265/V1073/385 & 385(A), Bowker to FO, 10 & 12 November 1956.
14FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 15.11.56; F0371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO,
16.11.56. For a detailed description of the meeting, based on minutes taken by Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, an 
Iraqi minister, see Heikal, Cutting, 216-23.
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UNEF would take up position in the fighting zone without delay, and suggested that the Suez 
Canal problem must be settled through negotiations with Egypt under UN auspices. 
Meanwhile, freedom of passage through the canal should be safeguarded, fully respecting 
Egyptian sovereignty. It also emphasised the urgency to solve the Palestine dispute, taking 
the 1947 UN partition resolution as a basis for negotiations. ^
All pact-members (including Britain) were relieved at this outcome. ^  Nuri had for the 
first time secured regional backing for the Arab position on Palestine, while Menderes 
probably viewed Turkey's new, more committed attitude vis-a-vis Palestine as a price worth 
paying to guarantee the pact's survival.
In the prevailing tense political atmosphere in Iraq, however, this communique was not 
enough. Hoping "to satisfy pressure for some action to be taken," Iraq broke off on 
November 9, diplomatic, and, a week later, economic, relations with France for the latter's 
alleged "continual interference in Arab affairs".^ Iraq did not cut off diplomatic relations 
with Britain, but decided unilaterally to exclude her representatives temporarily from future 
meetings of Baghdad Pact Council Deputies. This restriction would not apply to meetings of 
committees and sub-committees, nor affect the position of the British staff on the Pact 
Secretariat. This decision was taken without consulting Turkey, Pakistan or Iran. 19 
Ankara, however, regarded it as "a concession of form rather than substance to Arab public 
opinion and, therefore, not to be taken too tragically" and tolerated such measures 
temporarily to preserve Nuri's cabinet. Baghdad was informed, however, that Turkey did not 
regard herself as bound by this decision with which she in no way agreed.
Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian and Pakistani leaders held a second unofficial summit in Baghdad 
on November 19-23. Pakistani leaders were due to arrive there on a private visit on 
November 17, so Nuri welcomed Menderes's suggestion that he should join them, too. 
Menderes hoped to use the meeting to provide Nuri with continual encouragement and
15Kyle, Suez, 487. See full text in Noble Frankland(ed), Documents on International Affairs, 1956, 
(1959), 313-14.
*°Kyle, Suez, 488; FO371/121265/V1073/385, Bowker to FO, 10.11.56. Lloyd, for example, sent 
confidential individual messages of thanks to Nuri, Menderes and the Shah; see FO371/121266/V1073/392, 
Stevens toFO, 13.11.56.
l^FO371/121682/VQ1904/l & 3, Wright to FO, 9-10 November 1956.
18FO371/121265/V1073/387, Wright to FO, 9.11.56; F 0371/121682/VQ1904/2, Wright to FO, 9.11.56. 
Nuri also concentrated his verbal attacks on Israel and tried to show that her and Moscow's interests in the 
Middle East coincided. Moreover, Nuri sent a discreet message to 'Abd al-Nasir, proposing a private meeting 
to sort out their political differences; see Elie Podeh, "The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez 
Crisis", MES, 29/1 (January, 1993), 100. He also reportedly toyed with the idea of nationalising the IPC or at 
least of insisting upon the elimination of French participation; see FO371/128057/VQ1051/34, Wright to 
Lloyd, 11.7.57.
19FO371/121265/V1073/387, Wriglit to FO, 9.11.56.
^Soysal, Analysis, 40; FO371/121266/V1073/399, Bowker to FO, 14.11.56.
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support "to meet the difficulties of his present position without jettisoning the substance of 
his associations with the West".21 Iran's Foreign Minister arrived on November 19. Iraqi 
leaders were still under great internal pressure. Menderes and the Pakistanis tried hard to 
stiffen them. The Iraqis requested to go beyond the Tehran communique, and the new 
Baghdad communique of November 23, besides reaffirming the recommendations of Tehran, 
further endorsed the communique issued by the Arab Heads of State meeting in Beirut (13-15 
November 1956), which had demanded the implementation of the UN General Assembly 
recommendations and the dissociation of the Suez canal question from the circumstances of 
the aggression against Egypt. 22 The participants of the Baghdad meeting also sent President 
Mirza on a lightning visit to Riyadh, to win King Sa'ud's support for then declared fight 
against communism, and, then, to Lebanon to assure President Sham'un of then desire to 
provide him with any possible help and support. Menderes and Nmi also sent Sham'un 
separate messages of support.23 Britain was not invited again to the Baghdad meeting, but 
Wright was consulted before the publication of the communique. He was reassured that the 
pact would continue intact and that its committees would work on a five-power basis. It was 
requested, however, that no statements about those meetings should be disseminated by 
London-based news agencies or the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).24
During his stay in Baghdad, Menderes held on November 17 a long meeting with 'Abd al- 
Ilah and emphasised the dangers of changing Nuri's cabinet. Menderes also assembled at the 
Turkish embassy up to forty Iraqi political figures and members of the loyal opposition and 
warned against the dangers of trying to exploit the situation for then own personal or party
interests. 25
A third quadripartite meeting, scheduled for early December in Ankara, was called off in 
the last minute, because the governments involved thought that political tensions had 
somewhat eased, largely due to Washington's renewed interest in the fortunes of the Baghdad
Pact. 2 b
Turkey further attempted to placate Arab public opinion by taking a more pro-Arab stand 
than before during the annual session of the UN General Assembly. Al-Jamali, the head of the
21FO371/121648/VQl022/15, Bowker to FO, 15.11.56; ibid., -/16, Wriglit to FO, 17.11.56; F0371/ 
121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 16.11.56.
22See text of Baghdad communique in FO371/121648/VQ1022/22, Wriglit to FO, 23.11.56; of Beirut 
communique, iiiFrankland, Documents, 1956, 319-20; Chamoun, Crise, 311-13.
23FO371/121223/VQ1022/2-3, Wriglit to FO, 21.11.56.
24FO371/121266/V1073/397(A), CRO outward telegram, 13.11.56; FO371/121267/V1073/411, Wright 
to FO, 13.11.56.
25FO371/121223/V1022/ll, Stewart to Young, 29.11.56; FO371/121647/VQ1015/104, Bowker to FO,
17.11.56.
26FO371/12l267/V1073/420, Stevens to FO, 28.11.56; ibid., -/425(A) & 429, UK High Commissioner, 
Pakistan to CRO, 3-4 December 1956. See also infra.
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Iraqi delegation to the session, appreciated the fact that Turkey had, "for the first time," 
stood by and voted with the Arabs "in connexion with the aggression against Egypt, Algeria 
and the Arab refugees".27 Turkey's new stand toward Algeria, however, brought her into 
conflict with France. Birgi had to admit that Algeria had previously been an embarrassment 
for Turkey and that Ankara’s position had been re-examined in light of the evolving 
situation.^In  return, Nuri went out of his way during the next Pact Council meeting 
(Karachi, June 1957) to state Iraq's support for a settlement in Cyprus, safeguarding the 
constitutional and international rights of the Turkish civil population. 29
Moreover, since Turkey's regional allies had urged her, in Baghdad, to break off her 
diplomatic relations with Israel,3 0 Ankara recalled, on 26 November, its Minister, §efkati 
istinyeli, from Tel Aviv. Turkey declared that her Minister would not return until a "just and 
final solution" could be found to the Palestine question. She also refused to receive any 
successor to the outgoing Israeli Minister in Ankara, who had already completed his of tour 
of duty. Israel was privatey told, however, that Istinyeli's recall did not mean breaking off 
relations with Israel. The reduction in the level of diplomatic representation was not an 
unfriendly gesture, but simply a device to strengthen the Baghdad Pact. Turkey would like to 
maintain friendly relations and commercial ties with Israel. The Turkish legation in Israel 
continued to function normally, with the counsellor acting as charge d'affaires. The first 
secretary of the Israeli legation in Ankara, in turn, also took over as charge. 31 Unconfirmed 
news-agency reports claimed that Menderes had even considered severing formal diplomatic 
relations. His Minister for Trade and Economy, Zayyat Mandalinci, had pointed out, 
however, that this kind of rupture might adversely affect the normal development of Turkish- 
Israeli commercial and economic relations. 3 2
Another sign of Turkey's increasing reluctance to be identified with Israel was the report 
in the Israeli newspaper ha-Arez of 9 January 1957, that acting Foreign Minister Ethem 
Menderes had vetoed a proposed visit to Israel by Turkey's Defence Minister to increase 
bilateral military co-operation, for Turkish military experts had highly praised Israel's military 
capacity during the Sinai campaign.33
ismet Inonii, the leader of the main opposition RPP, had been annoyed at not being 
consulted by the government during the Suez war. Not wishing to see Ankara involved in the
27FO371/128044/VQ1022/4, Wright to FO, 18.3.57.
2%DDF, 1957,1, 304, 547.
29FO371/127828/VB1072/121, Lloyd to FO, 3.6.57.
30FO371/121266/V1073/397(B), CRO outward telegram, 26.11.56.
3 ^ Reeva S. Simon(ed.), The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor o f J. C. Hurewitz (1990), 
356; Soy sal, Analysis, 40; Gruen, Turkey, 358-59; Kurk^uoglu, Tiirkiye'nin Politikasi, 100.
32Gruen, Turkey, 342.
33Cited ibid., 369.
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Arab-Israeli conflict, lie disapproved of Turkey's endorsement of the Beirut communique and 
disliked Istinyeli's recall.34 The RPP parliamentary group declared on December 1 that 
Turkey's endorsement of the Beirut communique represented a new commitment "which the 
government has no authority to undertake".33 From then on, the RPP attacked the pact for 
contributing to regional instability. Its newspaper, Yeni Ulus, criticised Western powers for 
trying ineffectively to use it simultaneously both as a regional defence shield against Soviet 
expansionism and as an instrument to settle regional disputes.36 The other opposition parties, 
the Republican Nation Party and the Freedom Party (an offshoot of the ruling DP), also 
criticised Istinyeli's recall. The fortnightly review, Forum, argued that "if a war were to break 
out in the Middle East tomorrow, the Israeli army would be the only serious force capable of 
fighting on our side; its value is greater than the combined value of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and 
other Arab armies". Although Turkey, suggested Forum, should support the Arabs wherever 
then claims were justified, such as in Algeria and over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
Company, "in our actions we should not try to play up to the Arabs, but to serve as an 
example to them. Otherwise the Baghdad Pact will never succeed in solving the problems of 
the Middle East".37
Israel was disturbed by this apparent shift in Turkey's official attitude, fearing that the 
Baghdad Pact might eventually become a vehicle of anti-Israeli propaganda. She even 
suspected that Iraq might try to impose, through the pact, some kind of embargo on supplies 
to Israel.3**
The extent to which these measures strengthened Nuri's powerbase at home is, of course, 
open to conjecture. Some suggest that Nmi survived only because of Washington's 
"independent stand" during the Suez w a r .39 More plausible seems the explanation that Iraq 
was passing then through relatively prosperous times, and there was no gross economic 
discontent for Nuri's opponents to exploit. The army and security forces remained loyal. 
Disturbances were confined within the narrow circle of students and pan-Arab nationalists, 
and Nmi remained sufficiently powerful to have some prominent radical opposition 
politicians jailed.40 was 011jy ju February, however, that he "felt strong enough to agree to
■^Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin Ismet Pa$a'h YU lari 1944-1973. Book III: DP Yokug A$agi 1954-1957 
(1991), 219-20.
^Gruen, Turkey, 343-44.
36lvo J, Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War JJ 
Era (1974), 38; FO371/121267/V1073/410, Bowker toFO, 13,11,56.
■^Quoted in Laqueur, Transition, 190-91.
38F0371/127815/VB10353/1(A), FO to Karachi, 4.6.57.
3 ^ Decker, Policy, 213.
^Fernea and Louis, Revolution, 45; Saad, Iraq, 56; al-'Akam, Ta'rikh, 185; al-Takriti, Al-Wasi, 147; 
FO371/121647/VQ1015/103, Wriglit to FO, 14.11.56; FO371/121662/VQ1051/51, Wriglit to Lloyd, 7.12.56; 
FO371/128057/VQ1051/34, Wriglit to Lloyd, 11.7.57.
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the unobtrusive resumption of work in the Pact Committees with British p a r t i c i p a t i o n , " 4 1  
while martial law was lifted only on 28 May 1957.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
The Suez debacle precipitated renewed Baghdad Pact activity to secure Washington's 
adherence. Turkey's role in this respect was again pivotal, for the satisfaction she had 
received from the Tehran Pact Council meeting (April 1956) had, as anticipated, long 
evaporated, making her return to the familiar tune of the necessity of expanding the pact- 
membership and bringing in the USA.
Turkish officials had continued, throughout the summer of 1956, to emphasise informally 
to their allies the importance of US adherence.42 in August, Birgi told Dulles that American 
membership would best guarantee Israel against further Arab aggression, since no Arab pact- 
member would then dare move against Israel.43 Qn another occasion, he claimed that "the 
Israeli Ambassador was known to have advocated United States membership of the Pact on 
two occasions recently".44 Turkish official circles again aired complaints that the pact was 
"in the doldrums"; it had "no influence over vital issues"; it was being "clearly ... 
overshadowed by other developments" and failing to "provide an alternative policy" for 
Egypt's allies "if indeed they decided to detach themselves" from her.45 Finally, on November 
1, in a most significant and unprecedented gesture, Bayar frankly called in public for full US 
membership.4b The American ambassador in Ankara, Fletcher Warren, formally 
recommended, in early October, to his government to accede immediately to the pact or, at 
least, grant further substantial economic and military aid to its members as evidence of 
continuing American support. He thought that "Turkey's confidence in America's 
determination to defend Western interests in the Middle East has been so much shaken during 
the last few weeks, that some spectacular gesture was necessary to restore it".4?
Although demands that Washington should join "at once" and also "step up economic and 
military aid, particularly to Iran and Pakistan" were not incorporated into the Tehran 
communique, the participants frankly told Britain that these were, in addition to solving the
41FO371/128057/VQ1051/34, Wright to Lloyd, 11.7.57.
42FO371/119088/JE14211/326G, FO to Bagdad, 31.7.56; F0371/119144/JE14211/999, Menderes to 
Dulles, 15.8.56.
43FO371/121274/V1075/153, Stewart to Beeley, 13.12.56.
44F0371/124021/RK1052/6, FO minute by Hope, 25.8.56. Birgi's assertion seems to be totally 
unfounded. This author has detected no noticeable change in Israel's hostility to the pact throughout the 
period under discussion.
45FO371/121263/V1073/340, FO minute by Brimelow, 27.9.56; ibid., -/348G, Rose to Wright, 10.10.56.
4<% 0371/124001/RK1016/43, Bowker to Lloyd, 6.11.56.
47FO371/121274/V1075/129, Stewart to Rose, 9.10.56.
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Palestine question, "essential" for the survival of pro-Western regimes in the area.48 The 
Baghdad meeting went further and decided to make two foimal and urgent requests for 
American adherance, first, through the US ambassador in Baghdad and, then, by sending 
Prince 'Abd al-Ilah to Washington. The Turks were not happy about the choice of 'Abd al- 
Hah, but claimed that "they were faced with a fait accompli" on then arrival in Baghdad. 49
The Eisenhower administration realised, too, that the post-Suez situation could, if left 
unchecked, ultimately strengthen Soviet influence in the area and constitute a severe-possibly 
fatal-strategic and economic blow to Western interests. With British influence in the area 
having received a severe setback, Washington understood that it should now be more active 
in defending those interests. It soon warned Arab countries that close ties with Moscow and 
the flow of Soviet aims posed "the greatest threat to the Middle East".50 Washington still 
desired, however, to "stay clear of Arab and Israeli politics now incident to Iraq's membership 
in the Baghdad Pact"51 and thought that Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon were exaggerating the 
existing Soviet threat.
This assumption was, of course, not entirely unfoimded. On many occasions in the past, 
the above-mentioned powers, Turkey in particular, had used all means possible to induce 
Washington into a deeper involvement in the area. Now, however, the Turkish worries 
seemed to some observers to be more sincere than previously. Reported Bowker: "Turkish 
neives are strong and there is no sign of panic. But for the first time since my arrival" in 
Ankara in 1954 "I sense a very real feeling of anxiety over Turkey's position and an 
instinctive turning to Turkey's British, and particularly American, allies for moral and material 
support, for once devoid of any tendency to exploit the situation for Turkey's own
advantage". 52
With deliberations still continuing in Washington, the State Department published on 
November 29 a statement to demonstrate America's support to the Baghdad Pact, and 
especially to Iraq and Iran, with whom she had no foimal treaties of alliance. It praised the 
role played recently by Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and warned that Washington would 
view with utmost gravity any threat to then territorial integrity or political independence. 5 3
All main Turkish newspapers greeted the statement. 54 Menderes, however, found 
Washington's attitude of "observation rather than action" very disappointing.55 Birgi opined
48FO371/121265/V1073/385, Bowker to FO, 10.11.56.
49FO371/121282/V1079/8G, CRO outward telegram, 22.11.56; FO371/121268/V1073/445, Stewart to 
Rose, 7,12.56.
50Torrey, Syrian Politics, 337; FO371/121869/VY10345/3-4.
5 lFRUS 1955-1957, XII, 331.
52FO371/121801/VR1091/957, Bowker to FO, 16.11.56.
5^See full statement in Frankland, Documents, 1956, 319-20.
54F0371/121223/V1022/9, Stewart to FO, 1.12.56.
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that Washington still hoped to reach some sort of modus vivendi with Egypt and refrained 
from joining the pact not to hinder such an eventual arrangement.^
Every US ambassador in the region, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff', were 
supporting US adherence. A hard core of opposition remained, however, at the top of the 
State Department, still seeing Israel as an obstacle. Eisenhower was against, too, because "if 
the British get us into the Baghdad Pact-as the matter would appear to the Arabs-we would 
lose our influence with the Arabs".57 j/]ie Congressional recess made the declining of the
membership invitation easier.58 Iraq, too, opposed US adherence if that meant a 
simultaneous security guarantee to Israel, while Turkey disliked the idea of a broader, 
alternative pact with a wider Arab membership. Dulles even suggested at some stage that Iran 
might join SEATO, so that "there would be a solid United States guaranteed line from 
Tiukey to Pakistan," giving Iraq automatic protection against any Soviet invasion.59 Finally, 
the administration decided to seek congressional authorisation for the President to take, if 
necessary, stronger action to support pro-Westem forces in the area. 60 Dulles thus hoped to 
signal that Washington would fight to defend its interests in the Middle East and pave the 
way for Washington's participation in the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.61 This 
proposal, however, reportedly generated little enthusiasm in the State Department other than 
with Dulles and his confidantes. 62 American diplomats in Arab capitals were bitter about it 
and opposed it almost unanimously.
This new initiative, the Eisenhower Doctrine, was presented to Congress on 5 January 
1957. The President stated that a political "vacuum" had arisen in the Middle East. 
Washington must now make more evident its willingness to support the sovereignty of 
Middle Eastern states against the threat posed by "international communism". He asked for 
authorisation to employ, upon request and whenever necessary, American forces to secure 
and protect then integrity and independence against overt, armed aggression from any power 
controlled by "international communism," as well as to undertake programs of military aid 
and economic co-operation to strengthen countries, whose independence was threatened.
55FO371/121223/V1022/ll, Stewart to Young, 29.11.56.
56po37i/i21274/V 1075/153, Stewart to Beeley, 13.12.56. Stewart also reports the existence of another, 
albeit less influential, school of thought within the Turkish Foreign Ministry, probably at its lower levels, that 
opposed Washington's adherence, arguing that once it joined, further Arab accessions would only weaken the 
pact by complicating its machinery and widening the area of its responsibility.
5 ' Aston, "Highjacking", 136.
58FO371/121230/V10345/5, CacciatoFO, 1.12.56.
59FRUS 1955-1957, XII, 331.
^Fernea and Louis, Revolution, 87-88; Axelgard, Policy, 190-92.
61F0371/121230/V10345/10G, CacciatoFO, 29.12.56.
^Copeland, Game, 191.
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The doctrine-formulated and proclaimed without consulting London-specifically 
mentioned only aimed aggression and said nothing about subversion. American leaders 
hoped, however, that it could achieve a broad "umbrella,,r and threats, like subversion, would 
also be effectively deterred. The doctrine was designed to bolster the confidence of pro- 
Westem Middle Eastern governments by eliminating then fear of overt attack by 
"international communism" and offering economic assistance that would allow them to fight 
subversion by building up their internal security forces and improving their economies. It 
soon became clear, however, that the doctrine had its shortcomings, too. It was designed as 
merely one aspect of Washington's global Cold War strategy, ignoring ciucial regional 
considerations, which quickly reduced its newly-acquired popularity among certain Arab 
nationalists, damaged its ability to deal creatively with the region's problems and exacerbated 
tensions at the heart of Middle Eastern instabilities. It did not touch the topic of the surge of 
radical pan-Arab nationalism in the region and the reasons behind the atmosphere of intense 
suspicion-if not outright hatred-of the West. It did not specify when and how a government, 
particularly in Syria and Egypt, could be branded as being under "international communist" 
control, and was powerless to deter the USSR from giving military and/or economic 
assistance to governments in the region or to supply inducements to the latter to stop seeking 
closer relations with Moscow. Egypt and Syria, where Soviet penetration was deepest, were 
unlikely to request US aid, while the main threat to pro-Western governments, like in Jordan 
and Lebanon, came not directly from Moscow, but from radical pan-Arab nationalists, 
personified by 'Abd al-Nasir. The doctrine also ignored the Arab-Israeli dispute, some say on 
purpose, in the vain hope of diverting the attention of Israel and conservative Arab regimes 
from what divided them to then presumed common enemy. 63 These shortcomings would 
seriously hamper the doctrine's smooth implementation and give rise to serious differences of 
interpretation between Washington and its regional friends.
Despite these inconsistenceies, however, the doctrine was approved by Congress, and, in 
March 1957, Ambassador James P. Richards embarked on a long Middle Eastern tom, 
visiting, inter alia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, but not Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan. He explained that the doctrine was not intended to replace the Baghdad 
Pact. Washington simply believed that it was better to help the pact, and other Middle 
Eastern states outside it, rather than join it.64 Moreover, Washington would now accept an 
invitation to join the pact's Military Committee,65 a formality duly completed during the
63Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deten'ence in American Policy: Theory and Practice 
(1974), 317-37; Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (1981), 91-92; DeConde, American Foreign 
Policy, II, 292; Gaddis, Strategies, 180; Troen and Shemesh, Suez-Sinai Crisis, 251,
64FO371/127742/V10345/105, Bowker to FO, 23.3.57.
65FO371/127814/VB10345/23, Beeley to Stevens, 6.4.57.
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Karachi Pact Council meeting in June 1957. The USA made clear, however, that its 
participation was "related solely to the Communist menace and carries no connotations with 
respect to intra-area matters".66 A total amount of $200m in aid was distributed to some of 
Washington's clients in the area, $12.57m being earmarked towards several joint projects of 
regional character considered by the Baghdad Pact Economic Committee. Iraq and Turkey 
got further individual grants as well. 67
Both Iraq and Turkey (including the opposition RPP) welcomed the doctrine and the 
Richards tour. 6 & Although the doctrine fell short of formal US membership, it was certainly 
an improvement over the previous American position insofar as it declared unequivocally her 
intentions vis-a-vis the USSR. Washington was now, they reasoned, to all intents and 
purposes, a pact-member. Furthermore, the American president would, henceforward, enjoy 
greater freedom in extending already appropriated funds for military and economic aid in the 
area. This attitude was publicly endorsed during yet another quadripartite summit of the 
regional members of the Baghdad Pact held in Ankara on 19-20 January 1957.69 Behind-the- 
scenes, however, the Western powers were intimated that they "still hoped that America 
would join the Baghdad Pact since her failure to do so strengthened the opposition to
Besides Iraq, Libya and Lebanon were the only Arab countries officially to endorse the 
doctrine. Egypt, Syria and anti-Western elements in the Middle East in general interpreted it 
as a new American effort to ensnare the Arabs in a neo-colonialist embrace.
The exact Saudi attitude towards the doctrine remained initially unclear, although the 
USA was trying hard at the time to bolster King Sa'ud's pan-Arab image as a potential rival to 
Abd al-Nasir. Washington also attempted to bury the hatchet between Baghdad and Riyadh. 
Nuri had, in the past few years, repeatedly accused Riyadh, in private, of indulging in bribery 
to bolster 'Abd al-Nasir's position in the Fertile Crescent and had naively asked Washington 
to find some means to cut off, or threaten to cut off, the flow of American petro-dollars into 
Saudi Arabia. A certain Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement, however, had been evident since the
66]3urke, Pakistan, 171.
67Axelgard, Policy, 218; FO371/127742/V10345/104, Bowker to FO, 23.3.57; FO371/127743/V10345/ 
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F0371/ 115532/V1073/1342, Record of restricted session of Baghdad Pact Council meeting, 22.11.55.
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summer.72 prince 'Abd al-Hali's American visit oil February 4-17 provided an opportunity to 
take yet another step in that direction, as it coincided with an official visit by King Sa'ud. The 
Americans had invited the latter to impress on him and bring him fully into the Western camp. 
'Abd al-Hah and Sa'ud had two friendly meetings in Washington on February 6-7.
'Abd al-Hah's visit, first proposed in November, had been postponed due to initial 
American reluctance to receive him immediately. 73 The Ankara meeting recommended that 
he should urge in particular that the Eisenhower Doctrine should not exclude American pact- 
membership and that the doctrine should, as far as possible, be channelled through the pact. 
He was also to ask that no aid should be given to Egypt and Syria and request full American 
support for the pact's planned collective, large-scale counter-propaganda campaign in the 
Middle East.74 jn the end, however, 'Abd al-Hah did not get any immediate promise for US 
adherence, nor any fresh promises of arms. He was told that Washington must keep a balance 
of arms deliveries not only between Israel and the Arabs, but between the Arabs 
themselves.75 The Americans, however, thought that the Iraqi delegation had "sensed that 
there was goodwill" and "were optimistic about future prospects". Robert B. Memminger, 
the State Department Special Assistant for Baghdad Pact Affairs, who had attended 'Abd al- 
Ilah's meeting with Bill Rountree, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and 
Africa, said that
the Crown Prince had produced a short list of subjects, but had then harped on 
Palestine for an horn, leaving only time for a brief and desultory discussion of other 
subjects, among which were Algeria and Jordan. Nothing new emerged. He had 
barely mentioned the Baghdad Pact, and Rountree had found himself making what 
nrnning there was on this question... Although the Iraqis had inevitably brought up 
the question of United States membership of the Pact, he thought they now 
understood the United States Government's reasoning on this matter.76
'Abd al-Hah also asked Washington to put-with its NATO allies-political and economic 
pressure on Syria to force her to repair the IPC pipelines.77 On his way back, he stopped in 
Turkey and Iran to brief them on his visit. 78
72podeh, "Struggle", 94-95; FO371/121264/V1073/351, 'Record of Meeting of Representatives of 
Bagdad Pact Powers', 4.10.56.
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During his meetings with Sa'ud, 'Abd al-Hah did not ask Riyadh to join the Baghdad Pact, 
but was at pains to explain elaborately its anti-Communist and defensive character. He hoped 
that Sa'ud "would henceforward view the Pact with a more benevolent eye" and that "an 
atmosphere had been created which could be conducive to further meetings between the 
members of the Royal H o u s e s " . H e  did not expect, however, "any early and spectacular 
change in the Ring's attitude," for the latter seemed to believe that communism "had not 
taken substantial root in the Middle E ast".^  The Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement was crowned 
with Sa'ud's visit to Baghdad in May.**l
Ankara welcomed all efforts to woo Sa'ud away from Egypt and wanted to assist 
Washington and Baghdad to that effect. It did not make any direct representation to 
Damascus to obtain a commutation of the death sentences passed against the arrested 
plotters, fearing that it could be counter-productive, but believed, like Washington, that 
Sa'ud's intervention to that effect had proven decisive.^2 There was talk of Bayar visiting 
Saudi Arabia. Menderes, too, expressed readiness to go if it would be of use. ^  Moreover, 
Ankara welcomed ‘Abd al-Dah’s proposal to send a Turkish delegation to Saudi Arabia under 
the guise of pilgrimage. It was to be headed by Ahmed Saleh Koror, the Secretary-General of 
the Prime Minister's office, but the visit was later cancelled by Turkey at the last moment 
without any explanation.*^
Turkish-Syrian Relations after the Suez War 
Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated further soon after the Suez war. The Turkish 
embassy in Damascus had been regularly reporting, throughout the previous months, about 
an alarming increase in the activities there of Eastern Bloc missions. Ankara deduced that 
Moscow had shifted its attention from Egypt to Syria, a conviction solidified after the 
cease-fire at Suez. The embassy now reported that al-Quwath had received promises of arms 
during his Moscow visit, and Syria was, in turn, telling other Arab states that she could now
79FO371/128052/VQ10345/l, Bailey to Rose, 13.2.57.
80FO371/128051/VQ10344/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 8.3.57.
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85FO371/130184/RK10325/2-3, Bowker to Riches, 21 June & 10 July 1957.
8(% 0371/121867/VY10338/8, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 26.9.56.
160
ass on to them Soviet arms in return for their olitical su o r t.^  Turkey told her Western 
allies that Moscow "might, if need be, press matters to the point of creating undeclared and 
local warfare in the Middle East".^  Cumhuriyet reported that the amount of Soviet goods 
passing through the Turkish straits in the first three months of 1957 had doubled compared 
with the same period the previous year. Over than 70% of those Soviet ships had sailed to 
Middle Eastern ports, notably in Egypt and Syria.^ The paper also reported that the Syrian 
government were collecting signatures in favour of the return of the sanjak of Alexandretta to 
Syria and that Syrian army intelligence officers were boasting that the region would be re­
annexed to Syria "with the help of our great Russian ally". 90
Reports received in Ankara about the actual quantity of Soviet arms and planes delivered 
to Syria, and the number of Soviet technicians actually working there, were contradictory. 
The sense of alarm they created in Turkey was, however, extreme. 91 The Turkish ah attache 
in Moscow, for example, believed that if the USA did not join the pact, Moscow would try 
and destroy it by engineering a military coup in Iraq through Syrian intervention. He alleged 
to his British colleague that in a secret defence treaty signed on November 9, the Soviets had 
undertaken to strengthen the Syrian army, particularly the ah force, and support Syria's 
territorial claims against Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and Tuikey. They had also promised to 
arrange, in the initial stages of a Syrian invasion of Iraq, appropriate diversions elsewhere to 
keep Washington occupied. British diplomats in Moscow refused to believe these allegations, 
but a certain degree of official Turkish panic was u n d e n i a b l e .92
This panic had probably been exacerbated by the influx into Turkey of many Syrian right- 
wing politicians and officers implicated in the failed c o u p .93 Ankara accepted them on a 
short-term basis on the definite understanding that they would not engage in any political 
subversive activities while in Turkey.94 Menderes even intervened personally to re-establish 
the rights of Mikha'il Hyan over some of his confiscated property in liatay.95
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"The danger presented by Egypt," claimed Menderes, "had now, as a result of the Anglo- 
French intervention, been delayed for a year or six months, and that the focus had now 
shifted to Syria, the central point of the area". Syria "was now becoming a Russian satellite". 
"The Russians could now build up their position" there "whenever they wished to". If left 
unchecked, this could have an adverse effect on pro-Western elements in Lebanon and 
Jordan, and Turkey could, in future, have a group of Soviet-controlled satellites on her 
southern borders. ^ 6 This was a prospect Ankara dreaded most. It was specifically to avoid 
this that it had gone along with the "Northern Tier" scheme.
There was no unanimity, however, among Turkish leaders, on how to tackle the situation. 
For Bayar, "in Syria it was necessary to encourage the people against their leaders". 97 Rural, 
however, argued emphatically that this tactic would fail. Power in Syria was concentrated in 
the hands of al-Sarraj and a few other dedicated left-wingers in key positions. They 
controlled the army and administration and were too strong for the "increasingly anxious and 
discouraged" Nationalist/Populist opposition. The Syrian crowds, "which had been 
systematically indoctrinated through the radio," could "be whipped up at any moment". For 
Rural, "the long term solution was that Syria should be merged with Iraq and possibly 
Jordan". Unless Iraq intervened and helped in establishing a pro-Western dictatorship, any 
internal coup, without outside assistance, "would almost certainly be followed by a counter 
coup resulting in a further elimination of the more moderate elements". An Iraqi intervention, 
thought Rural, could count on the support of certain tribes and some army units.^ Rural's 
change of heart was really significant, for he had previously categorically opposed all kinds of 
foreign intervention. His suggestion, however, did not excite the Turkish leadership. The 
USA, Britain, France, Iraq and Lebanon, too, were worried about the increasing Soviet 
influence in Syria. 99 But, as before, there were in disagreemnt on what measures to take, if 
any. The best the West could hope for, admitted Birgi, was to make the dangerous situation 
in Syria relatively harmless. i "
Ankara proposed that the question of Soviet penetration in Syria and the consequent 
threat to Lebanon might be brought before the UN. Britain, however, discouraged this 
suggestion, for it was "hard to see any attempt to initiate a debate on the subject could end
96FO371/121223/V1022/ll, Stewart to Young, 29.11.56; F0371/121373/V11910/17, Chancery, Ankara 
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otherwise than failure," as it would be difficult to demonstrate that what was going on in 
Syria contravened the UN Charter in any way or that the UN was competent to discuss such 
a situation. Ankara was also discouraged by Sham'un's reluctance to take the matter to the 
UN. hi the end, it agreed to Britain's suggestion to discuss the situation in the NATO 
Council. Menderes and Birgi, however, wanted to keep any such proceedings on a "call 
attention and for information" basis and not allow it to develop into inappropriate and 
premature discussions on any NATO action or into equally inappropriate juridical 
discussions. 101
Addressing a NATO Council meeting on November 28, the acting Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Ethem Menderes, said that the Syrian government was dominated by the Deuxieme 
Bureau, headed by al-Sarraj, "version syrienne de Nasser". He accused Damascus of 
engineering disturbances in Lebanon and encouraging separatism in Trip oh. Ankara was 
convinced, he said, that underestimating the gravity of the situation could be fatal. 102 jje 
most carefully eschewed, however, any proposals for military action, hi the end, the Turkish 
delegation undertook to prepare, in good time, a paper on this subject for the NATO 
ministerial meeting. NATO's Standing Group, in turn, agreed to prepare an assessment of the 
threat to NATO's flank in the Middle East, as well as of the strength of Soviet aims supplied 
to Middle Eastern countries in excess of then normal requirements. 103 Then, during the 
NATO ministerial meeting of December 11, Turkey proposed that the Middle Eastern 
situation should be subject to continual study in the NATO Council; that NATO military 
organs should study its implications; and that member-countries establish a political attitude 
and interest in the matter. Had the Syrian situation aggravated further, Turkey's next 
objective would have been to pursue with moderation and discretion her long-cherished 
dream of establishing a suitable political/military link between NATO and the Baghdad 
Pact.104
Ankara also directly protested to Syria, on November 15, against the activities of her 
Consul in Istanbul, who was allegedly putting out reports of the arrival in Syria of large 
quantities of Soviet arms. 1^5 Birgi also proposed that Syria should undertake to publish, as a 
gesture of goodwill, all Turkish denials of official Syrian statements alleging Turkish 
interference in Syrian affairs, and stop attacking the Baghdad Pact and its individual
101FO371/121867/VY10338/21G; ibid., -/26G, FO to Ankara, 24.11.56.
102See full speech in FO371/121867/VY10338/30, Steel to Lloyd, 28.11.56.
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members, particularly Britain. Although Syria formally gave the assurances requested, Birgi 
thought that no importance could be attached to them and no change should be expected in 
Syrian policy. 106 Syria, in turn, resumed its accusations of Turkish violations of her airspace, 
hostile propaganda, tendentious rumours, and conspiracy-together with France, Britain, 
Israel and Iraq-against her security. On December 1, she complained to the UN to that effect. 
These charges were echoed by the radios in Cairo and Moscow. 107 Turkey, of course, 
denied them c a t e g o r i c a l l y .  108 November 30, the Turkish Ministry of Defence stated that 
Turkish army manoeuvres were r o u t i n e ,  109 a n d  later denied press allegations that Turkey 
had sent two battalions of troops to Iraq at Nuri’s request. 110
Tehran was so worried at the escalation of tension that the Iranian ambassador in Ankara 
sought and received from Menderes and Birgi assurances that Turkey would not intervene 
militarily in Syria. Menderes added that, as far as he knew, Iraq, too, did not have any 
aggressive intention. 111
In this tense atmosphere, Turkey planned to tighten up control on her border with Syria 
for the declared aim of preventing smuggling. Bayar believed that the contraband over 
Turkish frontier was being encouraged by the Syrian government and having a serious effect 
on the^Synan balance of payments. 112 Ankara wanted to establish, along the entire ffontier, a
security zone, 12.5-25 km wide. None of its inhabitants would be allowed to hold stocks of 
merchandise beyond those considered necessary for his/her own maintenance. A road would 
be constructed along the whole frontier to facilitate its control. In addition, Ankara would 
establish a 500m wide "no-man's land" on the frontier, the population of which would be 
moved out, their possessions expropriated and the area mined. Such measures would have 
further aggravated bilateral relations because a lot of the land to be expropriated belonged to 
Syrian citizens. 113 There is no evidence, however, that they were fully implemented.
Turkey and the Events in Jordan 
The Eisenhower Doctrine brought into the open cracks that already existed covertly within 
the post-Suez Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian-Jordanian alliance. Syria and Egypt vehemently 
opposed the doctrine. Jordan and Saudi Arabia joined them in early condemnation, but soon
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changed their attitude. For King Sa'ud, his visit to Washington was a watershed. From then 
on, relations deteriorated between Riyadh and Damascus in particular. **4 Riyadh closed its 
embassy in Damascus and cut off all economic links with Syria until all attacks on the King 
ceased in the Syrian press. It also pressed Damascus to repay its outstanding $30m debt. 
Diplomatic relations were not severed, however.
The political crisis in Jordan in April 1957 crystallised the new divisions in the Arab 
world. After Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia had failed to fulfill then promise to replace the 
British subsidy to the Jordanian army, King Husayn seriously disagreed with the policies of 
Sulayman al-Nabulsi's radical pan-Arab nationalist government that had come to power in 
October 1956. Husayn gradually became convinced that al-Nabulsi and COS 'Ah Abu Nuwar 
were, in collusion with Egypt and Syria, plotting to depose him and set up a republic. Having 
seemed the backing of his Bedouin troops, he therefore sacked al-Nabulsi, banned all political 
parties and proclaimed martial law. Abu Nuwar sought refuge in Syria. Husayn re-assumed 
full control of Jordan's foreign policy and re-established good ties with the Western camp. * *6
During those tense days, when the balance of forces in Jordan could have tilted either 
way, the support King Husayn received from Riyadh and Washington proved decisive. Sa'ud 
put his forces, stationed in Jordan, under Husayn's direct command and sent immediate 
financial assistance. Washington, in turn, stated that Jordan's independence and integrity were 
vital to its security; donated $10m in emergency aid; and dispatched, as a gesture of public 
support, the Sixth Fleet into the Eastern Mediterranean, where it remained until early May, 
when Husayn's position seemed no longer to be in danger. Baghdad, however, blamed 
Husayn for having senselessly gone too far in co-operating with Egypt and Syria, refused to 
lend financial support and confined itself to concentrating some troops along the Jordanian
border. **7
The role, if any, played by Turkey during this crisis remains shrouded in mystery due to 
lack of access to first-hand documentary evidence. There were reports of considerable 
Turkish troop concentrations along the Syrian border and that the Fifth Armoured Brigade of 
the Second Turkish Army Coips had been moved there from Ankara. Some Turkish Foreign 
Ministry officials, the Commander of the Second Turkish Army, General Rii§tu Erdelhun, and 
Jordan's ambassador told British diplomats in Ankara that the troop movements were related 
to events in Jordan and had Washington's approval. "Persons closely connected with the
H^Petran, Syria, 118-19; alJ Azm, Mudhakkarat, II, 490-93, 506.
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[Turkish] Government" were quoted in The New York Times as saying that the moves were 
made to give "the Syrians something to think about beside Jordan". Bowker, however, 
tended to agree with those Turkish officials and the US military attache in Ankara, who 
claimed that the movements had no political implications and that it was usual for the Turkish 
army to cany out regular seasonal exercises in April and May. 1 1 ^  Several Turkish 
newspapers had also interpreted the movements as a measure of support for Husayn against 
possible Syrian intervention. 119 The Turkish government did not make any statement on this 
subject. Al-Bitar, however, declared, that on the basis of explanations received from Kural, 
his government believed that the movements were normal seasonal exercises. 120
Al-Quwatli invited the Heads of Foreign Missions in Damascus on a conducted tour 
along the Turkish-Syrian frontier, in company of the Syrian COS, Tawfiq Nizam al-Din. The 
Turkish charge d'affaires was instructed to take part. 121 According to Turkish sources,
at one point near the frontier the President said to the Charge d'Affaires that if they 
could look into Turkey they might see something interesting. The Charge d'Affaires 
promptly invited him to go over the border, but the President smilingly declined the 
invitation. 122
Moreover, Bowker gathered, from Turkish officials, that Ankara had even dissuaded 
Baghdad from making any statement about its troop concentrations on the Jordan border. 123 
Whether Ankara ever contemplated sending troops into Syria during the crisis is 
uncertain. Any intention to do so was not put to the test. Syria herself made no attempt to 
intervene in Jordan. Whether she, together with Egypt, disregarded the signs of impending 
change in Amman or was persuaded by 'Abd al-Nasir personally to keep a low profile is also 
difficult to tell. 124 Soon, however, Jordan politely requested the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from her territory and then expelled two Egyptian diplomats, accusing them of interfering in 
her internal affairs. Ambassadors were withdrawn from both Cairo and Amman. 125 Mutual 
recriminations in the officially guided media of Damascus and Amman continued in frill swing 
throughout the summer to the extent of being labelled as "the Syrian-Jordanian crisis".
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Menderes had, at the end of March, already expressed confidence that "the situation in 
the Middle East was steadily improving". He now probably felt even more pleased. The pro- 
Westem Arab regimes in the area and the Baghdad Pact had, for the time being at least, 
survived. There was renewed co-operation between Britain and the USA, and contacts had 
been established with Riyadh. Moreover, it was agreed to hold the next Baghdad Pact 
Council meeting in Karachi in June. 126
The events in Jordan, however, had simply been a single episode in what was coming to 
be seen as a struggle between the conservative, pro-Westem governments and then 
opponents-the anti-Baghdad pact coalition of radicals, pan-Arab nationalists and 
Communists-led by 'Abd al-Nasir. Husayn's victory had solved none of the region's existing 
contradictions. Kural feared that the developments in Jordan "would give another opportunity 
to" the present Syrian regime "to make telling use of then ciy that Syria's national existence 
was threatened by foreign intervention" and thus tiy to strengthen its home base further. 127 
Events in the following few months showed that the prudent Kural was right again in his 
cautious attitude. 'Abd al-Nasir had spent the few months following the Suez war rebuilding 
his forces and international standing. Soon after Israel's total withdrawal from Gaza, he began 
to capitalise on the political victory he had achieved.
126FO371/127755/V1075/10, Bowker to FO, 29.3.57. 
127FO371/128222/VY1015/58, Bowker to Watson, 3.5.57.
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8“Perhaps the Gravest Crisis since the War...”
Developments in Syria in August 1957 ignited an acute regional political crisis, sucking in all 
major political powers within the Middle East and outside. Global Cold War concerns, 
regional paiticulaiist interests and internal political pressures within the countries involved 
became dramatically intertwined, perhaps, as never before. For Dulles, it was "a period of the 
greatest peril for us since the Korean War";l for Nuri, "perhaps the gravest crisis since the 
war, which involved the issue of the free world versus the Communist world, while future 
Turkish Foreign Minister ilter Turkmen reminisced decades later that had not Syria and 
Turkey respectively enjoyed Moscow's and Washington's support, without the latter, the 
crisis might have easily generated into an all-out war.3
George Kirk, Patrick Seale, Gordon Toney, Omer Kuriapuoglu, Douglas Little, David 
Lesch and others have pieced together the available evidence and come out with a cohesive 
picture of this crisis. Their conclusions and explanations have generally passed the test of 
time.^ Many important questions, however, remain unanswered and some will probably 
continue to be so until the official records of all regional powers involved become frilly 
accessible to historians. This chapter will, after briefly nairating events, deal in detail with the 
nature of this crisis and the attitudes of some of the individuals and states involved, seeking 
to add to our' understanding of the nature of the regional political struggle in the late 1950s in 
general and just before the sudden Syiian-Egyptian merger (1958) in particular.
The Sequence of Events
On August 6, Syria's acting Defence Minister, Khalid al-'Azm, concluded in Moscow an 
extensive economic and technical agreement with the USSR. Then, on August 12, the Syrian 
government announced the discovery of another, US-backed right-wing plot. Three
^Lesch, Syria, 157.
2FO371/128227/VY1015/186G, FO to Bagdad, 11.9.57.
-^Bagci, Demolcrat, 150-51.
4George Kirk, "The Syrian Crisis of 1957-Fact and Fiction", JA, 36/1 (January 1960), 58-61; Seale, 
Struggle, 289-306; Torrey, Syrian Politics, 360-67; Lesch, Syria, 138-209; Petran, Syria, 121-24; Little, 
"Cold War", 69-75. In this narrative, footnotes are inserted only when the information mentioned is taken 
directly from new, primary sources.
American diplomats were expelled from Syria, pushing Washington and, then, Damascus to 
declare the Syrian and American ambassadors residing in their respective capitals as personae 
non gratae. Diplomatic relations were not severed, although Eisenhower had been ready to 
take that risk, believing that it "would at least demonstrate to the public the seriousness of the 
situation" in Syria. ^  Finally, on August 15, an extensive shake-up within the Syrian officer- 
corps replaced many older officers, considered "moderates" in the West, with younger 
officers more amenable to radical reformist and pan-Arab nationalist ideals. 43-year-old 
radical 'Afif al-Bizri, suspected of Communist leanings, replaced Nizam al-Din as COS.
Despite repeated denials from Damascus, the West and its friends now expected an 
imminent, full Communist take-over in Syria, similar "to that in Czechoslovakia before the 
Benes and Jan Masaryk affair". ^  Charges against the accused plotters were dismissed as 
fabrications to justify ensuing purges. Ankara urged Washington to prevent a complete 
satellisation of Syria, alleging that, under the recent economic agreement, Syria had 
mortgaged all her exports to the Eastern Bloc in return for armaments and some capital 
investment projects to be carried out with the help of Soviet experts. "Russia and the Western 
Powers were now face to face in the Asiatic Middle East," said Minister of State Zorlu. The 
Soviet objective was clear: "the whole of the Middle East from Syria to Yemen". "It was 
hopeless to expect that the Syrians would take action to arrest their present trend". Zorlu 
predicted that al-Quwatli would soon be marginalised and al-'Azm-after getting elected 
Speaker of the Syrian Chamber-would effectively assume the presidential prerogatives. ^  
Kural said Nizam al-Din's dismissal's was because of his opposition to the Soviet deal.^ 
Ankara agreed with its Western allies that the Syrian army remained ineffective to pose any 
immediate threat to Syria's neighbours, but feared that Syria could instigate subversive 
operations against the latter. It preferred to see the present Syrian regime brought down by a 
move from one or more of her Arab neighbours, for it was hoped that Iraq or Saudi Arabia, 
shocked by the latest developments, might take the lead to that effect. Ankara, said 
Menderes, was waiting for a "solid decision" from Washington "in order to be able to take 
appropriate m easures". 9 He warned, however, that "there should be no demonstrations 
(expressions) on behalf of Israel. They would only aggravate matters and give Soviets ample
5FRUS1955-1957, XIII, 635.
6FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 642, 713; FO371/128228/VY1015/212G, Macmillan to Nehru, 14.9.57. 
7FO371/128227/VY1015/198G, Stewart to FO, 13.9.57.
8FO371/128225/VY1015/132, Bowker to Rose, 24.8.57.
9FRUS, 1955-1957, XIII, 643.
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ground for exploitation".^ Furthermore, since Kings Husayn and Faysal, and Prince 'Abd al- 
Hah, were on private visits to Istanbul at the time, Turkish leaders consulted them. Turkey 
could do nothing about the situation in Syria, said Menderes, but Iraq must. 11
Washington, however, soon realised that although the governments of Lebanon, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq were deeply concerned with the Syrian situation, none seemed ready to 
take the lead in engineering either individually or collectively a change in Damascus. 
Washington also initially left the issue of ultimately invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine 
deliberately vague, preferring to keep Damascus guessing. Instead, one of Washington's 
prominent Middle East experts, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Administration Loy 
Henderson, advanced to August 23 his pre-planned torn to the area (on other business) to 
report on the situation in advance of America formulating a clear position. ^
Henderson visited Turkey and Lebanon, meeting with Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanian and 
Lebanese leaders. He avoided Damascus despite public and official Syrian demands for such a 
visit. 13 Henderson expressed Washington's understanding and support for the concern 
expressed by its friends over the Syrian situation and wanted to leam then views, without 
suggesting any precise course of action. Any "remedial action," he said, should be taken by 
Syria's immediate neighbours within the framework of the UN, promising full support for any 
course of action which could bring about a change of regime in Syria. I4  He reportedly left, 
generally speaking, "the impression of having been inadequately briefed and rather devoid of 
i d e a s " .  According to Iraq's acting Foreign Minister, 'Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari, Henderson 
pressed the Iraqis, in Istanbul, "to take action against Syria as soon as they could find a 
pretext which would stand up in the Security Council". "Military action," opined he, "once 
started, must be completed within 100 horns," suggesting that discussion should be continued 
through the American ambassador in Iraq. But when a meeting was arranged in Baghdad, it 
was found that the ambassador knew nothing of the subject and had no instructions. ^
A contemporary American observer says Henderson's ten-day mission "died aborning". 
He himself later acknowledged that it had been a "mistake".^ He was unable to propose, on
l0FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 644; FO371/128224/VY1015/110A, HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 
23.8.57; FO371/128228/VY1015/220, Stewart to Watson, 13.9.57; FO371/128231/VY1015/312, Stewart to 
FO, 9.10.57.
1:1FO371/128224/VY1015/102, Beaumont to FO, 21.8.57.
1 % 0371/128224/VY1015/112, CacciatoFO, 23.8.57.
l3FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 650-74; FO371/128225/VY1015/146, Scott to Rose, 3.9.57.
14Frost, UAR, 94-95; FO371/128225/VY1015/143, CRO outward telegram, 2.9.57; F0371/127743/ 
V I0345/127, Stewart to Rose, 6.9.57.
15FO371/128224/VY1015/121G, HM Consul General, Istanbul to FO, 25.8.57. 
16FO371/128227/VY1015/195G, FO to Bagdad, 12.9.57.
Archie Roosevelt, For Lust for Knowing: Memoirs o f an Intelligence Officer (1988), 433-34.
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his return to Washington, any concrete plan for action. He simply confirmed that Turkey was 
greatly concerned by the threat to her southern flank and was the only country truly disposed 
to take strong action against Syria. Turkey, Menderes had said, needed support in order to 
dissuade Israel from taking any action that might precipitate a crisis, as well as against any 
possible Soviet threat. Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, however, had been "wishy washy". 
Faysal II and 'Abd al-Hah had been in a more spirited state of mind than the members of the 
new Iraqi government of Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, who had been deeply concerned, but unable 
to suggest anything positive that could be done. King Husayn and Menderes did not favour 
bringing Egypt into the deliberations at this stage, but the Iraqis had appeared to be. ^  
Washington, therefore, confined itself to accelerating the delivery of allocated military 
equipment to strengthen the resolve of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey against 
any possible threat from Syria.
Anti-Western forces in the Middle East, however, interpreted Henderson's visit as a 
prelude to an imminent coup in Syria. According to Lesch, this suspicion "really engaged the 
Soviets in the crisis," sharply escalating its proportions. Moscow again adopted a tough anti- 
Western public attitude in defence of Arab nationalist demands. This was greatly appreciated 
by radically-minded Arabs at large and contributed to the upsurge of Communist support in 
Syria. On September 19, two Soviet warships dropped anchor in Lattakia and stayed there 
until October 2.
Damascus itself formally asked, on September 15, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq whether they 
were indeed worried, as claimed by Washington, about the situation in Syria, and 
understandably, all three officially denied being responsible in any way for Henderson's views. 
Even the Turkish Defence Ministry denied, on September 14, "as a kind of assurance" to 
Syria, allegations that up to 50,000 Turkish troops had been concentrated along the Syrian 
border. Turkish troop movements in the border region, it stated, were connected to pre­
planned NATO manoeuvres. 19 Damascus seemed satisfied with the outcome. Al-Bitar 
declared that if Syria and Turkey "were left alone, relations between them would return to 
normal at once... Turkey was arming herself too, but this did not make Syria 
apprehensive". 20
It would have been surprising if Turkish-Syrian mutual expressions of goodwill had lasted 
long, for both sides distrusted each other's intentions, and Turkish troop concentrations were,
lBFRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 670, 682; FO371/128224/VY1015/121G, HM Consul General, Istanbul to FO,
25.8.57.
19FO371/I28229/VY1015/248G, Stewart to Rose, 19.9.57.
20fO371/128242/VY10344/10, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 27.9.57.
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this time, undeniable. Mutual recriminations soon resurfaced.21 Whether Tuikey and/or Syria 
really expected the other to take direct military action or simply wanted to distract popular 
attention horn then other internal problems is difficult to tell in absence of first-hand official 
records. The Syrian government told the people to dig trenches around then villages in 
preparation for an attack and distributed arms to the Popular Resistance Movement. 
Neighbouring states, particularly Iraq and Jordan, really feared the possibility of an armed 
conflict. Ankara, therefore, had to categorically assure them both that no military action 
against Syria was being contemplated 22
The Turkish-Syrian crisis coincided with the annual session of the UN General Assembly, 
turning the latter inevitably into an arena for East-West confrontation. The American, Soviet 
and Syrian Foreign Ministers, together with Turkey's permanent representative at the UN, 
Seyfidlah Esin, traded accusations on the subject in then respective speeches to the 
Assembly. In this phoney war of words, each camp was striving for a propaganda victory. 
Even some of the public remarks the protagonists made in the following weeks outside the 
UN were timed to have maximum effect on proceedings in New York, an attitude, which did 
not, of course, help alleviate tensions. Later, however, the UN provided the means to defuse 
the conflict peacefully.
On October 15, al-Bitar requested to inscribe urgently on the General Assembly agenda a 
Syrian complaint, that massive concentrations of Turkish troops, larger than those planned 
for the regular* military manoeuvres, had been noticed along then* common border. Shots had 
been "fired from Turkey at persons on Syrian territory" and Turkish aircraft had violated the 
Syrian ah* space on several occasions. Moreover, Syrian citizens had been abducted by the 
Turkish authorities. Al-Bitar* asked the Assembly to set up a commission to investigate and 
report on the situation on the Turkish-Syrian border.22 The Syrian complaint was 
immediately endorsed by the U S S R 24
Ankar a denied all Syrian charges. It feared that a UN commission would restrict its ability 
to act if it judged necessary to do so, but, after informally consulting its allies, it reluctantly 
agreed to proceed with the debate. Nevertheless, it was ready to argue, if necessary, that any 
commission should also investigate Turkey's frontiers with Bulgaria and the USSR25
21FO371/128242/VY10344/8, Stewart to FO, 25.9.57; FO371/128230/VY1015/297, Scott to Rose,
1.10.57.
22FO371/128242/VY10344/19, 27 & 35.
2^FO371/128242/VY10344/13 & 16, Dixon to FO, 16.10.57. See text of Syrian complaint in F0371/ 
128243/VY10344/46, UK Delegation, UN to FO, 9.10.57.
24See text of Soviet letter in FO371/12S242/VY10344/16(A),
25FO371/128242/VY10344/28G, Stewart to FO, 18.10.57; ibid., -/32(A), Dixon to FO, 19.10.57.
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Tlie projected Assembly debate put Iraq in a dilemma about whom to back in public. 'Ali 
Mumtaz urged Ankara to "be as conciliatory as p o s s i b l e " .  2 6 Even Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Mahmud Fawzi allegedly tried hard to persuade Syria not to proceed, pointing out that it 
would be difficult to confine discussions to the narrow questions of the Syrian-Turkish border 
situation, and that a broader debate could embarrass the Arabs in general. The Syrians, 
however, claimed Fawzi, "had said that for domestic reasons some action had to be taken at 
the United Nations, otherwise the situation might slip in Syria... Bitar had said that the Syrian 
idea was to produce a detente and get something out of the United Nations which could calm 
the situation". 27
To these hesitant countries, King Sa'ud's offer of October 20 to mediate between Turkey 
and Syria came as something like a heaven-sent blessing. Relations between Riyadh and 
Damascus had improved recently, and Sa'ud had urged Eisenhower to show moderation 
toward Syria. On September 25, he had even briefly visited Damascus and arranged a Syrian- 
Jordanian agreement to cease mutual propaganda attacks on their airwaves. 28
The exact reasons behind Sa'ud's new mediation effort remain unclear. Damascus, 
however, seemed reluctant to miss the opportunity of a highly-publicised verbal clash in New 
York. While praising the King's good intentions, it urged him to withdraw the offer, for there 
was, it claimed, no conflict between Syria and Turkey. Simply, Turkish troop concentrations 
and threats of aggression ought to be brought to an end.29 Kural reported that although the 
Syrians seemed to be alarmed at the position they now found themselves in and would have 
liked to find a way out, they were under strong Soviet pressure "to continue attempt to create 
crisis atmosphere".30
Ankara, although not ready itself to accept any mediation, believed that Sa'ud's initiative 
was well meant and, ffomthe point of view of the forthcoming UN debate, well timed. Bayar 
could not leave Turkey in the last week of the general election campaign.3 ^  Instead, Zorlu 
visited Sa'ud on October 24. He returned with the impression that the King "was favorably 
disposed toward the Baghdad Pact, and was irrevocably at odds with Nasser, but that he was 
immensely cautious because of the dangerous position brought about by having so many bad 
elements surrounding him".32
26FO371/128243/VY10344/46, Wright to FO, 22.10.57.
27FO371/128242/VY10344/18, Dixon to FO, 16.10.57.
28FO371/128230/VY1015/276G, Johnston to FO, 30.9.57.
29FO371/128242/VY10344/41(A), Caccia to FO, 21.10.57; FO371/128243/VY10344/47, Middleton to 
FO, 22.10.57; FO371/128243/VY10344/57(A), CRO outward telegram, 24.10.57. 
30FO371/128243/VY10344/57(E), CRO outward telegram, 24.10.57.
3 !f O371/128242/VY10344/34 & 42, Stewart to FO, 20-21 Oct. 1957.
32FRUS, 1958-1960, X, Part 2, 740.
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Iraq, too, firmly supported the Saudi offer and urged Syrian leaders to accept it.33 Iraq 
also hoped that Sa'ud would now realise Damascus's real intentions and its reluctance to 
make any compromise, thus consolidating the drawing together of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Saudi Arabia and increasing "the weakness and isolation of Nasser".34 Iraq worked hard in 
New York to reach a consensus among Arab delegates not to support Syria in the Assembly 
debate if she persisted in rejecting Sa'ud's offer. 3 5
The UN debate dragged on from October 23 to November 1. The Western powers 
managed to have it adjomned twice allegedly to give time for Sa'ud's initiative to develop.3b 
Meanwhile, Moscow increased tension by publicising military and naval exercises in 
Transcaucasia and in the Black Sea and appointing World War II hero Marshal Konstantin 
Rokossovski Commander of the Transcaucasian military district. On the night of October 29, 
however, Soviet leaders, Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin and Anastas Mikoyan, suddenly 
appeared at the Turkish Embassy reception in Moscow to mark the anniversary of the 
proclamation of the Turkish republic. Khrushchev said that his presence at the reception was 
"a gesture toward peace". He condemned warmongers and predicted that "there will be no 
war! "3 7 Some of his other remarks were interpreted as an attempt to blame the recently 
dismissed Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, for the rise in international
tensions. 3 S
Khrushchev's remarks helped the protagonists to conclude the UN debate smoothly 
through carefid stage management. Two different draft resolutions had been tabled. Syria's 
had called on the UN to constitute a fact-finding commission to investigate immediately on 
the spot the situation along the Turkish-Syrian border and submit a preliminary report within 
two weeks.39 The second draft, expressing primarily the American point of view, had 
requested the Secretary-General to undertake informal discussions with Syria and Turkey; 
proceed, if necessary, to the countries concerned; and report on his discussions to the 
Assembly as soon as possible, thus carefully avoiding the idea of a commission, resented by 
Turkish and American military experts.40 Now, al-Bitar was persuaded by Fawzi and other 
Ar ab delegates not to press the Syrian draft to a vote, on condition that the item itself would 
not be withdrawn from the agenda. Syria's opponents, in turn, convinced Iraq's representative
33FO371/128243/VY10344/66(A), Wright to FO, 24.10.57. 
34FO371/128044/VQ1022/ll, Wright to FO, 23.10.57. 
35FO371/128243/VY10344/57(E), CRO outward telegram, 24.10.57. 
36F 0371/128243/VY10344/34, Stewart to FO, 20.10.57. 
37FO371/128244/VY10344/85, FO to New York, 30.10.57.
38Vali, Bridge, 175; Lesch, Syria, 208-09.
39See full text in FO371/128244/VY10344/86, Dixon to FO, 30.10.57. 
40FO371/128244/VY10344/87, Dixon to FO, 30.10.57.
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to ignore instructions, received from Baghdad, to speak in rebuttal of Syrian accusations 
against the Baghdad Pact.41
The conclusion of the debate in this manner enabled the two camps to claim victory. An 
official Syrian spokesman said that world public opinion had been made aware that Turkey's 
attitude constituted a danger to world peace. Syria had proved to the whole world that she 
constituted no danger to Turkey and that she sought only to preserve her own independence, 
while Turkey had been obliged to reaffirm its peaceftd intentions before the Assembly. He 
also claimed that Syria had been supported by "a large number" of UN members and all Arab 
countries,42 referring probably to the cable of support conveyed to Syria by 21 Afro-Asian 
countries on October 2343 ant| t0 the unanimous resolution of the Arab League condemning 
all attempts to interfere in Syria's domestic affairs and committing itself to co-operation in 
repelling any aggression. This resolution, however, had not referred to the commission of 
investigation demanded by Syria. 44 Turkey and her allies, in turn, thought that the outcome 
had "been as favourable as we could have hoped for," believing that Syria and the USSR had 
evidently suffered a check in the UN. The Turks rightly observed, however, that there were 
absolutely no grounds for complacency about the way things were going in Syria herself: the 
position of the present Syrian regime had not been shaken, and the intimate character of 
Syrian-Soviet relations had not changed.45
Thereafter, political tensions in the Middle East relatively eased. Mutual recriminations 
between Turkey and Syria dwindled. The Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
Melih Esenbel, met a few times with the Syrian minister in Ankara and told him that Ankara 
wanted to see the problem solved. 46 On November 6, the Syrians circulated a new complaint 
about Turkish violations of their air space, raids by Turkish soldiers into Syrian territory and 
abductions of Syrian civilians by Turkish authorities,42 only to tell the UN Secretary-General 
a week later that now they did not want a commission of investigation under any 
circumstances, nor did they want him to go out to the area unless he was sure in advance of 
achieving something by doing so. They also asked him to sound informally if Ankara, in turn, 
was prepared to make some friendly move.48
41FO371/128244/VY10344/85(C), (D) & (E), Dixon to FO, 31 Oct.-l Nov. 1957. 
42FO371/128232/VY1015/352, Scott to Rose, 7.11.57.
43Aykan, Ideology, 81-82.
44See full text in F0371/127752/V1072/18.
45FO371/128244/VY10344/85(E), Dixon toFO, 1.11.57; ibid., -/100 Stewart to Rose, 1.11.57. 
4f%agci, Demoh'at, 95.
47FO371/128244/VY10344/85(H), Dixon to FO, 7.11.57.
48Ibid.s -/85, Dixon toFO, 15.11.57.
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The apparently good meeting on November 7 between al-Bitar and Rountree also helped 
to ease tensions. Al-Bitar emphasised that "Syria would like to normalise the diplomatic 
situation with the US, and was disposed to seek to find ways and means of improving 
relations".49 Washington soon appointed Charles Yost as its new ambassador in Damascus.
Washington and Riyadh suggested, therefore, "that it might be timely and appropriate 
now to withdraw the Turkish forces at present on the Syrian frontier on the termination of 
the present m anoeuvres". 50 Ankara agreed, and the withdrawal was completed by November 
29. Ring Sa'ud publicised on Saudi radio that in reaching the decision to withdraw its troops, 
Ankara had taken account of his advice. 5 1
Menderes's critical remarks as regards Syria during the meeting of Heads of government 
of NATO countries held in Paris on December 16 briefly resurfaced tensions. The Turkish 
Premier claimed that the USSR dominated Syria and mat Syria was under de facto 
Communist rule, but this claim had not been manifested till then for tactical purposes. 
Developments in Syria were very serious, menacing Turkey and the sovereignty of Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. If the USSR continued to establish positions in Syria, he 
said, the Syrian problem should become a direct concern to NATO. 52 Qn December 19, the 
Syrian government sent protest notes to Iraq, Turkey and other NATO governments against 
Menderes's remarks, expressing fears that they seriously aimed at dragging NATO "to serve 
illicit and illegitimate objectives". Damascus denied again the existence of foreign bases in 
Syria and said that her request for a commission of investigation was "tacit evidence" of her 
"good intentions". 52
The note addressed to Iraq contained a bitter attack on the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi 
cabinet decided to return it as unacceptable. 54 Britain and the USA avoided a formal reply in 
order not to "dignify the Syrian charges and keep alive an issue which serves Soviet 
interests". Washington, however, orally communicated to Syria its confidence that Turkey did 
not harbour aggressive intentions against her. It also acknowledged the affirmation that there 
were no foreign bases in Syria and that the establishment of no such base would be 
permitted. 5 5
49FRUS1955-1957, XIII, 744.
50FO371/128233/VY1015/355G, Bowker to FO, 14.11.57; F0371/127725/VI022/65, Morris to Hadow,
3.12.57.
51FO371/130181/RK10316/7, Bowker to FO, 28.11.57.
5^FO371/134392/VY10344/l, 'Translation of Substantive Portions of Syrian Note of December 19, 
1957'.
53See M l text of note in FO371/134392/VY10344/1, Levant Department to Chanceiy, Ankara, 7.1.58. 
54FO371/134394/VY10393/l, Wright to FO, 4.1.58.
55FO371/134392/VY10344/2, Note by US Delegation, 26.12.57.
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The only formal reply was Turkey's. It described Syrian allegations as "unfounded". It 
was "erroneous and extremely regrettable" to qualify Menderes's views "as a cold war 
campaign directed against Syria". Simply, communist penetration "had assumed a universal 
character," while "an independent and powerful Syria" was necessary in the interests of 
Turkey's own national security. 5 6
This exchange was the last in 1957. Despite the ferocity of some of the counter­
accusations, the region's political map had not changed. Syria's sudden merger with Egypt, 
however, would soon change that.
W hat Was the Crisis About?
Today, in the light of available evidence, it is generally accepted that the August events in 
Syria, which precipitated the crisis, were not necessarily inter-connected. Syria's agreement 
with Moscow did not have any secret military clauses. Syria had been in real need of new 
sources of revenue to strengthen her defences by expanding her industrial and agricultural 
base. The idea of approaching the Soviets for credits belonged to al-'Azm, who, like many 
other Syrian politicians, believed that the hardships faced by Syria's economy were 
deliberately caused by her adversaries, aiming to bring about. a change of regime. They 
attributed Syria's loss of traditional wheat markets in Greece and Italy to deliberate dumping 
of American wheat. Al-'Azm had asked to visit Moscow in April and had received the Syrian 
cabinet's prior oral approval as regards his intentions. No written decision had been taken, 
however, to prevent any possible leak.57 Syrian claims about the uncovering of an 
"American" plot (Operation Wappen) were genuine and well-founded.58 "The American 
plot," aptly notes Lesch, "in many ways, resembled the British-Iraqi action in 1956 
(Operation Straggle) and failed just as miserably; but whereas the British were in no position 
to react to the Syrian disclosure because of their preoccupation with the fall-out from the 
Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration had no such burden".59 Moreover, while 
Washington was directly accused of engineering the 1957 plot, the blame in 1956 had been 
put solely on Ir aq. Whether the Syrians knew then about British involvement and preferred to 
keep silent or the detained plotters were able to conceal the British link is another issue.
5<^ See frill text in FO371/134392/VY10344/4, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 24.1.58.
Al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, III, 5-9; Petran, Syria, 120; Lesch, Syria, 126. The fact that Turkey's trade 
volume with the Soviet Bloc had also increased nearly fourfold since 1953, and was much larger than Syria's, 
was conveniently ignored in the West or was, at most, rationalised. Campbell, Defense, 274 wrote: "The case 
of [Soviet trade with] Turkey is one of economic necessity for the Turks, because of their lack of foreign 
exchange and of credit in the West. They have taken the step with their eyes open and are on guard against an 
economic dependence that could give Moscow the ability to exert significant pressure".
5&See details in Eveland, Ropes, 230, 246, 253-54; Copeland, Game, 188; Little, "Cold War", 68-71.
^Lesch, Syria, 138.
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Washington was now under heavier pressure to react. Finally, dismissals and reshuffles in tlie 
Syrian officer-corps were regular occurrences. Nizam al-Din resigned after remaining in a 
clear minority in rejecting demands by other officers for a sweeping reshuffle. Al-Bizri, seen 
then by his fellow officers as a progressive and reliable nationalist, was chosen because of his 
independence and good relations with all factions competing for influence in the army.
At the time, however, Western imagination went wild. The ferocity of public 
recriminations and the passions that the crisis generated led many to assume that more than 
simple political point-scoring was at stake. Some interesting, not to say bizarre, conspiracy 
theories were suggested. The Jewish Observer reported on October 25 that Syria had planned 
to retake suddenly from Turkey her adjacent territory, including Alexandretta. Moscow 
would then intervene under the guise of stopping the fighting and put the issue before the 
UN, inducing the latter to acknowledge the accomplished fact of re-transfer of Alexandretta 
to Syria. This plan had reportedly failed only because of Syrian slowness to act. Turkey had 
gotten wise to then intention and taken the necessary precautions. Subsequent Soviet 
accusations against Turkey were simply a belated attempt to gain something after having 
"lost the opportunity of again showing herself as a fiiend of the A rabs", 60 Others professed 
to see a Kurdish connection, based on suspected Soviet backing for Kurdish nationalism and 
on the Kurdish origins of al-Sarraj and Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash. They 
warned that a Soviet-sponsored revolt might soon be organised in the Kurdish districts of 
Turkey, claiming that "the Soviets have had Kurdish parachutists and propaganda cadres in 
training in Erevan for some time". "Kurdish officers and intellectuals in Syria," they reasoned, 
"can be relied on to be loyal to the Soviet connection since they will feel that they are 
working towards the liberation of then own country". 61
Today, all accessible diplomatic records show no indication whatsoever that any such 
theory was based on firm ground. Any future full explanation should undoubtedly be sought 
in simpler terms. Many important questions remain, however, in the dark. This chapter will 
tackle some of them.
The Crisis and Internal Turkish Politics
The crisis aggravated partly because Ankara, which had noted with apprehension leftist gains 
during four Syrian parliamentary by-elections in M ay,62 now urged its allies to deal toughly
60FO371/128244/VY10344/90, Cotton to Beeley, 27.10.57.
61f O371/130177/RK1015/33. British diplomats dismissed the Kurdish connection on the naive 
assumption that "the spectre of a Kurdish national rising" in Turkey was "virtually a tiling of the past" and 
that, under DP, Kurds were peacefully assimilating.
^Kiirk^uoglu, Tiirkiye'nin Politikasi, 104-05.
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with Damascus. This research has failed to uncover enough new evidence, however, either to 
confirm or reject claims that Menderes's government deliberately exploited the Syrian crisis 
prior to the early general election it had called for October 27, seeking a renewed mandate 
from the electorate, after being heavily criticised by the opposition for the failure of its 
economic policies and Menderes's own alleged autocratic manners.63 inbnii was reported, at 
least on one occasion, to have publicly said that "demonstrations on the Syrian frontier were
unnecessary". 64
Did Washington Encourage Turkey to Attack Syria?
Washington was certainly not keen initially to sanction a Turkish invasion of Syria, without 
altogether dismissing that possibility, however. Said Dulles: "Undesirable as it would be that 
the Turks should take any initiative perhaps it could not be prevented unless one of the Arab 
states was prepared".65 A US National Intelligence Estimate, dated September 3, predicted 
that most Syrians would
oppose unilateral Turkish intervention and few would rally to a movement which 
appeared to be dominated and directed by Turkey. On the other hand, intervention by 
one or more Arab states would be favored by members of the opposition even though 
they would suspect that it had Turkish support and that some degree of overt Turkish 
participation would be likely at some point. The degree of Syrian support for such 
intervention would depend in some measure on the effectiveness with which Turkish 
initiative could be concealed and, more importantly, on indications of the likelihood of 
the success of intervention. 6 6
Menderes, in fact, had warned 'Abd al-Hah in vague terms, on September 2, that if the 
Arabs were unable to take action themselves against Syria, Turkey would then be compelled 
to consult with Washington as regards what it should do.67 So, did Washington, after having 
concluded that there would be no collective Arab response to the Syrian situation, tacitly give 
Turkey a green light to act on her own? Lesch claims it did. He sees the delivery, on 
September 12, of an oral message to Menderes as the major turning point in Washington's 
approach to the crisis and contends that it was not coincidental that, on September 10, the 
day that telegram was drafted, Dulles had publicly stated that the dangerous situation in Syria
63 Ahmad, Experiment, 397; Lederer and Vucinich, Soviet Union, 41.
64FO371/130177/RK1015/36, Stewart to FO, 21.10.57.
65FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 670.
6&FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 678-79. King Husayn, too, told Henderson that "Turkey should not participate 
in fighting"; see ibid., 655.
67FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 672.
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could be resolved through peaceful measures. Lesch believes this was a covert message to 
Turkey that Washington now wanted others to make the running, 68
This author thinks that there is not enough evidence yet to support this view. There is, 
however, Dulles's own admission in July 1958 that, in the autumn of 1957, Washington "had 
avoided telling the Turks directly that they should not take action, since to do so would have 
given an excuse for putting the blame for subsequent developments on our restraining 
them".69 it seems likely that this decision was taken after Arab reluctance to resort to force 
had become apparent79
Lesch seems unaware of Dulles's above-quoted statement. He curiously omits, however, 
other pieces of information, published in volume XDI of Foreign Relations o f the United 
States 1955-1957, which he obviously had access to. Washington's message to Menderes 
formed part of a series of confidential messages conveyed on September 10 to Israeli Premier 
David Ben Gurion, Prince 'Abd al-Hah, King Husayn, and the Lebanese President and Foreign 
M inister. 71 They had been compiled as a result of US/UK consultations held in Washington 
after Henderson's return from the Middle East. Lesch strangely ignores the other messages.
These messages, together with the US/UK memorandum on Syria, dated September 
11,72 formulate Washington's official attitude toward the situation. Washington believed that 
"Syria has become, or is about to become, a base for military and subversive activities in the 
Middle East designed to destroy the independence of the other countries in the area and to 
bring them within the domination of the Soviet/Communist bloc". Reaffirming the 
Eisenhower Doctrine and the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, it asserted that if any country in 
the region was subjected to any such "aggressive action," Washington would then hold that a 
case existed for individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It 
promised "prompt and sympathetic" consideration to any request by Syria's Arab/Muslim 
neighbours "for economic assistance and military supplies" if the latter "in connection with a 
concrete plan" wanted to protect themselves against "the threat of Syrian aggression". It 
promised further to support those countries in the UN Security Council or the General 
Assembly, and extend them, if requested, "economic assistance and military supplies" if they, 
"responding to provocation, should act pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter". If any of
68Lesch, Syria, 156, 161, 201.
69FO371/133823/V1078/12G, 'Record of Conversation between Lloyd and Dulles', 18.7.58 
"^Eisenhower, Waging, 201.
71 See full texts of messages in FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 690-99. The message addressed to 'Abd al-Ilah 
was later also passed on, on further instructions from Washington, to ' Ali Jawdat as well.
72f O371/128227/VY1015/185G, 'Syria: Memorandum', 11.9.57. The draft of this document was first 
handed to the British on September 7, who undertook not to publish it except after further consultations with 
Washington. Negotiations on some minor aspects of phrasing continued until early October.
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Syria's Arab neighbours were attacked by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, without the intermediacy of 
Syria, then Washington, "upon request, would be prepared to use its own armed forces to 
assist any such nation or nations against such armed aggression". A Sino-Soviet attack with 
the intermediacy of Syria was not mentioned, probably because this possibility was already 
covered by the other commitments mentioned. Furthermore, Washington promised that if any 
provocative act by Syria led to hostilities between Syria and Iraq and resulted in the closure 
of the BPC pipelines, then it would, as a temporary emergency, help to mitigate the financial 
consequences of this to Iraq, and reactivate immediately the Middle East Emergency Oil 
Committee, formed during the Suez crisis, to organise alternative supplies of oil for Western 
Europe. It would also "continue to deploy the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean". 
Washington stressed that "momentous decisions" "may be taken only by [the] nation 
concerned" and, therefore, it cannot "assume responsibility of urging" its friends "any specific 
course of action or inaction". It preferred, however, that "if any action were taken in respect 
to aimed provocation to eradicate danger represented by current Syrian situation, initiative in 
first instance should come from Arab state or states". Turkey "should not act other than in 
requested reinforcement of Arab defensive action," while "Israel should, irrespective of 
provocation other than large scale invasion, show restraint so as not to unite and inflame the 
Arab world against Israel and in support of Syria on the theory that Israel has aggressive 
puiposes and territorial ambitions". In all cases, however, it was a precondition to any US 
suppoit that hostilities would merely restore "Syria to the Syrians" and not impair "the 
political independence and the territory of Syria".
The messages were not identical. Each emphasised one aspect of US policy or another 
according to the nature of Washington's links with the recipient country or the latter's 
military/political potential. In no way, however, were they contradictory. In Turkey's case, 
the NATO link and Washington's commitments emanating thereof if Turkey was attacked by 
the Sino-Soviet Bloc "directly or by organized volunteers" were understandably underlined. 
The only interesting and thought-provoking point specific to Turkey was the indication that if 
Turkey might eventually "feel compelled to react to armed provocations which implied a 
serious threat to its own national integrity and independence" or if she came "to the aid of any 
of Syria's Arab neighbors engaged in hostilities with Syria," Washington would provide then 
support in the UN. Can the phrase feel compelled to react be taken as a hint to engineer a 
pretext to invade Syria? In this author's view, not. It was too vague to push the usually 
cautious Turks toward action. True, a few sentences in the messages conveyed to Menderes 
and 'Abd al-Ilah remain classified, but until they are declassified, and probably even after, 
there seems no reason to interpret these messages as an important departure from previous 
American policy Washington probably gave too many hints to different parties, with no
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motive to resort to force, and thus unwillingly discouraged even the most enthusiastic to take 
some action against Syria.
Today, mainly because of lack of accessibility to official Turkish records, it remains 
unclear whether later Turkish troop concentrations and movements were in any way related 
to the American message concerned and, perhaps more importantly, how did Ankara 
interpret that message and whether the latter had any profound effect on Turkish thinking and 
actions. Accessible evidence-relating to Turkish consultations with British and American 
leaders-however, does not depict any profound change.
Turkey and Iraq's Attitude
Turkey, like the West, was disturbed at the new Iraqi government's attitude and its apparent 
reluctance to "educate" its public and world opinion about subversive Syrian activities against 
neighbouring Arab states. 73
The political climate in Iraq had changed considerably after the Palace had finally 
sanctioned-duiing the temporary lull following the events in Jordan in April 1957-the 
customary change in government, for Nuri had already been in office for almost three years, a 
period quite long by Iraqi standards. His resignation on June 8 was because of splits in his 
cabinet over development policy in fight of losses of revenue caused by the stoppage of oil. 74 
He was replaced by 71 year-old 'Afi Jawdat al-Ayyubi, while the Foreign Ministry was 
assigned in an acting capacity to Finance Minister 'Afi Mumtaz al-Daftari. The new Iraqi 
cabinet was described as "essentially of the same political complexion as Nuri Said's old 
cabinet," and Nuri's return as Premier was predicted after a brief rest.75 The choice of'Afi 
Jawdat, some believed, was an attempt "to show that it is possible to be a Nationalist and a 
pro-Baghdad Pact politician at the same time". The new Premier, despite being considered "a 
weak and vacillating character of small intelligence," enjoyed more respect among pan-Arab 
nationalists than N u r i .  76
Ankara had expressed anxiety at Null's departure and asked the new government for a 
clear, public commitment to continue supporting the pact. Indeed, "high quarters" in Iraq 
categorically assured that "the general lines of foreign policy, including support for the 
Baghdad Pact, will remain unaltered".77 Ho immediate public statement was made to that 
effect, however, and leaving aside a single communique issued after an official Iraqi visit to
73Lesch, Syria, 151; FO371/128228/VY1015/234G, FO to Istanbul, 25.12.57. 
74]Vfichael Ionides, Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt o f1955-1958 (I960), 197. 
75FRUS1955-1957, XII, 1058.
76F0371/128040/VQ1015/25(B), FO minute by Hadow [n.d.]. 
77F0371/128040/VQ1015/26-27, Wright toFO, 18 & 21 June 1957.
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Tehran, the new government did not officially mention the pact by name in public until 
November 9, i.e. four months after taking office and well after the Turkish-Syrian crisis had 
somewhat subsided. 78
Instead, 'Ali Jawdat was busy " clearing] the clouds in the Arab atmosphere," removing 
"artificial differences" and strengthening "fraternal ties among all Arab States,"79 a relatively 
popular policy both at home and across the Arab world. 80 Informed that Abd al-Nasir would 
cease hostile propaganda against and was anxious to improve relations with all Arab 
governments, he ceased the jamming of Egyptian, Syrian and Soviet broadcasts. 81 Syria and 
Egypt were assured that Iraqi foreign policy "contained no hidden designs antagonistic to the 
interests of any of the other Arab countries". 82
Throughout the Syrian crisis, too, 'Ah Jawdat turned down all suggestions that Iraq 
should take military action against Syria. Iraq's oil revenues had sunk sharply because of the 
closure of the IPC p ip e lin e ,an d  he did "not wish to give the Syrians an excuse to cut the 
pipeline". The Iraqis, suggested one diplomat, "have no intention of being sucked in by the 
apparent readiness of Syria to be friends, but they want a quiet life at home and abroad". 84 
'AH Jawdat was admittedly worried by the leftward drive in Syria as the a latter "lay athwart 
Iraq's lifelines with the Mediterranean". He was prepared to tighten the grip at home, if 
necessary, but had only received "vague and temporising" answers from his personal friends 
in Syria-al-Quwatli, and Populist leaders Rushdi al-Kikhya and Nazim al-Qudsi-to his 
enquiry about what kind of help Iraq could provide to strengthen their position against the 
leftists. 'Ah Jawdat further feared that Israel could take the opportunity and provoke some 
kind of military conflict, thus tempting Syria and Jordan to seek their ultimate salvation in 
friendship with the USSR. 86 Xn contrast to Turkey, Iraq withdrew its troops from H3, a 
disused oil pumping station just inside Iraq, "because of the strong propaganda insinuations 
about the reasons why Iraq was maintaining troops so near the Syrian border".8? Iraq 
(supported, in this case, by Turkey) also opposed Iranian and Pakistani suggestions that the 
Baghdad Pact should get involved in the Syrian crisis, arguing that even secret discussions to
78FO371/127819/VB10393/l, Wright to FO, 15.11.57.
79F0371/128040/VQ1015/33, Wright to FO, 8.7.57.
S0FO371/134197/VQ1015/l, Wright to Lloyd, 27.12.57.
8 lF 0371/127801W1671/4, Beaumont to Rose, 30.7.57.
82FO371/128249/VY10393/6, Beaumont to FO, 13.8.57.
83CampbeIl, Defense, 259.
84FO371/128249/VY10393/5, Beaumont to FO, 12.8.57.
85FO371/128249/VY10393/6, Beaumont to FO, 13.8.57; FO371/128249/VY10393/21G, Wright to FO,
16.10.57.
86FO371/128224/VY1015/102, Beaumont to FO, 21.8.57.
87FO371/128229/VY1015/247G, Beaumont toFO, 24.9.57.
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that effect were "bound to leak and arouse resistance from Arab opinions," enabling Syria and 
Egypt "to stigmatize the Pact as engaged in interfering in Syrian internal a ffa irs " .^
Moreover, 'Ali Jawdat's envoy, Jamil al-Madfa'i, stated in Damascus that Iraq, as a 
member of the Arab League and ALCSP, would "rally to Syria like a brother in case of 
aggression" even if the USA and the Baghdad Pact were among the attackers. ^ 9 On 
September 26, 'Ali Jawdat himself briefly visited Damascus and met with Syrian leaders. He 
refused to be party to a joint communique-not to cause dismay among Syria's other 
neighbours-but declared satisfaction with his talks and hoped that Iraqi-Syrian relations 
would soon revert to their past cordiality. 90 Following 'Ali Jawdat's return to Baghdad, the 
Iraqi Minister in Damascus, believing to have his authorisation, stated in a note to the Syrian 
government on September 28 that "any aggression against Syria or any other Arab country, 
will be considered as aggression against Iraq and all Arab countries". 91 The government- 
guided Syrian media, in turn, never attacked 'Ali Jawdat's government. 92
'Ali Jawdat's "lack of grip" and "his weak attitude over Syria" were resented by the Palace 
and Nuri. Nuri warned, however, that any Turkish intervention in Syria could be disastrous 
and should not be considered. Iraq could intervene to change the regime in Syria only (a) as 
an ally of Jordan, if the latter took action under the pretext of demanding the return from 
Syria of Jordanian political refugees accused of plotting against King Husayn, or (b) to assist 
a fomented tribal uprising in Eastern Syria, whenever the Syrian army was called out to 
suppress the rebellion. Turkey could, in these cases, "immobilise as many Syrian units as 
possible by a show of force on the frontier". 93
The Iraqi press was also divided between pro-Westemers and pan-Arabists over its 
treatment of the Syrian situation,94 while the Iraqi public at large reportedly considered
the changes in Syria to be the business of the Syrians and all the 'flap' in the Western 
and particularly the American press as designed to prepare the ground for American 
intervention in the internal affairs of Syria. Their sympathies lie largely with the Syrian 
Government faced, as it is, by the danger of Israel (supported by the West) and 
standing, as it does, for Arab nationalism and unity. 95
88FO371/127818/VB10389/l, Beaumont to FO, 26.8.57; FO371/128224/VY1015/116, Beaumont to FO, 
25.8.57; FO371/128241/VYI0388/18G, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 11.10.57. 
89FO371/128228/VY1015/242(A), Beaumont to FO, 25.9.57.
90FO371/128230/VY1015/281G, Beaumont to Hayter, 27.9.57; ibid., -/297, Scott to Rose, 1.10.57. 
91FO371/128249/VY10393/14, Beaumont to FO, 30.9.57.
92FO371/128230/VY1015/282G, Beaumont to FO, 1.10.57.
93FO371/128225/VY1015/155G, FO to Bagdad, 6.9.57; FO371/128227/VY1015/186G, FO to Bagdad,
11.9.57.
94FO371/128234/VY1016/4 & 7, Beaumont to FO, 21 & 29 August 1957. 
95FO371/128227/VY1015/187, Beaumont to Rose, 6.9.57.
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These divisions among politically-conscious Iraqis soured relations between Baghdad and 
Ankara. Iraq's attitude was criticised by the Turkish press and caused indignation in Turkish 
diplomatic circles. 96 Turkish officials were aware of the state of public opinion in Iraq, but 
still blamed 'Ali Jawdat for his "lack of will" to act or see the dangers of the Syrian situation. 
Their sole consolation was the belief that the Palace was "fully alive to the dangers and 
determined to act if necessary, "97 for they held, that during the informal Turkish-lraqi 
discussions in Istanbul in August, Faysal It and 'Abd al-Hah had agreed, that any possible 
action taken against Syria should be initiated by Arab states under Iraq's l e a d e r s h i p .9 8  
Ankara was, therefore, extremely angered by 'Ali Jawdat's Damascus visit and considered his 
remarks "extremely dangerous and directly contrary" to decisions taken in Istanbul. Ankara 
was also puzzled by (the correct) reports that the visit had indeed been suggested by N u r i .  9 9  
It feared that if Jordan failed to raise any support from Iraq or other pro-Western Arab 
countries, she would feel obliged to fall back on a policy of solidarity with Egypt and 
Syria. *90 The Turkish ambassador in Baghdad was immediately summoned to Ankara for 
consultations and instructed to deliver a long written message to the King and Crown- 
Prince. 101 Menderes was convinced that both "enjoyed such position in Iraq that if they 
should make firm decision any Iraq Government would follow it". 192 Therefore, according 
to Michael Stewart, the British charge d'affaires in Ankara, he
reminded the King that he and the Crown Prince had agreed in Istanbul (a) on the 
Syrian threat and (b) on the need to demonstrate Arab disapproval of the present 
Syrian regime with the Iraqis as the leading spokesmen. He went on to say that recent 
Iraqi action ... were profoundly disquieting and contrary to the decisions taken jointly 
in Istanbul, They also nullified the efforts of the Turkish Government, which had 
brought the United States Government and "even the United Kingdom" to support 
their point of view, to put Syria on notice and to warn Arab and world public opinion 
of the present dangers. Menderes then said that the excuse offered by the Iraqis that 
the public statements made by Ali Jawdat and other Iraqi spokesmen were necessary 
for the purpose of Arab and internal Iraqi politics was invalid. In any case, these 
statements and acts were being exploited by Soviet and Syrian propaganda to the 
disadvantage of the Arab countries themselves and to Western interests. They had in 
fact "pulled the mg from under the feet of Turkey" and those who were trying to 
meet the Syrian danger, including King Hussein. Menderes then ... ventured to
^ I v a n o v a ,  Otnoshenie, 24; Aksin, Tiirkiye'nin 1945den Sonraki, 105-06. 
97FO371/128229/VY1015/248G, Stewart to Rose, 19.9.57.
98F 0371/128231/VY1015/304G, Stewart to Rose, 4.10.57. 
"FO371/128249/VY10393/17G, Beaumont to FO, 2.10.57. 
100FO371/128231/VY1015/312, Stewart to FO, 9.10.57. 
101FO371/128230/VY1015/286G, Stewart to FO, 2.10.57.
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suggest that further measures were necessary [to give substance to decisions allegedly 
taken in Istanbul], including bringing the Iraqi press and radio under proper control. 
Finally, there was a clear hint ... that amongst the measures necessary was the early 
replacement of Ah Jawdat by Nuri.
Stewart gathered that this last point "was made clearer still orally by the Turkish 
ambassador".! 03
Faysal II and 'Abd al-Hah told the Turkish ambassador, however, that they had not 
changed then views and remained faithful to decisions taken in Istanbul. But since the 
measures contemplated there did not have an aggressive character, consequently, there was 
"no contradiction between them and Ah Jaudat's statement that Iraq will not approve 
aggression against Syria". 'Ah Jawdat had visited Damascus "on his own responsibility" and 
without then knowledge. The Palace did not know anything about the September 28 note 
before its delivery and it, too, represented only 'Ah Jawdat's own views. Finally, Faysal said 
that the statement "approving Syria's acceptance of Soviet arms was aimed at 'distracting' 
Mid East and Iraqi pubhc opinion. Nuri had made similar statements in the past about Egypt's 
acceptance of Soviet arms". Ankara found the explanation only fairly convincing. It implied 
that either the Palace had lost control of the Iraqi government or was subservient to it. 
Commented 'Abd al-Hah: "The Turks do not seem to understand the constitutional situation". 
"While he and the King stand by the views they expressed in Istanbul, it is for the Prime 
Minister and Government to decide on action". 104
'Ah Jawdat thus showed how dependent Ankara was on Nuri to maintain the functioning 
of the Baghdad Pact. Understandably, there was some Turkish relief when 'Ah Jawdat 
resigned in mid-December after having failed to call new elections, which, he felt, were 
needed to introduce certain internal reforms. 105 He was succeeded by the weak, but 
staunchly Pro-Nuri, former Minister of Communications and Works, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mhjan, 
who formed "essentially a Cabinet of Nuri's supporters without Nuri". Mhjan re-appointed 
Burlian al-Din Bash A'yan as Foreign Minister and endorsed the Baghdad Pact in his first 
Prime Ministerial statement. 106 Opposition remained strong, however, and during his 
government's first parliamentary debate on December 17, Mhjan had to concede that if the 
interests of Baghdad Pact members were to clash with those of Arabs, "the Arab interest 
would take priority". 107
103FO371/128231/VY1015/304G, Stewart to Rose, 4.10.57.
104FO371/128230/VY1015/286G, Stewart to FO, 2.10.57.
10^Marr, Iraq, 121; Simon, '’Hashimite", 318; FO371/134197/VQ1015/1, Wright to Lloyd, 27.12.57. 
106FO371/128041/VQ1015/54-55, Wright to FO, 15.12.57; FO371/134197/VQ1015/2, Wright to Lloyd,
28.12.57.
107FO371/133912/VB10393/l(A), Kellas to Chancery, Ankara, 13.1.58.
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Even after Migan's appointment, the Turks were gravely annoyed when Iraq's permanent 
representative at the UN voted, in the Political Committee, in favour of a Greek draft 
^ resolution proposing to grant the majority of the population in Cyprus (i.e. the Greeks) the 
right of self-determination, while in the Plenary, Iraq's ambassador in Washin^oh lii clear 
disregard of further specific instructions fiom Baghdad to vote with Turkey, only abstained. 
Iraqi government officials were furious, and, in order to placate Ankara's anger, showed the 
Turkish ambassador in Baghdad the text of their instructions to New York. Although the 
latter was satisfied with the explanation he received, Turkish-Iraqi relations had evidently 
suffered additional damage. 108
Turkish-Egyptian Relations during the Crisis 
Egypt's adversaries noted her attitude during the crisis with interest. They had long predicted 
that while Syria would initially willingly follow Egypt in cultivating better relations with the 
Eastern Bloc, 'Abd al-Nasir would eventually find it hard to make her follow an opposite 
course if he ever judged that his ties with the Communist world had begun to jeopardise 
Egypt's freedom to act. They now believed that this was actually taking place, having 
received reports that 'Abd al-Nasir had had no foreknowledge of the Syrian-Soviet agreement 
and was now feeling uncomfortable with the increasing Syrian-Soviet rapprochement and 
advances made in Syria by local Communists and fellow-travellers. ^  ^  Hence, Iraq had 
proposed, during the Istanbul discussions, to incorporate Egypt into the secret talks among 
neighbouring governments concerned about what action to take as regards Syria. HO When 
Abd al-Nasir dispatched, on October 13, around 2,000 Egyptian troops to Lattakia allegedly 
to defend Syria against any "Turkish aggression," Westerners interpreted this as a sign of 
Egypt's conviction that any possibility of an armed conflict was remote. Otherwise, Egypt 
would not have committed troops. Egypt's attitude during the UN debate was also 
interpreted as a sign of Egyptian anxiety.
Ankara, too, reacted to the dispatch of the Egyptian contingent with equanimity. Esenbel 
opined that its arrival "might have been to try and prevent the present Syrian regime from 
slipping further into the Russian grip", m
Turkey's attitude had its origins in her steadily improving relations with Egypt since the 
beginning of 1957. Both sides, however, had till then accorded this rapprochement a low 
profile. Since late May 1957, British diplomats in Ankara had reported "a felling off during
108fO371/127829/VB1072/176(C), Wright to FO, 22.12.57. 
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recent months in Egyptian propaganda specifically directed against Turkey"; the presence of 
Menderes at a football match in Istanbul on May 20 between two Egyptian and Turkish 
teams, where he presented a cup to the defeated Egyptians; and favourable comments by 
Cano Radio and the Egyptian charge d’affaires, 'Uthman 'Asal, on the interest shown by 
Menderes in improving Turco-Egyptian relations. 1 ^  Later, the Turkish and Egyptian 
Ministers of Commerce exchanged official visits, and new ambassadors were appointed in 
both capitals. The attendance of Menderes and two other Turkish Ministers at the Egyptian 
embassy's reception to mark Egypt's National Day on June 18 was a unique event, 
commented upon favourably by Cano Radio and accorded fiont-page headline treatment in 
ZaferX^
This rapprochement worried the Western powers and, for entirely different reasons, 
Moscow. Recent Turkish moves, argued Lloyd, "can hardly be said to accord with our* policy 
of going veiy slowly with Nasser and of giving him as little help as possible". Bowker was in 
no doubt that the rapprochement was, as always, "personally directed and controlled" by 
Menderes, although the latter was "evidently under no illusions about Colonel Nasser's 
equivocal attitude to the Baghdad P a c t " .  114 j i i q  Chef de Protocol^ a t  the Turkish Foreign 1 
Ministry explained that Turkey's anti-Egyptian policy since 1955
was actually the work of Monsieur Birgi who was both anti-Nasser and anti-Arab.
Since Birgi had gone [as Turkish ambassador] to London the pro-Arab group in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been working on the Prime Minister. Their advocacy 
of closer relations with the Ar ab countries in addition to Iraq was also in accordance 
with Monsieur Menderes's natural inclinations. The influence of the ex-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Professor Kbprulti could also be discerned there. 1 ^
'Asal comfirms that Menderes was instrumental in changing Turkey's attitude vis-a-vis Egypt 
and that Birgi's departure was crucial to that effect.
Ankara seems to have become apprised of above-mentioned Western apprehension and 
immediately embarked upon a consistent effort to play down the significance of steps already 
taken. Menderes raised the subject of future relations with Egypt during the Karachi Pact 
Council meeting (3-6 June), but facing a unanimous desire to go very slowly with 'Abd al- 
Nasir, retreated immediately and expressed full agreement with the rest.
112FO37i/i28242/VY10344/6, Stewart to Watson, 23.5.57.
113F0371/1301S1/RK10316/1, Bowker to Ross, 31 May & 21 June 1957; The Times, 19.8.57. 
114FO371/130181/RK10316/3, Lloyd to Bowker, 1.8.57; ibid., -/4, Bowker to Lloyd, 24.8.57. 
l^FO371/130181/RK10316/3, Chancery, Istanbul to Levant Department, 10.7.57. Koprulii was well- 
known for his strong desire to keep on good terms with the Arab world as much as possible.
116A1-Katib, Hikayat, 167-68.
117See FO371/130181/RK10316/1 & 3'C'.
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In the autumn, British diplomats detected a slowing down in the rapprochement, caused 
probably by "Nasser's uncompromising stand in favour of the present regime in Syria," and 
delaying the actual exchange of ambassadors until the end of October. This assessment, 
however, should be dealt with some caution, for Ankara remained as tight-lipped as possible 
on its dealings with 'Abd al-Nasir.
Turkey, the Baghdad Pact and Israel
The crisis made Turkey-striving, as before, to expand and consolidate the Baghdad 
Pact-come very close to breaking diplomatic relations with Israel Not long after Zorlu's 
departure from Riyadh, the Turkish Ambassador at Jedda was informed by a close associate 
of King Sa'ud that the latter was ready to consider joining the pact on condition that its name 
was changed to something like the Middle East Pact-thus dropping the name of Baghdad, 
which Sa'ud allegedly disliked for its implications of Iraqi leadership-and Turkey broke off 
relations with Israel. H 9 Moreover, reported Bowker, Bayar had received, in October, a 
letter from Sa'ud
to the effect that cooperation between Saudi-Arabia and Turkey would depend on 
Turkey's aligning herself with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim States over Israel. 
Esenbel said this meant breaking off all relations with Israel, both political and 
commercial. No reply had been sent to that message. Since then the Turkish President 
had received a message from the President of Pakistan conveying a further message 
fr om King Saud on the same subject and I gathered on the same lines. 120
The Turkish government might have also been influenced by Najdat Safwat, the First 
Secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Ankara, who had told British diplomats back on July 31 that 
the Arabs could understand the special position of Britain and the USA, but "could not 
understand, or forgive a purely Middle Eastern state like Turkey declining to break off 
relations with Israel... It was Turkey's persistence, in this, rather than anything else that was 
keeping King Saud out of the Pact, and making him so opposed to T u r k e y " .  121 Given his 
reputedly outspoken character, Safwat could have also shared his views directly with 
influential Turkish politicians.
U 8FO371/130181/RK10316/5(B), FO minute by Watson, 31.7.57.
119FO371/130181/RK10316/7, Bowker toFO, 28.11.57.
120po371/127725/V1022/61, Bowker to FO, 9.12.57. The issue of replacing the Baghdad Pact with an 
alternative Middle Eastern Islamic pact seems to have been informally discussed among Iraqi politicians as 
well. Al-Suwaydi says he favoured such an option; Nuri, did not; see Tawfrq al-Suwaydi, Mudhakkarati: nisf 
qarn-in min tarikh al-'Iraq wa-l-qadiyyah al-’arabiyyah (1969), 568-69.
121fO371/127725/V1022/38, Chancery, Ankara to Chancery, Bagdad, 10.8.57.
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Britain and the USA opposed Ankara's suggestion to break off diplomatic relations with 
Israel. Wlien the Turks specifically solicited Washington's advice, the latter strongly 
discouraged them, while Britain warned that "the Turks should be very careful in dealing with 
King Saud, since we have information which suggests that he may be thinking not so much of 
joining the Baghdad Pact as of joining in a pro-Western Arab alliance on condition that Iraq 
leaves the Baghdad Pact and joins this body". *22 Turkey soon dropped the suggestion.
This simple thought, however, that Turkey could unilaterally break off relations with 
Israel shows that Israeli fears, expressed since 1955, that the Turkish-Iraqi pact would 
gradually cool Turkish-Israeli relations, were not unfounded. It also sheds doubt on the 
correctness of theories propagated by some Western historians on the existence of a "special 
attraction" and "political empathy" between Turkey and Israel, from which Turkey has 
allegedly always resisted to depart even when under strong Ar ab pressure. 123
It is improbable that Ankara sincerely believed that the Palestine question was the real 
cause of all the current turmoil in the Middle East. Soon after the Syrian crisis had abated, 
however, Turkey came under pressure from Iraq and Pakistan to agree to a meeting of the 
regional members of the Baghdad Pact in Istanbul on December 10-11 and promised there 
that Menderes would explain then views on Palestine and other aspects of the Middle Eastern 
situation at the meeting of Heads of government of NATO countries in Paris on December 
16. 'Ali Murntaz stated in Ankar a that Arab states unanimously rejected any partial settlement 
of the Palestine problem, and any solution should encompass a settlement of boundaries 
based on the 1947 UN partition resolution. 124
Menderes duly carried out his promise, stating publicly that the unresolved nature of the 
Palestine question was creating an atmosphere which facilitated the infiltration of 
Communism into the area. He called for a swift solution based on the UN partition 
resolution, but did not make any direct criticism of Israel. 125
122FO371/127810/VB10325/l, FOto Ankara, 12.12.57.
l 2^See Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (1991), 82; Simon, Middle East, 354; and Ihsan 
Giirkan, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process", Turkish Review o f Middle East 
Studies, 7 (1993), 108-09, 112.
124po371/136450/RK101/l, Bowker to Lloyd, 4.2.58; Saad, Iraq, 418-19; Ivanova, Otnoshenie, 20, 73- 
74. There seems to be no independent evidence to corrborate al-Suwaydi's assertion in Mudhakkarati, 556 
that the Ankara meeting also assigned "Iraq to overthrow the Syrian regime, giving the government to 
civilians and keeping the Syrian army out of politics". Al-Suwaydi is not usually reliable as far as dates and 
specific events are concerned, and he has perhaps confused this Ankara meeting with a previous, similar 
informal gathering held to discuss the abortive 1956 coup in Syria.
l 25po37l/l33923/VB 1075/1, Bowker to FO, 1.1.58. Menderes repeated this view when presenting his 
new government program to the GNA on December 4; see Ismail Arar(ed.), Hukumet Programlan 1920-1965 
(1968), 303.
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Baghdad, however, was unable to make full use of Menderes's speech for internal 
propaganda purposes. The Iraqi propaganda machine had been alerted to concentrate on his 
remarks on Palestine. Unfortunately, on the day, none of the major international new agencies 
reported the passage on Palestine. The Iraqi government was extremely bitter both against 
the agencies and the British embassy, which, it assumed, should have alerted them. In the 
end, Iraqi officials had to monitor Ankara Radio to find out what exactly Menderes had said 
and publicised his remarks on Radio Baghdad. This exercise could not be undertaken by the 
local press, however, and the latter did not cover the issue. 126
Even when in Paris, the thought of expanding the pact was not off Menderes's mind. 
During separate meetings with Eisenhower and Dulles on December 18-19, he emphasised 
again that formal US accession would have a favourable effect on "undecided" Arab states 
such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and would take the heat out of the Palestine 
question by reducing the possibility of an Israeli threat to the Arab states. The Americans, 
however, repeated that this "good effect" would be outbalanced by their need to enter into a 
balancing agreement with Israel. Eisenhower only promised to instruct to have the question 
specified further. 127 Dulles, however, promised to take a new look at the problem if Turkey 
could convince Israel not to press for a security arrangement whenever Washington joined 
the pact. Menderes, who, had, only a few weeks ago, been thinking of breaking off relations 
with Israel, surprisingly replied that Turkey was already doing this. 128
The Internal Power Struggle in Syria 
It can be safely contended that Damascus did not entertain any immediate plan to attack any 
of its neighbours. Worries, however, that Syria might, in time, turn into a base to de-stabilise 
neighbouring pro-Western Arab regimes were not entirely illusory. The crisis would certainly 
not have attained such proportions had, first, Washington and, then, Ankara, not taken an 
aggressive stance. Washington's strong reaction to the expulsion of the diplomats, together 
with accumulated Syrian worries about the ultimate intentions of her pro-Western 
neighbours, elevated the originally bilateral American-Syrian problem into an international 
crisis. It did not stop, however, the Syrians from ratifying the accord with Moscow and 
helped pave the way for the Syrian-Egyptian merger. Syria's official attitude during the crisis 
remained generally one of simple reaction. She tried hard not to antagonise Egypt, Iraq or 
Saudi Arabia and dispel worries of Soviet infiltration. Internal popular support for the regime
l26F0371/133885/V1671/2, Wright to Hadow, 10.1.58. 
127FO371/127814/VB10345/34, Bowker to FO, 24.12.57. 
n *FRUS 1955-1957, XIII, 673-75.
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remained strong. Even what was left of the People's Party and, more amazingly, the banned 
SSNP in exile declar ed then* full support.
Behind-the-scenes, however, the alliance of pan-Arab nationalists, radicals and 
Communists was already cracking. With their right-wing, pro-Iraqi adversaries 
comprehensively defeated in December 1956, differences among the victors had, by the 
summer of 1957, deepened. Pan-Arab nationalists, being also dedicated neutralists, feared 
that the Communists were trying to pull Syria and the Arab world away fiom the West and 
closer to the Eastern Camp. Al-Bitar opposed al-'Azm's mission to Moscow, preferring to get 
financial and economic assistance fiom Yugoslavia instead. His Ba'thist colleagues were later 
more conciliatory to the West and Turkey. Al-'Azm and the Communists, however, sensing 
that Syria's adversaries were really after then own skin, took a tougher stand against Ankara 
and Washington and gave little prominence to Saudi mediation attempts. Internal divisions 
within the Syrian Army General Staff were of no less importance, for top army officers had 
the habit of acting independently of Syria's political leadership, and the landing of Egyptian 
troops in Lattakia took place, in all probability, without the prior approval of the 
constitutional, civilian government.
During the crisis, however, not enough attention was paid by foreigners to this increasing 
cleavage, and the exact lines of division became clear to the outside world only during Syria's 
merger with Egypt in early 1958.
129Lesch, Syria, 105-06, 192; al-'Azm, Mudhakkarat, III, 10; FO371/128230/VY1015/297, Scott to 
Rose, 1.10.57.
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9The Era of the Two Arab Unions
The formation, in February 1958, of the United Ar ab Republic (UAR), through the merger of 
Syria and Egypt, and that of the Arab Union (AU) between Iraq and Jordan were most 
dramatic events in modem Middle Eastern history. Diis chapter analyses the Turkish reaction 
to then emergence.
Turkey, the Baghdad Pact and the Formation of the UAR
Discussing in detail the reasons behind and events leading to the emergence of the UAR is 
beyond the scope of this study, 1 Briefly stated, demands for union with Egypt had been 
growing within pan-Arab nationalist circles in Syria in general, and among Ba'thists in 
particular, since 1955, in parallel with the political rapprochement between the two states. 
These demands intensified in late 1957 as the sense of panic and insecurity caused by the 
Turkish- Syrian crisis pushed many Syrians to consider seriously a union with larger, stronger 
and internally stable Egypt. Within the ruling coalition, the Ba'thists were opposing the desire 
of the Communists and followers of al-'Azm to keep Syrian foreign policy independent of 
Egypt thr ough further improvement of relations with the Eastern Bloc. The Ba'thists feared 
that, through then better organisation and grass-roots support, the Communists and then 
allies could outscore them in forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. The Ba'th, 
therefore, supported the Syrian Army General Staffs demand for an immediate and total 
union with Egypt as a way out of Syria's international insecurity and internal political 
wrangling. 'Abd al-Nasir felt he had to agree to the request. Rejecting it could have harmed 
his prestige in the Arab world indefinitely and pushed Syria away fiom his direct influence 
into either the pro-Soviet or pro-Westem camps. He also probably saw in the proposed union 
a springboard to obtain a further foothold in the region in his struggle for supremacy against 
the Hashimites. Prior to giving his agr eement, however, 'Abd al-Nasir seemed the withdrawal 
of Syrian army officers from political life and the dissolution of all Syrian political parties, to 
be replaced, on the Egyptian pattern, by a National Union. Ba'thist leaders believed that 'Abd
^See details in Frost, UAR, 14-150; Seale, Struggle, 307-26; Torrey, Syrian Politics, 347-83; Petran, 
Syria, 124-27; al-'Azm, Muclhakkarat, III, 77-183; Haykal, Ma alladhi, 6ff; Tlas, Mir'at, 724-51.
al-JNasii's policies were modelled along their own notions of radical social reform at home 
and neutralism in foreign policy and, therefore, hoped that, through such reorganisation of 
party-political life in Syria, they could dominate the new unified state ideologically. President 
al-Quwatli and al-'Asali's cabinet, facing a fait accompli, accepted the agreement 
immediately. The only minister to oppose it plainly was al-'Azm. His relations with Cairo had 
been soured since 1955 and he now rightly realised that the union would end his political 
aspirations. The union was first announced in the Egyptian press on 27 January 1958. No 
political organisation in Syria dared to speak in public against either the principle or form of 
the union. Nationalists, Populists and even the Muslim Brotherhood greeted it and dissolved 
themselves, hoping that they could thus get rid of the Communists. The latter, caught 
completely unaware by the flow of events, were, of course, unhappy, but felt that they, too, 
had to support the union in public. Bakdash, however, did not attend the February 5 meeting 
of the Syrian Parliament, which unanimously approved the agreement and nominated 'Abd al- 
Nasir for the office of President of the UAR. Bakdash left Syria the same day and was not to 
return officially until 1966. The union was formalised through referenda held in both Syria 
and Egypt on February 21, which also approved 'Abd al-Nasir's candidacy as president. Soon, 
diplomatic missions in Damascus were formally terminated and asked to present their new 
credentials to 'Abd al-Nasir. ^  On March 8, Yemen established with the UAR a looser Union 
of Arab States, which was left open to other Arab states that might agree to participate in the 
future.
Western officials had, in the past, disliked the possibility of a Syrian-Egyptian union, 
fearing that it "would harden the present divisions in the Arab world and tend to consolidate 
the foothold which the Russians had already obtained". They had also dismissed the various 
Syrian calls to that effect, however, as propaganda. ^  It is not surprising, therefore, 
considering the speed with which the merger came into existence, and the reticence shown in
^FO371/134382/VY1015/16, Scott to Rose, 13.2.58. Prior to the UAR's formal establishment, Syria 
announced the discoveiy of another plot and the arrest of unnamed agents, who, allegedly financed by 
Washington at the cost of $lm  and controlled by Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, had reportedly infiltrated into 
Syria to cause disturbances and start trouble on the Syrian frontier on February 21 to give Turkey and Israel 
an excuse to intervene; see FO371/134382/VY1015/15- 15(A). Subsequent historical research has failed to 
uncover any hard evidence related to these allegations. The Turkish legation in Damascus thought at the time 
that the reports had probably been deliberately inspired by the Syrian government to give it a valid excuse for 
concentrating extra security forces in certain areas to make sure that there was no trouble during the 
plebiscite; see FO371/134382/VY1015/21, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 25.2.58.
-^ For official British views, see F 0371/121864/VY10316/5; ibid., -/9, Graham to Zulueta, 11.7.57; 
FO371/128237/VY10316/1, Middleton to Hayter, 25.7.57. F 0371/128251/VY1051/17, FO minute by Hadow,
6.12.57.
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the past by Egyptian leaders on this subject,^ that all foreign countries concerned were 
caught by surprise and did not earnestly discuss that possibility until at least January 23. 
Moreover, this subject seems not to have come up during preparatory contacts leading to the 
January 28 Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Ankara.
By then, the serious differences among the various components of the ruling coalition in 
Syria were being increasingly noted abroad. The initial Western response was that nothing 
should be done to prevent the developing of a formal split. Public attacks and other measures, 
which could look "like overt hostility to Syria," were avoided. Westerners sympathised with 
the Ba'th, but recognised that, even if the latter came on top, it would still pursue a policy of 
close alignment (aimed towards actual union) with Egypt, which "would command more 
sympathy from public opinion in neighbouring countries than the present one" and 
presumably be no less dangerous to the security of Ir aq, Jordan and Lebanon. Dulles thought, 
therefore, that the West "should not take too discouraging a line with Nuri" if he attempted 
to change the political balance in Syria thr ough Iraqi-inspir ed action. ^
Ankara, too, was aware of the internal differences within the Syrian leadership. Kural 
reported on 24 December 1957 that there was a conflict between the Ba'th and Communist 
parties below the surface. The Ba'th had opposed al-'Azm's visit to Moscow in July, fearing 
that it could enhance Communist prestige. After receiving the results of that visit in a chilly 
fashion, however, it had subsequently been attracted by Soviet promises of assistance. 
Nevertheless, the Populists and, then, the Ba'th had later decided not to participate in and 
ultimately managed to postpone indefinitely the scheduled local elections, fearing that the 
Communists might win "a large number of seats in several Municipal Councils and thus make 
fairly sure of winning the National elections". Egypt, too, had been anxious about al-'Azm's 
increasing influence and her own dwindling prestige in Syria. 'Abd al-Nasir had, therefore, 
sent troops to Syria to re-strengthen his influence and attempted to establish co-operation 
with al-'Asali and his National Party, assuring the latter of his "support in the internal struggle 
against the Communists in Syria". Rural, too, seemed to believe that Ankara should, for the 
time being at least, refrain from publicly attacking the Syrian regime and let matters there 
take their own course. He reported that al-Bitar had, following his return from New York, 
told his Ba'thist colleagues of his conviction "that the Turks would not have attacked Syria 
during the period of Turco-Syrian tension". The anti-Turkish campaign of the Syrian press 
had subsequently dwindled away and had only been briefly revived following Menderes's
4Al-'Azm, Mudhakkamt, III, 106-07; Torrey, Syrian Politics, 332-33; FO371/121864/VY10316/5, 
Trevelyan to FO, 1.7.56.
5FO371/133915/V1072/25, Caccia to FO, 19.1.58; FO371/134382/VY1015/8, Brief for Baghdad Pact 
Council meeting, 20.1.58.
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Paiis speech, which had put al-Bitar in a precarious position. He had come under heavy fire 
from leftists in the Syrian leadership. "If Khalid-el-Azm had not been in Moscow at the time" 
to exchange the ratifications of the Soviet-Syrian agreement of August 1957, Kural 
continued, "he would probably have been able to force Bittar's resignation". There was no 
mention of an impending Syrian-Egyptian union in Kural's detailed report. "The internal 
struggle is a straight fight for power and not to any marked degree an ideological conflict," 
he said, but the Ba'thists could still "give up the struggle and decide to co-operate with the 
Communists if they estimate that the latter are too strong in the c o u n t r y " .  6
Thus, Ankara, too, did not take Syrian calls for an immediate union with Egypt seriously. 
On the night of January 24, Menderes unexpectedly paid a brief visit to Baghdad, but during 
liis high-level negotiations there, the issue of the Egyptian-Syrian union remained olf the 
agenda. Dulles, to assure regional pact-members of Washington's firm support, was going to 
head the US observer delegation during the forthcoming Pact Council meeting for the first 
time. Menderes asked Prince 'Abd al-Ilah to attend the meeting, too, because, with his 
presence, additional pressure could be put on Dulles to agree to
(a) United States full membership of the Pact;
(b) development of United States policy on Palestine towards the Arab point of view;
(c) additional United States economic and military support of the Pact 7
Menderes's main goal was undoubtedly the first. He probably included the other points to 
make his invitation to 'Abd al-Ilah more attractive. For Iraqis, the prospect of US adherence 
seemed to be of no great importance. Nuri did not even mention it when giving Selwyn Lloyd 
a resume on what had been agreed with Menderes in Baghdad.^ The Crown-Prince preferred, 
in the end, to stay away, and requested Nuri to head the Iraqi delegation, despite the fact that 
the latter was not even a cabinet minister at the time. Nuri was accompanied by Foreign 
Minister Bash A'yan, al-Jamah and al-Suwaydi.^
Menderes also raised in Baghdad the question of expediting the establishment of a link 
between the Baghdad Pact and NATO. The Iraqis responded that any legal link with NATO 
would create great difficulties for them, especially because of France's relations with Israel. 
An informal link designed for propaganda purposes would be of no use and would only 
attract further Arab criticism. However, it would be all to the good if there were anything of 
real value to be gained, say, in the military or economic field, by establishing practical
(%O371/134382/VY1015/2, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 3.1.58.
7FO371/133908/VB10345/12, Crawford to FO, 25.1.58
^FO371/134219/VQ1015/3, 'Record of conversation between Lloyd and Nuri', 26.1.58.
9FO371/133914/VB1072/8, Wright to FO, 11.1.58.
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relations with NATO. The Iraqis requested, however, that, in this last case, and for the 
reasons mentioned, there should be no publicity on the subject. ^
Finally, Menderes urged the Palace to re-appoint Nuri as Premier. Menderes returned 
"fairly satisfied with the result of his mission". He "had been badly shaken by Ah Jaudet's 
behaviour in the summer and did not think that the present Iraqi Government was much 
stronger. He felt that the internal situation was deteriorating and it was vital that Nuri should 
be brought back". Ring Faysal and 'Abd al-Ilah told him that new elections were indeed being 
planned, probably in May, to pave Nuri's way back to the premiership. 11
Once the Ankara Council meeting got off1 officially, however, it was the impending 
Egyptian-Syrian union that received most attention behind-the-scenes. At the suggestion of 
Dulles, two specially restricted sessions were held on January 28-29 to discuss the issue. ^  
All delegations present thought that the Syrian people was somewhat dragged by its leftist 
leaders into this hasty union, which, they agreed, would also bring about a critical situation in 
Lebanon, Jordan, Ir aq and Saudi Arabia. "The majority of the Syrian people, if they had free 
choice, would prefer union with Iraq rather than with Egypt," said Nuri and asked whether 
the participants "would encourage Iraq, if there were elements in Syria which wished to get 
rid of the Egyptians and the Russians" and "work for union between Iraq and Syria". He also 
"alluded to the Iraqi frontier dispute with Syria, saying that the districts of the Mosul Vilayet 
which were allocated to Syria would in fact much prefer to be united with Iraq and he was 
sure that if they had a free choice that was the way they would go". ^  Menderes, however, 
believed "that Iraq was not now strong enough to take any effective action on its own against 
Syria, even with the help of Jordan". He, together with Ali Quli Ardalan, Iran's Foreign
10FO371/133908/VB10345/12, Crawford to FO, 25.1.58.
1 ^ F0371/134197/VQ1015/13, 'Record of conversation between Lloyd and Menderes', 25.1.58.
12See details in FRUS 1958-1960, X, Part 2, 33-38; FO371/134386/VY10316/10G, Lloyd to Butler, 
28.1.58; FO371/134389/VY10316/115G, 'Record of specially restricted meeting', 29.1.58.
13 It should be remembered that Nuri had never considered post-World War I boundaries in the Middle 
East as sacrosanct. In addition to his famous proposal to the British government in 1943 to establish a "Fertile 
Crescent" unity, he reportedly offered Turkish Foreign Minister JjSiikru Saracoglu in June 1940-without 
having raised the issue beforehand with the Iraqi cabinet-tlie possibility of Iraq ceding her Kurdish-populated 
territories to Turkey, in return for Turkish support for an Iraqi-Syrian union; see Naji Shawkat, Sirah wa 
dhih'ayat thamanin 'am-an (1977), 391-92, 405-06. Finally, on 8 January 1957, Nuri told the US charge in 
Baghdad that no step should be taken towards a federal Egyptian-Syrian union "without the Syrian people 
being given the opportunity to express their views". Nuri asked "whether it would be consonant" with the 
Eisenhower Doctrine "for Iraq to request the United Nations to send a mission of three or more 
representatives of neutral countries, such as the Scandinavian countries or Switzerland, (he did not consider 
India as a neutral) to ascertain the wishes of the people on the borders of Syria and Iraq by means of a 
plebiscite or free vote". He "believed that the tribal areas in Syria west of the Iraqi frontier and south of the 
Turkish frontier as far as perhaps a line from say, Jerablus southwards, would prefer to join Iraq," claiming 
that "he would be willing for a free vote to be taken in the corresponding tribal areas on the Iraq side of the 
frontier as well"; see FO371/128249/VY10393/1, Wright to FO, 8.1.57.
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Minister, criticised Iraq for "maintaining that nothing could be done because the Arabs were 
in favour of Arab unity". "If the Iraqis thought that their union was more important than 
resisting Soviet Imperialism," warned Menderes, "then other countries would have to revise 
their policy" and "take steps to defend themselves". "Turkey was in danger of being encircled, 
and some action must be taken". "The Syrians were very different from the Hungarians," and 
"Communism could easily gain a firm hold in Syria without the necessity of the Russians 
putting in any forces". Iraq needed the help of other Arab states, said Menderes, and called 
on participants to co-ordinate a common policy to persuade other Arab states to join forces 
with Iraq. Dulles and Lloyd made clear that their governments would not themselves take any 
initiative against the union, but promised to support any Arab initiative to that effect, 
preferring some sort of co-ordinated action taken by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. 
Dulles opined that the Baghdad Pact, too, should not take any concerted action before 
knowing the views of the Arab countries. He was doubtful, however, "that any Arab state 
seemed prepared to act on the strength of United States backing". "In fact," concluded he 
sarcastically, "the only people who were prepared to take effective action in the area were 
Nasser and Ben Gurion". Dulles then called on Iraq to "bring the Arah countries to express 
disapproval of Egyptian-Syrian union and say that it was not true Arab unity at all". "There 
should be rapid exploration under Iraqi auspices (with the help of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
the Lebanon) to discern what opportunities existed to bring to light opposition elements in 
Syria" and any emerging internal opposition there "should receive the recognition and 
support of the other members of the Pact". Otherwise, any "action by Iraq alone would be 
[still] better than nothing". Washington, said Dulles, could not give Moscow any kind of 
ultimatum to keep off, since it was not overtly involved in the matter. *4 The British FO staff 
following developments fiom London, in turn, notified the UK delegation in Ankara that any 
Iraqi attempt to incorporate parts of Northeast Syria would surely consolidate the Syrian- 
Egyptian alignment and "provide an admirable opportunity for further Soviet penetration". 
They suggested that, in the prevailing circumstances, existing contingency plans formulated 
by the Ar ab Committee might have more chances of success to halt the leftward drift in Syria. 
The plans referred to assumed an "Iraqi (and Jordanian) military intervention at the request of 
a Syrian revolutionary government" that would preserve Syria's independence.^
Esenbel lightly remarked later that "everybody [in Ankara] seemed to be waiting for 
someone else to make the first move and that there was a lamentable lack of leadership".^
14See also FRUS 1958-1960, XIII, 412-13.
l^FO371/134386/VY10316/10G, Dean to Lloyd, 29.1.58. For the Arab Committee, see p. 119, note 73.
^FO371/134388/VY10316/74, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 11.2.58.
200
Hence, the meeting only concluded that "the initial reaction [to the announcement of the 
union] should be cautious, that no move should be made which might have the effect of 
cementing the Union, and that the first positive reaction should come fiom the other Arab 
states and not fiom the Western p o w e r s " . ^  It also agreed to encourage resistant and 
dissident elements inside Syria; give prominence, in Arab countries, to public expressions of 
opposition to the extinction of an independent Arab state as a national entity and its 
absorption under the military dictatorship o f ’Abd al-Nasir; and, finally, help Iraq in trying to 
associate itself with Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, but also with Sudan, Libya, Tunisia 
and Morocco, in opposing or acting against the union. 18
The impending Egyptian-Syrian union did not, of course, push all original items off the 
Ankara meeting agenda. It softened, however, the criticism that Britain and the USA were 
accustomed to hear fiom regional members concerning the amount of aid given. ^  The 
question of US membership, too, was put on the back-bumer and, as far as this author has 
been able to gather, not raised again until the July 14 revolution in Iraq.
Nuri pleaded again for an early solution of the Palestine problem in accordance with past 
UN resolutions and called for the reactivation of the 1949 UN Palestine Conciliation 
Commission, which had consisted of American, French and Turkish membership. Iraqi 
delegates asked for a direct reference in the final communique to Palestine and, preferably, to 
the relevant UN resolutions as well, which, they said, "would take the wind out of' the "sails" 
of Iraqi opponents of the pact. Iraq could do nothing as regards the UAR, argued Nuri, 
unless she got moral support over Palestine. His suggestion was received very coolly, 
however. Other regional members "made it quite clear that, if a specific mention to Palestine 
were to be included, they would have to ask that questions of special interest to them should 
also be mentioned". They, especially Feroze Khan Noon, the Pakistani Premier, "pressed the 
Iraqis to accept that the Communist threat was an issue on its own and would have to be 
dealt with even if the Arab-Israel dispute did not exist". Dulles, in turn, opined that attempts 
to reactivate the commission were certainly not what the situation demanded, stressing that 
the degree to which Washington could co-operate with the pact would largely depend on 
whether Americans were convinced that it was an organisation designed to defend the area 
against international Communism rather than an instrument for prosecuting the Arab cause 
over Palestine. The Iraqis ultimately gave in-reportedly "not very graceftdly"~and accepted
17FO371/133915/VB1072/59(A), FO minute by Hadow, 5.2.58.
18FO371/134386/VY10316/12G, Lloyd to FO, 29.1.58.
19FO371/133915/VB1072/47, Lloyd to FO, 30.1.58.
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to drop any reference to the UN resolutions on Palestine. 20 Both al-Jamali and al-Suwaydi 
claim, however, that Dulles later visited the Iraqi embassy in Ankara and promised to re-open 
discussions on the future of Palestine, including the possibility of reactivating the Conciliation 
Commission, during the next annual UN General Assembly session the following September. 
Al-Suwaydi adds that Dulles also agreed to review Nuri's proposal to exclude France from
that commission. 21
Iraq's request that the USA and UK should put pressure on France to hold elections in 
Algeria was also turned d o w n .  22 I r a q i  leaders still tried to keep a brave face in public, 
however. Bash A'yan stated that Palestine and Algeria had been discussed in Ankara, and that 
Iraqis had "found more response" from the other delegations. "All agree that a quick solution 
of the Palestine question according to the United Nations resolutions is n e c e s s a r y " .22
Turkey, of course, had her own quarrel with Britain over Cyprus. Lloyd had brought to 
Ankara new British proposals to solve the problem, but the Turks continued to insist on 
partition.24 Turkey, however, did not push the Cyprus issue into the meeting agenda and its 
absence seemed not to diminish Turkish "warmth and friendliness" towards their British
guests. 2 5
With no firm decision taken in Ankara on how to oppose the UAR, Western powers and 
their regional allies inevitably drifted toward a more resigned and somewhat philosophical 
attitude. There were no indications of organised opposition within Syria. Instead, talk of a 
union had apparently aroused considerable spontaneous enthusiasm among the Damascene 
masses. Western observers hoped that the union would reduce Communist influence in Syria 
and represent a real set-back for Soviet influence in the area. They estimated that the union 
could survive for a number of years until opposition would develop, in the long run, amongst 
conservative elements in Aleppo, as well as ethnic and religious minorities throughout Syria,
20FO371/134386/VY10316/10G, Lloyd to Butler, 28.1.58; F 0371/133915/VB1072/47, Lloyd to FO, 
30.1.58; F 0371/133915/VB1072/51, 'Summary record of part of discussion at restricted session1, 30.1.58.
Al-Jamali, Dhikrayat, 115-16; idem., Mawaqif 146, 167-68; al-Suwaydi, Mudhakkarati, 556.
22F0371/133915/VB1072/59(A), FO minute by Hadow, 5.2.58.
23F0371/133916/VB1072/68, Wright to FO, 19.2.58.
24Ba£ci, Demokrat, 116.
25F 0371/133916/VB1072/70, Wright to Lloyd, 12.2.58. Moreover, when Nuri stopped off in Ankara in 
early June 1958, on his way to London, he volunteered during conversations with Menderes, to take up, while 
in London, the Cyprus question in an attempt to gain British support for the Turkish position. The Turkish 
authorities, however, having no great confidence in Nuri as an intermediary, feared that any such intervention 
might eventually even harm their cause and immediately asked Ambassador Birgi in London to urge restraint 
on Nuri; see FO371/134219/VQ1051/19, FO minute by Hoyer-Millar, 25.6.58. Turkey did accept, however, 
NATO mediation in the Cyprus dispute; see Karpat, Transition, 143-44; Bagci, Demokrat, 118, 162.
202
who would probably lose then- quasi-constitutional right to participate in running the Syrian
government.
Among Syria's neighbours, it was only in Turkey that the growing belief about Soviet 
unhappiness made some difference to the official attitude. For conseivative Arab 
governments, whether a check against communism in Syria or not, 'Abd al-Nasir would, as 
head of the UAR, become an even more formidable ideological enemy and a rallying point for 
then* internal radical opponents. Turkey, however, had been improving her relations with 
Egypt for over a year. In this new atmosphere, Kural's views, on coming to terms with the 
Ba'th Party and other radical nationalist, but anti-Communist, elements in Syria, had finally 
found some attentive ears in Ankara. Kural had already been trying, within the limits of his 
jurisdiction, to strengthen the position of all anti-Communist forces in Syria. He, in parallel 
with the attempts of the Egyptian ambassador, Mahmud Riyad, had persuaded the 65 right- 
wing Syrian deputies, who had resigned then* seats in early June 1957 with the intention of 
forcing new legislative elections, to return to the Chamber, Argued Kural: "They would have 
even less influence outside Parliament than they had inside it".27 Later, when al-Quwatli 
attempted, for personal reasons, to transfer al-Sarraj to a diplomatic post abroad, Kural 
thought it would be against the interests of the Baghdad Pact powers for al-Sarraj "to go at 
this stage, since he was potential opponent of Soviet influence".28
Turkish diplomats privately admitted that information they received about the factors 
behind the union and the Soviet attitude towards the latter was contradictory. Menderes told 
Dulles on January 26 that "the main pressure for union came from Syria, that the Soviet 
Union and Syrian Communists were behind the pressure. Nevertheless, the willingness of the 
Egyptian regime to go along with the idea demonstrated that Egypt was collaborating with 
the Communists".29 Kural, in the meantime, had rightly informed Ankara in early February 
that al-Quwatli's "departure for Cano [to finalise the union agreement] had been preceded by 
violent disagreement in the Syrian Cabinet and Parliament (sic I). Khalid El Azm in particular 
was known to have been strongly opposed to the Union".29 Sources emanating from Beirut, 
however, had claimed that the union had actually been engineered by al-Bizii, implementing 
decisions made in Moscow, which had reportedly realised the impossibility of establishing a
26FRUS 1958-1960, XII, 39-42; FO371/134386/VY10316/4, Noble to Lloyd, 28.1.58; ibid., -/8, FO to 
Beirut, 28.1.58; FO371/134386/VY10316/32G, Caccia to FO, 4.2.58; FO371/134381/VY1011/1, Middleton 
to Lloyd, 6.2.58; FO371/134388/VY10316/69, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 12,2,58; F0371/ 
134382/VY1015/19, Scott to Rose, 20.2.58.
27FO371/128222/VY1015/64, Middleton to FO, 5.6.57; ibid., -/68, Stewart to Watson, 7.6.57.
28FO371/128232/VY1015/346, Johnston to FO, 29.10.57.
29FRUS1958-1960, X, Part 2, 737.
30jfo371/134388/VY103 16/74, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 11.2.58.
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Communist stronghold in Syria and had therefore taken the initiative in forming the UAR, 3 1 
The Assistant Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Zeki Kuneralp, was still 
undecided, on February 10, whether Bakdash's departure from Syria was a sign "that 
Communists were not pleased" or simply a "manoeuvre".3 2 Turkish officials admitted, 
however, that even if the advance of Communism had been checked as a result of the Syrian- 
Egyptian merger, the UAR would still "militate against the interests of Middle Eastern 
countries in general and especially those of Arab kingdoms. It would also threaten the 
independence of Arab States in North Africa and not contribute to the re-establishment of 
peace in the area".33 Ankara dismissed any lingering hopes that Egypt could still be won over 
with offers of economic help. 'Abd al-Nasir's aims went beyond what the West could provide 
and could be gained only at the West's expense. He wanted to gain control of the oil fields in 
Saudi Arabia and, possibly, Iraq, and, to achieve that objective, he still needed Moscow's co­
operation. 34 Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and not Turkey or Israel, should be worried by 
the formation of the UAR, emphasised one Turkish political commentator, because 'Abd al- 
Nasir was exploiting the idea of a great Arab state to acquire their natural resources and their 
thinly-populated agricultural land.3 5
All these Turkish reservations, however, were kept strictly off official statements. Ankara 
wished to avoid a position of strong opposition to the UAR, in particular since there had been 
no resistance within Syria, even among the tribes. 36 Hence, beginning with a press 
conference given on January 27 by Turkey's new Foreign Minister, Zorlu, Ankara regularly 
underlined that "Turkey's attitude towards the Union would depend on its orientation". If it 
would remove Syria from the Soviet axis, Turkey would be particularly pleased, as she did 
not like to see any of her neighbours or fellow nations "become tools of the aggressive aims 
of international C o m m u n is m " .  37 Zorlu told the GNA on February 25 that Turkey "hoped that 
Egypt would be able to exercise a positive influence on Syria and that she should succeed in 
protecting Syria, as she had already done for herself against Communist infiltration and in 
safeguarding the policy of the United Arab Republic fiom Communist influence". "Turkey 
had made efforts to improve relations with Egypt," and "at present friendly relations existed
31FO371/134387/VY10316/65, Roberts to FO, 12.2.58; FO371/133798/V10344/2G, Bowker to Rose, 
9.4.58.
3^F0371/134388/VY 10316/74, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 11.2.58.
33FO371/134387/VY10316/65, Roberts to FO, 12.2.58.
34FO371/133798/V10344/2G, Bowker to Rose, 9.4.58.
33Dunya, 11.2.58.
3^FO371/133798/V10344/l, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 2.4.58,
3^Kiirk9U0^1u, Tiirkiye'mn Politikasi, 113-14; FO371/134387/VY10316/58, Chancery, Ankara to Levant 
Department, 7.2.58; FO371/136456/RK1022/4, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.2.58.
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between the two countries". "Turkey felt no enmity against Nasser and there are no problems 
between him and Turkey". 38
’Abd al-Nasir appeared satisfied with the public Turkish reaction and thanked the Turkish 
ambassador in Cairo for Zorlu's friendly references to the UAR and himself, repeating that he 
"was fighting and determined to fight the Communists11. ^  'Abd al-Nasir also told US 
Ambassador Raymond Hare, on March 20, that he had been trying to keep the USA and 
Turkey entirely out of his speeches when attacking "imperialism" in general.40
The Turkish opposition RPP advocated a policy of "wait and see without being hostile" 
until, it said, the general policy of the union became clear. The party hoped that the UAR's 
policy "would be governed with a mentality of peace and friendship," because its ultimate 
survival "would largely depend on its policy towards its neighbours".41
The official recognition of the UAR by Turkey was delayed, however, due to Iraqi 
reluctance to do the s a m e .  42
Turkey and the Formation of the AU
Iraq could not publicly condemn the principle of Arab unity, which she had always staunchly 
advocated. Mhjan stated in Parliament that "the question of unity concerned the Egyptian and 
Syrian peoples" and that "he wished them success". His only expressed regret was "that Iraq 
and other Arab countries had not been asked for then views on the projected union before it 
had been announced, as it was expected in accordance with the ties of Arab brotherhood". 
Behind-the-scenes, however, the Iraqi cabinet formally concluded on February 4 that the 
Syrian-Egyptian merger "constituted a threat to the structur e and regime of Ir aq," by bringing 
to her doorstep the Egyptian revolution, which many Iraqi leaders now believed, was "not 
intended to be for domestic consumption only but to be followed by a similar form of 
revolution in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and ultimately in Saudi Arabia". Moreover, the emphasis 
on the "Republican" form of the union could hinder Ir aq's future expansion; the iuture of the 
free flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean was now at 'Abd al-Nasir's mercy; and Soviet- 
Syrian co-operation in the development of the upper waters of the Euphrates could also in 
the long-term hinder Iraq's irrigation schemes. The establishment doubted the loyalty of 
certain junior army officers and feared that spontaneous manifestations of joy among 
opposition nationalist circles and students-who had, almost without exception, welcomed the
38FO371/136456/RK1022/4, Bowker to Lloyd, 28.2.58.
3^FO371/133798/V10344/l, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 2.4.58,
40FRUS1958-1960, XIII, 435.
4ffiO371/136456/RK1022/2, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 11.2.58.
42s ee infra.
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UAR very enthusiastically as an important step towards foil Arab unity-could create an 
uncontrollable situation. Mirjan was empowered, therefore, to introduce, whenever 
necessary, martial law (or lesser emergency powers) to maintain internal security.43
In the long-term, however, it was imperative for the Hashimite monarchies of Iraq and 
Jordan to take some drastic counter-measure in order not to concede all the laurels of Arab 
unity to 'Abd al-Nasir. Attempts to forge some sort of alternative union, between Iraq, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, had already been launched by King Husayn on January 27.44 Many Iraqis, 
including Nuri, were initially worried that Jordan would be an economic burden on Iraq and 
that the standard of living in Iraq would be adversely affected. Prince Abd al-Hah, in turn, 
feared that a counter-alignment of monarchies against Egypt and Syria might be unpopular. 45 
Ultimately, however, he went along with the Iraqi cabinet's unanimous decision of February 4 
to work for a closer association between Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The cabinet had 
decided further that Iraq and Jordan should go it alone if Saudi Arabia proved reluctant to 
participate, and that the tiny, but oil-rich, sheikhdom of Kuwait should also be asked to join, 
for "the best chance for the oil producing Arab countries was to stand together in a 
confederation. Otherwise they would be swallowed one by o n e " .46 Iraqi leaders also thought 
that Kuwait's riches could be useful to consolidate economically any union with Jordan, 
without any reliance on outside assistance in the future. The setting up of a confederation, 
said Abd al-Ilah, should be followed by the active encouragement of dissidence in Syria. 
Syria, too, should ultimately be brought into the projected confederation, "by the use of force 
if there was no way," for "if the present trend of events, both inside Iraq and in the 
neighbouring countries, continued without further check, the situation would crumble 
irretrievably within a period of months and certainly before the end of the year. The impact of 
Nasser's success and propaganda would prove too strong". 'Abd al-Uah emphasised, 
however, that "rather than succumb it would be better for the Hashemites to go down 
fighting honour ably ".4 7
These attempts received general approval during the Ankara meeting. Noon "kept 
pressing Nuri, sometimes in rather insulting terms, to take some action including union with
43FO371/134197/VQ1015/2, Wright to Lloyd, 28.12.57; ibid, - / l l ,  Wright to FO, 11.2.58; F0371/ 
134386/VY10316/28(A) & 31, Wright to FO, 4-5 February 1958; FO371/134387/VY10316/41G, Wright to 
FO, 6.2.58.
^FRUS 1958-1960, XI, 268.
45FO371/134036/VJ1071/17G, Crawford to FO, 31.1.58.
46FO371/134386/VY10316/37G, Wright to FO, 5.2.58.
47FO371/134198/VQ1015/18G, Wright to FO, 26.2.58. See also FO371/133814/V1072/81G, Wright to 
Lloyd, 21.3.58.
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Jordan (with or without Saudi A ’a b ia ) " 4 ^ and urged "the Iraqis to get on rapidly with a 
federation," commending "to them the solution in Malaya [inaugurated in 1948 and continued 
after the country's independence in 1957], where the Sultans had agreed among themselves a 
system of rotation as Heads of State". Lloyd backed Noon, saying that "a coordinated Ar ab 
reaction" was needed, "leading to a new pattern of Arab association, another grouping of 
Arab s t a t e s " .49 Warning that Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon may otherwise 
succumb one by one, Lloyd assured that any such initiative would enjoy the pact's and 
Washington’s support.^
With King Sa'ud ultimately preferring to stay aloof, it fell to Iraq and Jordan to go it 
alone. An alternative association between Iraq and Jordan, the Arab Union, was established 
on February 14. The two countries agreed to establish, within three months, a single federal 
government with each entity retaining its own political system and sovereignty over its 
territories. Foreign policy, diplomatic service, military affairs, customs and educational 
systems would be unified first, followed by work on unifying the currencies and co-ordinating 
financial and economic policies. Husayn conceded the office of the Head of the Union to 
Faysal and agreed to become his deputy, in return for Jordan being, despite its smaller 
population, equally represented with Iraq in the projected joint legislative assembly. The flag 
used by the Hashimites during the Great Arab Revolt of 1916 was symbolically adopted as 
the flag of the AU.51 Faysal and Husayn also agreed privately that whenever King Sa'ud 
decided to join the AU, he should automatically be asked to head it. 52 Iraq undertook to 
meet 80% of the federal budget in the fir st year, thus adding an annual burden of £ 17m on the 
Iraqi treasury. Later, however, Washington promised to contribute $25m and Britain, $4m 
annually for the next three years to cover some of the union's budgetary e x p e n s e s .  53
Within Iraq, the Palace considered the situation too grave for trifling. Mitjan, considered 
"too irresolute and vague," especially in trying to challenge 'Abd al-Nasir on the airwaves, 
was forced to resign on March 2, and Nuri immediately formed the next cabinet. To show 
"that Iraq has firmly taken up the challenge delivered by Colonel Nasser," the new 
government included heavyweights like al-Jamali (Foreign Affairs), al-Qazzaz (Interior) and 
Bash A'yan (Information and AU Affairs).54
48FO371/134386/VY10316/10G, Lloyd to Butler, 28.1.58.
49f o 371/134389/VY10316/115G, 'Record of specially restricted meeting', 29,1,58.
5°FO371/134386/VY10316/12G, Lloyd to FO, 29.1.58.
51Hussein, Metier, 153-54; Saad, Iraq, 195-96; FRUS1958-1960, XII, 293-94.
52FO371/134025/VJ10393/47, Johnston to FO, 20.2.58.
5^Saad, Iraq, 205; FO371/134219/VQ1051/14, 'Conversation between Lloyd and 'Abd al-Ilah', 6.6.58; 
FO371/140896/EQ1011/1, Crawford to Lloyd, 29.1.59.
54FO371/134198/VQ1015/19, 22 & 27.
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New, rigged legislative elections followed on May 5, during which reportedly "no Deputy 
was elected who did not have the blessing of the Government". Opposition leaders did not 
bother to run and publicly called for a boycott, while newspapers reported the results only in 
their inside pages as a perfunctory matter. 5 5 The new Parliament amended the Iraqi 
constitution to conform with the new constitution of the AU. On May 19, an AU 
government, headed by Nuri and having an equal number of Iraqi and Jordanian ministers, 
based in Baghdad, was formed to deal with matters of defence, finance and foreign affairs. It 
assumed its duties on July 1. The foreign affairs portfolio went to al-Suwaydi. The regional 
Iraqi cabinet was, therefore, duly reconstructed with Ahmad Mukhtar Bab an appointed as
Prime Minister. 56
Menderes and Zorlu publicly welcomed this closer association between two friendly, pro- 
Western Arab governments. Bayar and Menderes sent on February 16 messages of 
congratulation to Kings Faysal and Husayn, and official recognition followed on February 
20.57 privately, however, the Turkish line was more realistic. A meeting of Turkish 
diplomatic representatives in the Middle East, held in Ankara in late March, under the 
chairmanship of Zorlu, concluded that the AU was "perhaps the last and only hope in the 
Middle East area itself of effective opposition to Colonel Nasser," and "therefore deserved 
every support that Turkey and other well-disposed Governments could give it".58
The only question that Turkey wished to see clarified before the AU came into existence 
was the issue of Jordan's future relations with the Baghdad Pact. Tbe Turkish ambassador 
offered King Husayn, in early February, "an unconditional Turkish guarantee of military aid 
against Israel attack if Jordan would enter the Baghdad Pact". The King and his Foreign 
Minister replied, however, that "this was not practical politics at present" and "seemed to 
doubt the tactical wisdom of the Turks in pressing so keenly for it". 59
The Western powers, however, were not so enthusiastic to have Jordan in the pact. 
Rumours that Jordan had raised the possibility of Iraq leaving the pact received mixed 
reactions in the State Department. Some staff members argued that it would be better if Iraq 
left, for her position in the Arab world had been weakened by her membership in the pact. 
"With Ir aq out," they argued, Washington "would no longer be inhibited by fear of trouble 
with the Israelis from joining the Pact, which could revert to the original 'northern tier'
55Ai-'Akam, Ta'rikh, 337; Grassmuck, "Process", 400, 414-15; FO371/134198/VQ1015/37, Falle to 
Hadow, 21.4.58; ibid., -/46, Wright to Lloyd, 10.5.58.
56FO371/134028/VJ10393/134, Wright to FO, 19.5.58.
57F0371/133912/VB10393/5, Bowker to FO, 17.2.58; FO371/134025/VJ10393/50, Bowker to FO, 
21.2.58; FO371/136456/RK1022/4, Bowker to Lloyd, 28.2.58.
58F0371/133798/V10344/1, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 2.4.58.
59F0371/133813/V1072/5, Johnston to FO, 6.2.58.
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concept". Furthermore, after Iraq's withdrawal from the pact, a new and wider Arab grouping 
could be formed instead, and Saudi Arabia might then even agree to join the AU. Other State 
Department officials, however, wanted Iraq to stay, arguing "that the effect of Iraq's 
withdrawal on the Baghdad Pact would be disastrous" for the preservation of Western 
influence in the Middle East and that it "was not necessary to the success of union between 
Iraq and Jordan". Sa'ud, they claimed, "would not join the new Union; and that it would be of 
doubtful advantage if he did". They wanted to discourage Jordan "from pressing the point" of 
Iraq's withdrawal and urge Iraq "to resist". The Department eventually said "that Iraq should 
decide for herself'. Britain, too, wanted Iraq to stay the pact, motivated probably by the 
desire not to lose the military facilities, that she enjoyed under the 1955 Special Agreement, 
which was tied to Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact. 60
In the end, Iraq and Jordan agreed that each side would abide by the international 
agreements it had entered before the establishment of the AU, without there being any 
corresponding obligation on the other, i.e. Jordan would remain outside the pact, while Iraq 
would stay in.61 Jordan did not tiy to persuade the Iraqis "to break their obligations under 
the Baghdad Pact. All she wanted was that they should be fully aware of her views when the 
time came for them to consider then* position under the Pact, and i.e., at the end of five year 
p e r i o d " .62 Britain was pleased with this arrangement as she would not have to extend her 
present obligations to Ir aq to cover Jordan as w e l l .  62
Iraqi Ambassador Najib al-Rawi assured Menderes on February 17 that "there was 
absolutely no foundation to the reports that Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact had 
been put forward as a condition of the Arab Union".64 Ankara accepted the explanation. 
According to Kuneralp, "for the time being at any rate the Turkish Government thought it 
would be unprofitable to try and peer more deeply into the future".65
It seems probable, however, that Ankara gave some kind of informal assurance to Jordan 
to come to her assistance in case of an unprovoked Israeli attack. Al-Jamali told a Turkish 
journalist that Turkish politicians had accepted in principle to intervene if Jordan were 
attacked by Israel. The RPP, therefore, claimed again, based on this report, that the 
government was giving away too many commitments without consulting the GNA. Kuneralp, 
however, said on March 14 that "it was quite untrue that the Turkish Government had
6°FO371/133908/VB 10345/18, Morris to Hadow, 24.2.58.
61FO371/133911/VB10380/l, FO minute by Hadow, 18.2.58.
62FO371/134024/VJ10393/24, Johnston to FO, 17.2.58.
63FO371/133911/VB10380/2, Rose to Johnston, 29.5.58.
64F0371/133912/VB10393/5, Bowker to FO, 17.2.58.
65pO371/133912/VJ10393/7, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 25.2.58.
209
recognised any specific obligation," adding ambiguously that if Jordan were actually attacked 
by Israel, "the Turkish Government might have to consider their position". 6 6
The "practical demonstration of Iraqi loyalty to the Pact" reportedly gave Turkey "much 
satisfaction" and recovered in Turkish eyes much of the ground that Iraq had lost during the 
Syrian crisis and the UN debate on Cyprus in autumn 1957. On the whole, the tendency in 
Ankara reportedly was "to assume that it is Jordan which has been brought nearer practical 
co-operation with the Baghdad Pact rather than that the Iraqi connexion with it had been 
weakened". 67
Turkey and the Recognition of the UAR
With no real reasons to justify delaying recognition to a new state that had been formed 
observing, in outward appearances at least, all the criteria needed of a voluntary union, 
Ankara would have probably preferred to grant early recognition to the UAR, especially in 
view of its relatively improved relations with 'Abd al-Nasir. The Middle Eastern members of 
the Baghdad Pact had agreed in Ankara, however, that they would take a common line on the 
issue of recognition, and Iraq's reluctance to recognise the UAR later caused Turkey 
problems.
Iraqi leaders had been disinclined to recognise the UAR even before their agreement with 
Jordan. They had not congratulated its formation officially and had barred the post office 
fiom transmitting to Cairo and Damascus individual cables of appreciation. 6 8  Iraqi diplomats 
in both Morocco and Libya, and, possibly, in other like-minded Arab states as well, were 
instructed to consult with their Baghdad Pact colleagues and try to urge their host 
governments jointly to act in concert with other Arab states and not recognise the UAR 
precipitately. 69 After the decision to establish the AU, Iraq and Jordan agreed that neither 
government should recognise the UAR de jure until the formation of the first AU 
government, so as not to prejudice in advance the decision of the latter when the time
came. 70
On February 21, Bash A'yan asked the heads of mission in Baghdad of Iran, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Britain and the USA to withhold recognition for the time being. The decision, he 
said, "had been taken first and foremost because Jordan wished it," but also because both Iraq
66FO371/133940/VBl 193/1, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 17.3.58.
67FO371/134025/VJ10393/48, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 18.2.58.
68Saad, Iraq, 267, 273-74; FO371/134386/VY10316/28, Wright to FO, 4.2.58.
69FO371/134387/VY10316/45(A), Graham to FO, 10.2.58; FO371/134388/VY10316/91, Chancery, 
Rabat to African Department, 12.2.58.
70FO371/134388/VY10316/98, Wright to FO, 20.2.58.
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and Jordan believed the UAR was "against the wishes of the majority of the Syrian people 
who were being given no free opportunity to express their views". "Immediate de jure 
recognition would be discouraging to such elements in Syria as might wish to dissent from, or 
oppose, virtual annexation by Egypt". Moreover, Iraq still did not know the UAR's attitude 
towards the security of the IPC pipeline. Bash A'yan thought that Egypt, too, "was not in any 
particular hurry for frill recognition, for at any rate perhaps a month or two ... provided this 
were on a basis of reciprocity". The Iraqi government would not query the credentials of 
representatives of the UAR at international conferences, but would also wish not to seive on 
a credentials committee.71 On the same day, the Iraqi government issued an official internal 
circular explaining, in the same terms, the reasons behind its decision not to recognise the 
UAR, and, two days later, cabled to that effect to fellow conservative Arab governments.7 2
Iran and Pakistan were considerably disturbed by Iraq's request and postponed 
recognition only with the greatest reluctance.7 3  Ankara, however, was more forthcoming. 
Zorlu thought that, in this specific case, "Turkey's decision should be subordinated to the 
over-riding necessity of supporting Iraq at the moment when she is inclined to feel isolated 
and that the tide is running against her" .7 4  He informed the American and Baghdad Pact 
embassies that Turkey did not intend to recognise the UAR in the immediate future and 
thought that the rest should follow a common line. An Egyptian-Sudanese border dispute, 
prominent at the time, on the region of al-Halayib, added Zorlu, could provide another reason 
for delay. ^ ^ For Ankara, the presence of its ambassador in Caho amounted to de facto 
recognition, and it hoped that the eventual transition to de jure recognition would be 
achieved, without the need of a public statement, when the ambassador would present his 
new credentials to 'Abd al-Nasir.7^
The Iraqi request was impractical and destined from the start to failure. It was always 
clear that it would be veiy difficult for Iraq's friends and allies to keep then word and delay 
recognition. Lebanon recognised the UAR and AU simultaneously on February 17, followed 
by Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Tunisia. The USA recognised the UAR on February 25, while 
Iran was the first to break ranks within the Baghdad Pact, extending recognition on February 
27. Sudan followed on March 2 .
71FO371/134389/VY10316/104, Wright to FO, 21.2.58. 
72Saad, Iraq, 271-72.
73FO371/134389/VY10316/105(A), Stevens toFO, 22.2.58. 
74FO371/134390/VY10316/178, Bowker to Rose, 11.3.58.
75FO371/134389/VY10316/105, Bowker to FO, 21.2.58. 
76FO371/134389/VY10316/133, Bowker to FO, 27.2.58.
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Turkey and Pakistan now realised that recognition could no longer be delayed, fearing 
that if it was put off further, Cairo could either apply pressure or ultimately claim that both 
had recognised the UAR under pressure. Zorlu told US ambassador Fletcher Warren on 
March 8  that both countries would recognise the UAR on March 12. The Iraqi government 
was told in advance of their intention, and had to acquiesce with good grace.77 qtie Turkish 
mission in Damascus was withdrawn. Agreement was secured, however, to establish a 
Consulate-General in Damascus instead. The Turkish Embassy in Cairo, the Consulates- 
General in Cairo and Alexandria, and the Consulate in Aleppo continued to function as 
before. ^ 8
Turkey and the Confrontation between the UAR and AU
The two Arab unions were established in an atmosphere of mutual animosity and remained 
adversaries throughout their brief period of coexistence. Neither accorded the other 
diplomatic recognition. They disagreed on almost all major political issues, and their radios 
waged a relentless war of mutual accusations.
During these few months, the Turkish government never concealed its sympathy for the 
AU, despite the prevalence of a different opinion among certain Turkish Foreign Ministry 
officials. Kuneralp, for example, likened, in an internal memo, the emergence of two unions in 
the Arab world to the process of Italian and German unification in the 19th century. He 
forecast that, through the grass-roots support it enjoyed, its appeal to the youth, and various 
other reasons, the UAR was more likely to succeed than the AU. He proposed that Turkey 
should further improve relations with Egypt. Kuneralp now attributes Turkey's continued 
suspicious attitude towards Egypt to the latter's support for the Greek-Cypriot c a u s e .  79
Turkey's posture ensured that tensions along the former Turkish-Syrian border and 
mutual recriminations between Turkey and the UAR would not die down. There were 
repeated reports of border incidents.^0 The Turkish Foreign Ministry denied Syrian press 
reports that seven Turkish jet aircraft had flown over Syria on February 27 and that, on 
March 4, large numbers of Turkish troops, tanks and motorised vehicles had been 
concentrated at the approaches of AJk^akale station near the border on the Turkish side.^l 
Syria continued, however, to accuse Turkey of mine-laying and diverting the waters of the
77FO371/134390/VY10316/178, Bowker to Rose, 11.3.58; ibid., -/176(A), Bowker toFO, 15.3.58. 
78FO371/133896/V1091/9, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 12.5.58.
^Kuneralp, Sadece, 101-02.
^Suwaydan Nasir al-Din(ed-), Yawmiyyat wa watha'iq al-wahdah al-misriyyah-al-suriyyah, Vol. II: 1 
May-31 August 1958 (1988), 19, 98.
81FO371/134392/VY10344/5, BBC monitoring, 6.3.58.
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liver Jagh-Jagh in al-Jazirak, and thus depriving of water for a three-week period 10,000 
hectares of land used to cultivate cotton. She protested that Turkish citizens holding transit 
permits to facilitate then work on land near the frontier had been entering Syria without good 
reason. The two countries agreed, therefore, to cancel existing permits and asked holders to 
submit new applications in order to be investigated by the Syrian authorities. 82 Later, Turkey 
tightened up control of movement over the frontier allegedly to deal more effectively with the 
problem of smuggling. 83 Turks, and even Syrians with special permits, were denied 
permission to enter Syria. Turkey's decision, in early July, to close the fr ontier altogether was 
particularly painful for owners of land living on both sides of the frontier. The UAR 
authorities protested against this decision and, in turn, forbade then own citizens to enter 
Turkey. These Turkish measures were seen in Damascus as part of a new Turkish-Iraqi- 
British co-ordinated plan to put pressure on Syria to desert Egypt and join the AU instead. 
The frontier was re-opened on July 13.84
Turkey believed that provided King Sa'ud did not openly oppose the AU, his approval 
was "not a matter of immediate consequence". She agreed that Kuwait's accession would 
strengthen the AU.85 On both counts, however, Ir aq failed. Riyadh blessed the AU, but was 
too frightened of Egypt to think of joining it. 8 6  Iraq also failed to obtain Kuwaiti accession 
to the AU. Her Ruler, Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, suspected that, in view of Iraq's 
historic claims over the territory of Kuwait, such a step could be suicidal to the sheikhdom 
and its ruling family.
A major issue of controversy between the two Arab unions was the unrest in Lebanon, 
where, in early May, a broad coalition of left-wing and pan-Arab nationalist opponents of 
President Sham'un had risen against his supposed wish to amend the constitution in order to 
be able to run for a second six-year term. Sham'un accused the UAR of aiding the rebels and 
interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs
Turkish officials had been expecting disturbances to flare up in Lebanon for some time. 
'Abd al-Nasir, they reasoned, had been "temporarily balked of his prey in the shape of Jordan 
by the Iraqi-Jordanian union" and was "likely to turn the heat on Lebanon".87 Americans 
believed that Turkey had been solicited by Sham'un and had actually promised his
82FO371/134384/VY1015/58, 66 & 68, Scott to Rose, 4 & 27 June & 3 July 1958.
8^F0371/134392/VY10344/7, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 9.4.58. 
84FO371/134384/VY1015/69 & 71, Scott to Rose, 9 & 18 July 1958.
85FO371/134025/VJ10393/48, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 18.2.58; F0371/133798/ 
V10344/1, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 2.4.58.
86Saad,Iraq, 199; FO371/140896/EQ1011/1, Crawford to Lloyd, 29.1.59.
82FO371/133798/V10344/l, Chancery, Ankara to Levant Department, 2.4.58.
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government active sympathy and support. 8 8  Lebanon's ambassador in Washington told 
Dulles on June 15 that "the Turks might also contribute to pacification of the situation in 
Lebanon by massing forces on the Syrian frontier”. ^  Qn May 25, the Turkish ambassador in 
Washington, Ah S. H. Urgiiplii, declared his country's readiness to send troops to Lebanon at 
the UN's request.9° There were reports that Ankara had actually offered Sham'un's troops 
some minor items of equipment.91 Turkey strongly urged her Western partners to support 
Sham'un.92 Washington, however, was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the UAR 
over Lebanon. The Turkish ambassador in Lebanon, Cevdet Diilger, was shocked to hear that 
Sham'un was hesitating to invoke immediately the authority he had received from his cabinet 
to call on friendly Western governments to intervene and that Western diplomats were 
strongly discouraging him from doing so.93 Washington was confident that Ankara would 
almost certainly support any possible US/UK intervention in Lebanon and even help Lebanon 
if fighting began with the UAR Menderes's government, however, was not included in any 
way in Washington's preliminary discussions with its alHes as regards possible intervention 
"because they are very leaky in security matters".94
Iraq, together with Jordan, openly backed Sham'un, too. She favoured military 
intervention to back him and reportedly offered to conclude a defensive or political 
agreement with Lebanon.95 Al-Jamali said if Sham'un's opponents invited UAR forces to 
Lebanon, as a response to a possible similar invitation by Sham'un himself to Iraqi and 
Jordanian troops, that would be "an additional advantage," "since it would justify an Iraqi 
attack on Syria".96 in the end, no troops were sent until July 14 either to Lebanon or Syria. 
Iraqi expectations that an anti-Egyptian uprising in Syria also failed to materialise. Nuri 
admitted on July 2 that Iraq was not taking direct action in Syria only because her lack of 
adequate air cover. "Iraqi ground forces could deal effectively with anything the Syrians or 
Egyptians could put against them", but "the Egyptian air forces were too strong for them".92
**FRUS 1958-1960, XI, 29.
89Ibid., 132.
99Nasir al-Din, Yawmiyyat, II, 45.
9*Lederer and Vucinich, Soviet Union, 41.
92FO371/133798/V10344/l, Bowker to Rose, 9.4.58.
92F0371/133820/V1076/5, Roberts to FO, 17.7.58.
94FRUS1958-1960, XI, 59, 97, 122, 136, 173, 201, 204.
95Chamoun, Crise, 415-16; Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self- 
Importance", The Beirut Review, 5 (Spring 1993), 97.
96FO371/134144/VL10344/l, Stewart to FO, 19.5.58; FO371/134220/VQ1051/23, Beeley to Hayter, 
30.1.58; FO371/133798/V10344/4G, FO to Ankara, 15.7.59.
97FO371/134220/VQ1051/21, Lloyd to Wright, 4.7.58.
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Ironically, it was Nun's decision on July 1 to send an additional Iraqi brigade to Jordan, 
that provided rebel Iraqi army officers with the opportunity to move their brigade (loaded 
with live ammunition) through Baghdad on July 14 and topple the monarchy by re-directing 
then* fir e-power against the Palace. Some of Nuri's opponents have claimed that the brigade 
was really destined to proceed eventually to Lebanon to assist S h a m 'u n .9 8  Turkey's response 
to that revolution will be analysed in the following chapter.
98Majid Khadduri, Republican ‘Iraq: A Study in 1Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution o f 1958 (1969), 57.
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The End of the Road: 
Revolution in Iraq
In the early morning of 14 July 1958, rebel military units toppled the Iraqi monarchy. The 
King, the Crown-Prince and Nuri were killed during the takeover. A revolutionary 
government, led by Brigadier 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, was foimed, consisting of a mixture of 
army officers, former opposition politicians and representatives of banned political parties. It 
announced its adherence to the principles of the Bandung Conference. The Baghdad Pact 
headquarters were closed and padlocked, and members of its secretariat debarred from access 
to their offices. The AU was unilaterally dissolved, and all measures taken and laws passed in 
accordance with its constitution were immediately considered null and void. 1
The July 14 coup immediately altered the nature of Egyptian-Iraqi relations. 'Abd al-Nasir 
had known for some time that a group of Iraqi "Free Officers" had been preparing a coup. 
The latter, in turn, had expected Cano to support then new regime and had agreed that they 
would immediately join the UAR, if they encountered stiff opposition from monarchists. 
News of the coup were received jubilantly in Cair o and Damascus. Later that day, the UAR 
became the first state to recognise the new regime. 'Abd al-Nasir pledged to defend Iraq 
against any external attack and, on July 19, signed in Damascus an agreement to that effect 
with a visiting high-level Iraqi delegation. A UAR military mission arrived in Baghdad the 
next week, followed by shipments of arms and ammunition. ^
The USSR recognised Qasim's government on July 16 and agreed immediately to the 
latter's proposal to resume full diplomatic relations. Recognitions by other Communist states 
followed.
IfClialil, Arab States, I, 91-92.
^Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (1987), 
28, 58; Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall o f  Soviet Influence in the 
Middle East (1978), 93; idem., Cairo, 133; el-Sadat, Search, 153; Khadduri, Republican 'Iraq, 36, 57, 59-60, 
66; Be'eri, Army Officers, 179-80.
Turkey, the 14 July Coup and the US/tJK Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan
For Western powers and their Mends in the Middle East, the change of regime in Iraq was 
not welcome. The brutalities committed by the Baghdad mob during the military take-over, 
including an attack against the Turkish cemetery in Baghdad and the Turkish Information 
Office, added to their distaste. ^
Over the years, Western observers had been aware of the widespread popular discontent 
in Iraq. Britain had continually urged her Mends in Baghdad, particularly after 1955, to 
undertake seiious measures of reform to keep up with the expectations of the public, forge a 
wider social base and, hence, diminish internal opposition to Iraq's foreign policy.^ American 
diplomats resident in Iraq, too, had regularly reported on the widening gap between the 
government policies and the rising middle-class and urban aspirations. Washington, however, 
had abstained from taking any radical step to strengthen Iraq politically and/or militarily for it 
did not wish to make Britain suspicious that it was attempting to replace her influence in 
Iraq. 6
Without free access to first-hand Turkish documents, it is difficult to form an adequate 
picture of official Turkish perceptions as regards the durability of the monarchy in Iraq. 
Furthermore, the Turks seem to have never discussed this issue thoroughly with their British 
allies. Some casual remarks made by high-ranking Turkish politicians and civil servants 
during their meetings over the years with their British counterparts make this author assume 
r" j that Turkish officials, too, recognised that their alliance with Iraq was based almost entirely 
on Nuri(s firmness and might come to a halt overnight if he died, was assassinated or 
toppled. 6  Zorlu told Macmillan asVback as 24 October 1955 that "a few riots could 
overthrow General N uri".^
Nuri, however, had clung to the belief that the growth and prosperity generated by the 
increase in Iraqi oil revenue in the 1950s would gradually spread more widely and immensely 
strengthen the whole fabric of the national life, and that once his countrymen realised how 
prosperous and contented they would be in a decade, when his reconstruction schemes were 
carried out, they would no longer listen to "a handftd of troublemakers".^ Despite intelligence
^See details in Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (1964), 502; Trevelyan, Revolution, 137-38; 
Fernea and Louis, Revolution, 56, 71; Lunt, Hussein, 73-74; FO371/133912/VB10393/15, Bowker to FO,
18.7.58.
4Shuckburgh, Descent, 238; Fernea and Louis, Revolution, 35, 38, 40; Khadduri, Republican 'Iraq, 36-
37; Louis, Empire, 309, 591.
6Axelgard, Policy, 220-21, 228; Decker, Policy, 128.
6FRUS1952-1954, IX, Part 1, 447.
7F0800/678, f. 53.
^Majid Khadduri, Arab Contemporaries: The Role o f  Personalities in Politics (1973), 34; Fernea and 
Louis, Iraqi Revolution, 45; FO371/121641/VQ1015/12, Wright to Rose, 15.2.56.
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reports concerning the activities of the "Free Officers," and Turkish and Jordanian warnings 
that an Egyptian-inspired army plot was possible, Iraqi leaders had stubbornly contended that 
no attempt to force a violent change of government from within was probable. 9
Curiously, the regional members of the Baghdad Pact had previously agreed to hold 
another informal summit in Istanbul on July 14 to discuss the situation in Lebanon and the 
Middle East in general. King Faysal and Nuri had planned to attend the meeting.^ But, 
instead of the plane carrying the Iraqi delegation to Istanbul, news came from Baghdad of the 
coup, just as the other participants were also arriving. Menderes was reportedly shocked at 
the news. 1 *
The participants at once decided to change the venue of the meeting to Ankara, where 
they could, through the wireless and cipher facilities of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, follow 
events in Iraq more closely. Initial talks in Ankara were largely incoherent and conducted in 
an atmosphere bordering on panic. The grave effects events in Iraq might have on the pact's 
future, together with perceived UAR and Soviet plans to exploit the Kurds were discussed. 
There was widespread, general dissatisfaction over American policy, especially her 
unwillingness to support President Sham'un firmly. The participants communicated then 
general disapproval of the idea of a UN Security Council meeting to discuss recent events in 
Iraq to the US charge d'affaires, Carlos C. Hall. They also agreed that a paper should be 
drafted the next day, setting out in the firmest terms the necessity for prompt and resolute 
action both in Lebanon and elsewhere in the area. ^
In the meantime, the Eisenhower administration, fearing that the dramatic events in Iraq 
could destroy the whole Western security structure in the Middle East, felt that it now ought 
to agree to Sham'un's request to intervene in Lebanon. Within 24 hours, US marines were 
disembarking near Beirut.^ Washington's move was received in Ankara with great 
satisfaction. Turkey permitted the Americans to use the Ihcirlik air-base near Adana, 
connected to the Strategic Air Forces Command of NATO, for the pmposes of the said 
operation. The projected message to Eisenhower was substantially diluted. It now urged
^Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Wujith 'iraqiyyah 'abr al-tarikh (1987), 152-53; idem., Mudhakkarati, 594-97; 
Hussein, Uneasy, 159-61; Trevelyan, Revolution, 136.
^F0371/133918/VB1072/144, BBC monitoring, 9.7.58. Bayar had also invited King Husayn, but the 
latter had declined, judging that his presence in Istanbul would be a great mistake; see F0371/133911/ 
VB10380/6, Mason to FO, 12.7.58.
* iBirand, Demirkirat, 148.
12Toker, Demokrasimizin, IV, 122; FO371/133918/VB1072/169, Bowker to Lloyd, 18.7,58. 
l^Chamoun, Crise, 420-25. By August 13, American shore forces in Lebanon numbered 14,000. They 
left on October 25; see Murphy, Diplomat, 497.
^Ambassador Diilger in Beirut was also delighted. He jocularly told Robert Murphy, Eisenhower's 
envoy to Lebanon, that Washington "should have bought off the Lebanese-it would have been much cheaper 
than sending in the fleet"; see Murphy, Diplomat, 497.
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tlie application of tlie Eisenhower Doctrine (meaning, probably, in this case, the extension of 
US military action) to preserve the independence and integrity of the AU as well. Zorlu told 
Hall that they hoped to get a reply within the next two days. ^  He later told Bowker that 
Ankara welcomed Britain's support for the US action in Lebanon and asked Britain to 
support the Ankara meeting's appeal to Washington, Ankara, said Zorlu, had received a 
report unfounded as it turned out-from its embassy in London to the effect that Britain was 
considering sending troops to Kuwait and Bahrain. The Turkish government and the Heads 
of State of Iran and Pakistan "welcomed this intimation and hoped that such action would be 
taken f o r t h w i t h " . ^  The Turks, reported Bowker, who had previously thought that the 
weakness of American policy had been largely responsible for recent developments in the 
region, had now probably concluded that it had been Turkish pressure alone which had 
brought about the US military initiative in Lebanon and were suggesting to have it extended 
to Jordan and even to Iraq. ^  American military intervention in Lebanon, however, was 
simply a signal to Caho and Moscow that Washington would use force, if necessary, to arrest 
the further crumbling of the Arab conservative order. Washington had already realised that 
trying to restore the Iraqi monarchy would be almost impossible without risking a global 
confrontation with Moscow. This and subsequent Turkish requests for the extension of 
military action, therefore, fell on deaf ears.
Meanwhile, King Husayn had taken over, on July 14, the responsibilities of Head of 
State of the AU and asked all AU embassies and friendly governments to ignore instructions 
emanating from the new Baghdad government.^ He had further asked Turkish Ambassador 
Mahmut Dikerdem, that same day, not to recognise Qasim and to pass on to the Ankara 
meeting his suggestion to attack the revolutionary regime in Iraq. Bayar sent the King a 
personal message of encouragement and ftdl support. Subsequently, the three heads of state 
advised him, in a separate message, to request the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 
theAU . 1 9
In the morning of July 16, the participants in the Ankara meeting returned to Istanbul.
That night, the three heads of state re-affirmed in a new message to Eisenhower their 
agreement with the American decision "to safeguard the independence of Lebanon" and re­
urged prompt US action in Iraq, Syria and Jordan to forestall the possibility of Soviet
15FO371/133918/VB1072/146, Bowker to FO, 15.7.58; ibid., -/169, Bowker to Lloyd, 18.7.58.
16FO371/133791/V1022/12G, Bowker to FO, 16.7.58.
17FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
18F0371/134030/VJ10393/195, Johnston to FO, 18.7.58; FO371/134258/VQ1903/12, Bowker to FO,
22.7.58.
19Birand, Demirkirat, 148; FO371/133918/VB1072/146, Bowker to FO, 15.7.58.
70FO371/133918/VB1072/152, Bowker to FO, 16.7.58.
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landings there. Zorlu told Hall that information about such a possibility had been received 
from the Egyptian Consulate-General and the Syrian Consulate in Istanbul, as well as from an 
unnamed source in Egypt. For those present in Istanbul, said he, the AU continued to exist 
and any military action in Iraq would be for the purpose of restoring it. Furthermore, Zorlu 
told Bowker that Ankara thought that it would be much better if Britain could also take 
similar action. "The quicker the action was taken the easier it would be," for "it would be 
infinitely more difficult to counteract" any Soviet action "once it had been taken". "Time was 
past for worrying about Arab reactions. It was certain that if no action was taken the whole 
of the Western position in the Middle East was lost". Turkey would not act unilaterally, 
continued Zorlu, but would be prepared to provide wholehearted moral support and/or 
consider any appropriate supporting action she could furnish. He emphasised, however, that 
"it must be clearly demonstrated that the initiative came from the leading Western Power". 
The second message, handed both to Hall and Bowker, demanded an emergency meeting of 
the Baghdad Pact powers as soon as possible, in the presence of Dulles, to discuss recent 
developments and "demonstrate forthwith that the Baghdad Pact was alive and functioning". 
A third message suggested that the "council deputies as well as the secretariat and other 
organs of the Baghdad Pact should provisionally be transferred to Ankara and that the 
Ambassadors in Ankara should be nominated as deputies on the Baghdad Pact Council". 
Zorlu also expressed fear that the 200,000 Iraqis of Turkic origin might come under "the 
brutal attack of revolutionaries"^ 1
On the night of July 16, encouraged by the stand taken by the three-power summit and 
the US intervention in Lebanon, King Husayn invited the US and UK governments to send 
troops "for a limited time only" to Jordan, to be used only in the case of an anticipated 
external aggression from the UAR.22 with the USA already involved in Lebanon, it fell to 
Britain-with US consent, of course-to fill the void in Jordan. Early in the morning of July 17, 
the 2,500-strong Parachute Brigade stationed in Cyprus was ordered to Amman.23 The 
British government, however, defined the task assigned to its forces in Jordan more broadly: 
"to provide assistance in the face of an imminent attempt by U.A.R. to create internal 
disorder and to overthrow the lawful Jordanian Government and of a threat to the territorial 
integrity of Jordan proposed by the movement of Syrian forces towards her n o r t h e r n  frontiers 
and by infiltration of aims across it".2 d
2 lFRUS 1958-1960, XI, 306-08 & XII, 78; FO371/133791/V1022/13G, Bowker to FO, 17.7.58; F0371/ 
133918/VB1072/153 & 155, Bowker to FO, 17.7.58; ibid., -/169, Bowker to Lloyd, 18.7.58.
^Lunt, Hussein, 76; Dann, King Hussein, 92.
^FO371/133817/V1073/3G, 'Record of conversation between Lloyd, Alphand, and Lucet', 17.7.58.
24fo371/134200/VQ1015/1 15(G), CRO outward telegram, 25.7.58. The British contingent stayed in 
Jordan until November 2; see Lunt, Hussein, 76-78; Dann, King Hussein, 89.
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In the morning of July 17, Esenbel was delighted to hear from Bowker that Britain would 
send forces to J o r d a n .25 During a press-conference later that day, Zorlu confirmed that, for 
Ankara, King Husayn was now heading the AU. He said that the Turkish ambassador in 
Baghdad, Behcet Turkmen, had, on instructions from Ankara, been in touch with the 
revolutionary authorities in order to investigate the position in Mosul and the attack on the 
Turkish military cemetery there, requesting that such actions should not be repeated and that 
the employees of the Baghdad Pact Secretariat should be allowed their freedom. Zorlu again 
expressed concern about the security of the lives and property of the large "Turkish," i.e. 
Turkoman, community in Iraq. He stated that Turkey had taken "necessary" measures along 
the Syrian frontier some time ago. The frontier, which had been closed for a few days, was 
now open again. Only certain new "precautions had been taken" as a result of the Iraqi
crisis. 2  ^
The Eisenhower administration ultimately decided to assign, together with Britain, "first 
priority to increased military and economic aid for Turkey and Iran. They should have all the 
assistance they can absorb". Dulles, however, "did not feel we could send our troops further 
than L e b a n o n " . 22 So, the American answer on July 17 to the three heads of state was 
phrased in "non-committal" terms to the effect Washington intended to take all necessary 
measures to safeguard the independence of the small states in the Middle East regardless of 
the consequences, and that it had already declared its support for King Husayn.2 8  There was 
no promise of sending troops to Iraq to overturn the revolutionary regime.2^
Did Turkey Intend to Invade Iraq?
Turkey thus hawkishly advocated, during the three-power summit, Western-led military 
action to forestall possible advances by anti-Western forces in the Middle East.30 She 
suggested to her allies that the "rebel Baghdad regime" should not be recognised and that
25FO371/133918/VB1072/169, Bowker to Lloyd, 18.7.58.
2^Kurkguo^lu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 133; FO371/133918/VB1072/154(A), Chancery, Istanbul to 
Levant Department, 18.7.58. On the Turkish-Syrian border closure, see p. 213.
21FRUS1958-1960, XII, 72-75, 77.
28F0371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
^Washington (and London) also politely declined Jordan's request, on July 18, for the extension of 
US/UK "military, economic and political assistance" to enable the AU government "to crush the insurrection 
and to restore affairs to their normal form in the Iraqi sector". American officials reasoned that King Husayn 
could not provide from his own army "an effective and politically dependable force for the invasion of Iraq ... 
even if he were supplied with the necessary p[etr]ol[eum] and if enough Western troops were moved into 
Jordan to relieve the army entirely of public security responsibilities in Jordan"; see FRUS 1958-1960, XI, 
344-45 & XII, 86, 89; F0371/134200/VQ1015/115(G), CRO outward telegram, 25.7.58.
30See also FO371/133820/V1076/5, Roberts to FO, 17.7.58.
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foreign envoys should now be accredited to Ring Husayn as the new head of the AU.31 But 
did Turkey ever really plan to invade Iraq on her own as a last attempt to re-establish the old 
order? Political analysts and historians have expressed many differing, sometimes even 
contradictory, opinions over this subject. Metin Toker, Orhan Soysal and Richard Robinson 
contend that Menderes, Zorlu and some of their close associates did propose such an 
intervention, but it failed to matetialise largely because of Washington's d i s a p p r o v a l .3 2 On 
the other hand, Ismail Soysal, who, in 1958, was the spokesman of the Turkish Foreign 
Ministry, George Harris and others deny that any Turkish intervention in Iraq was a real 
/  possibility^ To provide a fidly justifiable answer is impossible to-date and will perhaps 
t 7 r  remain so till all relevant data become accessible to researchers. Some further light can now 
be shed, however, based on US and UK archival material.
Menderes reportedly suggested, during the three-power summit, "that Turkey should 
invade Iraq with four divisions which could be made available at short notice," but was 
eventually persuaded by Pakistani President Iskander Mkza "to see the folly of such 
a c t io n " .34 Menderes's enthusiasm can be partly explained by the information he received 
from Turkish diplomats in Iraq. On July 14, Ambassador Behcet Turkmen reported 
widespread opposition to the Iraqi plotters, and as the Turkish embassy wireless in Baghdad 
was then one of the very few channels of communication available with the outside world, the 
three leaders had no means to verify the reports. The Istanbul press of July 15 was also full of 
reports-emanating probably from same source-of counter-action, among Kurds, tribesmen 
and certain army units loyal to the monarchy, against the revolutionary regime in various 
locations throughout I r a q . 35 Later, Iran's Foreign Minister, Ah Asghar Hikmat, also 
complained that Turkmen had gr avely misled the meeting. 3 b
How and why the Turkish embassy obtained such reports remains unclear. It can only be 
surmised that wishful thinking might have played an important part in creating or, at least, 
exaggerating news received concerning minor incidents of disobedience to the new regime. 
Turkish officials had always dreaded the prospect of having their* country encircled by the 
USSR and pro-Soviet Arab regimes. The July 14 coup, thought initially to be the work of 
local Communists and supporters of'Abd al-Nasir*, held forth such a prospect. It should not
31FO371/134199/VQ1015/78, Roberts toFO, 15.7.58.
3^Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development (1963), 187; 
Toker, Demolcrasimizin, IV, 125-28; Soysal, Analysis, 78. See also Akfjin, Tiirkiye Tarihi, IV, 185.
33George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945- 
1971 (1972), 65-66; Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 83.
34FO371/134212/VQ10344/4, Syinonto Laithwaite, 5.8.58.
35FO371/134199/VQ1015/68 & 68(A), HM Consul-General, Istanbul to FO, 15.7.58.
36FO371/133919/VB1072/176, FO minute by West, 5.8.58.
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sound strange, tlien, that the Turks rushed to believe every reported counter-revolutionary 
activity. The part attributed to the Kurds in this alleged revolt can, in turn, be partly explained 
by the widely-held belief in Western capitals that Muslim Kurds would acquiesce in remaining 
within an integral Iraqi state only as long as the latter was ruled by the Hashimites, the direct 
descendants of Prophet Muhammad.
Menderes had also other, albeit at the time less discernible, internal reasons to dislike a 
military coup toppling the legitimate government of a friendly neighbour. The Turkish 
economy was passing then through a crisis. Furthermore, the Turkish military, which had 
played a vital part in modem Turkish politics, was recently showing certain signs of 
dissatisfaction with Menderes's record and methods. There had been talk of a military 
intervention before the October 1957 legislative elections. Then, in December, nine officers 
had been arrested in Istanbul and accused of fomenting rebellion in the army. All, except the 
informer, had eventually been released because the long investigation, including torture, had 
failed to uncover anything illegal. Suspicions, however, had, needless to say, p e r s i s t e d . 3  7
During the first few days after the coup in Iraq, Ankara left its allies in no doubt that it 
might eventually take unilateral action not only in Iraq, but perhaps also in Syria. Ian Scott, a 
senior British diplomat in Beirut, had from Sham'un on July 17 "the distinct impression that 
he had received unofficial or private word that Turkey intended to intervene in Syria". 3 8 
Dulles believed, on July 14, that "there is a good chance, whatever we do, the Turks will 
move" into I r a q .39 Two days later, he considered the "silence" from Turkey during the last 
few days disturbing. The Turks had put two divisions on the alert in the Far East of the 
country, and Robert Murphy thought "that Turkish operations in northern Iraq are entirely 
possible".4^ The British reasoned that while a Turkish intervention "might have a deterrent 
effect on the Iraqi rebels, it might, on the other hand, encourage the Russians to make 
trouble, all the more so since they have a common frontier with Turkey".^1 For CIA chief 
Allen Dulles, however, the Turks, "in view of their position vis-a-vis the USSR," were 
"unlikely to move [against Iraq] without 'guarantees' from the U.S.A."42
From July 17 on, however, Turkish hints of a desire to invade Iraq assumed a more overt 
tone. The reasons of this change in language are not fully clear, but the possibility of a sense 
of Turkish desperation with perceived American inaction should not be ruled out. Zorlu told
3 ^  Ahmad, Experiment, 58-59, 155; idem., Making, 10, 125; Bagci, Demokrat, 97; Birand, Demirkirat, 
140-48.
38FO371/134392/VY10344/8,‘ Scott to FO, 18.7.58.
39FRUS1958-1960, XII, 307. •
40Ibid., 75.
41FO371/133798/V10344/4G, FO to Washington, 15.7.58.
42FRUS 1958-1960, XII, 311.
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Hall directly that morning that Turkey wished to invade Iraq and would be glad to know 
what support and guarantees she would receive in that event from Washington.43 Almost 
simultaneously, Menderes told the US head of mission in Istanbul that in view of a request 
"received from King Hussein that Turkey should intervene militarily in Iraq and Syria" and
the information that the Russians intended to put forces into Iraq, the Turkish 
Government had decided to move forces into Iraq, believing that whoever got there 
first was unlikely to be dislodged. They expected support in Northern Iraq. They 
would not involve Americans in any militaristic adventure, but they would want their* 
moral and material support, and help with air cover.44
Two days later, Zorlu told The Daily Mail of London that the British action in Jordan should 
be extended to I r a q .45 Interestingly, however, Ankara did not approach Bowker directly with
such a request. 4b
The Turkish proposal to invade Iraq was discussed at a high-level US/UK meeting in 
Washington on July 18. Lloyd had flown there on July 16 to conduct urgent discussions on 
the current situation. Again, there was not much backing for the Turkish suggestion, the main 
fear being yet again that it might precipitate a stronger Soviet reaction. Rountree opined that 
whilst the Turkish decision was probably not a firm one, "it was probably more than bluff. It 
fitted with the military thinking of Menderes and Zorlu". The Soviets "would almost certainly 
know of Turkish planning and this knowledge alone might lead to a Russian decision to send 
volunteers to Iraq". Dulles, in turn, said that, if Moscow sent in so-called volunteers, it could 
only be checked by a major attack on the USSR, leading to general nuclear war. Ah* Chief 
Marshal Sir William Dickson, the Chief of the British Defence Staff, and Gen. Nathan 
Twining, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "the Turks were unlikely to 
be able to mount the operation successfully," pointing out to the existence of an intense Iraqi 
suspicion and hostility towards the Turks as demonstrated during Baghdad Pact military 
planning. The Iraqi people, therefore, would probably immediately unite to repel any Turkish 
invasion. Furthermore, there was no evidence of any organised opposition to the coup within 
Iraq. The participants decided to strongly discourage Ankara from invading Iraq. During the 
Turkish-Syrian crisis of 1957, pointed out Dulles, Washington "had avoided telling the Turks 
directly that they should not take action, since to do so would have given an excuse for- 
putting the blame for subsequent developments on our restraining them," but the prevailing
43FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
44FO371/133823/V1078/12G, 'Record of a Conversation between Lloyd and Dulles’, 18.7.58.
43Kurk9UO t^u, Twkiye'nin Politikasi, 131. According to Ba^ci, Demokrat, 97, Zorlu said that Turkey 
would reciprocate by sending units to Jordan if tlie Soviets sent "volunteers" to the Middle East. 
46FO371/134212/VQ10344/2G(B), Hood to FO, 19.7.58.
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situation was perhaps too dangerous for Washington "to risk playing the hand in the same 
way on this occasion". Americans were generally confident that Turkey would not take any 
unilateral action without promises of US support. Dulles admitted, however, that it would be 
dangerous to use '"the Soviet argument' with the Turkish government, as it would give the 
impression that US policies were in the last analysis dictated by the Russians". It "would be 
contrary to the whole deterrent policy" and "anything of this kind said to the Turks would, 
owing to Turkish insecurity, certainly leak back to the Russians". The two sides agreed, 
therefore, that suitable political arguments to be used with Ankara should be:
(a) The impossibility of defending Turkish action before world opinion. This would in 
turn make it difficult to respond to Russian intervention to help the Iraqi regime;
(b) the fact that a Turkish invasion would unite the Iraqis in support of the new 
regime;
(c) the best way to handle the Iraqi situation was to wait and watch developments, 
building up assets within the country which might at some future time make it 
possible to bring about a change. The Musaddiq example could be quoted.47
Hall, however, reportedly used, for some unknown reason, when delivering Washington's 
reply, arguments of both political and military nature, that were slightly different from those 
mentioned above. He told Zorlu that Washington thought that the proposed action, given the 
military difficulties involved and the situation prevailing in Iraq, was of doubtftd feasibility. It 
could not encourage the Turkish action until, at least, it received further information on 
Turkish plans and estimates of the situation in Iraq. 4 8 Furthermore, US Ambassador Warren 
interrupted his holiday and returned to Turkey on July 19. He met immediately with and 
probably actively dissuaded both Menderes and Bayar from taking any military action.49
The Americans kept up their pressure in the next few days "to restrain any rash Turkish 
action," until the latter's enthusiasm appeared to have subsided. Soon, the Turkish 
government issued a correction as regards Zorlu's interview with The Daily Mail, stressing 
that in the event of any discrepancy between that interview and a somewhat more restrained 
statement which Zorlu had given to the press shortly before, it was the press statement which 
should be regarded as authoritative.^ Then, on July 26, the acting Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Namik Gedik, told the GNA that Ankara did not wish to comment on the internal affairs of
47Lloyd, Suez, 258; FO371/133823/V1078/12G, 'Record of Conversation between Lloyd and Dulles', 
18.7.58; FO371/134212/VQ10344/2G & 2G(A), Hood to FO, 19.7.58.
48FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
^^Toker, Demokrasimizin, IV, 129-30.
50FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
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any country and wanted to continue its harmonious relations with the brotherly Iraqi 
people.
Today it looks bizarre that the main reason which made Washington restrain Turkey from 
taking military action was the fear that it might precipitate a wider conflict involving the 
USSR, for historians now know, based on information emanating from Egyptian sources, that 
Moscow itself was unwilling to get involved in any direct military confrontation.^ 
Khrushchev refused 'Abd al-Nasir's request to put out a statement committing Moscow to the 
defence of Qasim's regime against possible Western pressures and only agreed to declare 
manoeuvres for 24 Soviet Army divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border in the hope of 
keeping Ankara in check. 'Abd al-Nasir was extremely saddened. He still publicly declared, 
however, reportedly as an attempt "to cover up for the Soviet Union and at the same time 
make the West think that the Iraqi Revolution was being backed," that Moscow stood by the 
Iraqi Revolution. ^  3 As Fawaz Gerges rightly puts it, "the balance of terror had served to 
influence the superpowers against precipitate acts". Iraq was no^tocpfcmportant, in the 0  
prevailing circumstances, for either superpower to risk a global war. They would sooner 
neglect then local allies than endanger the international balance of power. ^ 4
Moscow's reluctance to defend Qasim was not apparent at the time, however. Moscow 
did not disclaim 'Abd al-Nasir's remark and warned Turkey against any attack on Iraq.^ But 
more than any Western fear of precipitating an eventual Soviet military involvement, it was 
the fact that the revolution in Iraq was accomplished with the most minimal of resistance that 
pulled the rug from under the feet of advocates of military intervention. Qasim was 
determined to show an image of moderate nationalism. He made every effort to curb the 
excesses of the mob and reassure Western governments of Iraq's friendly intentions, in hope 
of getting quick recognition and denying the external friends of the old regime a chance to 
intervene. ^ ^ He pledged to honour the existing contracts of foreign oil companies investing 
in Iraq and tried to gain the confidence of the Kurds. ^ 7 The Turkish embassy in Baghdad, 
too, in time began to report "on the control established by the Iraqi Government over the 
whole country and then general popularity". Furthermore the Turkish press and, still less, the
^Kiirk^uo^lu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 133; F0371/133798/V10344/7, Bowker to FO, 28.7.58.
^Dann, King Hussein, 90, 189,
5%1-Sadat, Search, 153; Heikal, Sphinx, 93-100; idem, Cairo, 134-36; Nasr, 'Abd al-Nasir, 164. 
^Gerges, "Lebanese Crisis", 100.
^Kurkfiiogfu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 131-32; FO371/133796/V10338/56, Bowker to FO, 23.7.58. 
-^Khadduri, Republican 'Iraq, 56; Fernea and Louis, Revolution, 71, 78; Lunt, Hussein, 74; Dann, King 
Hussein, 88; Kurk?uo0u, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 125-26; FO37I/133199/VQ1015/93(A), CRO outward 
telegram, 23.7.58.
5^Sluglett, Iraq, 78; Khalil, Arab States, I, 29-30; C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in 
Iraq", MEJ, 13/1 (Winter 1959), 53.
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general public, did not show "any enthusiasm for Turkey to become involved in military 
adventures against Iraq " .58
That Turkish politicians told their friends and allies they wanted to intervene in Iraq is 
evident beyond doubt. Whether they were serious in their assertions or if they made any real 
preparations to that effect is an entirely different issue, however. In view of the lack of access 
to Turkish diplomatic and military records, it is impossible, at this juncture, to give a clear-cut 
affirmative or negative answer to these two questions.
During the Yassxada trials after the 1960 mihtary coup in Turkey, evidence was produced 
that, according to the private papers of then Minister of Labour, Hayrettin Erkmen, Zorlu had 
foiinally proposed to intervene militaxily in Iraq in July 1958 with the aim of crushing the 
hisurgents. Bayar and Menderes, after short deliberations, had approved the suggestion, while 
the cabinet, as a whole, was kept in the dark during this crucial process. Erkmen had noted 
that only American objections had eventually prevented such a step from being taken. 5 9 The 
couit, however, did not pursue this charge, because, says Harris, it evidently regarded it as 
insubstantial. 60 Eikmen's notes are seconded, however, by what al-Suwaydi reports in his 
memoirs fr om Najib al-Rawi, Iraq's ambassador in Ankara.61 The allegation, meanwhile, that 
not all Turkish cabinet ministers were aware of or agreed with Zorlu's plans can perhaps be 
corroborated by the remarks of Turkey's Defence Minister, then visiting Washington. He told 
Allen Dulles on July 20 that "any entry by the Turks into Iraq would be folly". 62
Revolutionary Iraq and the Baghdad Pact
As regards the Baghdad Pact, the official Iraqi attitude, after initial outright condemnation, 
began to show signs of moderation, too. When Turkmen saw Qasim and Minister of 
Information Siddiq Shanskal in connection with the attacks on the Turkish cemetery and 
Information Office, both were profuse in apologies and added that Iraq wished to remain an 
active member of the Baghdad P act.63 A few days later, the new Iraqi ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Information enquired Turkmen whether Turkey would recognise their new regime 
and support Iraq if she wished to remain in the Baghdad P ac t.64 Wright also reported that 
"the rebel regime might be prepared to continue Iraqi participation" in the Baghdad P a c t .65
58F0371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58. 
^Kiirkipiioglu, Turkiye'nin Politikasi, 132.
^Harris, Alliance, 66.
6-*-Al-Suwaydi, Mudhakkarati, 592.
62FRUS1958-1960, XII, 85-86.
63FO371/133912/VB10393/15, Bowker to FO, 18.7.58. 
64FO371/134210/VQ10344/4, FO minute by Gore-Booth, 21.7.58. 
65FO371/133918/VB1072/157, Lloyd to FO, 17.7.58.
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Macmillan took this possibility seriously.66 Britain wanted "to hold the door open for 
eventual Iraqi participation in some form".67 Washington, however, saw little prospect of 
Iraq remaining in the pact.68 it was further worried that the Iraqi revolutionaries might lay 
hands on and publish certain Baghdad Pact documents. There was a lot of material, it feared, 
which, "if quoted out of context," would cause America and the pact-members "considerable 
embarrassment".69 Qasim, however, immediately sent the seized pact archives to Cairo. The 
Egyptians, in turn, refused a Soviet demand for copies of those documents and told them 
simply that they would be informed of anything in the documents which was felt to be of vital 
concern to Moscow.76
The Baghdad Pact Council Meeting and Recognition of the Iraqi Republic
Despite the continuing doubts about Iraq's eventual position vis-a-vis the Baghdad Pact, 
Qasim had done enough in his first two weeks in power to convince the world that he 
effectively controlled Iraq and enjoyed enough popular support to force the issue of de jure 
recognition onto the international agenda.
Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, India and Afghanistan recognised the new 
regime. Soon, some NATO members and Iran made their impatience clear as regards the 
undue delay in recognition.71 The Turkish attitude softened, too. If on July 17 and 21, Selim 
Sarper, Turkey's representative at the NATO council, had argued against early recognition, 
even suggesting that "no word of it should leak out as it would do great harm if it were 
known we were considering recognition,"72 on July 24, Zorlu simply declared, in a non­
committal manner, that Ankara had not yet taken a decision on recognition. 73 Gedik's above­
quoted statement followed two days later.
The regular Baghdad Pact Council meeting, scheduled for London, took place on July 
28-29. No Iraqi representative was present. 74 The issue of recognition of the new Iraqi 
regime was discussed on the first day. The participants noted the new government's "solemn 
assurances of their desire for friendly relations and for the continuation of political, 
commercial and other relationships on their previous basis" and agreed, without much 
dissent, that "political arguments are on balance in favour of recognition". They decided that
66FO371/133808/V1051/44G, Macmillan to Lloyd, 18.7.58.
67FO371/133918/VB1072/165, FO to Washington, 23.7.58.
68FO371/133908/VB10345/19G, Hood to FO, 21.7.58.
69FO371/133912/VB10393/19, Wiggin to Hadow, 21.7.58. See also Decker, Policy, 192.
^Heikal, Cairo, 96; idem., Cutting, 223-28.
71FO371/133919/VB1072/184, FO minute by Wright, 27.7.58.
72F 0371/133820/V1076/6, 8 & 11, Roberts to FO, 17, 21 & 22 July 1958.
73FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25.7.58.
74FO371/133918/VB1072/157, Lloyd to FO, 17.7.58.
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Middle Eastern members should take the lead to that effect within the next few days, closely 
followed by the USA and B r it a in .  75 a  policy of wait-and-see would be adopted as regards 
Iraqi membership of the pact, with member-states conducting further consultations if the new 
government expressly wished to continue membership. Moreover, "if and when it became 
appropriate to establish new Headquarters, this should be located in Ankara".
On behalf of the three Middle Eastern members, Zorlu again appealed to Dulles-who was 
heading the US observer delegation-to join the Baghdad Pact in order to give it "new life". 
Dulles again declined the invitation, claiming "that the pact was a Very loose' obligation 
requiring only consultation". Instead, he promised that Washington would increase military 
aid to regional pact-members and would promptly enter with them into agreements designed 
to boost mutual co-operation. 76
Iran, Turkey and Pakistan recognised the new regime on July 31. Turkey's decision was 
communicated simultaneously to the Iraqi embassy in Ankara and through the Turkish 
ambassador in Baghdad. 77 Later that month, Zorlu conferred in New York with Iraq's 
Foreign Minister, 'Abd al-Jabbar Jumard, who reportedly spoke of his government's intention 
"to establish friendly relations with Turkey and that the bonds between the Turkish and Iraqi 
peoples were brotherly". 78 Britain recognised Qasim's government on August 1; 
Washington, on August 2, following a brief visit to Baghdad by Murphy. 79 Meanwhile, King 
Husayn officially recognised, also on August 2, the break-up of the AU.^O
Iraq formally quit the Baghdad Pact on 24 March 1959. This decision was probably 
reached after leftist pressure on Qasim Her withdrawal meant the end of almost forty years 
of close relationship with Britain, for the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement of 1955 thus lost the 
legal basis upon which it had been operating. The last British officers stationed in al- 
Habbaniyyah and al-Shu'aybah left Iraq on 30 May 1959.81
After Iraq's withdrawal, the Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO) with its new headquarters in Ankara. The text of the pact, i.e. the 1955 Turkish- 
Iraqi treaty, remained unchanged. The USA did^otjformally join CENTO, but participated as 
an observer in all its committees and provided financial support for economic projects 
undertaken under its auspices. Her forces took part in CENTO military exercises.
75FO371/134216/VQ1041/23, FO to Amman, 29.7.58.
76Burke, Pakistan, 194; FRUS 1958-1960, XII, 111; F0371/133919/VB1072/178 & 182.
77Soysal, "Baghdad Pact", 83; FO371/134216/VQ1041/23(B), Bowker to FO, 30.7.58; ibid., -/23(D), 
Roberts to FO, 31.7.58.
7 8F0371/134212/VQ10344/5, BBC monitoring, 20.8.58.
7^Murphy, Diplomat, 501-04.
80F0371/134030/VJ10393/203(D), CRO outward telegram, 4.8.58.
8*Ruindezli, Bor'ba, 93.
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Furthermore, on 5 March 1959, Washington signed three identical bilateral defence co­
operation agreements with CENTO's regional members.
Disagreements among Turkish Political Parties
The revolution in Iraq had profound implications for the future of Turkey's Arab policy. The 
opposition RPP had for some time been raising doubts in public about its viability. Indnu 
reportedly believed that "Menderes had blurred the distinction between Turkey's alignment 
with the West based on ideological considerations fiom those based on national security 
considerations" and had consequently "overextended Turkey's commitments to the United 
States, and was following a policy contrary to Turkey's interests in the Middle E a s t " .  82 The 
new, vigorous tone of RPP criticism was consonant with the increasingly tense and hostile 
government-opposition relations in Turkey. RPP leaders claimed that Turkey had failed in the 
Middle East, antagonising the Arabs and pursuing an unrealistic policy towards Israel. The 
Baghdad Pact had drifted away to m  its original aims. With the exception of agreeing as 
regards showing solidarity against cold war pressures, its members
had been in conflict in regard to then individual conceptions of the Pact. There had 
been a tendency to regard it as an organisation for producing loans and aid, but this 
was disregarded by those who were in a position to extend aid. Efforts had also been 
made to present the Pact as an organisation mainly concerned with the Arab-Israeli 
problem. These efforts were unjustified and had been rejected by the Pact Council. If 
the Baghdad Pact remained faithfid to its true aims, accusations directed against it in 
the Middle East would decrease. 83
Moreover, in a book published in 1959, but completed before the July 14 coup, Aptiilahat 
Ak§in, a former Turkish ambassador in Damascus, argued that it had been wrong to try to 
build a sound foreign policy based on friendship with unstable Arab governments, rightly 
suggesting that Iraq's membership of the pact was unpopular with her public and dependent 
solely on the survival of Nuri and the monarchy. Because of the pact, most Arabs were seeing 
Turkey as an enemy. Ak§in called on the government to concentrate in the future on the 
Turkey-Iran-Pakistan axis; minimise contacts with Israel; stay aloof from inter-Arab 
disagreements; and avoid antagonising Egypt and S y r ia .  84 Ankara University professor Fahir
^Soysal, Analysis, 54.
8^FO371/136456/RK1022/2, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 11.2.58. See also ibid, -/4, 
Bowker to Lloyd, 28.2.58.
^Ak^in, Tiirkiye'nin 1945 den Sonraki, 100, 106, 108, 111, 122, 125-26.
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Armaoglu also claimed that the pact had not established security in the Middle East. Instead, 
it had actually provided Moscow with an opportunity to infiltrate into the area, 85
The RPP's first reaction to events on July 14 was to call for national solidarity. However, 
besides a few supportive newspapers, it was almost alone on the Turkish political scene in 
disapproving the Western intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and criticising the facilities 
provided to US marines in Incirlik as an abuse of Turkish sovereignty. American troops were 
transported out of Incirlik on notification, rather than consultation with Turkish authorities. 
Western correspondents were brought to cover their arrival, while Turkish journalists arriving 
at the base over land, were stopped by Turkish perimeter guards and refused entrance to the 
base, forcing the Turkish media to get news of the operation from foreign sources. 8b
On July 26, the RPP called a special session of the GNA to discuss the situation in the 
region. It listened to Gedik's statement, but was unable to force a debate. Hence, Inonu 
convened a press conference to outline his party's position. Claiming that the RPP was trying 
to achieve national unity in face of external dangers, he accused the government of 
suppressing opposition views and even collecting opposition newspapers from news stands. 
The opposition had wanted a GNA meeting on July 17 or 18, when Washington and London 
were doing their utmost to prevent a Turkish military intervention against Iraq. The RPP 
opposed Western intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and called on the West to recognise the 
new Iraqi regime, Inonu stated that Turkey should take no sides in the internal conflicts in the 
Middle East and accused the government for being party for the last two months "to the 
internal politics of Lebanon," which, he claimed, "was detrimental to Turkey's interests". 
"The interventions in Lebanon and Jordan were no concern of Turkey. There were no 
Turkish subjects to protect there and there was no reason for Turkey to involve herself as a 
third party in the great political struggles in the Middle East". "It was wrong to adopt a 
vindictive attitude towards the new Iraqi administration which could become a normal and 
friendly neighbour in the future. Military and restrictive measures against Iraq would have 
been harmful and unjust," concluded i n o m i . 8 7  The newspapers Ulus and Yeni Gun published 
inonxi's declaration on July 27, but their issues were confiscated by the government as
"inflammatoty". 8 8
The smaller opposition Freedom Party also published, in Yeni Gun of July 28, the 
statement it had been unable to make in the GNA, opposing, too, Turkish intervention in Iraq 
and the delay in recognising the new government. Its attitude towards pan-Arab nationalist
^Quoted in Ba^ci, Demokrat, 99.
8%arrisf Alliance, 67; FO371/133786/V1014/80, Bowker toFO, 23.7.58. 
87FO371/133798/V10344/7-8, Bowker to FO, 28.7.58.
88Lederer and Vucinich, Soviet Union, 235.
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regimes, however, was more reserved than that of the R P P . 8 9  jjiirriyet and Cumhuriyet 
called on Britain to leave the pact, suggesting that it could become more useful if restricted to 
countries of the region. 9°
Gedik rejected inonii's accusations in Zafer of July 28. He denied that allied Western 
governments had ever "warned Turkey not to follow an adventurous course". To accuse the 
Turkish government, he said, of being adventurist was a provocation in itself. "Such 
accusations against Turkey were harmful to the country's national interests" and "aimed at 
destroying national unity".91
Disagreements between government and opposition continued during the debate on 
foreign and economic affairs at the extraordinary session of the GNA in August. Zorlu stated 
that "while Turkey sympathized with the trend of Ar ab nationalism, his Government was not 
prepared to countenance any subversive infiltration of international Communism which might 
threaten the general peace and security of the Middle East". Turkey approved of the US 
action in Lebanon because it was directed at forestalling any such infiltration. There had been 
no previous agr eement between Turkey and the USA for the use of the Incirlik air-base, nor 
any arrangement through NATO channels. "What Turkey had done in allowing the use of 
Adana airport was to help the helper in accordance with United Nations principles. The 
United States had sent troops to Lebanon at Lebanon's request; the aeroplanes had already 
flown over Germany, Italy and Greece; Turkey was merely another link in the chain". Zorlu 
said that allegations that Turkey had been prepared to send troops into Iraq and that she had 
only been restrained by US/UK pressure "were based on unreliable Press reports". Opposition 
spokesmen, in turn, tried to capitalise on "the glaring inconsistency" between Zorlu1 s original 
statements about the revolutionary regime in Iraq and his statement after Turkey had decided 
to recognise the new r e g i m e .  92
These public disagreements soon degenerated into serious accusations of misconduct. 
The RPP Secretary-General, Kasim Gulek, rashly stated in public that he hoped that the 
government had leamt a lesson from the fate of the monarchy in Iraq and that it would, in the 
future, reconsider its attitude towards political and press f r e e d o m s .93 Menderes, in turn,
89FO371/133798/V10344/10, Bowker toFO, 31.7.58.
90FO371/133947/VB1673/7, Bowker to FO, 31.7.58.
9 ^FO371/136456/RK1022/6, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 31.7.58, 
92FO371/136456/RK1022/7, Bowker to FO, 23.8.58.
92Bag;ci, Demokrat, 99; FO371/136452/RK1015/24, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department,
15.8.58.
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publicly accused the RPP, on September 6, of trying to provoke in Turkey a revolution of the
Iraqi type.94
For Kiirkipuo^lu, the Turkish opposition's stand against any military action in Iraq was as 
important as official Western attempts to restrain Menderes eventually and make him soften 
his attitude towards Qasim.95 Bagci sees it as the first crack in Turkey's traditionally bi­
partisan, foreign p o l i c y .9b This author shall suggest, however, that, despite the apparently 
unchanging line taken in public, the Turkish government itself was, by then, having serious 
doubts about the viability of its foreign policy towards the Arab world. It was clear by late 
1957 that, despite all Turkish efforts since 1954, Communism and anti-Western pan-Arab 
nationalism were gaining ground in the Middle East. Bayar acknowledged to Dulles, on 26 
January 1958, that, since May 1953, "there had been a marked deterioration of the situation 
in the area".97 Ankara had been searching desperately for some time for further opportunities 
and/or alternatives to stem the pro-Moscow, pan-Arab nationalist tide. The attempted limited 
rapprochement with 'Abd al-Nasir; the proposal to break off diplomatic links with Israel in 
the hope of luring Riyadh into the Baghdad Pact; the assurances given at the same time to 
Eisenhower that Turkey was working to soften Israeli opposition to US adherence to the 
pact; the promise to extend a Turkish security guarantee to Jordan in return for the latter's 
accession to the pact, if taken together, do not leave the impression of a coherent Turkish 
strategy in the Middle East, to say the least. Both government and opposition had, therefore, 
realised that the current policy was not providing the results they hoped for. It was simply 
more difficult for a ruling party to acknowledge the fact, than for an opposition which had 
been out of power for eight years and, hence, did not carry any responsibility for the 
friendships forged and the enemies made during that period.
The continuing confirmation in public of Turkey's alliance with Nuri did not prevent 
Menderes from looking for alternatives to oppose the rise of Soviet and/or Egyptian power in
9 4  A h m a d , Experiment, 158; Birand, Demirkirat, 149. A good indicator of the mood of mutual suspicion 
prevailing at the time between the two main Turkish political parties is the following rather curious incident: 
shortly after July 26, Giilek called on Ambassador Warren to say that whatever opposition speakers might 
have said, or might yet say, on the use of the Incirlik base by Americans during the intervention in Lebanon, 
it should not be interpreted as criticism of US policy in the Middle East or as lessening of the RPFs views on 
the importance of the Turco-American alliance within NATO. Within 20 minutes of this meeting, however, 
Warren received a telephone call from the Deputy Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, who, 
and subsequently the Minister of the Interior, pressed him to say what had been discussed with Giilek. The 
US embassy staff suspected that their telephone lines were bugged. Otherwise, they reasoned, Turkish 
government officials could have never known that Giilek had visited the embassy compound to meet 
specifically with Warren; see FO371/136453/RK1015/29, Chancery, Ankara to Southern Department, 5.9.58. 
^Kiirkijuo^lu, Tiirkiye'nin Politikasi, 132.
9%agci, Demokrat, 96-97,
97FRUS1958-1960, X, Part 2, 739.
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the area. One such alternative was the secret renewal of close contacts with Israel, despite the 
fact that it would, if known, have been extremely unpalatable to Nuri and contrary to the 
latter's own conception of the Baghdad Pact. Sometime in late 1957 or early 1958, i.e. just a 
few weeks after Turkey had been suggesting breaking off diplomatic ties with Israel, 
Menderes and the former Israeli minister in Ankara, Eliyahu Sasson, agreed during a secret 
meeting to co-operate over developments in Syria and set down a timetable and an agenda 
for further secret high-level bilateral meetings. In June, delegations representing the 
intelligence services of Turkey and Israel also had a secret round o f  t a l k s .  98 For Israel, this 
rapprochement was only another chain in her attempt to forge a anti-Arab "Periphery Pact" 
with Ethiopia, Iran and T u r k e y .  99 hi view of the total absence of original Turkish material 
on the issue, either published or available in archival form, it is impossible to know what were 
the ultimate objectives pursued by Menderes at that juncture.
Ismail Soysal records that "the disappointment following the coup d'etat [in Iraq] was so 
great that the Turkish rulers admitted with bitterness in then inner circles the impossibility of 
any political cooperation with the Arabs for a collective defence of the Middle East". 100 This 
bitterness was manifested in a more committed Turkish overture towards Israel, even at a 
time when plans for invading Iraq and trying to restore the old regime were still being argued 
for and against. Only five days after the coup, Zorlu proposed to the Israeli emissary in 
Ankara to hold a meeting between the two Premiers to seek full co-operation in political 
action. After receiving encouragement from Washington, Ben-Gurion paid a secret visit to 
Ankara on August 28-29. The two sides discussed ways to co-operate in Western capitals in 
explaining the dangers of'Abd al-Nasir's expansionist politics; Turkish assistance to Israel in 
the USA to help Israel get more aims; Israeli backing for Turkey over Cyprus; how to assist 
Ethiopia and Iran against Nasserist and Communist subversion; Israeli assistance to Turkey in 
industrialisation and in laying a pipeline from Iran to Turkey; joint scientific research; and the 
extension of trade between the two countries. 101
It has been claimed that this secret meeting laid the basis for a long-term secret 
intelligence co-operation between Israel, Iran and Turkey, which, some say, continues 
vigorously even today between Turks and Israelis. Suspicion has increased because both 
Israel and Turkey have always tried to play down the cordiality of these links. Documents 
related to this issue in Israeli archives remain classified, hi the political field, however,
^M ichael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion (1978), 261; Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Evety Spy a Pt'ince: The 
Complete History o f  Israel's Intelligence Community (1990), 83.
^Murphy, Diplomat, 505. For further information on the "Periphery Pact" see Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 
260-65; Nachmani, Israel, 74-76; Ivanova, Otnoshenie, 24-25. 
l°°Soysal, "BaghdadPact", 83.
Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 263-64; Raviv and Melman, Spy, p. 83; Nachmani, Israel, 74-75.
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Turkisk-Israeli diplomatic relations were stagnant throughout the Cold War years, while 
Turkey's links with the Arab world in general steadily improved in the 1960s and after as 
Turkey gradually adopted a new set of relatively limited, but ultimately more achievable, 
goals in her dealings with individual Arab states, based on the principle of non-interference in 
inter-Arab affairs and on improvement of bilateral ties. Consequently, Turkey publicly 
supported the political rights of Palestinian Arabs, in return for seeking Arab backing over the 
Cyprus issue. The Turkish-Arab rapprochement of the early 1960s might have been 
encouraged initially by Washington's major reappraisal of its strategy in the Middle East, after 
the 1958 Iraqi coup, when it became more flexible towards radical pan-Arab nationalist ideals 
as an "essential element in the prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area".^^ 
In the end, however, it persisted even after Washington's attitude toward 'Abd al-Nasir and 
his ideological allies had cooled.
Can this new official Turkish approach be seen as the continuation of the policies 
advocated by the RPP in 1958? Experts in modem Turkish aflairs have noted, for example, 
that the Turkish constitution of 1961, drawn up by the military,) had a striking resemblance to 
the political program adopted by the 14th RPP Congress in 1959. 1^3 A similar link, 
therefore, between the RPP's new approach towards the Arab world in 1958 and the official 
policies adopted after 1960 should not be immediately discounted as improbable. It ultimately 
remains, however, for fUture historians to investigate.
102George and Smoke, Deterrence, 358; Gerges, "Lebanese Crisis", 105. 
^°^Ak§in, Tiirkiye Tarihi, IV, 185; Birand, Demirkirat, 149-50.
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Conclusion
Turkey's attempted rapprochement with her Arab neighbours soon after World War II, like 
the rest of her foreign policy initiatives of that period, was fuelled primarily by her concern to 
contain the perceived Soviet threat to her territorial integrity and form of government. Even 
after having joined NATO, Turkey considered herself under a real threat of being encircled by 
the USSR and her satellites both from the north and the south. She, therefore, restricted her 
relations with Moscow, throughout the 1950s, to a few exchanges of economic character and 
did not even accept invitations for cultural or sporting contacts. Reliance on the Western 
alliance, particularly the USA, to prevent Soviet expansionism became the pillar of Turkey's 
foreign policy. She aimed consistently at the strengthening of the position of pro-Western 
elements in her vicinity and told Moscow on various occasions that any improvement in 
bilateral ties could only result from the development of general relations between NATO and 
the Communist Bloc.
Turkey fully endorsed the official American view that global peace was indivisible and 
that trouble in any part of the world contained the seeds of a general conflagration. She 
supported, therefore, Washington's plans to contain the USSR by establishing a chain of 
regional collective self-defence networks along the latter's long border both in Europe and 
Asia. This Turkish stand did not emanate solely from pure security considerations. Turkish 
leaders assumed that American aid to Turkey and Turkey's role in the foreign policy 
calculations of the West were intimately linked. They assumed, therefore, that a frill-hearted 
Turkish participation in the projected anti-Communist Middle Eastern pact would increase 
Turkey's strategic value in the eyes of the West, especially Washington; keep the latter remain 
committed to Turkey's defence; and result in as much American military and economic aid as 
possible. Turkish leaders regularly claimed in the mid-fifties that Turkey was the bulwark of 
the defence of the Middle East and had, up to that point, saved the entire region from 
Communist aggression. Her collapse, therefore, could have a detrimental effect on countries 
down to the Cape of Good Hope. If Turkey was to continue to play that vital role, however, 
it was necessary to strengthen her economically.
Turkey embarked on a determined effort to improve relations with the Ar ab world only 
after the conclusion of the Balkan Pact in 1954. Her ultimate aim was undoubtedly to bring
all Arab countries eventually into NATO. In the short run, however, Turkish goals were more 
modest. She realised that the Arab countries could not provide her with anything conap arable 
with the aid she expected from her NATO allies, but still thoughtiimportant not to let the 
Arabs side with her own enemies. The development of close ties between the Arabs, Turkey 
and the West would virtually guarantee the permanence in power in the neighbouring Arab 
countries of hke-minded pro-Western regimes and could thus make Turkey feel more secure 
against the possibility of Soviet-inspired subversive efforts emanating from countries lying to 
her south. The Arab countries could also offer Turkey and her Western allies some strategic 
facilities for the projected regional defence arrangements.
Turkey preferred, initially at least, to work with individual Arab countries on a bilateral 
basis, carrying out a campaign of goodwill and sympathetic behaviour according to their own 
individual characteristics and maintaining an attitude of benevolent understanding towards 
them. She hoped that this campaign might help the Arabs get over their mistrust of the Turks, 
emanating from the late Ottoman period. Turkey distrusted the Arab League and feared that 
if any proposal was referred to the latter, it would fail to produce any tangible result.
Of individual Arab states, Turkey always considered Egypt to be the prized possession, 
believing, like the British, that if Egypt could be convinced to adhere to any regional defence 
alliance, bringing in other Arab countries would be made much easier. Egypt's repeated 
refusals even to consider this subject made Ankara furious, however. Turkey's occasional 
decisions to stop wooing Egypt temporarily and try to create a Middle East defence 
organisation in spite of Egyptian reluctance, were, initially at least, simple manifestations of 
sheer frustration at being cold-shouldered by the Egyptians and carried more tactical than 
strategic significance. During these episodes, Iraq inevitably attained added importance for 
Turkish foreign policy-makers, as her leaders were known to be better-inclined towards 
MEC/MEDO proposals and were seen as a suitable counterweight for Egyptian influence 
within the Arab world. Iraqi leaders were the most concerned in the Arab world that the 
USSR posed a real threat to then country’s independence and political order. Nuri al-Sa'id, 
the strongman of Iraqi politics, was an advocate of close Arab-Western (and especially Arab- 
British) co-operation, contending that the Arabs could not co-operate with the Communist 
states without themselves becoming Communist, nor could they remain neutral between East 
and West because they lacked the appropriate means.
The Turkish-Pakistani choice of Iraq early in 1954 as the first Arab country to be 
approached to join them in a regional self-defence arrangement coincided with one of those 
periods of temporary Turkish disillusion toward Egypt's perceived obduracy. Strategically, 
however, Iraq was not unimportant. Her adherence would have somewhat filled the territorial 
gap between Turkey and Pakistan, given their agreement a strategic position in depth, air
238
bases, lines of communication from Turkey to the Persian/Arab Gulf and thus contributed to 
the protection of Turkey's eastern flank. Iraq responded favourably because she realised that 
Washington, the sponsor of the Turkish-Pakistani agreement, was now ready to provide arms 
to those Middle Eastern states, who would co-operate with the "Northern Tier" project. Iraq 
hoped that this would be a golden opportunity for all Arabs to improve their defence 
capability and exert considerable political influence on the West to make the latter agree to 
some of the Arab demands and ask for some concessions from Israel in the quest for a lasting 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Ideally, Nmi would have wished not to join the Turkish-Pakistani Agreement, but to 
establish either a pro-Western regional defence organisation based on the Ar ab League with 
Egyptian participation or a more limited sub-regional organisation, whereby Syria and 
Lebanon would join a projected Iraqi-Pakistani treaty thus ensuring Iraq's lines of 
communication with the Mediterranean. Besides being categorically against the inclusion of 
France in any final arrangement, Nuri disliked the idea of signing a smaller pact with 
Turkey-not objecting to Iraq's association with Turkey in a large regional grouping-arguing 
that the Turks were unpopular' in Iraq and other Arab states and were still suspected of 
harbouring irredentist designs in Northern Iraq. Nmi had overlooked the fact, however, that 
among all his candidates to enter the regional treaty he envisaged, only Turkey shared his 
determination to conclude an early agreement. He finally succumbed to the continuous 
pressure exercised by Menderes, but only after having made clear that Iraq would undertake 
no obligations beyond her own borders. He was forced, however, to concede more than his 
initial plan to keep the agreement with Turkey restricted to exchange of information on 
defence dispositions and preparations and free passage of military supplies through either 
party's territory to the other. Neither Nmi nor Menderes did push later for the conclusion of 
any subsidiary special agreement between the two governments as foreseen by the Baghdad 
Pact signed and ratified in February 1955. The pact proved, however, to be a starting point 
for the gradual establishment of cordial bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey and a 
close personal friendship between the two leaders.
Nmi had always hoped that Britain would play a part in any regional defence scheme. 
British participation could provide an "umbrella," under which the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 
due to expire in 1957, could be revised, thus bypassing any possibility of the repetition of 
widespread opposition among the Iraqi educated classes, which prevented in 1948 the 
ratification of the very similar* Portsmouth Treaty. A treaty revision, hoped Nmi, would 
strengthen the Hashimite regime at home and might improve the general Arab position vis-a- 
vis Israel. Menderes went along with Nmi's plan, because he, too, was most concerned that 
Britain should not withdr aw from the Middle East, hi the end, the only real difference of the
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1955 Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement from the abortive Portsmouth Treaty was that Iraq 
could now, in effect, unilaterally terminate it whenever in the fixture she decided to withdraw 
from the Baghdad Pact.
Turkey wanted to see the Baghdad Pact eventually become an elaborate NATO-type 
multilateral defence organisation^ and wished to embark on that road by first establishing a 
link between the two organisations. Her difficulties began, however, with the first necessary 
step to expand the Baghdad Pact membership into the Arab heartland. The desire to expand 
the pact remained one of the most salient features of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy all 
through the end of 1957 at least. The accession of new Arab states was deemed important to 
give the "Northern Tier" sufficient depth and thus turn the pact into a viable regional defence 
organisation. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon figured prominently on the Turkish list of 
prospective pact-members. After his success with Nuri, Menderes was initially confident that 
he could convince all Arab countries one by one to join. He still hoped that even Egypt could 
eventually be brought in.
hi the aftermath of the Turkish-Iraqipact, however, Egypt felt isolated and weakened and 
was interested no more in any accommodation with Turkey and the West. Her attitude made 
the recruitment of new Arab members very problematic. It soon became evident for Turkey 
that to most Arab nationalists, the threat of Soviet imperialism appeared only as a new 
"colonialist" invention designed to distract their attention from the evil purposes of its 
inventors. The Baghdad Pact was similarly interpreted as a ruse to perpetuate the resented 
British military presence in the Middle East. Arab nationalists were also resentful of Turkey's 
taking sides in the past with Western colonial powers in the latters' disputes with the newly 
emerging Arab countries, as well as her cordial links with Israel. In the case of Syria, 
Turkey's task was made even harder due the bitter historic legacy of the Hatay dispute.
Turkey was confident in the correctness of her belief that the only way open to the Arabs 
to attain maximum security was through following the Turkish path. She judged that the 
survival and reinforcement of the Baghdad Pact were indispensable and was the most 
determined Middle Eastern pact-member to pursue that cause. To put a break on the process 
of expansion, thought the Turks, would only mean a regression and a loss. Turkey, therefore, 
reviewed her political agenda soon and made the isolation of Egypt a priority. She tried hard 
to persuade the American and British governments to support actively the idea of the future 
expansion of the pact's membership and take a tough line with those Arab countries that 
opposed its establishment and expansion. For a year beginning in mid-1955, Turkish 
diplomats were alone in suggesting regularly to their Western colleagues that no progress
*This vision was shared, initially at least, by Anthony Eden; see Eden, Full Circle, 220.
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could be made with the extension of the Baghdad Pact so long as Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir 
remained in control of Egypt. Since it had become apparent that only conservative forces in 
the Arab world had any interest in joining the pact eventually, the Democrat administration in 
1 1 Ankara, which had done so much to improve Turkey's economic infrastructure and broaden 
SI political participation in the country, thus curiously found itself allied with conservative 
'I regimes and such social forces in the Arab world which were the least interested in reforming 
their economy and/or society.
The extension of the pact, thought the Turkish leaders, should be an indispensable goal 
towards which the efforts of all Baghdad Pact members should lead while reserving the 
choice of time and methods to be adopted. Turkey herself did not shun the use of unorthodox 
measures, during the preparation of the abortive 1956 coup in Syria for example, if they 
promised to bring about any substantial change in the regional political climate. Menderes 
sympathised with Britain and France during the Suez crisis, approaching the latter solely from 
a political, and never a legal, viewpoint. He would have probably liked to see them persist 
with their intervention in Egypt until the total defeat of 'Abd al-Nasir. Turkey consistently 
urged Washington to prevent a complete satellisation of Syria and later pushed her Western 
partners to do everything possible in support of the pro-Westem Lebanese government in 
1958. She received Washington's decision to land forces in Lebanon with great satisfaction 
and permitted the American marines to use the Incirlik air-base during that operation. 
Moreover, she made an unambiguous request to Eisenhower to extend this military operation 
to restore Hashimite rule in Iraq, even threatening a little later to take unilateral military 
action herself in this respect.
Turkey moreover used every diplomatic channel available to convince the USA, too, to 
join the Baghdad Pact. She was convinced that Washington's accession would be crucial in 
encouraging at least some of the still hesitant Arab states to adhere to the pact as well, which, 
in turn, would correspondingly reduce Egypt's ability to oppose Western policies in the 
Middle East, Without full US membership, thought the Turkish leaders, conservative regimes 
like Jordan and Lebanon might even fall under pressure from radical anti-Western elements. 
Washington, that had indicated early on that it strongly supported the pact, refused to join the 
pact as a full-member, however, putting forward various pretexts. Actually, it assumed that 
pro-Westem powers in the Middle East were exaggerating the extent of Soviet influence 
there and believed that each of the pact's regional members only wanted to strengthen their 
position in regional disputes through the pact mechanism. It did not want to break its links 
with countries in the region who, for a variety of reasons, were unhappy with the pact. The 
USA gradually became a member of all the pact committees, was the largest contributor to its 
budget and supported each area member with significant military and economic aid. Her
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failure, however, to join the pact as a full-member and/or show unambiguous active 
involvement proved ultimately to be one of the pact's main weaknesses. The lack of NATO 
interest in establishing a liaison with the Baghdad Pact, a fact which McGhee considers to be 
one of the main reasons of the failure of the latter,^ should perhaps be also attributed to 
Washington's hesitant attitude.
It was perhaps fortunate, however, that both the Americans and the Soviets suspected 
that their respective friends in the region were purposefully over-dramatising events there in 
order to draw them deeper in Middle East politics. The reluctance of the two superpowers to 
risk any direct nuclear confrontation proved crucial in avoiding an all-out war in the area in 
the late 1950s.
The Iraqi leadership, on the other hand, was more interested in receiving economic and 
military aid from the West and in Western diplomatic support over Palestine, rather than with 
the prospect of the pact's expansion and US membership. Iraq was certainly not against the 
expansion of pact into the Arab heartland, but she seemed somehow to attach much less 
importance to it, preferring to capitalise on getting declarations of approval of her conduct 
from uncommitted Arab states and thus isolating Egypt. Nuri believed that a decisive stand 
on behalf of the Baghdad Pact toward the Arab cause in Palestine might induce his internal 
opponents and radical Arab governments to refrain from attacking the pact, and perhaps in 
one or two cases, encourage them to join it. The linking of the 1955 Anglo-Iraqi Special 
Agreement with the Turkish-Iraqi treaty re-enforced, however, the relationship in Arab eyes 
between the Baghdad Pact and previous "unequal" military alliances imposed by former 
colonial powers and made future Arab adherences to the pact extremely unlikely. Turkish and 
Iraqi views also diverged almost constantly on how to handle the Syrian situation and how to 
encourage pro-Westem elements there. The Turks advocated a stem approach, while the 
Iraqis, perhaps being more aware of the intricacies of intra-Arab politics, preferred to adopt a 
relatively subtler line.
Turkey, nevertheless, was determined to play up the importance of the Baghdad Pact, and 
since Turkish-Iraqi co-operation was the cornerstone of that alliance, the provision of firm 
support for Nuri's government became very important for Menderes. He soon realised that 
the continuing friendship with Iraq was based almost entirely on Nuri's firmness and 
recognised that the alliance might come to a halt overnight if Nuri died, was assassinated or 
toppled. After being badly shaken by 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi's behaviour in the summer of 
1957 and being also unhappy with 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, Menderes pushed the Iraqi Palace 
hard in late 1957 and early 1958 to have Nuri reinstated as premier.
■^McGhee, Connection, 160.
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The change in Turkey's position toward the Palestine question was also motivated by her 
desire to strengthen Nuri's position. The Turks were initially determined that the proposed 
rapprochement with the Arab world must not involve any change in Turkey's policy of 
friendship with Israel Menderes believed that the Arab countries should, and inevitably 
would, acknowledge the reality of the existence of Israel and then a solution could be found 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict according to the existing realities. He argued that the exchanged 
letters on Palestine during the formulation of the Baghdad Pact were a reasonable price to 
pay in return for the gains to be made by the establishment of the pact, which, he hoped, 
would ultimately turn Arab eyes away from Israel into the "real" enemy, Moscow. Israeli 
diplomats, however, were never convinced by this argument and rightly feared that, on the 
contrary, the Arabs would influence Turkey away from her friendship with Israel. Indeed, 
there was a noticeable shift in the following four years in the Turkish attitude towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. With Nmi failing to make the pact popular outside his immediate circle, 
Menderes adopted a new, more committed attitude vis-a-vis the Palestine question thus 
hoping to secure the pact's survival. Turkey gradually distanced herself from Israel and tried 
to appear, at least in public, as a champion of Ar ab rights in Palestine, hi 1956, she lowered 
the level of her diplomatic representation in Tel-Aviv and a year later came veiy close to 
breaking all diplomatic links with Israel.
Turkey, for all these efforts, however, had in the end little to show in the way of tangible 
political gains. Bayar frankly acknowledged to Dulles on 26 January 1958 that since the 
latter's last visit to the Middle East in May 1953 "there had been a marked deterioration of 
the situation in the area".^ Turkey had failed to make any new friends among the anti- 
Western forces in the region. The tensions between Turkey and Syria had given the USSR an 
opportunity to make inroads in the Arab East. Egypt had taken control fust of Syria's foreign 
policy and then practically of the whole country. Turkish leaders, however, did not think that 
they themselves were solely responsible for the failure of their policy. Menderes confided to 
Anthony Nutting early in 1957 that "America's performance since the Baghdad Pact was 
signed in 1955 had done nothing but confuse and depress our best friends in the Arab and 
Moslem world".4 The limited change in Turkish foreign policy toward Egypt after the Suez 
war and Turkey's wish to avoid a position of strong opposition to the formation of the UAR 
could be explained, therefore, as an attempt by Ankara to devise an alternative policy vis-a- 
vis radical, but non-Communist Arab nationalism This new policy was initially developed 
somewhat independently of Washington. It was based on the hope that the growth 'Abd al- 
Nasir's influence in the region could "improve" the internal situation in Syria to the benefit of
SFRUS1958-1960, X, Part 2, 739.
^Nutting, Myself, 34-35.
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Turkey and keep the Syrians away from the USSR. Turkey's initiative to secretly restore 
cordial relations with Israel early in 1958 can also he judged as an attempt to devise an 
alternative policy to her commitment to the Baghdad Pact. But these policies remained for 
the most part hesitant and inconsistent. In public, Turkey remained attached to her alliance 
with Iraq; delayed the official recognition of the UAR in deference to Iraqi wishes; and 
strongly supported the AU during its brief existence. Turkish diplomats admitted privately 
that even if the advance of communism had been checked as a result of the Syrian-Egyptian 
merger, the UAR would still militate against the interests of pro-Westem Middle Eastern 
countries. They dismissed any lingering hopes that it might still be possible to win Egypt over 
with offers of economic help, for, they thought, Abd al-Nasir wanted to gain control of 
oilfields in Saudi Arabia and, possibly, Iraq, aims, which went beyond what the West could 
offer and could be gained only at the West's expense.
The July 14 revolution in Iraq, therefore, coincided with a juncture, when despite the 
continuing unequivocal pro-Iraqi stand of the Menderes government, there were already 
signs, albeit yet very dim, that doubts had arisen within the Turkish establishment about the 
long-term viability of Turkey's regional alignment with Nuri's regime. Besides being a short­
term setback for Turkish policy in the Arab world, the Iraqi revolution actually helped Turkey 
to solve, in the long-run, the dilemma of being both strongly committed to NATO and 
wanting to be seen, simultaneously, as a friend of the whole Arab world. The loss of Iraq, 
together with her key passes through the Zagros, the essential lines of communication from 
the Gulf to the Elburz and Zagros mountains and her vital air bases, doomed the potential 
effectiveness of the "Northern Tier" concept for defence of the Middle East as envisaged by 
military planners of the Baghdad Pact. For Turkey and her other allies, however, Iraq's 
continued association with the pact had already become politically untenable. Dulles, for 
example, opined that "the Iraqi Government fell because Iraq was in unnatural association 
with Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Baghdad Pact".^ Even if the coup had not taken 
place, wrote Zeki Kuneralp in retrospect, Iraq would have left the pact sooner or later,6
Indeed, Turkey’s links with the Arab world in general steadily improved in the 1960s and 
after as Turkey gradually developed a new general policy, more limited in its aims, yet 
ultimately much more successful in accomplishing its set goals, based on the principle of non­
interference in inter-Arab affairs and on improvement of bilateral ties. Consequently, Turkey 
also began to support publicly the political rights of Palestinian Arabs, in return for seeking 
Arab backing over the Cyprus issue. The first tentative steps of this new policy were taken
 ^Aston, "Highjacking", 136. 
^Kuneralp, Sadece, 97.
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during the military regime of 1960-61, hut the policy was first pursued vigorously during the 
premiership of Suleyman Demirel, considered a disciple of Menderes.
But could things have gone better for Turkey in the 1950s? Probably yes, if only Bayar 
and Menderes had been of somewhat different character. It can be safely argued now that 
they and then trusted lieutenants were generally ignorant at the time about the latest 
developments in the Arab world and found it extremely hard to understand and explain them 
The foreign-policy making apparatus in Turkey was centralised. Menderes, according to one 
of his biographers, had inherited from Ottoman times a belief that he and Turkey were 
destined to play a leading role in a new Middle East.? He was an extremely overconfident 
politician and had the habit of disregarding advice coming from the lower echelons if it 
contradicted his own convictions and perceptions. He faced no internal pressures as regards 
Turkey's relations with Arab states, his party enjoying a large majority in the GNA and having 
to deal with a local public opinion, which did not harbour in general any sympathy towards 
'Abd al-Nasir and his brand of radical Arab nationalism. All these factors made Menderes feel 
secure that he could guide the Arab world toward the path he desired as he used to do in 
internal Turkish politics, and he showed an unfortunate lack of imagination when things did 
not turn out the way he desired.
The opposition RPP did eventually raise doubts in public about the viability of Menderes's 
policies towards the Arab world and some of the alternatives it suggested might have been 
instrumental in shaping Turkish foreign policy in the next decade. There were already 
unmistakable signs at the time, however, of a not so negligible dichotomy between the senior 
and some of the relatively junior civil servants in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The Turkish 
Minister in Damascus, Adnan Rural, for example, consistently argued that the Syrians should 
be let to manage their* own affairs and thought that a modus vivendi could eventually be 
reached between the pro-Westem forces in the Middle East and followers of the radical 
nationalist Ba'th Party. He felt, however, that there was nobody in Ankara ready to listen to 
him, and it was only as a result of the limited rapprochement with Egypt after 1957, that his 
views did finally find some attentive ears in Turkey. There are moreover indications that 
some of the career diplomats within the Turkish Foreign Ministry had views different from 
Menderes and Zorlu on how to treat the UAR and AU. A careful study plotting the trajectoiy 
of the development of this alternative approach will certainly be most useful, but it may prove 
elusive until full access is accorded to all interested historians to the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
archives.
^Aydemir, Menderes'in Drami, 300.
245
Appendix: Biographical Notes on Some of the Prominent 
Personalities Appearing in the Dissertation___________
These biographical notes make no claim to be exhaustive and fully comprehensive. Details 
o f the lives and actions o f many o f the major figures referred to in the thesis, such as Adrian 
Menderes, Gamal ’Abd al-Nasir or John Foster Dulles, have already been described in 
many books and are usually found in standard encyclopaedias. They have, therefore, been 
omitted here. The purpose o f the list is, rather, to provide brief biographical details o f those 
individuals who are less well known but who-as the thesis has shown-had an important role 
to play in the events which have been discussed. In some cases it has not been possible to 
provide the date o f an individual's decease.
Al-'Asali, Sabri
Bom in Damascus in 1903. Received a law degree on the eve of the 1925 insurrection against 
the French, in which he took part. Practised as a lawyer in the late 1920s and 1930s. Was the 
Secretary-General of the League of National Action in the early 1930s. Joined the National 
Bloc in 1936. Sided with the Vichy in 1940-41 and was interned by the Allies on their 
invasion of Syria in 1941. Elected to Parliament in 1943. Became the Secretary-General of 
the National Party. Was Minister of the Interior (1948) and Prime Minister in 1954, 1955 and 
1956-58. Appointed Vice-President of the UAR in 1958, but resigned after a few months 
when his clandestine links with the Iraqi monarchy in the early 1950s became public as a 
result of the post-revolutionary trials of the leaders of the deposed regime in Baghdad. 
Arrested for political reasons by the Syrian authorities in July 1966.
Al-Ayyubi, 'Ali Jawdat
Bom in Mosul in 1885 or 1886. Educated at Istanbul Military College (1903-6). Deserted the 
Ottoman army in 1915 during World War I and later served in Faysal's Arab army. During 
and immediately after the latter's brief reign in Syria, became Governor of Aleppo (1919) and 
Director-General for Security. Returned to Iraq with Faysal in 1921 and held between 1921 
and 1930 a number of governorships in al-Hillah, al-Karbala1, al-Muntafiq, Diyali and Basra. 
Minister of the Interior (1923-24), Finance (1930-33) and Foreign Affairs (1939-41). Chief 
of the Royal Diwan and private secretary to Ring Ghazi I (1933). Prime Minister on three
occasions (1934-35, 1949-50, 1957) and President of the Chamber of Deputies (1935). 
Represented Iraq in Britain (1935-37), France (1937-38) and was Iraq's first ambassador in 
the USA (1942-48). Died in Beirut in 1969.
AJ-’Azm, Khalid
Bom in 1900. A western-educated businessman and large landowner and the descendant of a 
family that governed Damascus in the eighteenth century. Never joined the National Bloc 
during the French mandate. Was director of the National Cement Factory in the 1930s. Held 
the office of Syrian Prime Minister during the Vichy rule, when he was also nominally "Head 
of State" (1941); during the presidency of al-Quwatli (1948-49) and twice under al-Shishakli 
(1949-50 and 1951), when he refused Point Four aid and broke off Syria's customs union 
with Lebanon. In addition, was Minister of Finance in 1949; of Foreign Affairs, in 1955; of 
State in 1956-58; and Defence, in 1957-58. Opposed the formation of the UAR and held 
aloof from politics throughout the the latter’s three-and-a-half year existence. Re-elected a 
deputy in 1961 and was Prime Minister again in 1962-63. Evaded arrest during the 1963 
Ba'thist coup in Syria by seeking refuge in the Turkish embassy. Lived his last days in Beirut, 
where he died in 1965.
Baban, Ahmad Mukhtar
Bom in Baghdad in 1900. A lawyer by profession. Taught in the Law Faculty of the 
University of Baghdad and was a magistrate. Held governorships in Mosul (1926), al-Kut 
(1928) and al-Karbala' (1941). Held various ministerial posts in Iraqi cabinets: social affairs, 
in 1942 and 1946; communications and public works, in 1942; justice, in 1943-44 and 1953; 
defence, in 1955-57; and education, in 1957. Chief of the Royal Diwan in 1946 and 1953. 
Was Vice-Premier in 1954-55 and briefly held the office of Prime Minister in 1958. 
Sentenced to death by the revolutionary military court in 1958, he was pardonned and set 
free in 1961. Lived thereafter in Lebanon, but returned to Baghdad in 1975. Died when 
undergoing medical treatment in Bonn, West Germany, in 1975.
Birgi, Muharrem Nuri
Bom in Istanbul in 1908. Educated at the Galatasaray Lyceum; the School of Political 
Science in Paris; and the Faculty of Law in the University of Geneva. Began his diplomatic 
career in 1932. Served in Turkish embassies in Warsaw, Paris (under the Vichy government) 
and Madrid. Within the Foreign Ministry, successively occupied the positions of head of Co­
ordination, Consular, First and Second Political Departments. Appointed Deputy Secretary-
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General in 1953 and Secretary-General in October 1954. Ambassador in London in 1957-60. 
Permanent Representative to NATO in 1960-72.
Al-Bizri, Major-General 'Afif
Bom in Sidon (Lebanon) in 1914. Joined the Syrian army in 1937. Is said to have come under 
Marxist influence during his student days in Paris. Fought in the 1948 war against Israel and 
earned a reputation for gallantry. Joined in the mid-fifties an influential group of army officers 
which together with the Ba'th was largely instrumental in giving a radical orientation to 
Syrian politics. Presided over the military comt trying the accused in the "Iraqi" plot of 1956. 
Led the Syrian military team, in January 1958, to negotiate union with Egypt. Appointed 
Commander of the Syrian wing of the UAR army, now called the First Army. Soon resented 
Cano's overriding control on postings and transfers and resigned in protest. Accepted, 
however, an assignment connected with economic planning carrying a minister's salary. Lived 
in Iraq during the Qasim era. Reappeared on the political scene, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war, as a spokesman of national Marxism. Died in 1993.
Bowker, Sir* Reginald James
Bom 1901. Educated at Charterhouse and Oriel College, Oxford. Entered the British Foreign 
Office in 1925. Served as a diplomat in Paris, Berlin, Ankara (1933-36), Oslo, Madrid and 
Cairo. Was UK High Commissioner (later Ambassador) in Burma (1947-50); Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State at the FO (1950-54); and, finally, Ambassador in Ankara (1954-58) 
and Vienna (1958-61). Retired in 1961. Died in 1983.
Eralp, Orhan
Bom in Izmir in 1915. Educated in Robert College, Istanbul and received his Ph.D. from the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. Served in the Turkish ah force in the 
early 1940s. Joined the Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1942. Was Turkey's delegate at the UN 
Conciliation Commission on Palestine (1949-51) and a counsellor in London (1952). 
Director- General of the Second Department of the Foreign Ministry in 1953-57. Ambassador 
in Stockholm (1956-59) and Belgrade (1959-64). Permanent Representative at the UN 
(1964-69). Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry (1969-71). Permanent Representative 
at NATO (1969-72). Ambassador in Paris (1972-76). Permanent Representative at the UN 
again (1964-69). Retired in 1980. Died in 1994.
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Esenbel, Rauf Melih
Bom in Istanbul in 1915. Graduated from the Galatasaray Lyceum and the Faculty of Law at 
Istanbul University. Entered the Foreign Ministry in 1936. Served in the Turkish embassies in 
Paris (1939-43) and Washington (1945-52). Director-General of International Economic 
relations, 1952-54. Was assistant to Birgi and Secretary-General for Economic Co- 
operataion in 1954-57. Secretary-General of Foreign Ministry in 1957-60. Ambassador in 
Washington (1960 and 1967-79) and Tokyo (1963-66). Foreign Minister, 1974-75.
Esin, Seyfullah
Bom hi 1902. Educated at the School of Political Sciences, Berlin and George Washington 
University. Entered the Turkish diplomatic service in 1925. Served in Athens, Palermo, 
Berlin, Washington, DC, Buenos Aires, Tokyo and Stockholm Director-General of the 
International Organisations and Political Affairs Departments in the Foreign Ministry in 1945 
and 1946 respectively. Represented Turkey in Israel (1949), Austria (1952), the USSR 
(1954-56), the Federal Republic of Germany (1956-57) and the UAR (from November 
1960). Turkey's Permanent Representative at the UN (1957-60).
Gallman, Waldemar John
Bom in 1889. Educated in Cornell University and Georgetown Law School. Briefly 
instructed at Cornell University in 1921-22. Joined the US diplomatic service in 1922. Served 
in Habana, San Jose, Quito, Riga, Warsaw and Danzig. Minister to London (1945). 
Ambassador to Poland (1948), the Union of South Africa (1951) and Iraq (1954). Retired 
from the State Department in 1961 and immediately became a member of faculty at the 
Graduate School, Georgetown University.
Gardener, Sir Alfred John
Bom in 1897. Served in World War I. Posted to a number of British consular offices in the 
Middle East and North Africa between 1920 and 1944, including Damascus (1940-43). UK 
ambassador in Kabul (1949-53) and Damascus (1953-56). Retired from diplomatic service in 
March 1957. Died in 1985.
Al-Ghazzi, Sa'id
Educated in the Law Institute of Constantinople, Beirut and Damascus. Practised as a 
banister in 1919-27 and 1939-42. Elected deputy to the Syrian Constitutent Assembly in 
1928. Re-elected as a deputy in 1943 and 1947. Minister of Justice (1936, 1945 and 1948) 
and Finance (1946-48). Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in 1954. Prime Minister
again and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1955-56. Speaker of the Syrian Parliament in 1962- 
63. Disappeared from the active political scene after the 1963 Ba'thist conp in Syria.
Henderson, Loy Wesley
Bom in 1892. Educated at Northwestern University and Denver University Law School. 
Joined the State Department in 1920. A career US diplomat, and initially an expert on the 
USSR and Eastern Europe. After 1943, dealt largely with Middle Eastern matters. Headed 
the American legation in Baghdad in 1943-45. As Director of Near Eastern Affairs at the 
State Department in 1945-48, his role was pivotal during the formulation of the Truman 
Doctrine. US Ambassador to India and Nepal (1948-51) and in Tehran (1951-54), where 
helped to engineer the 1953 coup against Musaddiq and later worked hard to reach a new oil 
agreement with Iran in 1954. Under-Secretary State for Administration in 1954-61. Left the 
diplomatic service to become Director of Center for Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the 
American University (1961-68) and President of the Washington Institute for Foreign Affairs 
(1961-73).
Al-Jamali, Hr. Muhammad Fadil
Bom in al-Kazimiyyah in 1903. Studied in Baghdad to become an elementary school teacher. 
Taught for four years in a Baghdad elementary school prior to his studies at the American 
University of Beirut, from which he graduated in 1927. After briefly teaching at the Teachers 
Training College of Baghdad (1928), went to the USA in 1929 and received his M.A. and 
Ph.D. from the Teachers College, Columbia University in 1930 and 1932 respectively. 
Worked in the Iraqi Ministry of Education between 1932-1942. Appointed Director-General 
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and promoted to the rank of Minister in 1944. Member of the 
Iraqi Parliament and later President of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies. Iraqi Minister to Egypt 
(1949) and Permanent Representative to the UN (1950). Became cabinet member on several 
occasions and Prime Minister in 1954. Imprisoned in 1958-61 by the revolutionary regime in 
Iraq. Currently lives in Tunisia.
Al-Khuri, Far is
A Protestant Christian lawyer, bom in 1873. Educated in the American University of Behut. 
Deputy in the Ottoman Empire in 1914-18. Professor of Law in the University of Damascus 
in 1919-40. Minister of Finance (1920) and Education (1926). Joined the nationalist People's 
Party of Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar in 1925. President of the Syrian Parliament in 1936- 
39, 1943, 1946 and 1947-49. Prime Minister in 1944-45 and 1954-55. Led the Syrian 
delegation to the UN on various occasions. Died in 1962,
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Kuneralp, Zeki
Bora iu Istanbul in 1914. Lived most of his formative years away from Turkey. Graduated as 
lawyer from the University of Berne. Entered diplomatic service in 1940, after having 
accomplished his military service. Served in the Turkish embassies in Bucharest, Prague and 
Paris. Assistant Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in 1957-60 and Secretary-General 
in 1960 and 1966-69. Ambassador in Berne (Sept. 1960), London (1964-66 and 1969-72) 
and Madrid (1972-79). Retired in 1979.
Kural, Adnan
Bom in 1910. Educated in Ankara University. Entered the Turkish diplomatic service in 
1935. Served in Rome, Moscow and at the UN. Minister to Syria (1955-58). Ambassador to 
Greece (1958-60), Switzerland (1964-65), Italy (1965-66) and Spain (from 1967). Turkey’s 
Permanent Representative at the UN in 1962-64.
Menderes, Ethem
Bora in Izmir in 1899. Graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Ankara. Was 
member of the executive council of Aydrn Province (1933-38) and mayor of the city of Aydin 
(1938-45). Sat as member of the GNA for Aydin (1950-57) and Afyonkarahisar (1957-60). 
Held a number of ministerial portfolios, like Internal Affairs (1954), Defence and Public 
Works (1957-60). His tenure as acting Foreign Minister in 1956-57 was short-lived and 
mostly ineffectual. Detained in Yassiada after the May 1960 coup. Was released from prison 
in 1966.
Mirjan, ’Abd al-Wahhab
A rich Shiite landowner from al-Hillah, bom in 1907. Graduated form the Baghdad Law 
College iu 1933. A member from al-Hillah of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies between 1947 
and 1958. Was Speaker of the Chamber in 1948-50, 1951-52, 1953-57 and 1958. Minister of 
the Economy in 1948; Communication and Public Works, 1950, 1953 and 1957; Finance, 
1950; and Agriculture, 1954. Prime Minister in 1957-58. Was briefly imprisoned after the 
1958 revolution. Died in Baghdad in 1964.
Moose, James
Bom in 1903. Educated in the Kentucky Military Institute, University of Missouri, National 
University of Mexico and in Ecole Nationale des Langues Vivantes in Paris. Served in US 
diplomatic missions in Salonika, Paris, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus and Jeddah. Minister to 
Saudi Arabia (1943-44); Ambassador to Syria (1952-57) and Sudan (from 1958).
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Riyad, Mahmud
Bom in 1917. Studied and then taught in the Military College. Graduated from Military Staff 
College in 1943. A military man, was appointed head of Egyptian military intelligence office 
in Gaza during the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war and was involved in early negotiations with the 
Israelis. Entered politics after the 1952 revolution. Head of the Directorate of Arab Affairs in 
the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in 1954-55. Served as ambassador to Syria in 1955-58. He 
later became presidential adviser on foreign affairs (1958-62); permanent representative to 
the UN (1962); Foreign Minister (1964-72); and Secretary-General of the Arab League 
(1972-79). Died in 1992.
Salim, Major Salah al-Din
Bom in 1920. Graduated from the Military College in 1939. Participated in the 1952 
revolution in Egypt. Became Minister for National Guidance and Minister of State for Sudan 
Affairs in 1954-55 and editor of the daily, cd-Sha'b, in 1955-56. Dismissed after the Suez 
war. Later fell ill and died in 1962.
Al-Sarraj, Col. 'Abd al-Hamid
Entered the Military Academy in 1947, but did not get an opportunity to fight in the Arab- 
Israeli war* of 1948. Advanced his military training in France in 1952 and was Assistant Syrian 
Military Attache there in 1954. Chief of Army Intelligence in 1954-58. Held very influential 
positions in the Syrian region of the UAR in 1958-61. Detained in October 1961 in the 
aftermath of Syria's secession from the UAR Fled to Egypt in May 1962.
Shuqayr, Gen. Shawkat
Bom in Lebanon in 1912. Entered military service in Syria. Graduated from the French 
military staff college. Appointed Syrian Army COS in 1953. Resigned that post in 1956 and 
returned to his village, al-Qar'awn (Lebanon). Died in Lebanon in 1982.
Soysal, Ismail
Turkish Charge d'Affaires in Damascus in 1953-55. General-Director of Information at the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1958-59. Ambassador to Algiers (1965) and Lisbon (1983). He 
is currently the director of the Institute of Middle Eastern and Balkan Studies in Istanbul.
Troutbeck, Sir John Monro
Bom 1894. Eductaed at Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford. Entered the British FO in 
1920. Served in Istanbul (1927-30), Addis Ababa, Rio de Janeiro and Prague; Assistant
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Uuder-Secretary of State, FO (1946-47); Head of BMEO, Cairo (1947-50); and, finally, 
Ambassador in Baghdad (1951-54). Retired in 1955. Died in 1971.
Warren, Fletcher
Bom in 1896. Educated in the University of Texas. Served as a US diplomat in Havana, 
Baranquilla, Budapest, Managua, Riga and Bogota. US ambassador in Nicaragua (1945-47), 
Paraguay (1947-50), Venezuela (1951-56) and Turkey (1956-60).
Wright, Sir Michael Robert
Bom 1901. Educated at Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered the British FO in 
1926. Seived at Washington, Paris, Cairo (1940-43); Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FO 
(1947-51); Ambassador in Oslo (1951-55) and Baghdad (1955-58); and, finally, Head of the 
Permanent UK Delegation on Disarmament and Nucear Tests in Geneva from 1960. Retired 
in 1964. Died in 1976.
Zorlu, Fatin Ru$tii
Bom in Istanbul in 1910. A scion of a distinguished Turkish family, and later the son-in-law 
of the former Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rii^tii Aras. Studied in the Faculty of Political 
Science in Paris and in the Faculty of Law in Geneva before entering the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1932. Specialising in economic subjects, was head of the department dealing with 
commercial negotiations in 1937 and headed the Turkish permanent delegation to the League 
of Nations in 1938. After appointments in Paris and Moscow, became the head of the 
Economic Section of the Ministry in 1946 and was promoted to Assistant Secretary-General 
in 1950. In the spring of 1952, was appointed permanent Turkish representative on the North 
Atlantic Council with the rank of Ambassador. A deputy in the GNA in 1954-60. Minister of 
State and Deputy Prime Minister in general supervision of all economic, OEEC and NATO 
affairs (1954-55) and of Foreign Affairs (1957-60). Was Menderes's right-hand man and 
related to him by marriage. Their wives were first cousins. Hanged in 1961 in the aftermath 
of the Yassiada trials.
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